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IN  this volume we  resume the study of  the development  of 
political  theory  in  its immediate  relation  to  the historical 
events and conditions of  the Middle Ages at the point where 
we left it in the first volume.  I venture to hope that historical 
scholars will agree that it has proved to be of  real service to 
deal  with  the political  ideas inherent in  feudalism  in  close 
relation  to this development. 
I should wish to express once again my  obligations to the 
admirable work of  Mr  R. L. Poole, the most learned of  English 
students  of  the  Middle  Ages,  who  more  than  thirty  yeers 
ago, in his ' Illustrations of  Mediaeval Thought,' pointed out 
the great significance of  the position  of  Manegold and John 
of Salisbury in the development of  mediaeval political theory. 
The  detailed  study  of  the political  literature of  their tinies 
has  only  served  to bring  out  more  clearly  the justice  and 
insight  of  his recognition  of  their  place and importance. 
As  this work advances I become more and more conscious 
of the difficulty of  handling such large and diverse materials, 
and I am therefore very grateful to those scholars who have 
been  so kind as to help  me  with  their technical  knowledge 
of  particular  aspects of  the literature ; and I wish  therefore viii  PREFACE. 
to express my  most  sincere thanks to Miss  Pope of  So~ner- 
ville  College,  who  has  very  kindly  examined  all  the refer- 
ences  to  Mediaeval  French  writers,  to Professor  Meynial  of 
Paris, and Mr  E. Barker of  New  College, who have read the 
proofs  of  Part I., and to  Mr  F.  Urquhart  of  Balliol,  who 
has  read  the proofs  of  Part 11. 
The printed texts of  Bracton are obviously very defective, 
and I have used the text of  the Bodleian MSS.,  Digby, 222. 
Professor  Woodbine,  in  the  first  volu~ne  of  his  edition  of 
Bracton,  has  indeed  thrown  some  doubt  upon  Maitlmd's 
judgment  of  the value  of  this text,  but I have  thought  it 
best in the meanwhile, pending  the appearance of  Professor 
Woodbine's text, to use it.  I am under  great obligation to 
Mr  G.  C.  Winstedt  of  Magdalen  College  and the Bodleian 
Library for furnishing  me  with its readings throughout. 
A. J. CARLYLE. 
OXFORD,  1915. 
In this edition the text of  Bracton is given as in Professor 
Woodbine's  edition, so  far as it has  been  published,  and I 
give the reference to the folios, but I have also retained the 
reference to Books and chapters, as these may be convenient. 
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IN  the last volume we endeavoured to determine the nature of 
the influence of  the ancient world on the political theory of the 
Middle Ages,  as it is represented in the systems of  medieval 
Roman  and Canon  law.  It  seemed  well  to consider  these 
elements of  mediaval theory first, because in order to appreciate 
rightly the nature or characteristic developments  of  political 
thought, we must first consider carefully how much had been 
inherited from the ancient  world,  and also because  with the 
help of  these more or less systematic works we can distinguish 
more easily between the normal opinions of  men and abnormal 
or eccentric views. 
We  must now fnco the task of  trying to determine  what 
were the characteristic political theories of  those centuries of 
the Middle  Ages  during  which  all ideas  were  in a  state of 
ferment, during which nothing was  fixed or systematic, but 
every day as it brought new conditions so also it brought new 
theories, new ideas, often in such bewildering abundance as to 
make it difficult to estimate their value. 
We  turn in  this  volume  first  to the consideration  of  the 
characteristic  conceptions of  feudalism and their influence on 
the development of  political ideas, and we have found that in 
Order  to doal with  this effectively  we  must  carry our study 
down to the e~ld  of  the thirteenth  century.  For the rest we 
deal with the political theory as illu~trsted  in general literature 
Only to the end of  the twelfth century, for in tho thirteenth 
'"tur3'  the great schoolmen began to  reduce the world of  ideaa 
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and theories to a  systematic form.  The work of  these great 
systematic  thinkers was indeed often admirable and enlightened, 
and we propose in later volumes to deal with this, but there has 
been in our judgment some tendency to  misunderstand mediaeval 
thought, because it ha,s been  studied too exclusively in these 
systematic writers.  There has been a tendency to conceive of 
it as representing  a  completely  articulated  system  of  fixed 
principles  and logical  deductions from  tllem.  Tllis  is true, 
strictly speaking, only of  the Lhirteenth century, and even then 
only of  the great schoolmen.  The literature of  the centuries 
from  the tenth  to the  twelfth  century  represents  no  such 
systematic n~ode  of  thought ; the men of  these times had indeed 
in the writings of the Christian Fathers a great body of theories 
and  principles which had a constant influence upon them, while 
their habit of  life and feeling was grounded in the traditions 
of  the new Teutonic societies, but in neither of  these had they 
an ordered  and articulated  system of  political  thought,  but 
rather a body of  principles, significant indeed a,nd  profound, but 
not always easily to be reconciled with each other.  The history 
of  the social and political ideas of  these centuries is the history 
of  the continual discovery of  the relation of  the traditions and 
principles which men had inherited to the actual circulnstances 
of  the time. 
Our main difficulty in handling the matter is due not to the 
want of  materials, for there is almost an over-abundance of 
these, but rather to the variety and complexity of  the materials, 
and to the difficulty necessarily inherent in the attempt to set 
out in some systematic terms the conceptions of  men who were 
not systematic thinkers, while they were acting and thinking 
energetically and often audaciously.  And if  the materials are 
abundant, the political ideas themselves arc somewhat bewilder- 
ing  in their conlplexity.  It has sometimes been thougl~t  that  the 
political theory of  the Middle Ages was simple and  clear, because 
it was  dominated  by the principle of  the unity of  the world 
under the supremacy of  the spiritu:d  power.  But the real truth 
is very different.  We do not doubt that these conceptions had 
:L  real importance, but there were other aspects of  the theory of 
society which were at least equally important, and which Were 
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more  permanent  in  their  imp0rhINe.  We  cannot  rightly 
apprehend the character of mediaeval civilisation if  we conceive 
of it as something isolated from the continuous movement of 
Western life, for indeed as it was in a large measure founded 
upon the civilisation of the ancient world, so also it contahed 
the elements of  the modern. 
Let us try to sum up briefly  the general characteristics of 
the  ideas  with  which  the men  of  the Middle  Agcs 
set out. 
~t is evident to any student of  the political thought of  the 
Middle Ages that it  was immensely influenced by the traditions 
of the Christian Fathers-it  is from them that it directly and 
inlmediately  derived  the forms under which  it expressed its 
own  conceptions.  The formal political  theory of  the Middle 
Ages is dominated by the contrast between  nature and con- 
vention ; to the Fathers and to the great majority of  mediaeval 
writers,  until  St Thomas  Acluinas  and the recovery  of  the 
Aristotelian Politics,  all the great institutions of  society are 
conventional  and not  natural.  Men  are:  in  this  view,  by 
nature free and equal, and possess the world and the things in 
it in  common,  while  coercive  government  and  slavery  and 
private  property  are  conventional  institutions  which  were 
devised to correct the vices of  human nature when it lost its 
first innocence.  These great formal conceptions indeed control 
the terms of  political theory until the end of  the eighteenth 
century, until Rousseau and I3urke and the beginnings of  the 
nlodern historical  method.  In the first volume of  this work 
we have endeavoured to set out in detail the characteristics of 
this  mode of  thought, and we  can here only refer the readers 
to this. 
If, however,  we  are rightly to appreciate the relations  of 
mediaeval thought to that of  the ancient world,  we  must re- 
member that although these theories came to the Middle Ages 
1lrimarily througll  the Christian  Fatliers,  they were not dis- 
tinctively Christian conceptions, but rather the commonpliices of 
Lhe  later philosophical  schools, and the Fathers learned them 
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forms of  the political theory of  the Middle Ages represent there- 
fore an inheritance  from  the Stoics  and other philosophical 
schools of  the Empire. 
We  must  consider  a  little  more  closely  the character  of 
these theories.  To the Stoics and the Christian  Fathers the 
institutions of  society were conventional, not natural, and they 
understood the natural as being in the first place the primitive. 
Rut thenatural was to  them something more than the primitive, 
it  represented something  which wa S also essential and  permanent. 
It was  necessary  for the due order of  human life that men 
should rule over each other, and the Fathers added to this the 
conception  that in some sense  slavery was  a  punishment  as 
well as a remedy for human vice.  But both philosophers and 
Fathers maintained that the freedom and equality of  human 
nature continued to be real.  Their conception of  human nature 
was  radically  distinct from that which is represented by the 
Aristotelian  philosophy.  To them there was no such thing as 
a naturally servile person, for the soul of man was always free. 
This principle is indeed the exact reverse of  that of  Aristotle. 
He found the ground and justification  of  slavery in his judg- 
ment that only some men were in the full sense rational and 
capable of  virtue,  while  others were  not properly  and fully 
possessed of  reason,  and could not therefore in the strict and 
complete sense  of  the word  possess  virtue.  Whatever  may 
have been the foundation of  this judgment, the judgment had 
disappeared before the Christian era, and  Cicero had in a famous 
passage,  summing up the philosophical judgment  of  his time, 
repudiated it  in the strongest terms.l  Seneca, a hundred years 
later, repeats the judgment  in a  memorable  phrase.  Men's 
bodies,  he says,  may be  enslaved,  the mind is free.2  These 
principles  are also those  of  the Christian  faith.  To St Paul 
slavery is a merely external and accidental condition, the slave 
is just  as capable of  the highest  life,  the life of  communion 
with God, as the freeman.  His great words, "  There can be 
neither Jew nor  Greek,  there can be neither  bond nor free, 
there can be no male and female : for ye are all one in Christ 
1  Cf.  vol. i. p.  8 ; Cicero, '  De Legi-  Cf.  vol.  i.  p.  21 ;  Seneca,  '  L)e 
bus,' i. 10,  12.  Beneficiis,' iii. 20. 
J~~~~,"  represent the principle  of  all Christian writers.l  We 
have in the first volume pointed out how emphatically these 
are restated in the literature of the ninth ~entury,~ 
and in the second volume how they are repeated by the Roman 
jurists and the Canonists of  the Middle Ages.3 
~t  is not, however, only slavery which was held to be con- 
ventional, the same thing applies also to private property.  In 
the  and innocent conditions of  human life there was 
no such thing as privat'e property, but all tl~ings  were common. 
private property is the result of  man's greed and avarice, and 
is justified  only as a limitation  of  this.  Private property is 
indeed lawful, but it is the creation of  the State, and is deter- 
mined and limited by its authority ; and while the  institution is 
lawful under the sinful conditions of  human nature, the good 
things  which  God  has  given  men  through  nature  are  still 
intended for the use  of  all.  When the rich  man assists the 
poor he is doing an act of justice, not of  charity." 
The institution of government is also conventional, and not 
natural.  To the Stoics and the Fathers the coercive control of 
nlan by man is not an institution of  nature.  By nature men, 
being free and equal, were under no system of coercive control. 
Like slavery, the introduction of  this was the result of  the loss 
of  man's original innocence, and represented the need of  some 
power which might control and limit the unreasonable passions 
and appetites of human nature.  This was the doctrine of  the 
.Christian Fathers, but it was also the doctrine of  the Stoics as 
represented  by  Sene~a,~  and it is impossible to understand 
the rnedizval theories of  government if  we forget this.  It was 
not till Aristotle's Politics were rediscovered in the thirteenth 
century that  St  Thomas Aquinas under their influence recognised 
that the State was not merely an institution devised to correct 
men's vices, but rather the necessa~ry  form of  a real and full 
humall life.= The formal conceptions of  the Middle Ages were, 
l1o\~uver,  on  this point  liltlc :eSCected  by  St  Thomas.  It is 
Cf. Gal. iii. 28 ; vol. i. p. 84 ; and  Part I.  chap. 5 ; Part 11. chap. 0. 
PE' 111.124.  Wf. vol. i. pp. 23, 24,  125-131. 
Cf. vol.  i.  pp, lyy.aoy.  Cf.  St  Thornas  Aquinas,  '  De 
W  vol. ii. pp. 34-40, 117.135.  Regimirle  I'rin~i~~~rn,'  I.  i. ;  and 
'  Cf. vol. i. chaps. 4, 8,  12 ; vol. ii.  ' Summa  Theologica,' I. Q.  96.  4. 6  INTRODUCTION.  INTRODUCTION.  7 
evident that  the  conception of  the conventional and "unnatural" 
cl~aracter  of  the state was too firmly fixed to be shaken even by 
his authority, and that it passed with little alteration into the 
political theory of  the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries, and that, as we have said, it was not until Rousseau 
in the ' Contrat Social ' recovered the organic conception of  the 
state,l and till  the rise  of  the  historical  method  of  study- 
ing institutions, that this mode of  thought passed away ; and  it 
lingered on in the nineteenth century in the form of  the "police 
theory "  of  the state,  of  Herbert Spencer and the English radicals. 
The formal theory of  nature and convention in the Middle 
Ages represents the principles of  the post-Aristotelian philos- 
ophy, as mediated by the Christian Fathers.  We must refer 
the reader to the second volume of  this work for a discussion of 
the place of  these conceptions in the Roman and Canon law of 
the twelfth century. 
So far, then, we  have been  dealing with conceptions which 
dominate the theories of  the Middle Ages, and which had come 
to them through the Fathers, but which were not strictly speak- 
ing distinctively Christian, but rather represented the general 
principles  of  the post-Aristotelian  philosophy.  The political 
theory  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  also  however  profoundly 
affected,  or rather  controlled,  by  certain  conceptions  which 
were distinctively Christian in their form, if  not in their origin. 
The  first  of  these  is  the  principle  of  the  autonomy  of 
the spiritual life,  which  in  these  ages  assumed  the form  of 
the independence of  the spiritual authority from the control 
of  the temporal.  We have endeavoured in the first volume 
to give some account of  the nature and early forms of  this con- 
ception.  It  finds characteristic  and permanently  important 
expression in the phrases of  the letters and tractates of  Pope 
Gelasius I., in which he lays down the great principle that the 
spiritual and the temporal authority each derives its authority 
from God, and that each is independent of  the other within its 
own sphere, while each is dependent in the sphere of  the other.' 
1 Cf. Rousseau, '  Contrat Soclal,' I. 8.  Pope  Gelaslus  I., Tract.  I".  11,  and 
Cf. vol. I.  Part 111. chap.  16 ; and  Ep. xli. 2. 
we have in the second volume endcavoured to give some ac- 
count of  the treatment of  this principle by the Civilians and 
canonists of  the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.l  We shall 
llave to consider  in detail the relation  of  these principles to 
the tllcory and structure of  medi~eval  society.  We shall have 
to deal with the theory and the practical nature of  the relations 
of  the spiritual and temporal powers  in the Middle Ages,  to 
into the great conflict of  the Papacy and the Empire, to 
try to disentangle the real and vital significance of  that great 
dispute whose clamour fills these centuries. 
But before we do this we must remind ourselves of  the real 
nature  of  the  problem,  the real  and fundamental principle 
which  lies behind the confused noise of  factions.  Behind the 
forms of  the great conflict we have to recognise the appearance 
in  the consciousness of  the civilised  world  of  principles new 
and  immensely  significant.  For  behind  it all  there  lies  a 
development  of  the conception of  individuality or personality 
which  was  unknown  to the ancient world.  We  cannot here 
pretend  to  measure  fully  the  gulf  which  lies  between  the 
Platonic and Aristotelian  philosophy  and that of  the Stoics, 
and  the other later philosophical  systems,  but it cannot be 
doubted that the gulf is profound.  The phrases, for instance, 
in which Seneca describes the self-sufficiency of  the wise man 
may be exaggerated and overstrained.  No one, he says, can 
strictly be said either to benefit or to injure the wise man, for 
he is, except for his mortality, like God himself ; he is indeed 
bound to the service of  the common good, but if  the conditions 
of life are such as to make it impossible for him to take part in 
pubhc affairs, he can ~~ithdraw  into himself  and still serve the 
same caure by developing his own nature and chara~ter.~  The 
Phrases may be overstrained and rhetorical, but they represent 
a sense  of  individual  personality  which  is immensely  signifi- 
cant,  an apprehension of  aspects of  human life which are sacred 
and inviolable, independent of  the authority, and, in his view, 
even of the support of  society. 
Cf.  "01.  11. Part I. chap.  8 : Part  De Clernentla,' I.  3. 2 ; '  De Otlo,' 111., 
'I.  chaps. 10 and 11.  and vol. I. pp.  25-29 
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The changes which can be traced in the history of Western 
thought can be observed with equal clearness in the Semitic 
literature of  the Old Testament.  There are few sayings more 
significant than those indignant words in which Ezekiel repudi- 
ates  the traditional  conceptions  of  Israel.  "  The  soul  that 
sinneth, it shall die.  The son shall not bear the iniquity of  the 
father, neither  shall the fat,her bear the iniquity of  the son : 
t8he  righteousness of  the righteous shall be upon him, and the 
~~lickedness  of  the wicked shall be upon him." l  The solidarity 
of  the primitive and ancient group was giving way  before the 
development of  a new apprehension of  individuality. 
It is this apprehension to which a new impulse and force was 
given by our Lord and his disciples.  To them the soul of  man 
has  an individual relation  with  God  which  goes  beyond the 
control of  the society.  The principles of  the Christian religion 
represent, on this side, the same development as that of  Ezekiel 
and the Stoics, and it is on this foundation that the civilisation 
of  the medizeval and modern world has grown up.  This does 
not mean that religion has no social aspect, or that the political 
societies have no moral or spiritual character, but it does mean 
that men have been compelled to recognise that the individual 
religious and moral experience transcend t'he authority of  the 
political and even of the religious society, and that the religious 
society as embodying this spiritual experience cannot tolerate 
t'he control of  the State.  There are aspects of  human life which 
are not and cannot be under the control of  the laws or authority 
of  the State. 
It is true that the great individualist development has often 
been  misinterpreted  and exaggerated,  and the greatest t,ask 
of  the modern  world  is  to recover  the sense  of  the organic 
unity of human life, that sense of  unity which to the Christian 
faith is  equally  vital  with  the  sense  of  individuality.  The 
recovery of that sense of  unity by Rousseau and Burke does 
indeed represent a great moment in the development of  human 
apprehension, and separates the political thinking and action 
of  the nineteenth  centJury by a  great gulf  from  that of  the 
preceding  centuries.  We  are  once  again  Aristo  telim,  but 
Ezekiel xviii. 20. 
with  great  difference,  for the  apprehension  of  individual 
personality remains  with  US. 
16  is these convictions which lie behind the grea,t struggles of 
the  and temporal powers in the Middle Ages, the great- 
ness of the conflict is some measure of  the immense difficulties 
which beset then, and even now, the attempt to disentangle the 
sphere of religion from those aspects of  life which are under the 
control of the State.  For it  must not be supposed that this was 
an easy thing to do.  In  the first volume we have endeavonred to 
point out how in the  ninth century, while men clearly recognised 
ill principle the distinction between the sphere of  the two great 
authorities, yet in actual practice l,he two authorities constantly 
0verlapped.l  These difficulties became far greater in the cen- 
turies which  followed, and we cannot measure the significance 
of  the events which took place, or estimate the real cliaracter of 
the theories  which  were  put forward, unless  we  continually 
take account of  this. 
The  political theory  of  the Middle  Ages  then  inherited  a 
great conception of the independence  of  the Church,  and we 
have here the first conception which was distinctively Christian, 
at least in form. 
There is, however, another conception which the Middle Ages 
inherited from the ancient  world  which  is also  distinctively 
Christian in form if not in  substance.  This is the principle 
of the divine nature and origin of  political authority.  We have 
dealt with the origin and nature of  this conception in the first 
volume,2 and have in the second volume examined the  treatment 
of  tjho  subject by the Civilians  and Canonists of  the twelfth 
century,3  and it  is unnecessary to say more about it here, as we 
Shall  have  to consider  its significance very  carefully in this 
volume.  But we must be under 110  misapprehension, whatever 
may have been the precise significance of  St Augu~t~ine's  treat- 
ll1e~lt  of the nature of  secular authority, and the extent of its 
influence, the tra,dition which had come down  to the Middle 
Ages WAS substantiu,lly clear and emphatic, and that was t'l~at 
Cf. vol. i. pp  253.292.  218. 
'  Cf. vol. i. pp.  89-98,  147-160,  211-  a  Cf. vol. ii. pp.  76-78, 143-150. 10  INTRODUCTION.  INTRODUCTION.  11 
the  secular  power  is  a  divine  institution  and  derives  its 
authority from God. 
This conception had been interpreted by some of the Fathers, 
and notably by St Gregory  the Great, as meaning  that the 
authority of the secular ruler was in such a sense divine that 
it was irreligious and profane to resist, or even to criticise it.l 
The theory of  the "  Divine Right " of  the King is a palristic 
conception whose influence in the Middle Ages we  shall have 
to consider, although it was not till the period of  the Renais- 
sance that it can be said to have received its full development, 
and it was  then related to the development of  the absolute 
monarchy in Europe. 
Such, then, are in general outline the principles of  political 
theory  which  the Middle  Ages  inherited by direct  and con- 
tinuous tradition from the ancient world, and these influences 
must be clearly and sharply distinguished  from those which 
came  to  them  in  the  twelfth  century  through  the revived 
study  of  the  Roman  jurisprudence,  and in  the  thirteenth 
century through  the rediscovery  of  Aristotle's  Politics.  We 
have dealt with the former of  these influences in the second 
volume,  the latter we  must leave till we  can  deal with  the 
thirteenth  century in  a  later volume.  It  was  in the main 
through the writings of  the Fathers that the continuous tradi- 
tion came, but, as we shall have occasion to see, it was rein- 
forced throughout these centuries by the energetic study of  the 
Latin authors whose works had survived.  We have seen that 
in many most important aspects this continuous tradition repre- 
sents rather the general political ideas of  the last centuries of 
the ancient world than distinctively Christian conceptions. 
We must now observe that the order of  society in Western 
Etscope was bascd largely upon principles which belonged to the 
new societies.  There has been and there still is much contro- 
versy on the exact degree of  the independence of  the Teutonic 
constitutions and political principles.  The great constitutional 
historians of  the middle of  the nineteenth century, like mTaitx 
and Stubbs, assumed that the ancient world had little or no 
Cf.  vol. i. pp.  147-160. 
influence in determining the characteristic forms and principles 
of  the government of  the Teutonic state.  In the latter part 
of tile nineteenth century a very learned and capable body of 
scholars, of whom the chief  were, on the Continent, 
~~~t~l  de Coulanges, and in England,  Seebohm, argued that 
in reality much  which had been  thought to be Teutonic was 
an adalptation of  the forms and principles of  the pro- 
vincial administration  of  the later empire.  We do not need 
for our purpose to attempt  a  dogmatic decision  of  the con- 
troversy,  though we cannot conceal our own  conviction that 
the balance  of  historical  research  and discussion  has turned 
strongly against the Romanist  view.  For our purpose  it is 
enough  that we  should  obsorve  the nature of  the principles 
which  were implicit in the structure of  the new societies, and 
which  found  a  large  measure  of  reasoned  expression  in  the 
literature especially of  the ninth  century. 
Some of  these principles  are of great significance.  The first 
and fundamental principle implicit in the organisation  of  the 
new  societies is the supremacy of  the law or custom  of  the 
community over all its members, from the humblest free man 
to the king.  And the second is that there could be no suc- 
cession to kingship without the election  or recognition of  the 
community.  There is here indeed an obvious parallel, but also 
an obvious divergence in the structure of the Teutonic societies, 
as compared wit'h that of  the Roman empire.  It was indeed 
the fundamental  principle of the Roman jurists that the source 
of  a11  politicall authority  was  the  Roman  people,  that the 
ernperor held  his  authority only  because  the Roman  people 
had been pleased to confer it upon  him.l  But there was this 
far-reaching difference between  the Roman  legal theory and 
the principles of the Teutonic societies, that the Roman theory 
a  theory  of  origins,  while  the Teutonic principles  were 
of  actually existing conditions.  It was not meroly that 
the Teutonic king required the consent or recognition  of  the 
"mmunit~ for his accession to power, but that he was not over 
the law, nor its creator, but under it.  The Roman doctrine of 
the legislative authority of  the emperor has no counterpart in 
l Cf. vo1.i. pp. 63-70. 12  INTRODUCTION.  INTRODUCTION.  13 
the principles of the Teutonic societies, the law was the law of 
the comnlunity, not of  the king.  It  is true indeed that in the 
earlier Middle Ages there was normally no such thing as legis- 
lation in the modern sense, the law, strictly speaking, was noth- 
ing but the traditional custom of  the community, and legislative 
acts were, properly speaking, nothing but authoritative declara- 
tions of  custom.  As the changing conditions of  medizeval life 
finally made deliberate modification of  these customs inevitable, 
such action was taken, though rel~ctant~ly,  but could only be 
taken with the assent, expressed or tacit, of  the community. 
Here are indced political principles or ideas of  the highest 
moment, derived not from the traditions of  the ancient world 
and empire, but rooted in the constitutional practice of  the 
new societies.  We have endeavoured to set out the evidence 
for the predominance of  these conceptions in the first volume,l 
but their significance cannot  be fully  appreciated  without  a 
study  of  the  more  important  works  on  the  constitutional 
history of  the various European countries in the early Middle 
Ages. 
It is in relation to these principles that we have to study the 
appearance of  the doctrine of  the social contract ; that is, the 
conception of  an agreement or bargain between the people and 
the ruler.  In the popular mind this conception is supposed to 
belong  to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the 
real truth is that it is a mediaeval conception, and that it arose 
primarily  out of  conceptions and circl~mstances  which  were 
characteristic of  mediaeval  society.  This principle or theory 
has  some  place  in  ancient  literature,  especially  in  Plato's 
' Laws,'  and a phrase of St Augustine's  ha,s been  sometimes 
quoted as related to it, though probably without any sufficient 
j~stification,~  but there is no evidence that there is any con- 
tinuity between the Platonic theory and  that  of  the Middle Ages. 
We have in the first volume pointed out the circumstances out 
of  which we think it arose14  and, as we shall have to deal wit11 
it in detail in this volume, we need only here say that it seenls 
to 11s  clear that its origin is to he traced to the pronliscs  of 
1 Cf. vol.1. chap-. l9 and 20.  St  Augustine, '  Confessions,'  111.8. 2. 
Cf. vol. i. p. 17.  Cf. vol. i. pp. 240-252. 
to the law,  and of  good government taken by the 
king on his accession.  It  was in the eleventh century that the 
found a formal expression, but the principles which 
lay  behind  the f0I-mal expre~~ion  were already in existence, 
and were firmly rooted in the constitutionel order of  the early 
Middle Ages. 
a  approaching  the subject  of  the nature of  the political 
theory  of  the great  central period  of  medizeval civilisation, 
fronl the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, we must then first 
be  to observe the nature of  the general principles which 
the men  of  that time had inherited.  These principles  were 
complex, and no complete or systematic treatment of  them was 
until the thirteenth century.  It may indeed be doubted 
whether the various  elements were  capable of  being  brought 
into  an organic  relation  with  each  other,  but we  must not 
here anticipate the discussion which belongs to later volumes. 
Whether in the end these various conceptions were capable of 
being fused into an organic whole or not, we must recognise 
that they  all have a  real and significent place in  medizeval 
theory.  The great formal conception of the distinction between 
nature and convention, which came from the post-Aristotelian 
philosophy in which the Christian Fathers were trained ; the 
principle of  the equality and freedom of  men which arose out 
of  this and the Christian tradition ; the immensely significant 
conception of  the necessary freedom  of  the spiritual life and 
the spiritual authority which specially represents this ; the con- 
viction of the sanctity of  the political order ; the principle of 
the supreme authority of  the law or custom of the community, 
:~nd  of the King as responsible to govern according to the law, 
-these  Conceptions or principles dominated the sentiment and 
the  of all mediaeval society. 
Our  Present  task is to consider  the development of  these 
cOnce~tion~  under the actual circumstances of European society 
the tenth to the thirteenth centurie~,  and to inquire how  far  may  have  been  modified  or  superseded  by  other 
pruciples.  For the new times brought new  conditions, new 
and 
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have especially to consider how far the development of feudal 
ideas, and the organisation of  European society on the basis of 
feudal tenure, may have modified or overlaid earlier principles ; 
how far again in the great conflicts between the spiritual and 
the  temporal  powers  the  conception  of  the  sanctity  and 
autonomy of  either may have been questioned or denied.  The 
development  of  mediaeval  society  was  very  rapid,  and  the 
intellectual development  was  even  more rapid than that of 
the organisation of  society.  The greatest difficulty indeed with 
which the historian has to contend, in trying to interpret the 
Middle Ages to the modern world, is the impression that the 
civilisation of  these times was  stationary and rigid, that the 
medisval world was unlike the modern, specially in this, that it 
was unchanging, while we perpetually change.  This tradition 
is primarily derived from the ignorance and prejudice of  the 
men  of  the new  learning  and the Renaissance,  and lingers 
on, not in serious history, but in the literary tradition, and in 
the prejudices which arose naturally enough  out of  the great 
struggles of  the Reformation and the Revolution.  If  we are to 
study the Middle  Ages  intelligently, if  we  are to appreciate 
their real relation to the modern world, we must dismiss from 
our minds these notions of  a fixed and stereotyped society, we 
must rather recognise that there have been few periods in the 
history of  the world  when  the movement of  thought and of 
life  was  more  rapid  than  in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth 
centuries. 
When  we  attempt to trace the history  of  political  ideas 
in the Middle Ages, we  are at once confronted with the fact 
that, after the active political reflection which is represented in 
the literature of  the ninth century, there follows a  conside~- 
able period  from which  very little indeed of  political theory 
has survived in literature.  From the end of  the ninth century 
till the middle of  the eleventh the references to the principles 
or ideas of  politics are very scanty indeed.  We have indeed to 
remember  that it is probable that a  great deal of  literature, 
especially in the vernacular languages, has disappeared, but it 
is at least a probable conclusion from what has survived that 
there was not much reflection upon  sociaI and political ques- 
tions,  and that it was  not  till  the middle  of  the  eleventh 
century that the great political agitations in Germany, and the 
development of  tlle  great  conflict  between  the Papacy  and 
the Empire, compelled lnen to question tlleniselves  as to the 
principles which underlay the order of  society. 
Tllis  does  not mean  that during this  time no important 
changes were taking place in the structure of  European society ; 
on tile contrary, in some respects the period was one of  great 
and significant development.  It was during these years that 
feudalism was taking shape and form, establishing itself  as a 
system of  social and economic and military organisation, and 
in  some degree  affecting the structure of  government.  How 
far the growth of feudalism affected the principle or theory of 
political organisation is the first important question which me 
have to consider. 
It was  during these years  that European  civilisation  was 
being rescued from a  second great wave of barbarism, which 
threatened for a time to overwhelm it.  For upon the confused 
faction fights which distracted Western Europe while the great 
empire of Charlemagne was breaking up, there fell the torrent 
of  the second barbaric invasion.  The Norsemen on the North 
and West, the Magyars on the East harried and plundered, and 
for a  time it  seemed  as though  the work  of  the preceding 
centuries would  be  completely undone ;  and indeed  Europe 
very nearly relapsed into anarchy, and Church and State were 
almost overwhelmed in a common destruction.  But the victory 
of Alfred over the Danes, of Otto tlle Great at  the Lechfeld over 
the Magyars, and the limits within  which the Norse invasion 
of  France was finally  contained,  mark the fact that the new 
~ivilisation  was stronger than the forces which attacked it, that 
the  new  barbarians  had to reckon  with  a  civilisation  which 
wag not worn out like that of  the Western Empire wlliclr the 
brefathera  of  the Franks and the Englislrrnen had overthrown 
Centuries earlier, but with one which was living and powerful 
and capable of  a rapid recovery and growth.  The new invasions 
leave profound Lrnces behind them, but the greatest 
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North-Western France, proved rapidly that they were capable 
not merely of conquest, but that they could contribute greatly 
to the progress  of  the very civilisation which for the moment 
they had shaken. 
The  development  of  feudalism  was  in  great  measure  the 
result  of  the  downfall  of  the  Carolingian  civilisation,  but 
the effects of  this can also be traced in the relations of  the 
Papacy and the Empire.  The breaking up of  the Empire of 
Charlemagne might indeed seem to have  set the Papacy  at 
liberty, but actually it left it under the tyranny of  the bar- 
barous factions of  the Roman nobles, and its degradation was 
even deeper than that of  the State.  It was rescued from this 
in the tenth  century by  the Ottos,  and in the eleventh  by 
Henry  III., but  the  conditions  of  its  deliverance  held  in 
themselves the seeds of disaster.  The emperor exercised, and 
for the time with  excellent  results,  a  very large  measure  of 
control over the Church, and especially over the appointiilent 
of  its chief  ministers, but it was impossible that the Church 
should in the long run acquiesce in this.  The principle of  its 
necessary  independence  was  too firmly rooted in its history, 
and it was the attempt to recover and vindicate this which 
led  to the great conflict  of  the Papacy and the Empire,  of 
the spiritual and temporad  powers  in the various  European 
countries.  This  conflict in its turn contributed  a  great deal 
to compel men to consider and make explicit the fundamental 
principles  of  the structure and organisations  of  society,  and 
thus to produce  those energetic and audacious developments 
in political theory which we have to consider. 
We have, then, to deal with three great subjects-first,  the 
nature of  the principles implicit in feudalism, and the effect 
of  these principles upon political ideas ; second, the character- 
istic political conceptions of  the eleventh and twelfth centuries 
as related to the development of  the general political and social 
structure of  Western civilisation ; and thirdly, the forms and 
theories of the  relations of  the temporal and spiritual authorities. 
It  is indeed true that we cannot isolate these various aspects of 
mediaeval life and thought from each other, but they do in some 
measure really represent the operation of  different forces, and 
we  have to consider how far it may be true that they tended 
to give rise to different conceptions or principles.  We  shall 
to make the effort finally to bring our reflections  upon 
them together, and to form some unified view of  their effect 
upon  the principles  of  mediaeval life, but for the time being 
we  have found ourselves driven to deal with them separately. 
We have found that the adequate treatment of  the subjects 
has required so much space that we have decided to deal with 
feudalism and the general political ideas in this volume,  and 
with the relations of the temporal and spiritual powers in the 
next. 
We deal with feudalism first, not because it was in our judg- 
ment the most important element in the structure of  mediaeval 
society, but because it  has often been thought to have been so, 
and because this at least is true, that whatever its influence 
may have been, it represented  a new element in civilisation. 
In dealing with it we shall be obliged to transcend the limits 
of  time which we have set to the general scope of  this volume. 
For the significance of  feudalism in relation to political theory 
cannot adequately be discussed without taking into account the 
great feudal law books of  the thirteenth century ; and, what is 
more important, the system of  fe~da~lism  represents an organic 
development culminating in the latter years of  the thirteenth 
century, which cannot be understood unless we take account 
of  the whole process of  its development.  We are, of  course, 
amre of the risk that we run of  reading back the conceptions 
the thirteenth century into the elevei~t~h  and twelfth, and 
we shall do our best to guard against this risk. PART I. 
THE  INFLUENCE  OF  FEUDALISM  ON  POLITICAL  THEORY, 
CHAPTER  I. 
PERSONAL  LOYALTY. 
THERE  is perhaps no subject in medi~val  history which is so 
difficult  as  that of  feudalism.  Its origins  are still obscure 
and controverted, its development belongs largely to the tenth 
century, and tllere are few periods of  mediaeval history where 
the sources of our information are so scanty and so fragmentary, 
and in the literature which has survived thcrc is only a little 
that can be said to bear directly upon feudalism.  And, finally, 
its real nature and essential characteristics have been so con- 
fused by the laxity of literary usage that it is difficult to say 
what is meant by the word. 
F~udalislii  is a system of  personal relations, of land tenure, 
of  military  orgauisation,  of  judicial  order,  and  of  political 
order.  It affected  the life  of  every  class  in the  medizval 
colllmunity, from the villein  to the king or emperor,  and it 
even affected profoundly the position  of  at least the greater 
the bishops and abbots.  There are, indeed, few aspects 
Q*  mediaeval  life  which  were  not  touched  by  it,  and it  is 
therefore natural that it should be thought that it must have 
profo~dly  modified  both  the institutions  and the political 
Ideas  of  the Middle Ages. 
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subjects,  the  influence  of  feudalism  on  the institutions  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  its  direct  effects upon  the forms  of  the 
great  constitutional  development  which  culminated  in  the 
Parliament of  Edward I. and the States-General of  Philip the 
Fair, and the parallel developments in other European coun- 
tries.  We cannot even attempt to summarise the results of  the 
work of  the constitutional historians, for any summary would 
probably  mislead  rather than illuminate.  But it is possible 
to say that while feudalism left for centuries deeply marked 
traces on the social and political structure of  European society, 
and while the great systems of  national organisation did indeed 
take into themselves  elements which  belonged  to feudalism, 
they also represented principles which in their essential nature 
were independent of  and even contradictory to some specific 
characteristics  of  the feudal  system.  In the end  the king 
or the parliament,  or both, came to be directly related to all 
the individuals who compose the State, and in their authority 
the local and personal authorities and jurisdictions of  feudalism 
were finally lost.  The royal justice at last absorbs all feudal 
justice,  in the administrative authority of  tlhe crown  all the 
areas of  feudal administration are merged, and the legislative 
authority  of  parliament  asserts  itself  as  supreme  over  all 
feudal traditions and customs.  The king and the parliament 
represent  the nation,  and  the  unity  of  the nation  finally 
transcends  a11  the separatist  tendencies  of  feudalism. 
It may even be said that the best example of  this can bo 
found in that country where at  first sight feudalism might seem 
to have triumphed, for the unity of  the German kingdom was 
finally destroyed, and the great fiefs became practically auton- 
omous provinces.  But it was not feudalism which triumphed, 
but territorialism.  In the territorial areas there developed the 
same centralised authority and administration as in England or 
France, and it  was no doubt that very fact which accounts for 
the failure of the constitutional movement of  the close of  the 
fifteenth century. 
We have to deal here not primarily with institutions,  but 
with the question how far feudalism affected the political ideas 
of the Middle Ages,  how far its influence  coincided  with the 
which they inherited, a8nd  furthered the development 
of social and political ideas which were already present, or how 
far it may have tended to neutralise  or modify  them.  We 
must be prepared to find that the influence of  feudalism was 
very  complex,  and  that it  may  have  tended  in  different 
directions. 
We begin by pointing out what may seem a paradox;  that 
feudalism  represents  two  principles  which  in  their  ultimate 
development may seem contradictory, but which yet affected 
the minds  of  the men  of the Middle Ages at the same time. 
The first principle is that of  personal loyalty and devotion, the 
second is that of  the contractual relation. 
The first principle is that which is represented especially in 
the poetic literature of  the Middle Ages, and which has thus 
passed naturally enough into the literary as distinguished from 
the  historical  presentation  of  the  Middle  Ages  in  modern 
times.  We are all familiar with the romantic representation 
of  medi~val  life as dominated by the sentiment of  chivalrous 
loyalty and devotion.  How much of exaggeration there is con- 
tained in this we shall presently see, but there are elements of 
real truth in it.  And, more than this, these sentiments have a 
real and permanent importance in political as well as in social 
life.  Human life in its deepest  and largest terms cannot be 
lived upon principles of  utility and contract.  Whether in the 
family or in the nat,ion the actual working of  human life is 
impossible without the sense of  loyalty and devotion. 
This is the first principle of  feudalism, and the second may 
well seem contradictory to it.  For nothing could seem further 
apart than the conception of  personal loyalty and  the conception 
of  bargain or contract as the foundation of  human relations. 
And yet there is no escape from the conclusion that in the last 
resort  feudal relations  were  contractual  relations,  that the 
va"al  was bound indeed to discharge certain obligations, but 
Only on the condition that the lord also discharged his oblijin- 
lions to the vassal.  Here again it is evident that we are deal- 
With  a principle which is reasonable  and just,  for in the 
long run human relations are impossible unless there is some 
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The principles may seem contradictory, and  indeed they were 
hard to reconcile, but it is also true to say that they I~-ere  not 
only heId together  and constantly reconciled in practice,  but 
also that the political thinkers of  the Middle Ages were aware 
of  certain great rational principles which lie behind these con- 
ceptions, and in which they found a reasonable reconciliation 
of  them. 
For this is the tryth about feudalism.  At iirst sight it seems 
very strange and unintelligible.  We find it difficult to under- 
stand how men could think and act thus, but if  we are a little 
patient we find it becoming intelligible, and finally we see it not 
as wholly unnatural and abnormal, but as representing a phase 
of  social and political development which lies indeed behind us, 
but whoso  conditions  we  can  understand,  and we  shall see 
that in a measure these apparently strange principles  have a 
continuing significance even among ourselves. 
The difficulty of  understanding feudalism has been immensely 
increased  by the habit of  conceiving of  it as a homogeneous 
systeni, complete and perfect at some definite time and place. 
It becomes much more intelligible when  we  begin to see that 
under the one term there are contained ideas which were very 
different from each other, and that as it had slowly grown up, 
so it was perpetually developing and changing.  The feudal idea 
au it is presented to us in the epic or romantic poetry is some- 
thing quite different from that which is represented by such a 
characteristic  set of  law books  as those which  make up the 
Assizes of Jerusalem, or by Beaumanoir, and when M-e  look a 
little more closely we begin to understand this, and to see that 
the conceptions of  the epics and romances of  the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries represent sometimes the tradition of  the 
past, sometimes an elaborate and artificial convention rather 
than the actual reality. 
Thcre has indeed often been a very serious misunderstanding 
even among scholars as to the value of  the artistic representa- 
tion of  manners and customs.  In some poetry, as for instance 
in the earlier mediaval epic, the picture of  external Life  and 
manners of men and women, is highly realistic, and supplies Us 
with very  valuable information as to the conditions  of  con- 
temporary society.  In  other forms of literature, and especially 
in  the romance of  the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it is 
evident that we are dealing with an art which is in great part, 
in its relation to the circumstances of  life,  conventional and 
traditional,  and which  even in its essential  ~entimental  or 
emotional  interest  represents  an abstraction  of  human  life, 
valuable indeed and profoundly moving  and significant, but 
still  an abstraction rather  than a  realistic treatment.  The 
great fighting man of the epic literature, and the frank, high- 
hearted, and sometimes implacable woman, upon whom often 
the whole movement of the story depends, these are real figures 
of men and women, and they live in the real world.  But the 
romantic hero or heroine,  absorbed in their emotions, far re- 
moved from the actual circumstances of  daily life, are placed 
in a  world  which  is mainly  unreal  and conventional.  The 
transition  from the Beowulf  or  the Icelandic  Sagas  to the 
Arthurian romance is the transition from idealised and heroic 
reality to an elaborate convention. 
It is necessary to use the evidence of  mediaeval poetry with 
great  caution,  and to make careful  distinctions between  the 
value of  different  forms of  it as illustrating the customs and 
idcas of any one time. 
We  cannot here  attempt to discuss in detail the origin  of 
feudalism, the subject has been  handled  with  great learning 
by a number of  historians,'  but we  can say with  great con- 
fidence that its origin  was  extremely  complex.  Comitatu~, 
Commeudatio, and Beneficium, these are the main elements of 
the relation of  lord and vassal, and each of  these had an im- 
Poptarit part in the development of  the whole system.  From 
the Comitatus there came the devotion of the band of  followers 
to their leader in war, the almost indissoluble tie which united 
Lh@  "Companion '' to his chief in faith and loyalty, and this may 
been the first, as it was certainly among the most import- 
ant, of the elements out of which the feudal relation grew.  It 
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is this aspect of  the relation that we find specially illustrated 
in the epics and romances, while its  influence can also be traced 
in certain principles of  the feudad law books.  The process of 
Commendation by which a hitherto independent person became 
dependent  on  some powerful  man or ruler in return  for the 
protection that he could afford to him, was probably the means 
by which the feudal relation was most widely extended.  The 
gradual  transformaticlfl  of  a  relation,  which  was  originally 
almost wholly personal, into a great system of  land tenure on 
the basis of  military  or of  "  base " service, which in its turn 
became a system of  political relations, this is connected with 
the Beneficiurn.  It is out of  these complex and incoherent 
elements that the feudal system was gradually formed ; some- 
thing of  each goes to make up the whole  system as we  see 
it from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, and they are all  , 
represented in the literature and legal systems of  these times. 
It  is not necessary to deal at length with the conception of 
personal loyalty and devotion, it will be sufficient to indicate 
its nature by means of  an example from the literature of  the 
twelfth century. 
One of  the most interesting illustrations of  the influence of 
the conception is to be found in the French Chanson de Geste, 
the ' Raoul de Cambrai,' which belongs probably to t,he latter 
part of  the twelfth century.  When Raoul is knighted he ta,kes 
as his squire Bernier, the illegitimate son of  Ybert of  Ribemont. 
Raoul obtains from the King of  France a grant of  the lands of 
Vermandois, which had belonged to  Ybert's family, and  invades 
the country in spite of  the protests of  Bernier.  He sacks and 
burns the town of  Origny with its monastery,  and Bernier'~ 
mother perishes in the fire.  Bernier vows revenge, and joins 
his father ; and, in the battle which follows, kills Raoul.  But 
the significant thing is  the reluctance  with  -which he turns 
1  against Raoul ; in the firet flush of  his passion over his mother's 
death  he  does  indeed  refuse  all  Raoul's  attempts to make 
amends,  but aft'erwards he  endeavours to make peace,  and 
when he has given him the fatal wound he weeps and laments 
that he should have turned against him who had knighted him, 
and, in spite of  his grievous wrongs, he can find no joy in his 
vengeance.1  Through all his life the thought of  what he had 
done haunts him, and there is a tragic fitness in his end, for 
many years Raoul's uncle kills him near the place where 
lollg before he had killed Raoul. 
~othing  can illustrate more vividly the essential character 
of  the traditional feudal conception  as it is expressed in the 
of  the Middle Ages.  In spite of  the dreadful wrongs 
,,f  which  Raoul had been  guilty, in spite of  his  brutal and 
overbearing  character, in spite of  the wanton  murder of  his 
lnother and the other nuns of  Origny, Bernier feels that he has 
commil;ted an unheard-of crime in turning against his lord, to 
whom  he feels himself bound by ties even more sacred than 
those of  nat~re.~ 
Illustrat~ions  of the personal loyalty and devotion of  vassal 
to lord  could  be  indefinitely  multiplied from the mediaeval 
poets, but no useful purpose would  be here served by doing 
this.  Only  it is  important to remember  that they  do not 
represent a principle peculiar to France, but rather a universal 
and highly significant aspect of the organisation of  European 
society in the Middle Ages.  The feudal relation was not one of 
mere dependence, or of mere advantage, but one of  faith and 
loyal service, and the whole conception is admirably summed 
up in the famous phrases of the letter of  Fulbert of  Chartres 
~fritten  in  1020  A.D.  to the  Duke  of  Aquitaine.  He that 
swears  fidelity  to  his  lord  must  have  in  his  mind  these 
'  '  Raoul de Cambrai,'  31  32- 
"  R. 1'01, le sons quida changier 
Desoz son elmo commence a larmoier ; 
A haute voiz commence a huchier : 
'E  I  R., sire, fix le  franche mollier, 
Tu m'adoubas,  ce ne puis je  noier ; 
Mais durement le m'a puis vendu chier. 
Ma more arcis par dcdcns j. monstier, 
Et moi fesis la teste pepoier. 
hit  m'en ofris, ce no puis je  noier ; 
De la vengance ja plus fain ne qier.' " 
1 wish  here  to express  my  great 
~~l~gat,ion  to  the  extremely  valuablo 
and UuSgestive discussion of  this aspect 
Of  feudalism, as it is presented  in the 
French epics, by M. Flach, in an emay 
entitled, "  Le Compagnonnage dans les 
Chanson  de  Geste,"  which  he  after- 
wards embodied  in  his work  entitled, 
'  Les Origines de I'Ancienne France.'  I 
do not know that I am convinced  by 
his  very interesting and  ingenious  at- 
tonlpt to show that the fcudal relation 
finds its ultimate sourco i;l the concep- 
tion of  adoption into a new  family or 
blood  brotherliood,  but  M. Flach  has 
admirably  illust,rated  and  classificd 
the principles of  the feudal relation  as 
seen cspecielly in the mediaeval poetry 
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six words, "  Incolume, tutum, honestum, utile, facile, possibile," 
he must do what he can to keep his lord's body unharmed, to 
keep his  secrets and strongholds,  to maintain  his  rights  of 
jurisdiction  and all his other dignities, to keep his possessions 
safe, to see that he does not make that difficult or impossible to 
his  lord which is no#  easy and possible.  Fulbert adds that 
these ~bligat~ions  are mutual, and we shall have more to say 
upon this point present1y.l 
These  conceptions  were  not merely  traditional  or  merely 
ideal, and we should observe that they have their place also 
in  the more technical  expression  of  feudal  principles  in the 
law books, and as late as the thirteenth century. 
We have in the Assizes of  Jerusalem  a very full treatment 
of  the mutual obligation of  vassal and lord to which we shall 
constant,lg have to recur ; for  the moment  we  can  fix  our 
attention on one passage in the work of  Jean d'Ibelin, which 
forms a  very important part of  the Assizes.  In this passage 
he has described the mutual nature of  the obligations of  lord 
and vassal, and then points out that there are some obligations 
which  are peculiar  to the vassal.  The vassal owes  his  lord 
reverence  as well as faith, and must do some things for him 
which the lord is not bound to do.  He must be ready to act 
as a hostage to deliver his lord from prison, and if  in battle he 
sees his lord disarmed and unhorsed he must if  necessary give 
him  his  own  horse  in order  to enable  him  to escape  from 
1 Fulbert of  Chartres, Ep. 58 : "  Qni 
domino suo fidelitatem jurat,  ista sex 
in memoria  semper habere debet : in- 
colume, tutum, honestum, utile, facile, 
possibile :  videlicet,  Incolume,  ne  sit 
c!omino  in  damnum  de  corpore  suo. 
Tutum, ne sit ei in damnnm de secreto 
suo,  vel  de  munitionibus  per  quas 
tutus osse  pote-t.  Honestum,  ne  sit 
ei in da~nnum  de  sua iustitia,  vel  de 
aliis  causis  qure  ad honcstatcm  eius 
pertinere  videntur.  Utile,  ne  sit  ei 
in  damnum  do  suis  possossionibus. 
Facile vel possihile,  ne id bonum  quod 
dominus  suus  leviter  facere  poterat, 
faciat  ei  dificile : neve  id  quod  pos- 
sibile  ei  erat,  reddat  ei  impossibile. 
Ut  autem  fidelis  hrec  nocumenta 
caveat  justum  est  sed  non  ideo 
sacramentum meretur. 
Non  enim sufficit  abstincre a  malo, 
nisi  fiat  quod  bonum  est.  Restat 
ergo  ut  in  eisdem  sex  supra  dictis 
consilium et auxilium domino fideliter 
praestet, si beneficio dignus videri vu:'. 
et  salvus  esse  do  fidelitate  qunm 
iuravit. 
Dominus  quoque  fideli  suo  in  his 
omnibus  vicem  reddere  debet:  quod 
si non fecerit,  morito  censehitur mnle- 
fidus : sicut ille si  in  eorum  przevari- 
cntione vel  faciendo  vel  aonsentiendo, 
deprehensus  fuerit,  perfidus  et  per. 
jurus." 
danger, and again he must be ready to act as security for his 
lord's  debts to the extent of  the value of  his fief.l  The lord 
indeed in his turn do all that he can to help and deliver 
his  vassal  who  has thu~  imperilled  himself  for him,  and to 
him for the losses he may have suffered ; but there 
i~  a real and marked difference in the nature of  the obligations, 
they are indeed mutual, but they are not quite the same, and 
the element of reverence, which the vassal owes, is distinctive 
and  important.  It  is  noteworthy  that  both  Glanvill  and 
Bracton,  while  describing  the feudal obligations  as mutual, 
both treat the element of  reverence which the vassal owes as 
distinctive. 
The principle of  personal devotion and fidelity to the lord 
forms, then, a very important part of  the tradition of  medi~val 
society, and we must t'ake careful account of  it in trying to 
estimate  the characteristic  conceptions  of  the Middle  Ages 
with respect  to the nature of  political association.  And we 
must also observe that we have here something quite different 
from those principles of political relation and obligation which 
we  have  so  far considered.  These  sentiments  of  personal 
1 Assizes of  Jerusalem--Jean  d'Ibe- 
lin,  196 :  "  Mais  que tant  que  l'ome 
deit  au  seignor  reverence  en  totes 
choses,  et chascun  deit  garder  sa fei 
l'un vers l'autre fermement et enterine- 
ment,  chascun en  dreit sei,  por  sa  fei 
et s'onor garder et sa leaut6 et sa bone 
renom6e:  et l'ome  deit  tant plus  au 
seignor par  la fei  que  il  li  est tenus, 
que  le  seignor  B  l'home :  que  l'om 
deit  entrer en  ostage  por  son saignor 
geter  de  prison,  c'il  l'on  requicrt  ou 
fait roquerre  par certain messago.  Et 
"hascun  qrri  fait  homage  it  autre ost 
tenus  par sa fei,  ce  il treuve son seig- 
nor en bosoin cl'armes,  it pi&, entro ses 
enomis ou on lauc  que il soit en perill 
mart ou de prison, de faire son leau 
Poeir  de remontir  le ct geter 1e  de col 
porill,  et  c'il  autrement  ne  le  peut 
faice,  il li doit doner son cheval ou sa 
sllr  quei il chevauche,  c'il  la re- 
quiert, et aider le $ metre sur, et aider 
le B  son pooir  B  son cors sauver. .  . . 
Et chascun  qui  tient  fib  d'autre  de 
quei  il est son home,  est tenus B  son 
seignor d'entrcr por lui cn tel point en 
hostage  por  dette  on  en  plegerie  de 
tant  vaillant  come  le  fi8  que  il  tient 
do  lui, et do  quei  il  est  son  home, 
vaudreit  raisnablement  a  vendro  par 
I'assise." 
Glanvill,  ix.  4 :  "  Mutua  quidem 
dcbot  esse  dominii  ct  liomagii  fideli- 
tatis connoxio, ita qnod quantum homo 
debot domino ex homagio,  tantum illi 
dcbet dominus ex dominio pr~ter  solam 
revorcntinm." 
Rracton, '  De Legihus et Consuetudi- 
nibus Angliae,'  ii. 35. 3 (fol. 78) : "  Est 
itaque tnnta et  talis connexio per homa- 
gium inter dominus et tenentem suum, 
quod  tantnm  debet  dominus  tenentj, 
quantum tenens domino, praeter solam 
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loyalty must not be confused  with the principles  of  political 
society  either in  the form  in  which  they  had  come  down 
from the ancient world through the Fathers, or as they were 
implicit  in the political  s@ucture of  the Teutonic  societies, 
so far as we  have considered  them hitherto.  It is no doubt 
true that in the Teutonic societies, as distinguished from the 
developed political  organisations  of the ancient world,  there 
survived traditions and sentiments which were related to the 
conception of  the chieftainship of  a tribe, and one of the chief 
difficulties  in  dealing  with  the  history  of  feudalism  is  to 
disentangle  the tribal from the feudal  sentiment.  In some 
mediaeval slates, and especially in the German kingdom,  the 
influence of  tribal sentiment and tribal loyalty is difficult to 
measure, and it  is probably true to say that the feudal relation 
only partially overlaid it. 
However this may  be, these sentiments of  personal loyalty 
and devotion to the immediate lord to whom a man had sworn 
his  faith and service  constitute a new  element in the tangle 
of  ideac and organisations, out of  which there slowly emerged 
the national state of  modern times.  And it was an element 
which was  very  difficult  to reconcile  with the national idea 
and the national constitution.  The loyalty of  the vassal to 
his immediate lord was one of the most characteristic elements 
of  the cliaos of  the tenth century, and it wap only very slowly 
that this loyalty waf!  transferred to the national king. 
If  we  turn back  again to the French  epics  of  the Middle 
Ages  we  sometimes find that they represent alongside of  the 
profound devotion of the vassal to  his immediate lord an almost 
unmeasured  contempt for the king or  overlord,  and TTe  can 
find an illustration of this in the same Chanson de Geste, the 
' Raoul de Cambrai,' which we have already cited.  The death 
of  Raoul, which we have already described, is followed by a 
long  conflict  between  his  house  and that of  Bernier,  until, 
after a long struggle, Gautier, the nephew of  Raoul, and Ber- 
nier are reconciled with each other.  The King of the French 
is vexed at the reconciliation, and both parties then turn on 
the King and denounce him  as the real author  of  the feud. 
When the King threatens to take his father's lands from him, 
using many violent words, Bernier flatly defies him, and there 
follows a long war between the nobles and the King, who is 
represented  throughout  as playing  a  mean  but unsuccessful 
The nobles do indeed hold their hand when  the King 
is defeated, because he is their lord, but in the main nothing 
is  more  emphatically  marked  than  the  difference  between 
the  deep  sense  of  obligation  and loyalty  of  the  vassals  or 
companions to their immediate lords, and the loose and un- 
certain deference which they oBe to the overlord or King.1 
Enough  has been  said to indicate the nature of  feudalism 
conceived of  as finding its principle in the sense of  personal 
loyalty, of  an almost unlimited obligation of  the vassal towards 
his  lord.  This  conception  has  a  place even in the technical 
legal works of  the Middle Ages, but it is especially emphasised 
in the poetry,  in the epics  and romances.  It is to a  large 
extent upon  this that there has grown up the literary tradi- 
tion 01 mediaeval society as based primarily upon the conception 
of an unswerving loyalty, a romantic personal devotion which 
overrides all other obligations and principles.  But the whole 
truth is very dieerent from the literary tradition.  When we 
i~rn  from the poetry to the law  books  we  find  ourselves  in 
another world, we find a conception of  society which is much 
nearer to the actual conditions and ideals of  the Middle Ages. 
'  '  Raoul  de  Cambrai,'  hne  5368.  Id., line 5412.  Bernier- 
Guerri of  Cambrai- 
"  Sire asez poez plaidier  -. 
Qe par celui g1 tot a a ba~llier 
"B.  frere, por Dieu venez avant.  Ja vos secors ne 11  ara mestier 
Cls roi est fel .  .  Qe ne li face toz les membres trenchier." 
Iceste werre, par le cors S. Amant 
cOmmo~l~a  11,  se sevent 11  auauant.  Id., line 6425.  Gucrri- 
FaisOnq 11  gucro,  f~anc  clieveller  va~l  Cest coart roi deit on bien essilier, 
llult.'!  Car cebte guerre nos fist il commencier." O~AP.  11.1  JUSTICE  AND  LAW.  31 
CHAPTER  11. 
JUSTICE  AND  LAW. 
WE  have  dealt  with  that aspect  of  feudalism  which  would 
seem  to present  a  conception  of  social  or  political  relations 
very different from those which we have hitherto considered, 
and we  must recognise that we  have here a  principle which 
has exercised and still exercises a great influence in the actual 
working of  political and social relations.  When, however, we 
set out to examine the structure of  feudal society more com- 
pletely, we find that this principle of  personal obligation and 
fidelity is only one of  many principles, and that the normal 
conditions of  medisval society were not determined by such 
considerations alone.  No doubt the feudal system as a whole 
did materially affect the development of  the method of  govern- 
rnent in the Middle Ages,  but our own impression is that it 
did not really alter the conception  of  the nature of  political 
society to the extent which  might  be supposed, and that in 
the end its influence was in the main to strengthen the normal 
tendencies in tlie development of  constitutional order. 
There is still a  vulgar impression that in the Middle Ages 
men looked upon authority as irresponsible, that they conceived 
of the ruler as a person who exercised a capricious and almost 
unlimited authority over his subjects, and that men had little 
knowledge  of, or  care for,  any rational  principles  of  social 
organisation. 
We have endeavoured in the first volume to point out how 
wholly incorrect such an impression proves to be when  con- 
fronted with the energetic and abundant literature of  political 
thought in the ninth century, and in the last volume we have 
dealt with the carefully considered  theories of government of 
the civilians and Canonists, especially of  the twelfth century. 
It may be imagined that while this is true, the feudal system, 
its insistence upon the merely  personal  element  in  social 
relations, had undermined these reasoned judgments, and had 
diverted the attention of practical men from the consideration 
of the principles  of  political order.  It is no doubt true that 
the compilers of  the feudal law books were primarily practical 
men, trying to set down the details of  the customs and regula- 
tions of mediaeval society, and oot theorists in jurisprudence or 
politics ; but this in some ways only brings into sharper relief 
the fact that the system which they were describing embodied 
very important and more or less determinable principles,  and 
that they v, ere in a large measure conscious of  these principles 
and tenacious in maintaining them.  As  we  shall see, so far 
from its being trne that they conceived of  authority as some- 
thing arbitrary and capricious, they conceived of it as a thing 
very sharply defined and very severely limited.  The truth is 
that the characteristic defect of  the system of  mediaeval society 
was not that it  left  too much liberty for arbitrary and capricious 
action, but that it tended to fix both rights and obligations to 
such an extent as to run the risk first  of  rendering govern- 
ment  unworkable,  and secondly of  rendering the movement 
and growth of  life impossible. 
It is of  course  perfectly  true that mediaeval society often 
seemed to oscillate  between  an uncontrollable and arbitrary 
despotism, and an anarchical confusion, but this was due, not 
to the want  of  a  clear  conviction of  the rights and duties of 
rulers and subjects, but to the absence of  an effective instru- 
ment of  government.  The history  of  mediaeval society con- 
stantly illlpresses upon us the conviction that the real difference 
between a barbarous and a civilised political system lies in the 
fact  that  the  latter  has  an  almost  automatically  working 
and judicial  machinery,  while  the former  is 
dependent upon the chance of the presence of  some exception- 
""J'  and clear-sighted individual ruler. 
.  The truth is that the men  of  these times were in no way 
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for the great principles  of  human  life,  of  which  law  is the 
embodiment, but that they had no efficient civil service and 
police to secure the smooth execution  of  law.  They  appre- 
hended very clearly the principles of  political and social order, 
but it has taken all these centuries to work  out an adequate 
instrument for giving them practical effect. 
To the men of  the Middle Ages, as to every serious thinker 
upon politics,  the principle  which  lies  behind  every form of 
the authority of  the state is the principle  of  justice.  The 
justification  of  authority is  that it  represents  the principle 
of  justice ; the purpose of  it is to maintain justice.  There 
is  a  passage  in  one  of  the  French  epics  of  the  twelfth 
century which is very characteristic of  the temper and judg- 
ment of  the Middle  Ages.  The purpose  of  God,  the writer 
says,  in making the king,  is not to satisfy  his  appetite  or 
to enable  him  to rob  the poor,  but  that  he  should  tread 
down all wrongs under his feet, and that he should hearken to 
the complaint of  the poor man and do him right.l 
This judgment that authority stands for the maintenance and 
vindication  of  righteousness  lies  behind  the whole  structure 
of  feudal law.  It is admirably expressed in a phrase of  the 
Assizes  of  the Court of  Burgesses  of  Jerusalem : "  La dame 
ni le sire n'en  est seignor se non  dou dreit,"  and "  mais bien 
sachies qu'il n'est mie seignor de faire tort."  The authority 
of  the lady or lord is only an authority to do law or justice 
-for  the  phrase  implies  both-they  have  no  authority  to 
behave  unjustly.  Here  is  a  great  principle  stated  with  a 
certain  epigrammatic  force.  It  is  true  that  this  principle 
was  not  novel,  but  corresponds  with  the  traditions  of  the 
Roman  and Canon law,  and no doubt arose directly out of 
1 "  Le  Couronnement  de  Louis," 
line 176 
"  Filz Loo'is, a celer ne te quier, 
Quant Deus fist rei por peuples justicier 
I1 nel fist mie por false lei jugier, 
Faire luxure, ne alever pechi6, 
Ne eir enfant por retolir sen fie, 
Ne veve fame tolir quatre deniers ; 
Ainz deit les tore abatrc soz ses piez, 
Encontrcval et foler et plcissier. 
Ja  a1 povre ome no te chalt de tencier : 
Se il se claime ne t'en deit ennoier 
Ainceis le deis entendre et conseillier, 
Por l'amor Dcu de son droit adrecier ; 
Vers l'orgoillos  te deis faire si fier 
Comme  liepart  qui gent  vueille  man- 
gier." 
a Assises do la Cour des ~ourgeois,  z6' 
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$hose political  principles  of  the Teutonic societies  which  me 
have already considered,  as they are expressed in the writers 
of  the ninth century.'  But, though  the principle  was tradi- 
tional,  the whole  contents of  the Assizes  show  very  clearly 
that it was  no merely formal tradition,  but rather that the 
of such a typical feudal state as t,he kingdom of 
~~~~sahml  represented the effort to secure its reality. 
~t is worth our while to consider the character of  the whole 
passage from which  these words  are taken.  If  any man or 
woman, knight  or  burgess,  has obtained a  judgment  of  the 
court,  and  the  king  or  queen  endeavours  to  prevent  its 
execution, this is a sin against God and their oath.  For the 
king has sworn to maintain the good usages  and customs of 
the kingdom,  to protect the poor  as well  as the rich in the 
enjoyment  of  their  rights.  If  he  now  breaks  his  oath  he 
denies  God, and his  men  and the people  should not permit 
this,  for "  la  dame  ni le  sire n'en  est  seignor  se  non  dou 
dreit." 
Here is indeed an admirable summary of  the principles of 
government,  and of the relations of  rulers  and subjects ; we 
shall  presently  consider  this  more  closely  under  the  terms 
of  the place  of  law  in the political  principles  of  feudalism, 
but  in the meanwhile it is  important to observe  how  clear 
Of.  vol.  i.  chaps.  5,  18 ; vol.  ii. 
part 1. chaps.  1, 2 ; Part 11.  chnps. 
2, 3. 
'  Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois,' 
26:  "S'il  avient  que  un  homme  ou 
Une  feme seit jug4 par la cort, qui que 
il soit, ou chevalier ou borgbs, et le roi 
OU 1% rayne,  do  cuy est la terre, ne le 
veut  lai8se.r  desfairc au juise  ou il est 
jug6  par  droit,  il fait tort, et si  vait 
centre  niou  et contro son  sairement ; 
et il meysrnes se fauce et ne  peut  cc 
par  droit.  Car  le  roi  jure  tout 
premier,  sains,  de  maintenir  tow 
les  des autres rois ; aprds jure  cle 
mainBnir  10s  bons  has  ot  les  bones 
COustumes  dou resume ; aprds jure  de 
mainBnir et de garder 8,  dreit, contre 
A son poer, auci le povre 
VOL.  111. 
comlne  lo  riche et le  grant comme le 
pctit;  aprbs  juro  de  maintenir  cos 
homes  liges  k  drcit contre toutcs per- 
sonnes, segont l'us de sa cort, par ces 
homes  ligcs.  Et c'il  avient puis,  en 
aucune maniere, que il vaise contre ses 
sairemens,  il fait tout premier tort et 
ren6e  Dieu, puis que il fauce  CO  que il 
a  jur6.  Et ne  l'deivent  soufrir  cee 
homes ni le peuple ; car la dame ne le 
sire n'en ost seigneur se non dou droit, 
et do  cos  homes  faire  son  comande- 
ment, et de reseivre ses rentes par tout 
et  cos  dreitures.  Mais  bien  saclli6s 
qu'il  n'est  mie  seignor  do  faire  tort, 
car se il le  faiseit,  donc  n'i  avercit  il 
desous  lui  nu1  homc  qui  droit  deust 
faire no dire, puis qui le sire meyme se 
fauce por faire tort." 
a 34  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  PEUDAIJSM.  [PART  r. 
and well  defined is the general conception  of  the nature of 
political  authority.  The  feudal  lawyers  do  not  generally 
discuss abstract principles, but it is easy to see that behind 
the detail of regulations there lay the assumption that these 
represented some principles of  what was reasonable and equit- 
able, that political authority represented moral and religious 
, ions.  as well as purely legal obligat' 
Some of  the law  books,  and especially  the Assizes  of  the 
Court of  Burgesses, were  strongly influenced  by the revived 
study of the Roman law, and in these we find a more definite 
attempt to deal with the abstxact nature of  justJice.  These 
Assizes  begin  with  a  paraphrase  of  the  first  title  of  the 
Institutes of  Justinian,  and it is interesting to see how  the 
compiler  blends  religious  and legal  conceptions  to  express 
his  meaning.l 
The whole conception of  the feudal lawyers is summed up in 
a very important and significant passage in Rracton's treatise on 
the laws of  England.  The king, he says, must, at his corona- 
tion, swear three things-first,  that he will do what lies in him 
to secure that the Church and all Christian people may have 
peace in his  time ;  secondly, that he will forbid rapine and 
wrong-doing among all classes of  the people ; thirdly, that in 
all his judgments he will ordain equity and mercy as he hopes 
for mercy from God.  The king is indeed elected for this very 
purpose, tllat he sho111d  do justice to all men, and that through 
him God may distribute His judgments, for it would be useless 
to make laws  if  there were  not some one  to enforce them. 
The king is  God's  vicar  upon  earth,  and it is his  duty to 
1 '  Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois,' 
1 : "Do  justise  et de dreiturc  le cou- 
mencement  de  so  livre  devons  dire. 
Tout premibrement devons querre jus- 
tise,  par  son  dreit  douner  a  chascun 
llomme  et a  chascune feme :  car  en 
Latin  justise  se  descrive enci :  '  Jus- 
titia est constans et perpetua voluntas 
ius  suum  cuique  tribuendi.'  L  Con- 
stans,'  ce  est,  ferm  doit  estre  en  fei 
et en  justise,  car  celuy  qui  eat  Ecrm 
en fei et cn justise, oil vit et non mora 
mie.  Car  ce  dit 1'Escriture en la lei : 
'  Justus ex  fide vivit ' ce  est, le just0 
home si vit par fei.  Encement justis0 
deit estro eternel, c'est a dirc parrnablop 
car David  dist :  '  Justitia  Dei  manet 
in  seculum  seculi,'  c'est  a  dire  18 
droiture de Dieu est a touz jours  Per- 
durable.  Donc  do  fei  et  de  justisO 
devons  aver  maticre  tout  premiere- 
ment,  si  que  par  fei  et  par  justise 
puissons  rendro  son  dreit  a  chascuD 
home et a chascune feme." 
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divide right from wrong, the equit'able from the inequitable, 
his subjects may live honest,ly, and that no man should 
injure another. 
power, indeed,  he should excel  all his  subjects, for he 
should have no equal nor superior, specially in administering 
justice.  For the king,  inasmuch  as he  is  God's  vicar  and 
servant, can do nothing except that which he can do lawfully. 
~t is indeed  said that what pleases  the prince has the force 
of  law,  but  at the end of  this law there follow the words, 
cum lege regia, quae de imperio lata est,"  &C., that is, not 
everything is law which  may be thought  to be his  will,  but 
only that  which  is  determined  upon  with  the intention  of 
making laws, wit11 the authority of the king, with the counsel 
of  his magistrates, and after due deliberation and discussion. 
The authority of the king is the authority of  law (or right), 
not of  wrong.  The king, therefore, should use the aathority 
of  law  (or right) as being  the vicar and servant  of  God  on 
earth, for that alone is the authority of  God ; the adhority 
of  wrong belongs to the devil, and not to God, and the king 
is  the servsnt of  him whose work  he  does.  Therefore when 
the king does justice  he is the vicar of  the eternal King, but 
the servant of  the devil when he turns aside to do wrong.  Por 
the king has his title from the fact that he governs well, and 
not  from the fact that he reigns, for he  is  a  king when  he 
governs  well,  but  a  tyrant  when  he  oppresses  the  people 
entrusted  to him.  Let him  therefore restrain his  authority 
by  the  law,  which  is the bridle  of  authority, let  him  live 
according to law, for this is the principle of  human law that 
laws bind him who makes them, as it  is said, "  digna vox maies- 
regnautis  est  legibus  se alligatum  principem  profiteri," 
and  again,  "  Bihil tam proprium  est  imperii,  qnam  Iegibus 
~~vere.''  and "  maius  imperio  est  legibus  submittere princi- 
Paturn," and "  merito debet retribuere legi, quia lex tribuit ei, 
enirn lex quod ipse sit re=."  1 
'  Braeton, '  De Legibus et Consuetu-  subdito.  Imprimis,  se  esso 
Pf "-  >bus  Angliz.'  iii.  9.  2  (fol.  107) :  cepturum  et  pm  viribus  opem  im- 
enim  in  coronatione  sua,  in  psnsurum,  ut  ecclesiae  Dei  et  omni 
nomine  Jwu  Christi  prastito  sacra-  populo  Christian0 vera  pax  omni suo 
mento,  tria promittere populo sibi  ternpore  observetur.  Secundo,  ut 38  THE  INFLUENCE  OF FEUDALISnI.  [PART  I.  c=@. 11.1  JUSTICE  AND  LAW. 
To the feudalist, indeed, law is in such a sense the founda- 
t~on  of  authority,  that where  there is  no  law  there  is  no 
authority.  In the  terms  of  a  famous  phrase  of  Bracton, 
"  There is no king where \\ill rules  and not law." 
Braeton is indeed careful to maintain that all men are under 
the  king, while he is under no man, but only under God ; but he 
is under the law, for the law makes the king.  And he is under 
the law precisely  because he is God's  vicar, for Jesus Christ 
whom hc represents upon earth willed to be under the law that 
he might redeem those who were under the law ; and thus the 
blessed Virgin Mary, the mother of  the Lord, did not refuse to 
submit herself  to the ordinances of  the law.  The king ~hould 
do likewise, lest his authority should be unrestrained ; there is 
no one greater than the king in administering justice,  but he 
should be as the least in r~ceivi~~g  the judgment of  the 1aw.l 
We shall have to recur to this passage, and to deal with some 
sentences which  follow those we  have here  cited, as well as 
amator  iustlcle,  in  terrls  princlpes 
regnare  volu~t,  ut iuns  semitas  certls 
legibus limitantcs contentlones singulas, 
quas inlmica pacis discordla parturtv~t, 
mdicii calculo d~fiinirent  " 
1  Bracton.  '  De  Legibus  et  Con- 
suetudlnibus Anglice,'  1  8. 5 (fol  5b) 
"  Sunt etlam  sub rege liberl homlnes, 
et servi,  et eius potestat~  subiectl, et 
omnes  qudem  sub  eo,  et  lpse  sub 
nullo,  nisi  tantum  sub  deo.  Parem 
alltom non habet rex m regno suo, qula 
SIC  amitteret  precepturn,  cum  pal  in 
parem non habeat Imperlum.  Item nec 
multo fortius supenorem, nequc poten- 
t~orem  habere  debet quia  SIC  esset in 
ferior s~bi  subiectis, ct lnferlores pares 
esse  non  possunt  potentloribus.  Ips~ 
autem rex non  debet esse sub 11ommo 
sad sub deo et sub lcpe, quia lex faclt 
regem.  Attribuat igitur rex  leg^,  quod 
lex attr~bult  ei, videlicet dominationem 
et potestatcm,  non  est  enlm  rex  ubi 
domlnntur  voluntas  et  non  lex.  Et 
quod sub lege esse debeat, cum slt der 
vicanus,  evldenter  apparet  ad  simil~- 
tudinem  Jesu  Christi,  cuius  vices 
gerit  in  terris.  Qu~a  verax  del  mi- 
sencordla,  cum  ad  recuperandum 
humanum  genus  ineffab~l~ter ei 
multa  suppeterent,  hanc  potissimam 
eleg~t  viam  qua ad destruendum  opus 
diaboh non  virtute uteretur  potentle, 
sed inst~tie  ratione.  Et sic esse voluit 
sub  lege,  ut eos,  qui  sub  lege  erant 
redimerot,  nolu~t emm  uti  viribus 
sed  md~c~o.  Sic  etlam  benta  del 
gcnitrix,  Virgo  Maria,  mater  dominl, 
quz   singular^  privlleg~o snpra  legem 
fmt,  pro  ostendendo  tamen  humlh- 
tatis  exemplo  legallbus  subdi  non 
refugit  instltutis.  Sic  ergo  rex,  no 
potestas sua maneat infrenata.  Igltur 
non  debet esse maior  eo  in regni  Sue 
in exh~bitione  juris, mlnimus autem ew 
debet, vel quasl, ln iudicio susclpiendo. 
si petnt " 
Cf.  id,  n  24  1. 
Cf  also  '  Jostice  et Plet,'  I.  2.  3 
"  L1  prince n'est  pas sus la 101, mds  la 
101 est sus le prince , quar 11  11  donerent 
tie1  pnv~hge  comme 11  avoient."  (Cf 
Cod., I.  14. 4.) 
,,th  other passages related to this matter.  In the meanwhile 
it is sufficient to observe the emphatic assertion that kingship 
is  without law, and that the king is not only under 
~,,d  but also under the law.  It may perhaps be suggested that 
the evidence of Bracton as to the principles of  feudalism cannot 
be accepted without much caution, for his work belongs to that 
time  when  feudal relations were  giving way before national. 
Caution is no doubt necessary, but in this case we need have no 
scruple in taking Bracton's  phases as representative  of  the 
general system of feudal law, for these are precisely the prin- 
ciples which are set out in all the earlier feudal law books. 
It is this principle which  is emphatically  expressed  in the 
forms attendant on the coronation of  the medizeval king.  We 
have in the first volume dealt at some length with the great 
significance of  the coronation  oath in the earlier  medizeval 
societies ;  it  was equally important in the feudal State.  Jean 
d'Ibelin describes at  length the circumstances attendant on the 
succession to the kingdom of Jerusalem.  The king is to swear 
that he will help the Patriarch of Jerusalem and protect the 
liberties of the Church, that he will do justice to widows and 
orphans, that he will maintain the ancient customs and assizes 
of the kingdom, and that he will keep all the Christian people 
of  the kingdom  according to their ancient and approved cus- 
toms, and according to the assizes of  his predecessors in their 
rlghts and "  justises,"  as a Christian king and a faithful servant 
of God ought to do.  And what the king swears all the men of 
the kingdom are also to swear, that they \\ill hold and maintain 
the good usages and customs of  the kingdom.2 
l Cf. vol. 1  chap. 20. 
2  '  Assizes of  Jerusalem,'  Jean d'Ibe- 
Iln, vn. : "  Je trl . . .  promct a tel mon 
eelgnor  tel,  patriarche  de  Jerusalem 
'  . que  je  de  cest  lour  en  avant, 
ton feel a~dcor  et defendcor de ta 
persone  contre  toz  homes  vivant  el 
de Jerusalem.  Les possessions 
et  les  franchises  de  la  sainte  ygllse 
do Jolusalem  rna mere et de totes les 
ygllses apaltonant  ti  11  principaument 
' ' ' en  mon  tens  malntendrai  a elles, 
... 
as veves  et as orfenins justise  feral; 
les  privileges  des  beneu~es  reis  mes 
dovanciers et les  asslses  dou  rolaume 
et dou re1 Amauri et dou re1  Baudoyn 
son  fiz,  et les  ancienes  costumes  et 
assises dou rolaume de Jerusalem gat - 
derai,  et tot le  peuple  crestien  dou 
dit  roiaume,  selonc  les  costumes  an- 
cienes et  aproveez do ce rnesme rolaume, 
et  selonc  les  assises  des  devant  dls 
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This  principle  of  the loyal observance of  the law  is well 
expressed in another place where Jean d'Ibelin  says that the 
kings and nobles of  Jerusalenl should be wise, loyal, and good 
administrators of  justice : they must be loyal, for they must 
loyally keep and govern themselves and their people, and must 
not do or suffer to be done disloyalty or falsehood ; they must 
be  good  administrators  of  justice,  for they must uphold  the 
rigl~t~s  of  every man in their several courts and 1ordships.l 
The same principle is again tersely expressed in one of  the 
Norman law books.  When the Duke of  Normandy is received 
as Duke he must swear to serve the Church of  God, and to 
keep good peace and justice according to law ;  and again, in 
the most important of  the feudal law books of  Germany, the 
' Sachsenspiegel,'  when  the king is elected he is to swear to 
uphold the law of  the kingdom, according to his power.3 
We have a,lready dealt with the important passage in which 
Bracton  sets out the same principle in relation  to the coro- 
nation oath of  the King of  England,4  and Bracton is only com- 
menting  on  the immemorial  customs  attendant  on  English 
coronations,  customs which  had not been  in any  way inter- 
rupted by the Norman Conquest. 
garderai, sl colno roi crostien et feil de 
Dieu le doit, fuire en 8on roiaume." 
Id.  id., cxi. : "  Et toz les homcs dou 
roiaume  do  Jerusalem  deivent  jurer 
ausi de garder les assizes,  et les  bons 
us ct les b~nes  coustumes dou reaume 
do Jrrusnlem et tenir et maintenir." 
Id. id.,  viii. : "  Le  chief  seignor 
dou roiaume do Jerusalem, seit rei  ou 
autre, et toz les barons et seignors dou 
dit roiaumo,  qui ont court et coins et 
justise.  dcivent estre sages, loiaus, droi- 
turierv  et bons  justisiers  . . . loiaus, 
qui  il  loiaument  teignent,  mainent, 
mainteignent  et  gouvernent  eaus  et 
]or  homes  et lor  peuple,  et quc il  ne 
facent $  lor  cscient  ni  no  sueffrent  8, 
faire 8.  leur pooir  en lor seignorie des- 
loiaut6 ne faucet6 ; dreituriers,  que  il 
teignent et mainteignent  dreituro drei- 
tement  B  chascun  en lor  cours  et en 
lor  seignories,  selono  ce  qn'll  est  on 
droit sni." 
"  Statuta  et  Consuctudines  Nor- 
manioe,' i. 1 : "  Quando dux Norman- 
nioe  in  ducem  recipitur,  sacrament0 
tenetur  ecclesiam  Dei  doservire  et ea, 
que ad eam pertinent, et bonam pacem 
tenere et  legalem iusticiam." 
'  Sachsenspiegel,'  iii.  54.  2 : "  Als: 
man  den  Koning  kiiset,  so  sal  he 
dome  rike  hulde  dun,  unde  sveren 
dat  he  recht  sterke,  undo  unrecht 
krenke,  unde  it rike  voresta  an she 
rechte, nls hc kiinne unde moge." 
Sec p.  34. 
CHAPTER  I'II. 
THE  SOURCE  OF LAW. 
~m  lam  is then  to the feudal jurist  the expression  of  the 
principle of  justice,  and it is supreme in the state, the king 
himself is the servant of the law. 
What is then the source of  law, what is the authority which 
it represents ?  It is here perhaps that it is most difficult for 
the modern to understand the Middle Ages, while it is to the 
failure to do this that we may attribute most of  the mistakes 
which  have  been  made  with  regard  to  the nature  of  the 
mediaeval  State  and  the  conception  of  government  in  the 
Middle Ages. 
Above all things we must, if  we are to make our way at all, 
discard the common conception of  sovereignty, the conception 
that a law represents the mere command of  a lawgiver, or even 
of  a community.  This conception, whose value in regard to 
modern times we cannot here discuss, is wholly foreign to the 
Middle Ages.  To tjllem the law was not primarily  something 
made or created at  all, but something which existed as a part 
the national or local Life.  The law was primarily custom, 
ledslative acts were not expressions of  will, but records or pro- 
mulgations of  that which  was  recognised  as already binding 
men.  The conception of  legislation had perhaps already 
appeared in the ninth century, but if  so it had in the main 
died Out  again in the tenth and eleventh.' 
Bra~ton,  indeed, in a wcll-known passage based on Glanvill, 
that while other countries use '' leges '' and "  jus scrip- 
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turn,"  England alone uses  unwrittell law  and cust0rn.l  His 
phrase probably is related to the fact that there were people 
in  some  parts  of  Europe who  lived  under  Roman law,  and 
possibly  to  the  great  development  of  the influence  of  the 
Roman  jurisprudence  since  the  rise  of  the  law  school  of 
Bologna  in the twelfth  century.  While, however, we  can in 
part  explain  Bracton's  saying,  and while  it was  no  doubt 
correct  about England, it is a  curiously  inaccurate view  of 
the nature of  law in the other European countries. 
If  we turn from Bracton to his great contemporary, Beau- 
manoir, in France, we find that he asserts boldly that all pleas 
are determined according to custom, and that the great feuda- 
tories like the Count of  Clermont, and even the King of  France 
himself, are bound to keep them, and cause them to be kept ; 
and Beaumanoir states the two tests by which it can be deter- 
mined whether a custom is legally binding.  The first is that 
the custom is general, and has been observed without dispute 
as far as man's memory goes, the second is that there has been 
a dispute about the matter and that there has been a judgment 
of the Court about it.2 
1 Bracton,  i.  1.  2  (fol. 1): "Cum 
autem  fere  in  omnibus  regionibus 
utatur  legibus  et  iure  scripto,  sola 
Anglia  usa est in suis finibus iure non 
scripto et consuetudine.  In  ea quidem 
ex non  scripto  ius  venit,  quod  usus 
comprobavit." 
Cf.  Glanvill, Prologue. 
Beaumanoir, xxiv.  882 : "  Pour cc 
que tuit li plet sont demen6 selonc les 
coustumes,  et que  cest  livre  goncrau- 
ment  parole  selonc  les  coustumes  de 
la  contee  de  Clormont,  noz  dirons  en 
cest chapitre briement qucle chose est 
coustume, tant soit ce que nous en aions 
prl6  especiaument en aucuns chapitrrs, 
~elonc  ce qu'il convenoit es cas de quoi 
nous parlions. . . . 
Coustume si est approuvee par l'une 
des  11  voies,  dont  l'une  des  voies 
,i  est,  quant  elle  est  generaus  par 
toute 1s contee et maintenue do si lonc 
tans comme il  peut souvenir  a  home, 
sans debat ; si comlne  quant aucuns 
hom  de  poeste  connoist  une  dete,  on 
li  fet  commandement  qu'il  ait  pai6 
dedens  v11  jours  et v11  nuis,  et au 
gentil  home  dedens  xv  jors:  ceste 
coustume est  si clere  que je  ne  la  vi 
onques debatre.  Et  l'autre voie que l'en 
doit connoistre et tenir pour coustume 
si est  quant debas en a  estd, et l'une 
dos parties se vout aidier de coustume, 
et  fu approuvee par jugement si colnmo 
il  est  avenu  mout  de  fois  en  partics 
d'oirs  et en autres querelcs.  Par  ces 
11  voies  peut  on  prouver  coustumes, 
et ces coustumes  est li  cuons tenus it 
garder et a fere si garder a ses sougBis, 
que  nus  ne  10s  corrumpe.  Et se  li 
cuens  meismes  les  vouloit  corrompre 
ou  soufrir  qa'eles  fussent  corrumpues, 
ne  le  devroit  pas  li  rois  sonfrir,  car 
il  est  tenu a  garder, et a  fcre garder 
10s coustumes de son roiaume." 
perhaps, however, the most illuminating view of  the place 
of custom in medizeval law may be found in the account of  the 
origin  of  the Assizes  of  Jerusalem  which  is  given  by  Jean 
d'Ibelin and Philip of Novara.  The story is historically  very 
improbable,'  but it is none the less important for us,  for it 
in  a  very  vivid  fashion the conceptions  of  these 
jurists.  Jean d'Ibelin tells us that when Godfrey of  Bouillon 
had  been  elected  as head  of  the newly  conquered  state of 
Jerusalem,  he,  with the advice of  the Patriarch and prillees 
and  barons,  and the wisest  men  whom  he  could  find,  ap- 
pointed a certain number of wise men to inquire of  those who 
were  in  Jerusalem  what  were  the  customs  of  their  various 
countries,  and to put  these  into  writing.  When  this  had 
been done the collection was brought before Godfrey and the 
Patriarch and notables,  and he then with  their counsel  and 
consent  selected such of  the customs as seemed good to him, 
and made Assizes and usages, by which he and all the people 
of  the kingdom were to be g~verned.~  He relates further how 
the Kings  of  Jerusalem  with  the  same  advice  and consent 
added from time to time other Assizes and altered the old ones, 
after inquiring from those who came to the Holy Land about 
their customs and usages, and how several times the Kings of 
Jerusalem  sent to other  countries to inquire directly  about 
their   custom^.^ 
We have here a very suggestive account of what these jurists 
'  Cf.  G.  Dodu,  'Histoire  des  Insti- 
tutions Monarchiques dans le Royaume 
Latin de Jerusalem,'  pp.  3G-61. 
Jean d'Ibelin, i. : "  I1 . . .  eslat par 
le  conseil dou patriarche  de la  sainte 
citk  et yglise  de Jerusalem,  et par  le 
conseill dos  princes  et dos  barons,  et 
dos  plus  sages  homes  que  il  lors  pot 
aveirs,  sages  homes  A  enquerre  et Q 
savoir  des  genz  de diverses terres  qui 
l$. estaient les usage8 de leur terres ; et 
tot  quanque ciau  que  il  ot eslu  9.  ce 
faire en  porent  saveir  ne  aprendre  il 
mirent  et firent  metre  en  escrit,  et 
aporterent cel escrlt devant le duo Gode- 
froi ;  et il  assemble  le  patriarche  et 
les  autres avant dis,  et lor  mostra et 
fist lire devant eaus col escrit ; et  aprds, 
par  lour  conseill  et par  lour  acort,  il 
concuilli  de ciaus escrits ce  que bon li 
sombla, et en fist assises et usages quo 
I'ou  deust  tenir  et maintenir  et user 
ou roiaume de Jerusalom, par les quels 
il  et ses  genz  et son  peuple  et totes 
autres manieres do genz alanz et venans 
et demorans  en  son  reiaume  fussent 
gouvernes, gard6s, tonus, maintenus, et 
men& et justisbs  9.  droit et h raison  cl 
dit roiaume." 
Jean  dlIbelin, iii. ; cf  Philip  of 
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looked upon as a great legislative action.  The circumstances 
indeed were unpara(l1eled  in medieval history, for the Kingdom 
of  Jerusalem represented the establishment of  a Western and 
Christian  state in  an  alien  and infidel  country,  while  the 
Crusaders were not a homogeneous body, but were drawn from 
many different Western countries.  They were therefore, as the 
authors of  the Assizes thought, compelled to create a system 
of  law for t<hemselves,  to proceed to a large and comprehensive 
effort  of  legislation.  It is the more significant  that in doing 
this they, according to the tradition, endeavoured scrupulously 
to ascertain the customary laws of  the varions national societies 
from which the Crusaders came, and formed their own laws by 
a process of  selection and conflation from them. 
The whole  story illustrates  very vividly  the fact that the 
medi~val  conception of law was dominated by custom, for even 
when  the jurists thought that the Crusaders had to legislate 
for a  new political  society, they conceive  of  them as doing 
this by the process of  collecting existing customs, only select- 
ing and modifying as far as was necessary to bring them into 
some sort of harmony with each other.  The Assizes of  Jeru- 
salem  were,  in  their  estimation,  primarily  written  customs. 
And it is of  interest to observe that when,  as they thought, 
the great compilation was lost, when Saladin conquered Jern- 
saleni,  and when  therefore they  could no longer  consult  the 
text of  the written customs, they at once fell back upon the 
unwritten cnstoms and the decisions of  the c0~urts.l 
We have so far been  dealing with the Assizes of  the High 
Court of  Jerusalem, but there has also come down to us a col- 
lection of  the Assizes of  the Court of Burgesses.  It  is noticeable 
that these are influenced in a high degree by the Corpus Juris 
Civilis : no doubt this seems to indicate that the population of 
l  Jean d'Ibelin,  cxi. :  "  Les  assises  asslses  ne  pevent  estre  en  pluisors 
deivent  estre  tenus  fermement  en  choses provbes,  que par le lonc  usage, 
totes choses ; et do ce de quei l'on  ne  ou  par  ce  que  l'on  l'a  veu  falre  et 
sera  certain  qui  seit  assise,  deit  1'011  user,  comme assise ; et ce est maniere 
tenir  selonc  l'usage  et  la  longue  (le lei,  et deit  estre  et est  tenu  011 
acostumance.  Et  de  ce  que  court  reiaumc  do  Jerusalem  et en celui  de 
aura  fait  esgart  ou  conoissance  ou  Chypre  miaus  que  leis  ne  decrbs  ne 
recort  qui  seit  assise,  deit  estre  tenu  decretales." 
et  maintenu  come  aasise :  car  les 
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the towns was drawn in large measure from those countries like 
the south of  France, and some parts of  Italy, in which there were 
many who lived under Roman law.  Our text of  these Assizes 
dates from a much earlier time than the works of  Jean d'Ibelin 
and Philip of  Novara, it is indeed generally thought to belong 
to some time between  1173 and 1180.  It is not quite clear 
whether the statement of  Jean d'Ibelin with regard to the origin 
of the Assizes of  the High Court refers to them also, but there 
seeins no substantial reason to doubt it.  It is also deserving 
of notice that there was established in Jerusalem a court for 
the native Syrian population,  and that this  administered  a 
justice based upon their own customs.l 
The first element in the conception of  feudal law is that it 
is custom, that it is something not made by the king or even 
by the community, but something which is a part of  its life. 
We  can, however, see that at least as early as the thirteenth 
cent~uy  there began  to reappear  the conception  of  laws  as 
being made, not that the idea of  custom as law disappears, but 
that there gradually grew up alongside of  this the conception 
that laws  could  be  made  under  certain  conditions  and by 
suitable authority.  It  is difficult to say how far the develop- 
ment of  this was  due to the pressure  of  circumstances  com- 
pelling men deliberately to make new laws, or to modify old 
ones, how far it may have been facilitated by the revived and 
extended study of  the Roman jurisprudence,  and by the sys- 
tematic development of  the Canon l:tw,  whicli in this matter 
represents  the same  principles  as the Roman  law,  and was 
indeed no doubt greatly influenced by it.  Whatever may have 
been the circumstances which produced this great change, it is 
of  the first importance in the history of  political  theory to 
observe the fact of  the change. 
We  have  here  arrived  at the  beginnings  of  the  modern 
conception of  sovereignty, that is, of  the conception that there 
is in every independent society the power of  making and un- 
making laws, some final authority which knows no legal limits, 
and from which  there is no legal  appeal.  We  cannot here 
consider  how  far,  and in  what  sense,  this  conception  was 
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present  to the polit,ical thinkers  of  the ancient  world.  Still 
less  can me  here consider what is  the real character of  the 
modern theory, how far indeed it has been thought out com- 
pletely and adequately, how far it still represents a somewhat 
crude and inorganic conception  of  society, a  somewhat crude 
and partial apprehension of  certain elements in the nature of 
the state. 
It  is at  any rate quite certain that the modern conception as 
a whole was not only unknown to the Middle Ages, but that 
it  would  have  been  to thein  almost  unintelligible.  For to 
them the law of  any particular  state represented, in the first 
place,  the customs of  the community,  which  had not been 
made, but were part of  the life of  the community; and, in the 
second place, so far as they reflected upon the principles which 
lay behind these customs, they conceived of  them as related to 
and determined by the rule of justice ; and, if and so far as 
they went further, they conceived of  the law of  the state as 
subservient to the natural law and the law of  God. 
It remains true that at least in the thirteenth century the 
conception of  definite legislative action begins to appear, and 
we  must therefore now  consider  the terms or forms  of  this 
legislative action as it is presented to us by the feudal jurists. 
We begin with a phrase of  Glanvill which bears upon its face 
the influence of  the revival of Roman law, and which is yet also 
clearly mediaeval in its principle.  The laws  of  England, he 
says, though unwritten, may properly  be called "  laws,"  for 
the law says that whatever the Prince pleases  has the force 
of  law ; that is, we  may properly  call these "  laws " which 
have been promulgated on doubtful matters with the counsel 
of  the  chief  men  and  the  authority  of  the  prince.1  We 
may  put  beside  this  some  sentences  from  the  Norman 
' Summa de legibus ' of the middle of the thirteenth century. 
"  Consuet~ldines  " are customs  observed from ancient times, 
approved by the prince, and ma,intained by the people, which 
Glanvill,  Prologue :  "  Leges  4. l)),  "  eas scilicet,  quas super dubiis 
namque anglicanas, licct non scriptas,  in  consilio  definiendis,  procerum 
leges appellari  non  videtur  ubsurdum,  quldem consllio, et pnncipis accedente 
(cum hoe ipsum lox sit, '  quod principi '  authoritate, constat ease promulgatas." 
placet,  legis  habet  vigorem " (Dig., i. 
determine  to  whom  any  tjhing belongs.  Laws  (leges)  are 
institutions made by the prince and maintained by the people 
of  the province,  by  which  every  dispute is  decided.  And 
again, laws and institutions were made by the Norman princes 
with great industry, by the counsel and consent of  the prelates, 
counts, barons, and other prudent men, for the wellbeing of  the 
human race.l 
In these passages the conception of  the authority of  law is 
related first to custom, but the writers are aware that there are 
forms of  law which have an immediate origin of  a different kind, 
which  have been  made after due deliberatjioa.  The force of 
these  laws is derived from  the authority of  the prince,  the 
counsel and consent  of  the great men, and the observation, 
or  reception,  or  maintenance  of  them by  the people : it  is 
difficult to find an exact rendering for the phrase " a populo 
conservati." 
This  conception  of  law  is  characteristic  of  the  whole 
mediaeval tradition.  It is for the prince  or king to issue or 
promulgate laws,  and without  his  authority this  cannot  bo 
done ; but to make his action legitimate he must consult the 
great and wise men  of  the nation ; and the people or whole 
community has its place, for they have to receive or observe 
the law.  This is the conception  which  we  find in the poli- 
tical writers  and in the legislative  documents  of  the ninth 
cent~ry,~  and it is evident that it continued to be the concep- 
tion  of  the  feudal  lawyers  of  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth 
centuries.  It may have some relation to the definition of  law 
by  Pa~inian.~  It is possible  that the terms  of  the phrases 
which  describe the part of  the people in legislation  may be 
related to the principle laid down by Gratian, that no law is 
1  G  Summa de Legibus,'  X. 1 : "  Con- 
Suetudines  vero  sunt  mores  ab anti- 
qultato habiti, a principibns approbati 
et a populo  conservati, quid, cuius slt, 
vel  ad  quem  pertineat  limitantes. 
Leges autcm sunt institutiones a prin- 
cipibus facte et a  populo in  provinc~a 
conso~vate, per  quas  contentiones 
Singule  deciduntur ;  sunt  enim  lcgcs 
qllasi  instiumenta  in  iure  ad  conten- 
tionum declarationem veritatis." 
Id., Prologue : " Quoniam ergo leges 
et instituta,  que  Normannorum  prin- 
cipes  non  sine  magna  provisionis 
~ndustria,  prelatorum,  comltum,  et 
baronum necnon et ceterorum virorum 
prudentium  consllio  et  consensu,  ad 
salutem humani generia statuerunt." 
Cf. vol. i. pp. 229-239. 
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valid, by whomsoever  pron~ulgated,  unless it is accepted by 
the custom of those c0ncerned.l  A similar doctrine was held 
by some at  least of  the civilians of the twelfth and thirteenth 
The same  principles,  again, are stated by  Bracton  in the 
passage of  which we have already cited the first words.  While 
in almost all other countries men follow the laws (leges) and a 
written "  jus," England alone uses not  written lam but custom ; 
it  is not, however, absurd to call the English laws "  leges," for 
that has the force of  law (legis) which has been justly  deter- 
mined and approved, with the counsel and oonsent of  the great 
men, the approval (sponsione) of the whole commonwealth and 
the authority of  the king.  And again, in another place, he says, 
that such English laws and customs, by the king's  authority, 
sometimes command, sometinles forbid, and sometimes punish 
transgressors, and inasmuch as they have been approved by the 
consent of  those who are concerned with them (utentium), and 
confirmed by the oath of  the king, they cannot be changed or 
abolished without the common  consent of  all those by whose 
counsel or consent they were promulgated, although they may 
be improved (in melius converti) even without this consent, for 
to improve is not to de~troy.~ 
There is  one great feudal  lawyer  whose  position  requires 
some special examination, and that is Beaumanoir.  For his 
phrases are, at  least at  first sight, a little ambiguous.  In some 
l  Gratian, ' Dccrotum,'  D. iv.,  after 
3.  Cf. vol. ii. p.  165. 
a  Cf.  vol. ii. pp.  61-63. 
Bracton, '  De Logibus,'  i. 1.  2 (fol. 
2) : "  Cum  autem fere in omnibus rc- 
gionibus utatur legibus et iure scripto, 
sola Anglia usa est in suis finibus iure 
non  scripto  et  consuetudine.  In ea 
quidein ex non scripto ius venit,  quod 
usus  comprobavit.  Sed  absurdum 
non  erit  leges  Anglicanas,  licet  non 
scriptas,  leges  appellnre,  curn  legis 
vigorem habeat, quicquid de consilio et 
de  consensu  magnatum  et reipublica: 
communi  sponsione,  authoritate  regis 
sive  principis  praecedente,  iuste fuerit 
clirfiuitum et approbatum." 
Id. id., i.  2. 6 : "  Huiusmodi  vero 
leges  Anglicans  et  consuetudines 
regurn  auctoritate,  iubent  quandoque, 
quandoquo votant, et quandoque judi- 
cant et puniunt  transgressores ;  quae 
quidem,  cum  fuerint  approbatae  oon- 
sensu  utentium,  et sacrament0 regum 
confirmata:,  mutari  non  poterunt  nec 
destrui sine communi  consensu  eorum 
omnium,  quorum  consilio  et consensu 
fuorunt  promulgatz.  In  melius 
tamen  converti  possunt,  etiam  sine 
oorum  consensu,  quia  non  destruitur 
quod in melius commutatur." 
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passages  he would  seem to say  simply  that the king  ia the 
legislator, and if this stood alone, we might conclude that to 
him the authority of  law was derived siniply from the king's 
will.  It is indeed possible that Beaurnanoir represents some 
tendency which was peculiar to the French monarchy, a8nd  it 
is more than probable that his conceptions of  the nature of  the 
power of  monarchy  were  strongly influenced by the revived 
study of  the Civil law, and its conception  of  the legislative 
authority of  the Emperor, and we might therefore incline to the 
conclusion  that his  position  was  different  from  that of  the 
feudal lawyers whose principles we have so far examined.  In 
order then that we may rightly estimate his position we must 
examine briefly his conception of  the origin of  kingship. 
In  an important passage, which we shall have  to consider again 
lates, Beaumanoir says that in the beginning all men were free, 
and of  the same freedom, for we all are descended from one 
common parent,  but as the number  of  men  increa,sed strife 
arose, and those who desired to live in peace recognised that 
this was impossible while every man thought himself  as good 
as others.  They therefore electcd a king, and made hin~  head 
over them, and gave him power to judge their misdeeds, a,nd  to 
make commandments and "  establissemens "  over them1  The 
phrases of the passage suggest very strongly the influence of  the 
Roman jurisprudence ; the conception of  the original equality 
of  men, the appearance of  war and its consequent confusions 
and crimes, the conception of  the people creating a king and 
giving him authority  to  make laws, these may have come directly 
to Beaumanoir by many channels,but it  is at  least very probable 
that they represent the traditions of the Institutes and Mge~t.~ 
l Beaumanoir, xlv. 1453 : '' Comment 
que plusour estnt de gent soient main- 
tenant, volru est qu'au commencernont 
tuit  furent  franc  et  d'une  meismo 
franchise ; car  choscuns  set que  nous 
descendimes  tuit  d'un  pore  et d'unc 
mere.  Mes quant li pueples commenca 
a croiatre, et guerres et  rnautalent furent 
commenci8, par  orguoil  et par  cnvie, 
qui plus regrloit lors et Eet  encore  cluc 
mestiers  ne  fust, le  communet6s  du 
VOL. In. 
peuple, cil qui avoiont talent de vivte on 
pes, regarderent qu'il ne pourroient vivre 
on pes  tant comme chascuns cuideroit 
artre  aussi  grans  sir06  l'~u~s  comme 
autres;  si  eelurent  roi,  et 10  firent 
seigneur  d'aus, et li donerent le pouoir 
d'aus  justicier  de  lor  mesfbs,  de fere 
comma~~demcnx  et ostabllssemen~  sur 
aus." 
Cf. Digest, 1. 1. 4. 8; 2. l1 ; S. l ; 
Institute, i. 2. 2. 
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The phrases  are remarkable  both  for  their  democratic  con- 
ception of  human nature, and of  the source of authority, and 
for their sharply marked conception of  the legislative power of 
the king, and if they stood alone we  might have to conclude 
that Beaumanoir's theory of  the nature of  law was diflerent 
from that which we have so far seen to be characteristic of  the 
feudal juuists.  But the phrases do not stand alone, and in order 
to form a complete judgment upon his theory we must examine 
some other passages in his  work.  The first is one in which 
Beaumanoir is careful to point out that while every baron is 
"  souverain " in his own barony, the king is "  souverain "  in all 
the kingdom, and  has thus the general care of  the  whole kingdom, 
and therefore he can make such "  establisseinens "  as he thinks 
well for the common g0od.l  The words represent an important 
development of  the conception of  the national monarchy, and 
they attribute the supreme legislative power to the king ; but 
it should be noticed  that he holds  the power  because  he is 
responsible for the care of  the whole kingdom, and exercises it 
not for his  own  ends,  but for the common  good.  The last 
phrase is important, and is constantly repeated, the legislative 
power must be used for the comnlon good.2 
In  other passages we find, however, phrases which add another 
principle to these.  The king may make "  establissemens "  only 
for his own domain, and in this case they do not concern his 
barons, who must continne to administer their lands according 
to the ancient customs.  When, however, the "  e~t~ablissemens  " 
are general, they are i11  force throughout the kingdom.  But 
such  "  establissemens " are made "  par  tres  grant  conseil," 
1  Beaumanoir.  xxxiv.  1043 : "  Pour 
ce  que  nous  parlons en cest  livre,  en 
plusours  lieus,  du souverain,  et de ce 
qa'il  peut et deit  fere,  li  aucun  por- 
roient  entendre, pour  ce  que  nous  1112 
nommons conte ne duc, que ce fust du 
roi,  mais  en tous  les  lieus  que li  rois 
n'est  pas nomm0s,  nous  entendons  de 
ceus qui tienent en baronie, car chnscuns 
barons  est  souverain  en  sa  baronie. 
Voirs est que li rois est souverainu par 
dessua tous, et n de son tlroit, la general 
garde de tout son roiaume, par quoi il 
pot fere teus establissemens commc il li 
plest  pour  le  comlnun  pourfit,  et ce 
yu'il  establist  doit  estrc  tenu.  Et si 
n'i a nu1 si grant dessoi~s  li clue ne puist 
ostre  tres en sa  court  par  defnuLe  de 
droit  ou  pour  faus jugement,  ot  ponr 
tous lcs cas qui touchent le roi." 
P Cf.  id.,  xlix.  1512:  "Mes  li  rois 
le  peut  bien  fere  qunnt  il  li  plest  et 
quanL  il  voit  que  c'est  li  cornmum 
pourfis." 
and for the common  good.'  Again,  in  another  place ; the 
king  may indeed  make new  "  establissemens,"  but he must 
take great care that he makes them for reasonable cause, for 
the common good, and "  par grant conseil." 
~eaumanoir  does not anywhere  explain  what precisely  he 
means by the words "  par grant conseil " ; but it would seem 
most natural to understand them as referring to the need  of 
consultation with some body of  persons qualified to advise the 
king.  We  must then  at least correct our first impression of 
~eaumanoir's  theory of legislation.  He would  seem to place 
the royal authority in a more isolated position than is general 
in the feudal jurists,  he may be more influenced than they are 
in general by the newly recovered conception of  the legislative 
power  of  the emperor in the Roman law,  and may possibly, 
thougli  on  this  we  can  express  no  opinion,  represent  some 
conception  of  monarchy  which  was  developing  specially  in 
France at that time.  But, on the other hand, in his insistence 
upon  the need  of  reasonable  cause,  on the "  grant conseil," 
and on the principle that legislation must be for the common 
good, he comes very near to the general principles of  the other 
feudalists.3 
We are therefore justified  in the conclusion that the feudal 
conception of  law is first that of custom ;  and secondly, that 
So  far as men began to recognise the necessity of  actual legis- 
lative action, they conceived of  the law as deriving its authority 
not from the will or command of the ruler alone, but also from 
the counsel  and consent of  the great  or wise  men,  and the 
assent  of  the whole  community. 
Id., xlviii.  1499 : "  Mais  quant li 
Rois  fet  aucun  eutablissement  espe- 
cieaument  en  son  dernaine,  si  baron 
no  lessont pas pour ce  a user  on  leur 
hrres, selonc les anciennes coustumes. 
Me8  quant  li  establissemens  ost 
generaus,  il  doit  courre  par  tout 
roiaurne.  Et nous  devons  croire 
'We  tel  establissement  sont  fet  par 
tres  grant conseil  et pour  le  commun 
pourfit." 
Id.,  xlix.  6  :  "Tout  soit  il  rtinsi 
que li Rois puist fere nouveaus establis- 
semens,  il  doit  mout  prendre  yarde 
qa'il  les  face  par  rcsnable  canse,  et 
pour  le commun pourfit,  et par grant 
conseil." 
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CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  MAINTENANCE  OF  LAW. 
THE feudal jurists  held  clearly and maintained  emphatically 
that the relations of  men to each other are determined by the 
principles of  justice,  that the law is the form and expression 
of  justice,  and that it is in the strict observance of  the lam 
that men  find  the security  for  the maintenance  of  jvstice. 
The  principle  is  clear,  but  it may  be  said  that  this  was 
little  more  than  formal,  that the king might indeed  swear 
to administer justice  and to maintain the law, but there was 
no method by which this obligation could be enforced.  How 
far this was from being true we shall see as we examine more 
closely the principles of  the structure of  feudal society. 
We shall do well to remind ourselves  of  a very noticeable 
phrase in that passage in the Assizes of  the Court of Burgesses 
of  Jerusalem  which  we  have  already  quoted.  If  the lord 
should break his oath and refuse to minister law and justice to 
his people, they are not to permit t8his.l  This is a blunt ex- 
pression of  the principle which underlies the structure of  feudal 
society, and the relations of  lord and vassal.  But feudal law 
did more than recognise the principle, it provided a carefully 
constructed machinery for carrying it out. 
We must turn from the principle  of  the supremacy of  law 
to the method of  its determination  and enforcement.  That 
is,  we  must  examine  the  nature  of  the  feudal  court,  and 
the  relation  of  lord  and  vassal  to  this,  and we  begin  by 
examining  these  questions  as  they  are  presented  in  the 
~ssiaes  of  Jerusalem.  Jean  d'Ibelin  draws  out  with  great 
care the nature of the mutual obligations of  lord and vassal. 
Be expresses  in  the  highest  terms  the  fidelity  which  the 
vassal owes to his  lord, the service and help which he must 
rellder  to him,  the secrecy  which  he  must  maintain  about 
his  counsels, and the respect  which  he owes to his  wife and 
daughter,l  and he  enumerates  those  distinctive  obligations 
which  the vassal  owes  to his  lord,  which  we  have  already 
menti~ned,~  but  at the same time he insists  that the lord is 
bound to his vassal by the same faith which the vassal owes to 
him, and that he may not touch his vassal's body or his fief 
except by the judgment of  the court.3 
Tliese are the principles  of  the relation between  lord and 
vassal,  but  they  are not mere  abstract principles,  they  are 
legally enforceable.  If the vassal fails to discharge his obliga- 
tions, and the lord can establish this by the judgment of  the 
court, the vassal will lose his fief, and the lord can treat him as 
a, traitor, and as one who has broken his faith.4  On the other 
hand, if  the lord breaks his faith to the vassal, the vassal can 
bring the matter before the court, md  if the court decides in 
his favour, it will declare him to be free from his obligations, 
and  he  will  hold  his  fief  without  service  for  his  lifetime. 
Jean dlIhelin, 196. 
See p.  26. 
a  Jean  dlIbelin,  196 : "  Le  seignor 
ne  doit  metre  main,  ne  faire  metro 
main  el  cors  ni  el  fib  de  son  home, 
si  ce  n'est  par  l'csgart  ou  par  la 
conoissance de sa court ; et est tenus 
A  son  home,  se  me  sernble,  par  la 
fei  qui  est  entri'aus  de  totes  les 
choses avant dittes de  quei  home  est 
tenus  iL  son scignor ;  car entre seignor 
et home  n'a  que la  fei,  et la fci  deist 
coneue  et gardbe  entre  eaus  6s 
choscs avant dites." 
Id. id.:  "Et qui  faut  vers  son 
Reignor  d'aucunes  des  avant  dittvs 
~hoses,  il ment sa fei vers lui ; et se le 
%nor  Yen  pout  prover  par recort  de 
tout,  il  pora  faire  de  lui  et de  ses 
choscs  come  some  ataint  de  fei 
mentie.  . . .  Et  qui  defaut  B  son 
wignor, je  rrei  que il perdreit B sa vie 
le fi6 que il tient de lui." 
Id. 20G : " Se home ment sa fei vers 
son  seignor  ou le  seignor  A son home 
. . . et  de  laquol  dos  choses  dessuz 
ilittos  que l'un  mesprent  vers  l'ailtre, 
il  mert sa fei  vers l'nutre.  Et se  le 
seignor  en  at~int  son  home,  il  est 
encheu en sa mcrci de cors et de fi6 et 
de quanque il a, et Be  il on viaut aveir 
dreit et il le rcquiert  B sa court qu'elle 
li conoisse quel dreit il en deit aveir, je 
ouit que la court conoistra qu'il en peut 
de son cors faire justise,  selono cc  que 
le  mesfait  sora,  de  trayson  ou  dc  fei 
mentie,  et que il peut son  66 et totes 
ce9  autres  choses  prendro  et faire  en 
come  cle  choze  de  traitor  ou  de  fei 
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Neither  lord  nor  vassal  can  take the matter into his  own 
hands, but must submit his complaint to the court, and abide 
by its judgn1ent.l  It is tlie court which  is the judge  in all 
cases  of  dispute about the relative  rights  or  duties  of  lord 
and vassal. 
It  is thus important to ask what was the composition of  the 
feudal court.  It was  the court  of  the lord, and one  might 
naturally enough think that it was the lord who decided the 
matters brought before it.  Rut this was not the case ; the 
court was  composed  in principle  of  all the vassals,  and the 
judgment of  the court was the judgment  of  its members.  It 
was even by some disputed whether the lord was properly speak- 
ing a member of  the court at  all.  Jean d'Ibelin's work contains 
a very interesting and significant discussion of this subject.  He 
is dealing with the question how a man is to claim a fief wliicll 
he,  or his ancestors, have held, and says that the man is to 
appear before the lord and say by his advocate that he, or his 
ancestors, have held the fief, and that if the lord doubts this he 
is prepared to prove it "  par le recort de partie des honies de 
vostre court."  The lord may reply that proof  must be "  par 
privilege ou par recort de court," and that proof "  par la recort 
de partie des homes de la court "  is not valid, for there could be 
no  court  unless  the lord  himself  or  his  representative  were 
present.  To this the vassal replies  that on the contrary the 
lord may not sit in the court, "  as esgars ne as conoissance ne 
5,  recors que il font " ; the vassals are to sit witliout the lord, 
and when they have arrived at  their decision, it  is to be reported 
to the lord as the judgment of the court.  Jean d'Ibelin  does 
not formally pronounce a judgment upon the whole question, 
but he is clear that the presence of the lord is not necessary to 
constitute a proper court, at least in  eases concerning claims 
l  Jean d'Ibelin,  206 : " Et  se l'omo 
ataint son selgnor on cou~  t que 11  a mos 
pris veIs lui de sa fa, et 11  en requiert 
a avcir dreit par esgart ou par conols- 
sancc de court  JR cult que In court e5gar- 
l  dera ou  conoistra qucs l'ome  est quieto 
vers lui dc sa fei, et a son fib sans ser 
vlsc tote so vie. . . . Ne l'un n? peut de 
ce ataindro I'autre, se n'est par reconoi- 
sance qu'il  on a~t  faite en court ou par 
quei  l'un  mesple~gne  vels  l'autre  en 
court  de  aucurls  des  devant  dittes 
clioses .  car  selgnor  ne  pent  prover 
vers son home aucunc chose qu  monte 
H.  ~a  fe~,  ne  l'ome  vers  son  selgnor, 
t~utlemcnt  que par le recort dos homcs 
de la court don se~gnor." 
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to the tenure of  a fief.'  In anotller passage he describes the 
proper  procedure  of  the court  when  the king  or  his  repre- 
sentative is not pre~eat.~  The court, then, whose duty it is 
to enforce upon  lord  and vassal alike the due observance  of 
I  jean  d'Ibelin,  166 :  "Et  se  le 
vlaut  rlrns  dire  ou  esloiqnler 
celle  requeste,  11  11  peut  respondre ; 
. .  L  Je  n'entens  que  je  tel  recolt 
voz  dB1  faiie, ne  que  11  voz  vallle  ne 
dg.  valelr  8,  avelr  la  salsine  que  V02 
me  reque~6s, tot  11euss6s vos  enssl 
come voz  d~ttes,  se me1 ou mon 
aucestre  ne  fume  o  les  homes  de 
nosire court, par quei voz voles prover 
on  dlt ou  CG  fu fait que voz  offr6s a 
prolrer,  que  je  n'entens  que  court 
so  le  seignor  et  deus  de  ces 
homes  ou  plus  no  sont ensemble,  ou 
so  le  selgnor n'en  establ~st  nn homme 
en  leuc  de  lui  et autres  deus  o  lui 
come court a oyr et aveyr ou 8,  dlre ce 
qu'il lor comande que 11  en facent come 
couit ; et que  puisque  oourt  n'en  est 
N  ne  peut  estre sanz seignor  ou sans 
home  qu'il  alt establi  en son  leuc,  si 
n'entent je  por chose que v07 a168  ditte 
ne  offerte 8,  prover,  que le voz on d6e 
falrc le  recort  que  voz  mo  reqnerds, 
ne  que 11  voz vallle  ne  del  valeir  8,  la 
saisine aveir que voz me requer6s,  par 
cllose  que voz ales dite, se la court no 
l'esgarde :  ct  de  ce  me  met  je  en 
l'esgart dc la court, sauf ]non retonalll.' 
Contre  G  (  ce  peut  le  rcquerant  dirc : 
hire,  8,  ce  q~ie  voz  dittes  que  court 
n'est  que l& oh  le  selgnor  et deus de 
ces  homes  ou plus  ne  sont,  voz  dites 
votrO  volent6;  mals  je  antens  que  si 
Cst que  ens1  fuest  come  vos  dites, 11 
"'aurelt  Jsmals osgart  ne  conoissancc 
rerort  de  court,  car  selgnor  ne 
Put  nl ne deit cstre no seyr a la court 
O  homes de la court as esgars ni  as 
Conolssance ne  8,  recors  ~UC  11  font, 
le  font  11  sanz  lc  sclguor ;  et 
Want  11  10s  ont  fais  et  11  1es  ont 
retram  devant  le  seijinor,  co  que  la 
COUlb a fait, 801t  esgart ou conoissance 
ou  recort,  celu~  qu~  le  retra~t  on  la 
court dit . Slre la court R,  CO  fait.  Et 
por ce quo la court le fait, SI est clere 
chose  que  les  homes  sont  court  en 
nucun  cas  sans le seignor,  et pulsque 
11  le sont cn ailcun cas sanz le selgnor, 
ne  11  n'est  assise  ne  usaqe  qui  vaille 
que  en trl cas les  homes  de la court, 
dont  le  fib  muet,  ne  puiqsent  et 
deivent  recordcr  on  la court  ce  11  on 
veu  cclm  qui  requiert  Ia  saislue  dou 
fi6  ou  son  ancestre salsl  et tenant ou 
usant  de ce  que  11  requiert  come  de 
son fi6, ne autrement que par le recort 
des homes do  celle court ne  peut l'on 
prover  la  salsine  de  lui  ou  de  son 
ancestre  dou fi6  que 11  requiert ;  ' . . . 
Et selonc ce  qui est devant dlt, 11  me 
semble  que  la  cou~t  devrelt  esgarder 
que le seignor  n'a  chose dite por  quei 
11  dbe demorer rlue 11  ne  face  avelr  &U 
requerant le recort que 11  11  I equiert .  . . 
Que  se  autreinent  esteit,  moult  it 
enuls  pore~t  l'on  prover  nulle  saisine 
de  G6  do  lui  ou  de son  ancestre,  por 
quei  moult  de  genz  perdrelent  lcur 
dreit  et  leur  laison  par  defaute  de 
recort  de  cou~t,  laquel  chose  sere~t 
contre  drcit  ramon  et  tort  apcrt." 
Cf.  p.  65 for dlscusq~on  of  thls suhject 
by Beaurnanoir. 
2  Id. 257 :  "Et quar~t  colt est en- 
semble  por  jngement  ou  por  recort 
faire ou  p01 consell1 ou por avoiement, 
sanz le re1  ou sanz cel~ii  qui est ell son 
leuc,  11  (t.e., the  Constablc)  peut  et 
de~t  demander  l'avis  de  chascun,  OLI 
fame  le  demander au mareschal,  ce  11 
blaut.  et  pout  destraindre  chascun 
do  due ou  de  sol  aquitcr  s~ come  11 
est usage : et peut comanrler 8, retralre 
l'osgart ou la conolssancc ou le recolt 
l'aveement  que la court  a.  fah  auqu~l 
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these obligations, is illdeed the court of the lord, but its judg- 
ment is the conlnlon judgment  of all those concerned. 
It  may, however, be urged that this is very well in principle, 
bat what sanction could there be for such a comprehensive con- 
trol over lord and vassal, what power was there which could 
enforce the observation of  t,he decisions  of  the court.  This 
question may seem to us, from our modern standpoint, one of 
great difficulty, but tlie compilers of  the Assizes of  Jerusalem 
had what seemed to them a perfectly  simple and clear answer. 
The matter is dealt with both by Jean d'lbelin and by Philip 
of  Novara, but the treatment of the latter is the more complete. 
He has set out, in a passage to which we shall have to return 
later, the relation of  the overlord to the sub-vassals, as declazed 
in an Assize of Ring Aniauri, and then explains the position of 
the mesne vassals in case  of  dispute between  them  and the 
overlord.  The king, he says, recognised, when the Assize was 
establislied, that all his  liegemen,  whether they held  of  him 
immediately, or of  his  vassals,  were  bound in faith to each 
other, and could  demand aid each of  all the others,l and he 
draws out the significance of this in detail.  If  a vassal makes 
solno claim upon his lord and demands that the matter should 
be brought before the lord's  court and the lord refuses,  the 
vassal may call upon all his peers to go to the lord and demand 
that he should allow the matter to be brought before the court. 
If the lord refuse to listen to them, they must declare to the 
lord that they will discharge none of their obligation to him 
till he has  done  this.  And  thus also  if the case has  been 
brought before the court and the lord refuses to carry out its 
judgment,  the vassals  are t'o renounce  their  service  to him 
until this has been done.  And again, if  the lord or his repre- 
'  Pllilip  of  Novara,  B1 :  "  Vos 
aveis  oi  les  avantaiges  que  le  chief 
seignor a on la ligece de ses homes, aprds 
orreis  l'cschauge  et l'avantage  que les 
homes  lieges  ont  a  l'encontre  de  ce. 
JJe  roi  otroia,  R  l'establissement  de 
l'assise  que  tous  so9  homrs  ligos  qui 
totioient  do  li  ou  de ses  liomes,  queis 
qu'il  fussent,  grans  on  potis,  Emsent 
tcnil de fei l'un  b l'autre do co  que est 
clossus  escrit,  et que  chascun  d'eaus 
peust  requorre  les  autres  comes  srs 
peirs  on  tel endreit.  Et les homes  en 
sont tenu l'un  A.  l'autre,  nussi au petit 
come au plus grant, por qnei il ne seit 
entechi6  d'aucun  des  vices  por  quei 
l'on  pert  vois  en  cort.  La devise  de 
ce  par  quei  les  home  liges  sont  tenu 
l'un  a  l'autre,  est  desus  oscritr  et 
devis6e par  cehapitres." 
sentati~e  should  deprive a illan of  his  fief  without judglnent 
of  the court, the vassal's peers are to help him and give him 
force to recover  his  fief.  And  Philip  adds that he remem- 
bered that when the representative of  the Emperor (Frederick 
11.) deprived the lord  of  Beyrouth and his nephews of  their 
fiefs, this assize was cited in the court, and the court recognised 
it a$ va1id.l 
Jean  d'Ibelin maintains the same principles, and it is worth 
while to notice the emphatic phrases he uses with respect to the 
case of  a lord putting his vassal in prison without  tlie judg- 
ment of  the court.  In  such a  case his  friends  and relat,ions 
may summon all his peers to accompany them to the lord, and 
to demand his  release  or the judgment  of  the court.  If  the 
1 Philip of Novaw, 62 : "  S'il avenist 
que  aucun  des  liomes liges  venist  de- 
le chief seignor on Ia Haute Cour, 
et il foist aucune requeste et le seignor 
delaiast, et l'ome  li  TeqIIiSt  osgart  do 
cork  et le  soignor  ne  li feist aver  OU 
s'en  delivrast  par  esgart  de  cort  me- 
isme;  ou  s'il  avenist  que  l'on  ne 
le  laissast  entrer  devant  le  seignor 
et aussi le  deloiast  on  de venir  B  son 
dreit,  l'ome  peut  venir  a  ses  pers  18 
ou il les porra  trover, et requerre  lor, 
par la fei que 11  li doivent, come B lor 
peir, que il  veingent avant li seignor  o 
lui et li requierent  que il le maint par 
sa  cort  come  son  home,  et so  il  li  a 
requis esgart, que il le face aver ; il y 
deivent aler  et faire  c0  que  l'ome  lor 
a requis.  Et  s'il avenist que le seignor 
ne  vosist  otroier ne faire lor requeste, 
il  deivent  et pevent  dire  au  seignor, 
que  il  ne  feront  riens  por  lui  tant 
qu'il  ait  fait  lor  requeste.  Par  trei 
feis li doivent  ce  dire, et s'il  por  tant 
10  fait outreement, li povent gnagicr 
de lor servises tant que il li ait acom- 
 lie  lor  requeute.  Et s'il  avenet  quo 
la  tort  ait  fait  aucun  esgart,  et  le 
mignor  ne  le  veut tenir,  aussi  le  doi- 
guagier do lor serrises tant que il 
accornpli lor  crjgart.  Et se il  ave- 
qlle IC seignor, ou  autre por lui on 
aichoison  de li,  dessaissist  sans esgart 
de cort aucun de ses homes de tout ou 
de partie de son fib,  celui qui cst des- 
saissi  peut  requere  ses  pers  que  il  li 
aident Q  recovrer sa s~isinc,  fornissant 
dreit  au  seignor,  ot  se  le  seignor,  ou 
autre por lui, li seit que  demander et 
il est prest de fornir raison ; 10s homes 
en deivent requerre le seignor, se il est 
au pais,  ou le  Lailli, se le  seignor  n'i 
ost.  Et se  il  no  fait lor  requeste,  il 
pevent  et doivent  aler  b  lor  por  et 
doner li force  et pooir  do  recovrer  sa 
saisine  et les  rentes  dou  tens  pasd, 
c'est  assaver despuis que il fu deseaisi 
dou  fi6  sans  esgart  de  court.  Et ce 
meisme vi ge avenir de monseignor  de 
Baruth  h.  Acre,  quant  le  seignor  de 
Saeste  dcssaisi  li et sos  nevous et ses 
amis,  par  le  comandement  de  l'em- 
perour,  de  lor  fibs  que  il  avoient  B 
Acre.  Et adonc  fn  recordbe  et re- 
traite l'assise entorinement ; et toute la 
court dist et otroia que il entendoient 
que to1 estoit l'assise.  Et  IA. ot pluisors 
homes  liges  qui  l'avoient  oi  retraire 
autrofeis  en cort,  por  le  content  qui 
fu  entre  le  rei  Aimeri  et  messire 
Rau de Tabaric,." 
Cf.  also  Phil~p  of  Novara,  40,  and 
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lord refuses, they are to rescue their peer by force, unless the 
lord resists in person ; in that case, as they ca'nnot bear arms 
against him, they are each  and all to renounce all service to 
him till he has set their peer at liberty, or has submitted the 
case to the judgment of  the c0urt.l 
The principle of  the authority of the court in enforcing their 
mutual obligations upon lord or vassal is to the con~pilers  of 
the Assizes of  Jerusalem perfectly clear and obvious, and the 
whole body of  the vassals is bound to maintain this authority 
even  against  the lord.  This  is  perhaps  even  more  clearly 
brought out by Jean d'Ibelin in another passage, in which he 
maintains that if the court has given a judgment  against the 
lord in the case of  a  man who is not a  vassal, and the lord 
refuses to carry this out, such a man may lay the matter before 
the vassals and adjure them to compel the lord to carry out tlle 
judgment.  The vassals are then to go to their lord and request 
him to do this, and if  he refuses they are to declare to him that 
they are bound to maintain the honour of the court and the 
Assizes  of  the  Kingdom  of  Jerusalem,  and that they  will 
renounce all service to him until he has carried out the judg- 
ment of  the court.2 
Jean  d'Ibelin,  201 :  "Et  so  le  voz  devons  tant que  voe  ai4s  nostre 
seipnor  no  le  fait  delivrer  B  leur  rc-  per to1 delivrer ou fait delivrer, ou dite 
queste, ou ne dit chose par quel  il ne  laison por qi~ei  voz ne le dev4s fairo et 
le deit  faire et tel  que court l'esgardc  to1 que court l'osgarde ou conoisse." 
ou  conoisse,  tos  les  homes  ensemble  Cf. Phihp of  Novara, 59. 
deivent  aler 16  oh  il  sevont que il est  Jean  d'Ibelin,  244 :  "Et por  ee 
amst6 ot delivrer le  h.  forcc ou autrc-  que nos somes llomes de vostre court 
mcnt, se le cors do leur peignor ne lor  et que nos  somos  tonus  do  garder  et 
defent  as armes,  contre  le  quel  il  nc  fulre gardor  B  nos  pooirs  l'onor  do  la 
pevont  ni  ne  deivent  porter  armes ne  court  dont  nos  somes,  et  do  nlain- 
fair chose  a  force. . . . Et so  lc  seig-  tcnir  les asqises et les usages  dou  rei- 
nor le defont  contre eaus as armes 011  aume de Jerusalem, nos toz ensemble, 
autrement b force, il li deivent dire.  ct  chascun  par  sei,  voz  gajons  dou 
"Sire,  voz  estcs  notre  seignor,  no  scrvise  que nos  voz  devons,  tant  que 
contre vostre  cors  noz  no  portorernes  ros aiQs a  tel,"  et lc  noment,  "  tenn 
armes, ni  ne foriens chose a force.  Et  et parfait  ou  fait tenir et parfaire  ce 
pulsque voz noz defend& a force b tlo-  quo  vostre  court,  clont  noz  somes 
livrer  nostro  per  qui  est  pris  et em-  homes, a esgard6 ou coneu on  record&, 
prlson4s sanz esgart ne sans conoissance  ou  dit on  la  court  tel  rnlson  que  le 
de court, noz voz  gojons toe ensemble  court esgal.de ou conoisse yur voz ne 10 
et ehascun par sei dou servise quo noz  dev& fairo." 
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This was then t'lle method by which the authority of  the laws 
end  customs of  Jerusalelll was  to be  declared  and enforced. 
The court was the supreme judge, and  the lord, that is, the King 
of  sal sal em, had to submit to it ; if  he refused to do this the 
relations between  him  and his  vassals were for the 
time suspended, and they were to renounce all their service to 
llim until he submitted to the court and its judgments.'  The 
of  the Assizes justify their opinion by citing two cases 
in which, as they say, the va,ssals of  the kingdom of  Jerusalem 
had taken such acti~n.~ 
It may perhaps be urged that the Assizes of  Jerusalem repre- 
sent an extreme and even fantastic development of  the principle 
of the obligation of  the king or lord to govern according to law, 
and that their principle  of  the supremacy of  the court over 
the king or lord was eccentric and unparalleled.  It is indeed 
true that in their detail they represent a particular and local 
attempt to create a metliod of  control over the ruler, a method 
which, however good it may seem in theory, was not likely to 
produce an  effective  system of  government ; and  we cannot look 
upon this method as being more than one of  the many experi- 
ments in government which were being made in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries.  But we are in this work concerned rather 
with the principle which lay behind such experiments than with 
the experiments  themselves.  If  we  are content to consider 
them from this standpoint we shall find these experimerlts im- 
mensely interesting, and shall also find that these principles are 
reflected more or less clearly and completely in many at least 
of the feudal law books. 
In those compilations of  the feudal law of  Lombardy which 
are known to us as the ' Consuetudines Feudorum,' and which 
belong substantially to the twelfth century, the principles of  the 
relation of lord and vassal are set out with great clearness.  The 
obligations of  the vassal must be discharged by him, and if  he 
' Cf.  Jean  d'Ibrlln,  203,  204,  205,  Cf. Jean cl'lhelln, 203,  204 ; Philip 
2G8, 210,  213,  214,  239;  l'li~llp of  of Novara, 40, 42. 
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refuse or fails to carry them out, he will lose his fief.l  On the 
other hand, it is laid down with great emphasis that no vassal 
can be deprived of  his benefice except for a definite and proved 
~ffence.~  And it is very clearly maintained that in all cases of 
dispute about the fief  and its tenure between  the lord  and 
vassal  there is always a  proper  tribunal to decide, and thls 
tribunal is either the court which is composed of the peers of 
the vassal or the court of the Emper~r.~  It  is noteworthy that 
the lord has only the same remedy  against his vassal as the 
vassal against him, that is, the appeal to the court, and that the 
court is, if  need be, to compel the lord to make restitution to 
his vassal or to submit himself to the judgment of the court.  If 
the lord should refuse to do this the vassal can carry the case 
to the higher  authority,  that is,  clearly  to the overlord  or 
Emper~r.~ 
1 '  Consuetudines  Feudorum,'  11. : 
"  Qnla siipra dlctum est.  q111bus modls 
feudum  adqmntur  et retmetur,  nunc 
vldeamus,  qualitcr am~ttatur.  S1  emm 
prwhum campestre habuerit, et  vasallus 
eum  (domlnum)  morantem  in  ~pso 
praelio dlmlserit non mortuum non ad 
mortem  vulncratum,  feudum  ~mlttere 
debet.  Item si fidells domlnum cncur- 
b~taverlt  vel  ~d facere laboraverit aut 
rum  uxore  eius  turplter  luscnt vel  si 
cum film aut cum nepte ex filio aut cum 
sorore domln~  concubiler~t,  lure feudum 
amittere censetur."  Cf. v]. 11. 
Id.,  vi.  10  "Sanc~mus  ut nemo 
miles  sine  cognlta  culpa  beneficlum 
amittat,  si  ex  lus  rulpls  vel  causis 
convlctus  non  fuerit,  quas  m111tes  us1 
fiunt  vel  per  laudamentum  parium 
suorum,  el  deservlre nolurrmt." 
C. Lehmann,  in  h~s  edltron  of  the 
'  Coii~uetud~nes  Feudorum,'  glves  in 
full the text of  two groups of  1\ISS  fo~ 
Tit. v1 , but the differences are not  in 
the case of  the paisnges here quoted of 
siibsta~rtlal  Importance for our purpose 
S Id , v  1  "  S1  fuerlt  content10 
Inter  dominum  et fidelem  de ~nvesti 
tura  feud^, d~rlnlntur  per pares curtls " 
Id ,  vl.  5.  l . "  51 content10  fuorlt 
de  beneficlo  Inter  czpltaneos,  coram 
imperatore  dlffinlr~ debet.  S1  vero 
fueiit content10  Inter  maiores  valvas- 
sores  et mlnores  de  beneficio,  ludlcio 
parium dfiniatilr." 
Id., v~.  13.  "Et si  dommus  pos- 
sederlt  et mlles  SIC  d~xcrlt,  quod  in- 
vest~tus fuernt  a  domino  suo  et 
domlnus  negavcrit,  adh~beantur  pares 
1111~s  et per 11108 Invenlatur ventas." 
Cf. ni. 3, vm. 23. 
The  regnlat~ons  clted  In  this  note 
and  the  prev~ous one  are  founded 
upnn  the '  Edlctum de heneficiis regnl 
Itallcl,'  of  the  Emperor  Conrad  11. 
(1037 A.V  ) 
Id ,  vin. 29 : "  Dominus vocat mili- 
tem  qu~  ab  eo  feudum  poss~debat 
dlcendo  eum  in  culpam  incidisse  per 
quam  feudum  amlttere  debeat.  HIC 
non respondrt  Qu~d  dommo faciendum 
slt  quzrltur  Respondelur .  Curlam 
vocare  debet  et in  ea  de  millte  1110 
ronquerl, quam curlam ter vocare dehet 
spat10  elusdem  curlac  nrblt~io  tcrmln 
undo  S1  nec  ad tertiam vocat~onem 
enlt, hoc lpso feildum amittnt et ideo 
dobet  curla dominum  mltttie  111  pas* 
seislonem.  Sod  lntra snnum venerlt, 
iostitultur  cl  possesslo,  allorluln  et 
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The ' Sechsenspiagel,' the most important German handbook 
of feudal law, which was written before 1232, does not describe 
in detail like the Assizes of  Jerusalem the organisation of  the 
feudal court and the method of  securing its authority in en- 
forcing the mutual obligations of  lord and vassal, but it con- 
tains two very  significant passages  which  are related to the 
position of  the vassal and the control of  the king. 
In the first of these it says that a man may without violat,ion 
of his fidelity wound or even slay his lord, or the lord the man, 
if this is done in self-defence.l  In the second  it lays down 
the principle  that the man who feels himself  injured by the 
richtere " can appeal to the Schultheiss, and that also the 
Count Palatine is judge over the Emper~r.~ 
The work entitled ' Le Conseil de Pierre de Fontaines ' be- 
longs probably to about the year 1253, when its author was 
Bailli  of  the  Vermandois.  Its intention,  according  to the 
author, was to record the customs of  the Vermandois, and other 
lay cou~ts,~  but it consists  very largely of  citations from the 
Code and Digest of Justinian, and it has been suggested that it 
is really a fragment of  a French "  Summa " of  the Code.'  The 
author assumes that a vassal has the right to implead his lord 
in the lord's court, that is, that the court has authority to judge 
between  the lord and the vassal,  but he limits the right to 
benc6cium  et  possessionem  perdit. 
5  1. S1  vero vasallus de domlno quaen- 
tur, fors~tan  quia feudum  malo ordlne 
mtravit, domino perperam respondente, 
quid  vasallo  slt  fac~endum  quaeritur 
Respondetur : Curiam debet vocare et 
1"  ea  conquer].  Curia  dehet  adlre 
domlnum  eumque  salva  roverentia 
competenter cogere ut vel possessionem 
restituat  et  adquiescat  vel  ludlcio 
curl= se comlttat.  Quod 61  admonltus 
facere d~stulerit,  turn  llcet  vasallo  ad 
allam  malorem  potestatem  Ire  et sibl 
COn~ulere." 
'  'Sachsonsplegel,' m. 78.6. "Wundet 
0k  en  man  slnen  herren,  oder  slelt 
he  me  dot an notwere,  oder die  herre 
den  man,  he  ne  dut  weder  slne 
truwe  nicl~t,  of  &e  not  up  Ine  mlt 
rechte  vulbracht  aert."  Cf.  Glanvill, 
1x. 1. 
Id., 111.52. 3. . "  Wenne klaget man 
over  den  richtere,  he  sal  ant~verden 
ver  deme  scultheiten,  wen  die  scul- 
the~te is  richter  smer  scult ,  ale 
is  dle  palenzgreve  over  den  keiscr, 
unde  dle  burchgreve  over  den  marc- 
gre7 en." 
C£  111.  54.  4.  "Also  ne mach  deme 
koninge  neman  an  sln  11f  spreken, 
Ime  no  SI  dat rlke  vore  mlt  ordelen 
verdclt."  Cf.  ' Schwabcnsn~egel,' 100 
and  104. 
' Le  Consell  de  Pierre  de  Fon- 
tames,'  1.  2. 
"Cf.  P.  Vlollet,  '  Les  Etabhsue- 
ments  de Salnt  LOUIS,'  vol.  I.  p.  83, 
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questions  concerning the fief  and injuries inflicted  upon  the 
vassal concerning this.l 
In  the  ~oinpila~tion  known  as the ' Etablissements  de St 
Louis,'  we  have a  more complete treatment of  the relations 
of  lord and vassal,  which with some important modificatiolls 
represents  the  same  principles  as  those  of  the  Assizes  of 
Jerusalem.  In the first  place,  it is  very  clearly  laid  down 
that the obligations of  lord and vassal are mutual and must 
be observed with equal care by both.  The vassal who trans- 
gresses against this, and is guilty of various offences against his 
lord, will justly lose his fief ;  but then, with equal clearness, it 
is laid down that if the lord refuses his vassal the judgment 
of  his  court, or if he seduces his  wife  or daughter, then the 
vassal will be free from his obligation to him and will hold his 
fief from the ~verlord.~ 
Again we find in the Etablissements the same principle as 
that of  the Assizes  of  Jerusalem,  that in cases in the king's 
court  on  any matter concerning  a  vassal's  inheritance,  the 
'Le  Conseil  de  Pierre  do  Pon- 
tainc,'  xxi. 27 : ''  Ceste meismes forme 
qui  devant est racontbe  de la d6faute 
as  ajournez,  entent-je  que  l'en  doit 
regarder en la rlt.fante a1 home qui ses 
sires  pleidoie  en  sa cort  meismes,  et 
quant  li  homs  pleidoie  B son  seignor 
en sa cort  meismes.  . . . 28.  MBs  go 
ne  croi  pas  que  li  homs  puisse  son 
seigneur, ne ne doie, apelcr de dbfaute, 
fors  que del mesfnit  qu'il  li auroit fet 
puis  l'omaige,  en  son  propre  fi6  qu'il 
tient de lui,  ou en ses propres  chores 
qui  seroient  del  fib. . . .  Mes  del 
mesfet  que li  sires  feroit  B  con  home 
en son  propre  cors,  ou en ses propres 
clloses  qui  no  scroient mie  del fib,  no 
qu'il ne tendroit mio de lui, n'en feroit- 
il jB  son home riche,  s'il  ne voloit, ne 
droit  an  sa cort ne requerroit,  s'il ne 
voloit ; car li home de sa cort n'ont mie 
pooir de jugement  fBre sour le cors lor 
seignor,  ne  dc  nu1  de  ses  torz  fais 
se ce n'est  del fi6  ou de mesfait que i 
apartisnt." 
"  'Etablissements de St  Louiu,' I. 54 : 
"  Hom qui fait esquousse B son seignor 
si pert ses meubles ; ou so il met main 
B son certain a106 (avo6)  par msl respet, 
ou se il li escout autresi ; ou se il des- 
mant son sejgnor par mal respit, ou se 
il  a  mise  fause  mesure  en  sa terre; 
on  se  il  vn  defuiant  son  seignor  par 
mal respit ; ou  se il  a  peschi6 en ses 
estanz, an dessaii  de  lui ; ou  se il  a 
ambl6 ses conins en ses garennes ; ou se 
il  gist o sa fame, ou o sa fille, par coi 
ele soit pucele,  il em port  son  fib, par 
quoi  il  en  soit  provez.  Et dreiz  et 
costume s'i accorde." 
Id.,i. 56 : L'  Quant li sires vee B  son 
home le jugemant  de sa cort, et il en 
puis~e  estre prov&s,  il ne tendra jamais 
riens  de lui,  ainz  tendra  de  celui  qui 
sera  par  desus  son  seignor.  Et einsi 
seroit il se il gisoit o la fcme son home 
ou o sa fille, se ele estoit pucele ; ou se 
li  hom  avoit  aucune  de  ses  parentes 
et ols estoit pucele,  ct il l'aust  bailli6e 
a  garder  B  son  sejgnor,  et il  la  des- 
pucelast,  il  ne  tenroit  jamais  rien  de 
lui." 
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decision belongs not to the king personally,  but to the court 
including the vassal's peers.l  The Etablissements do not indeed 
contain the sanie elaborate machinery for the enforcement of 
$lle  judgments of the court as do the Assizes, but the compiler 
did not scruple to maintain that in the last resort the vassal, 
if the King of  France refuses to do him justice in his court, has 
the right to make war upon him, and is entitled to summon 
his sub-vassals to follow him.  Before they obey the summons 
they must indeed first go to the king and ask whether it was 
true that he had refused their lord the  judgment of  the court ;  if 
tile king denied this and said that he was willing to discharge 
his lawful obligations, they can refuse to follow their lord, but 
if  his complaint proved to be true, they must then follow him 
to war, even against the king2 
If we now turn to the greatest of the French feudal lawyers, 
that is to Beaumanoir, we find that his conceptions of  the rela- 
tion of  lord and vassal, while they differ in detail, are substanti- 
ally the same as those which we have hitherto considered.  In 
the first place, he sets out very clearly the principle that the 
1 Id.,i. 76 : "  Se li bers est apelee en 
la cort le roi d'ancune chose qni apart- 
aigne B.  heritage, et il die : '  jc no vucil 
pas estre jugiez  fors par nles  pers  do 
oeste  chose,'  adonc  si  doit  l'en  les 
barons  semondre  B  tout  le  moines 
jnsque  ZL  III., et puis  doit le  joutise 
feire droit, o ces et o autres chevaliers." 
Cf.  '  Jostice  et  Plct,'  xvi.  1 : "  Uns 
des peres  de  France s'otroia  B jugier 
pardevant le roi, par ceus qui jugier  le 
doivent, et dit que li rois, ne si consenz, 
ne le doivent pas jugier : mds il ne dit 
pas  bien.  lids li  rois,  no  son  conseil, 
sanz  autres,  ne  le  puet  pas  jugier 
c'est a dire que si pers doivent estre." 
a  Id., i. 53 : "  Se li bers a son home 
lit30 et il li die : '  venea vous en o moi, 
car  je  vueil  guerroier  encontre  le  roi 
man seignor, qui m'a vo6  le jngemant 
de  sa  cort,'  li  hom  doit  respondre  en 
tel  meniere  B  son  seignor :  ' sire,  je 
irai  volentiers  snvoir  au  roi  b'il  est 
Oin~ln~  come  vous  1s  me  dites. 
Adonc  il  doit  venir  au roi  et li  rloit 
dire.'  '  Sire,  mes  sires  m'a  dit  que 
vous li  avez v06  le jugement  de votre 
court;  por  ce  en sui  je  venuz  h  vos 
por savoir en la v6ritB : car mcs sires 
m'a  semons  que  je  aille  en  guerre 
encontre  vous.'  Et se  li  rois  die : 
'  je  ne  ferai  ja  B  vostre  seignor  nu1 
jugemant  en  mn  cort,'  li  hom  s'en 
doit tantost retorner & son seignor ; et 
li sires le doit porveoir de ses despens. 
Et se il ne s'an  voloit  nler o lui, il on 
perdroit  son  fi6  par  droit.  Et se  li 
rois  li avoit respondu : '  je  ferai droit 
volantiers  $,  vostre  seignor,  an  rrla 
cort,'  li  liom  devroit  venir  B  son 
seignor  et dire : 'sire, li  rois  m'a  dit 
qu'il  vous  fera  volentiers  droit en  sa 
cort,'  et se li sires dit : '  je  n'anterrai 
jamais  en sa cort,  mnis venez.vous  en 
o  moi,  ei  come  je  vous  ai  sernons,' 
adonyucs  porroit  bien  li  hom  dire : 
' je  n'i  irai  mie.'  I1  n'en  perdroit 
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obligations of  lord and vassal a~re  mutual, a,s the vassal owes 
fa,ith and loyalty to his lord, so also the lord owes these to the 
vassal, and the penalty for a violation of these obligations is the 
same, in extreme cases the lord will forfeit the homage of  his 
va,ssal, just as the vassal will lose his 6ef.l 
In the next place,  Beaumanoir lays down as clearly as the 
other feudal lawyers that these reciprocal obligations are pro- 
tected by a  suitable judicial  machinery.  In cases of dispute 
between the whole body of  the vassals and their lord, Beau- 
manoir holds that the court of  vassals cannot be judge, as they 
are all parties to the dispute, but they should demand justice of 
the lord and his council, and if  t'he lord refuses this they should 
go to the king, as overlord.  In the case, however, of  a dispute 
between a single vassal and the lord, the case is decided by the 
court of  the vassal's peem2  There is always a court which is 
competent to  decide upon disputes as  to feudal duties and  rights, 
Beaumanoir,  lxi.  1735 :  "  Nous 
disons, et voirs est selonc nostre cous- 
tume, que pour  autant comme li hons 
doit a son seigneur de foi et de loiaut6 
par la reson de son homage, tout autant 
li sires en doit Q son homme." 
Id., lxii.  1786 : "Et avec la foi, il i 
a  grant  peril  d'avoir  damage,  car 60 
li sires est atains de la dcfaute, il pert 
l'homagc  et chiet en grant amende,  si 
comme  nous  avons  die  alieurs  en cel 
chapitre  meismes,  et  se  li  hons  ne 
l'en  puet  ataindre,  il  pert  le  fief  et 
est aquis au seigneur." 
Id., ii.  65 : "Et qnant il faillent  a 
letw  fieigneur  en  tel  besoing,  il  de- 
servent  it  perdre leur fief." 
Id., i. 44  : "  I1 avient aucunes fois 
que  ples  muet entre le  conte et tous 
ses  hommes,  si  comme  quant aucuns 
des hommes requiert sa court d'aucun 
cas dont il ne la doit pas ravoir,-ou  il 
dit qu'il  a  aucune justice  en sa terre 
par  la reson  de son  fief,  que  li  cuens 
ne  li  connoist  pas,  ains  dit  qu'elo 
~partient  8. li par reson de resort. . . . 
En  tous  tes  cas  ne  doit  pas  li 
baillis  metre  le  plot  ou  jugement  des 
11omes  car  il  meisme  sont  partie,  si 
ne  cloirent  pas  jugier  en  lor  querelc 
meisme.  Donqucs  se  teus  ples  muet 
entre  lo  conte  ct  lea  hommes,  et li 
homme  lequierent  droit,  il  doivent 
prendre  cel  droit par  le  conte  et par 
son conseil.  Et si li cuens leur refuse 
ir  fere  droit  ou  il  lor  fet  mauvbs 
jugement,  t~ere  le  puent  par  l'une 
des 11. voies par devant le Roi, comme 
par devant souverain." 
Id., i.  45 : "  Des ples  qui muevent 
entre  le  conte  cl'une  part  et aucuns 
de ses homes singulierement de l'aiitre 
part,  dont  tuit  li  home  no  se  puent 
pas  fere  partic,-si  comme  d'aucun 
heritage  ou  d'aucune  forfeture,  ou 
d'aucune  querele,  des  queles  il  con- 
vient que jugemens  soit fes selonc  la 
coustume  du  pais,-en  tel  cas  putt 
bien  li  baillis  prendre  droit  pour  10 
conte  par  les  hommes.  Car  aussi 
comme  il  convient  les  hommes  lc 
conk  mener  leur  hommes  par  le 
jugement  de  lor  pars,  aussi  doit  li 
cuens  mener  ses  homme  par  le  juge- 
ment  de  ses  autres  hommes,  qui 
sont  leur  per,  es  querelcs  dout  tuit 
li  homrne  ne  font pas  partie  centre 
lui, $1  comme il est clit dea~us." 
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and this court is in the first place the court of  the lord, but the 
judgment in the court belongs to the vassals.  Until the vassal 
has demanded just'ice in the court he cannot appeal to the 
overlord, and Beaunlanoir mentions a famous case of  his time 
in which the men of Ghent had tried to bring a case against 
their lord, the Count of  Flanders, before the King of  France ; 
their  suit was refused on the ground that they had not first 
taken the case to the court of the Count of  F1anders.l 
The important matter is that the feudal court is not one in 
which  the judgment  is dependent  upon  the caprice  or  self- 
interest  of  the lord, but one in which, as it administers the 
custom and law of the district or country, so also the decisions 
are given by all those who are concerned to maintain  t,hem. 
The  true  character  of  the  court  is well  brought  out when 
Beaumanoir says in another place that when  a lord brings a 
case in his court against one of  his vassals he can take no part 
in considering what should be the judgment of  the court, it is 
the vassals who determine this ; if  the lord is dissatisfied with 
the judgment he can appeal against it, and the appeal goes to 
the court of the overlord.  Beaumanoir seems to maintain that 
in the Beauvosis  the lord was in no case a judge  in his own 
court, but only the vassals.2  We have dealt with the discussion 
of the place of  the lord in his court in the Assizes of  Jer~salem,~ 
it is very important to compare with this the opinion of a jurist 
of the caution and sagacity of  Beaumanoir. Finally, it  should be 
observed that Beaumanoir holds that in the last resort a vassal 
who feels himself wronged by his lord can renounce his homage 
l Id., lxi. 1779. 
P  Id.,  lxvii.  1857 : "  Quant li sires 
plede  en  sa court  contre son homme 
meiumos, il n'est  pas juges  no  ne  doit 
eatre au  conseil,  en sa cort,  du juge- 
ment.  Et quant li homme rendent le 
jugemant,  s'il  le  font contre li, apeler 
puet  comme  de faus jugement,  et 
doit  wtro  li  apcaus  clemen6s  en  la 
Court  du  seigneur  do  qui li sires  tient 
'8s  hornages  de  ceus  do  qui  il  apela 
'h jugement." 
Id., lrrvii.  1883 : "  Nus  par  nostro 
VOL.  m. 
coustume  ne  puet  fere  jugament  en 
sa court  ne  en sa querele,  pour  deus 
rosons :  la  premiere  rcsons,  pour  ce 
qu'uns  seus  hons,  en  sa  persone,  ne 
puet  jugier ;  aincois  en convient  ou 
II., ou 111..  ou IV.,  au meins, autres 
que  le  seigneur;  la  seconde  resons, 
pour  ce  que  la  coustume  de  nonu- 
voisins  est  tcle,  que  li  soignbur  110 
jugent  pas  on  lour  court,  mais  lour 
liomnie juyent." 
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and his  fief  and challenge his lord, and in the same way  tlle 
lord can renounce his right to homage and can then challenge 
his vassa1.l 
The great English jurist Bracton, as we have already seen, 
lays down the general principles of  the relation of  authority to 
justice,  and to law as the embodiment of  justice,  in broader 
terms than any of  the other lawyers whose work we have been 
considering.  His work also illustrates very specially s  move- 
ment  of  medi~val  society  which  we  have not yet  had  the 
opportunity to consider, that is, the gradual supersession  of 
the feudal  system  of  government  by  tl~at  of  the  national 
monarchy. 
We  have already  noticed  his  statement of  the reciprocal 
nature of  feudal  obligation^.^  TXsputes about these are decided 
in the court of  the lord, and if  that does not do justice the case 
is to be  taken to the county court, and finally,  if  the king 
consents, can be taken to the "  great court."  We have here 
1 Beaumanoir,  lxi.  1734 : "  Encore 
par  nostre  coustume,  nues  ne  puet 
apeler  son  seigneur,  Q  qui il  est hons 
de cors et de mains,  devant qu'il  li a 
delessi6 l'homage  et ce  qu'il  tient  de 
li.  Donques,  se  aucuns  veut  apcler 
son seigneur d'aucun  cas de crime,  ou 
quel  il  chice  apel,  il  doit  ains  l'apel 
venir  h.  son  seigneur,  en  la  presence 
de sea  pers,  et dirc  on  cestc maniere. 
'  Sire, j'ai  est.4 unc piece en vostre foi 
et en  vostre  homage,  et ai  tenu  de 
vous  tells  herit~ges  en fief.  Au  ficf, 
at 8,  l'homage,  et k  la foi, je  renolice, 
pour  ce  que  vous  m'av6s  mesfct,  du 
quel  mesfet  j'entent  8.  qerre venjance 
par  apel.'  Et puia  cele  reno~iciacion, 
semondre  le  doit  fere  on  la  court, 
de  son  souverains,  et aler  avant  on 
son, apel ; et s'il apele avant qu'il  ait 
renonci6  au fief  et 8. l'homago,  il n'i a 
nu1 gage, ains amendera k son seigneur 
la  vilanie  qu'il  li  a  dite  en  court,  ot 
a  la  court  aussi,  ct  sera  chascune 
amende do lx. lb." 
Id.,  ]xi.  1735 :  "  Nous  disons,  et 
voirs  cut  sclonc  nostre coustume,  quc 
pour autant comme li hons doit  A son 
seigneur  de  foi  et  de  loiaut6  par  la 
reson  de  son  homage,  tout  autant  li 
sires en doit 8. son homme, et par ceste 
reson  pouons nous  veoir  que puis que 
li  hons  ne  pent  apeler  son  seigneur 
tant  com  il  est  en  son  homage,  li 
sires  ne  puet  apeler  son  homme 
devant  qu'il  ait renonci6  k  l'homage. 
Donques,  so  li  sires  veut  apeler  son 
home,  il  doit  quitier  I'homage  en  la 
presence  du  souvewin  devant  qui  il 
apele  et puis  puet  aler  avant en  son 
apel." 
Cf. Summa de legibus, lxxxiii.  1. 
See p. 27. 
a  Bracton,  ' De legibns  et consuetu- 
dinibus  Angliae,'  iii.  7.  1  (fol.  105) : 
"  Nunc  autem  dicendum  ubl  ter- 
minandae  sunt  actiones  civiles,  quz 
sunt  in  rem  vel  in  personam.  Et 
sciendum  quod  earum  qua  sunt  in 
rem, sicut rei vcndicationes  per breve 
de  recto,  terrninari  debent  in  curia 
baronum  vel  aliorum,  de  quibus  ipse 
patens  clamaverit  tenere,  si  plenum 
rectum ei tenere voluerit vel possit vel 
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tile same principles as those which we have already considered, 
with the important modification that the c,ase is to be taken 
from the court of the lord to the county court, not to a feudal 
court. 
~t is, however, in his treatment of  the relation  of  the king 
to the law that Bracton is most interesting.  We halve already 
cited some of  the most important passages in which he sets out 
what  he  considered  the  most  essential  principles  of  king- 
ship, and the relation  of  the king to justice  and law.  We 
must now consider some aspects of  these in detai1.l 
There is no king, Bracton says, where there is  no law,2  and the 
phrase has an  immense constitutional and philosophical breadth, 
and warns us how short-sighted is the judgment of those who 
imagine that the Middle Ages had no philosopllical conception 
of the State.  For here we have no mere isolated phrase, but the 
summary expression  of  a principle which is illustrated in the 
whole constitutional structure of  medizeval society, and  not least 
in its feudal aspect.  Where there is no law there is no king, 
and the king is under God and the law, for it is the law which 
makes the king.3  The phrase may possibly be influenced by a 
reminiscence of  the words of  Theodosius and Valentinian in the 
'  Code,' "  our authority depends upon the authority of  law," 
but the phrase is not the less remarkable, for Bracton, who is 
constantly influenced by the Roman jurisprudence,  must have 
been  aware  that the Roman  law  books  also  contained  the 
doctrine  that the emperor  was  "  legibus  solutus,"  and he 
selects from the Roman tradition that which suits his purpose. 
The king is under the law, and is to obey the law himself. 
The king is indeed the minister and vicar of  God, but this is 
sciverit.  Si  autem  noluerit  vel  non 
Possit  vel  nesciverit,  tuno  probato  a 
tenente  quod  curia  domini  sui  ci 
recto  dcfecerit,  transferri  poterit 
placiturn  ad comitaturn, ut vicecomes 
teneat, et sic a comitatu trans- 
poterit  ad magnam  curiam,  ex 
?Orta  causa,  si  dominus  rex  voluerit, 
et ibi terminari." 
Cf. pp.  34, 38. 
Id.,  i.  8.  5  (£01  Kb)  :  "Non  est 
enim  rex,  nbi  dominatur  voluntas  et 
non lex." 
3  Id., i. 8. 5 (fol. 6b) : "  Ipse autem 
rex non debet osse sub homine, sed sub 
deo ot sub lege,  quia lex facit regem. 
Attribuat  ig~tur  rex  legi  quod  lex 
attribuit,,  ei,  vi~lelicet dominationern 
et potestatem." 
4  Code, i. 14. 4 : "  Adeo de auctori- 
tate iuris nostra pendet auctoritas." 
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only a further reason  why he should obey the law, for being 
God's minister his authority is only that of law (right), not of 
wrong  (iniuriae), for this  only  is the authority which  comes 
from God, the authority of wrong (iniuriae) is of tlie devll, and 
the king is the servant of  him whose works he does-the  vicar 
of  God when he does justice, the minister of  the devil when he 
does wrong.1  Just so far as the king is to be the vicar of  God 
he must follow the example of  Jesus Christ and the blessed 
Virgin,  who  submitted  thenlselves  to the law.2  It  is very 
significant that Braeton-while  maintaining in its highest form 
the conception of  the divine authority of the ruler, as we have  - 
just  seen, he calls him the vicar of  God-should  use this not 
as an argument for an unlimited and uncontrolled  authority, 
but rather as an additional reason  for maintaining  that the 
king  is  under  the law,  and must  govern  according  to law. 
Bracton does not hesitate to call the law "  fraenum potentiae," 
the bridle of  power.= 
And  now  lest  we  should  imagine  that this  means  little, 
because  the king  is  himself  the source  and author  of  law, 
Bracton  is  careful  to warn  us  against  a  perversion  of  the 
doctrine of  the Roman jurisprudence.  He was familiar with 
Ulpian's phrase that the will of  the prince has the force of law 
1 Bracton, 111.  9. 3 (fol. 107) : "  N~hil 
enim allud potest rex in terns, cum s~t 
Del minister  et vicarlus,  NS~  ~d solum 
quod de lure potest. . .  .  Potestas itaque 
sua iur19  est,  et non  iniuriae, et cum 
lpse  s~t  auctor  lur~s,  non  debet  inde 
lniurlarum nasci occasio unde lura nas- 
cuntur, et etiam qui ex offic~o  suo alios 
proh~bere  necesse  habet,  ld  ipsum  in 
proprla persona comm~ttere  non dcbet 
Exercere  igitur  debet  rex  potestatem 
luns, sicut Del vzcarius et mlnister  in 
terra, quia illa potestas sohus Del est, 
potestas  autcm ~niuriae  diaboli et non 
Del, et cmus horum opera fecor~t  rex, 
eius  mlnlster  ent, cuius  opera  fecer~t. 
Ig~tur  dum facit mstltlam, vicarlus est 
regls  eternl,  mlnister  autem  dlaboli 
dum declinet ad ~niunam." 
2  Id., I  R  6 (fol  ,5h)  "  Et quad sub 
~eg~  owe  ilebeat, rum slt Del vicarius, 
evidenter  appalet  ad  sirn~l~tudlnenl 
Jesu Chr~stl  cuius vices gcrit in terrls. 
Qu~a  verax  Del  mlser~cordia cum  ad 
rcparandum  humanum  ganus  ineffa- 
biliter  ei  multa  ~uppeterent, hanc 
potlssimam  elegerit vlam,  qua ad de- 
struendum  opus  d~aboli  non  vlrtute 
uteretur potmtiae, sed iustitia: ratione. 
Et sic  esse  volmt  sub  lcge,  ut  eos, 
qui sub lege  erant red~me~et.  Nolmt 
enim  ut~  viribus  sed  ludic~o.  Sic 
enlm  beata Del genltnx,  vlrgo Marla, 
mater  domini,  quae  singular1  privl- 
legio  supra  legem  fu~t,  pro  osten- 
dendo  taxnon  humilitat~s exemplo 
legallbus  snbdi  non  refugit  ~nstrtutls. 
Sic ergo  rex, ne potestas  sua maneat 
~nfrenata." 
Id ,111  9. 3 (fol. 107b) : "  Temperet 
~g~tnr  potentlam suam per legem 
fraenum est potentiae. ' 
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and evidently felt that this inight mislead men, and he there- 
fore lays it down that not everything which it  may be thought 
that the king wills has the force of law, but only that which 
is promulgated  by the king's  authority, with  the counsel  of 
great men, and after due de11beration.l  Again,  in other 
passages which me  have already qu~ted,~  in which he sets out 
the  great  importance  of  unwritten  and  customary  law  in 
~ngland,  he  says  that it is  reasonable  to call  the English 
laws, though unwritten, "  laws,"  for that has the force of  law 
which is set out and approved with the counsel and consent 
of  the great men, and the general approval of  the common- 
wealth, by the authority of  the king.3 
And  again,  when  these  laws  have been  approved  by the 
custom of  those concerned, and by the oath of  the king, they 
cannot  be  abrogated  or  changed without the conscnt  of  all 
those by whose counsel  and consent  they were made.4  The 
law is not something which the king makes or unmakes at  his 
ple:tsure,  but rather represents an authority which  even  the 
king cannot override. 
The king is indeed the supreme administrator of  law,  and 
1 Id ,111  9  3 (fol. 107) : "  Nihil enlm 
aliud potest re\  in terns, cum sit Del 
mlnlbter et vlcarius, nlsi id solum quod 
de lure potest, nec obstat quod dlc~tur, 
quod  principl  placet,  legls  habet v~g- 
orem, quia =eqnitur In fine legls, '  curn 
leqe regia qua de lmperio elus lata est,' 
id  cst  non  qulcqmd  voluntate  regls 
ternere  presumptum  est,  sed  ammo 
condonrl~ iura,  sed  quod  magnatum 
Suorum  conslllo,  rege  au~tontatem 
Pmatante,  et  hablta  super  hoc  do 
llherationo  et  tractatu,  recte  fueiit 
difim~tum." 
Cf. Dig ,I 4. 1 (Inst. 1. 2.  6). 
Cf. pp. 41, 42, 45. 
Id., 1.  1  2  (fol  1). "  Cum autem 
fere 14 omn~bus  regio~~ibus  utatuc 1cg1- 
bus et lure scrlpto, sola Anglla usa ost 
In  ems  fin~bus  lure  non  scripto  et 
consu@tudine. In ea  quldem  ex  non 
qC"Pto  ms  venit,  quod  usus  com- 
prohavlt.  Scd  non  erit  absurdurn 
leges  Anglicanas,  licet  non  scriptas, 
leges  appellare,  cum  legis  vlgorem 
habeat  qmdqu~d de  cons1110  et  de 
consensu  magnatum  et  re~pubhce 
communi  sponfiione,  auctoritate  regis 
slve  prlncipis  praecedente,  iuste fuerit 
d~ffinitum  et approhatum." 
Cf  Papln~an  in Digest, 1. 3. 1. 
Id., 1.  2.  6 (fol. lb) : "  Hmusmod~ 
vero leges Anglicanae et consuetudiues, 
regum  auctorltate  lubent  quandoque, 
quandoque vetant, et quandoque vm- 
dlcant  et  puniunt  transgressores. 
Qua  qmdem,  cum  fuerint  approbatae 
consensu  utentium,  et  sacrament0 
regum  confilmatze,  mutari  non  pote- 
runt nec  dcstru~  binc  communl  con- 
sensu eorum omnium, quorum cons1110 
et consensu  fuerunt  promulgata.  In 
mollus  tamen convert1 possunt,  etlam 
sine  eorum  confiensu,  qula  non  de. 
strmtur quod m mel~us  commutatur." 72  THE  INFLUENCE  OF FEUDALISM.  [PART  I. 
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acts, but it continues in a  different  strain.  The king  has a 
superior, that is God, and the law by which he is made king ; 
and also he has his court, namely counts and barons, for counts 
are so called  as being the king's  associates,  and he who has 
an associate  has a  master;  if  therefore the king  should  be 
without a  bridle, that is without  law, they should impose a 
bridle upon him.] 
It  is certainly difficult to reconcile this statement with those 
in other passages which we have already considered, in which 
it  is said very eil~phatically  that the king is under no man, that 
he has no  equal  or  superior,  except  God  and the law.2  It 
seems most  probable that the passage has been  interpolated 
into the text of  Bracton's work ;  but while it is difficult to 
think that Bracton would himself  have used these terms, it is 
not clear whether he would have repudiated the substance of 
them.  It is true that in the passages which we have just cited 
he says that if  the king refuses to do justice, he must be left to 
the judgment of God,4 but against this must be set the phrase 
l Bracton, 11.  16. 3 (fol. 34) : "Item 
factum regis  nec  chartam potest  qu~s 
judicare, ita quod factum domlni regis 
irntetur.  Sod  dicere  poterit  quis, 
quod  rex  lustitlam  fecent,  et  bene, 
et si  hoc,  eadem  ratione  quod  male, 
et  ~ta  imponere  el  quod  iniurlam 
emcndet,  ne  incidat  rex  et iustitla~i~ 
n  iudicium  .cir,entis  Del  propter 
inluriam.  Rex  autem  babct  superi- 
orem, Deum sc~l~cet.  Item legem, per 
quam  factus  est  rex.  Item  curlam 
suam,  vldolicet  comltes,  ot  barones, 
quin comltes dlcuntur quasi socii regls, 
et qui habet socium, habet maglstlum. 
Et  ideo si rcx fuent sine frzno, 1. slne 
lego, dehent el  il.rnum  apponere,  nisi 
111~1rnet  fuerlnt  cum  rege  sino  frreno. 
Et tum clamabunt  subditi  et dlcent, 
'Domlne  Jesus,  in  chamo  et  frano 
mnxillns  eorum  conqtringr.'  Ad  quos 
Dominus,  '  Vocabo  super  eos  gentem 
robustam  et longiuqunm  et lynotam, 
cuius  llnguam  ignorabunt,  quae  des- 
truet eos,  et evellet radi~es  eorum  de 
torra,  ct a  tallbus  ~ndicahuntur,  quia 
subditos noluerunt ]usto  lndicare '  ; et 
In fine, llgatis eorum mambus ct pedi- 
bus  mittct  eos  In  caminum  ignis,  et 
tenebras  esteriores,  ubi  erlt  fletus  et 
stndor dentium." 
Cf.  esp. pp.  67 and 70. 
Cf.  Maitland,  ' Bracton's  Note- 
Book,'  vol.  I.  pp.  28-33,  and  vol.  1. 
pp.  252  and 332  of  the edltion  of  the 
text of  Bracton whlcli 1s  being brouglit 
out by George E. Woodbine, Assistant 
Professor  of  History  at Yale.  Pro- 
fes7or Woodhine has come to the con- 
cluqlon that while  the passage is con- 
tained  in  one  group  of  MSS.,  thls 
evidence  cannot  be  accepted  against 
that of  two other groups of  MSS. whlch 
ornit  ~t.  Cf.,  however,  Dr  Ehrhch's 
work  just  mentioned,  pp.  202-205.  1 
am  glad  to have  the  opportunity  of 
expresslr~g  the great satisfact~on  which 
students of  medizeval law  will fool  tli~t 
I'rofessor  Woodhine  ha5  been  able  to 
n~ahe  such  substant~al  progioss  with 
his great enterprise. 
'  Cf.  I.  8, 5 , and ]v.  10. 
6'  minimus autein esse debet, vel quasi, in iudicio suscipiendo, 
si petat,"  1 the more general but very emphatic statement that 
tile king is uuder tlle  and the reference to the possibility 
that the "  Universitas Begni " and the "  Baronagium " may 
correct the king's unjust action.3  It should also be observed 
that in a passage which  also we  have already cited, Bracton 
describes the king as the vicar of  God if  he does justice, but the 
lllinister of  the devil if he turns to  injustice, and he uses phrases, 
derived in part from St Isidore of  Seville, that the title of  king 
is derived from good ruling, not from mere reigning, for he is 
a Bing while he rules well, but zt  tyrant when he oppresses the 
people which is entrusted to lii~1.~  It is indeed impossible to 
say with absolute confidence what Bracton may have implied 
in using the designation  "tyrant " of  the unjust king, but it 
must be borne in mind that in the common usage of  mediaval 
writers  this  is  generally  employed  to describe  a  ruler  who 
either never  had,  or had  ceased  to have,  any claim  on  the 
obedience of  his  subje~ts.~ 
WC are, however, not so much concerned with the question 
whether the words represent the opinion of  Bracton, or of  some 
other contemporary writer.  There seems to be no reason to 
think that the words, although interpolated, belong to a later 
time.  They are important to us on account of their correspon- 
dence with the principles of other feudal jurists.  The principle 
which  they  represent  is  the principle  of  some  of  the most 
important  of  these.  The Assizes  of  Jerusalem set  out very 
clearly that the king is subject to the law, and thak the court 
is the tribunal to which any one who feels himself  aggrieved 
by the king or lord can appeal, that it is responsible for the 
lnaintenance of  the law, if necessary even against the king, and 
they cite cases in which this principle had been carried out in 
action.G The ' Sachsenspiegel ' seems definitely to lay down the 
' Cf. 111  9, 3.  a  bene  regendo,  et  non  J.  rcgnando, 
a  Cf. p. 67.  qwa rex est dum bone  reglt,  tyrannns 
'  Cf. iv.  10.  dum  populurn  sihi  creditum  vlolenta 
'  Id.,  111.  9.  3  (fol. 107bl : "  Igitur  opprimit dominatione."  Cf.  St Idisore 
dum facit mstitlarn,  vlcarlus  est regis  of  Seville, Etym., ix. 3. 
aterni,  minister  autem  thaholi  dum  Cf. I'art  I1  of  thls volume, chap. v 
declinet ad iniurlam.  Dlcltur enim rex  Cf. pp. 52-59 74  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  FEUDALISDI.  [PART  I. 
doctrine that even the king is answerable to one who can judge 
him.1  The '  Etablissements of  8t Louis ' are clear that even in 
the case of  the Ring of  France the vassal can demand justice 
of  him in his Court, and that if the king refuses to give this he 
can make war upon the king, and can require his sub-vassals to 
follow him.2  And though Beaumanoir does not commit himself 
to any definite statement about the coercion of  the king, he 
does emphatically set out the general principle of the supremacy 
of  the court as determining the mutual obligation of lord and 
va~sal.~ 
It is, we think, clear that the feudal system was in its essence 
a  system of  contractual relations,  and that the contract was 
binding  upon  both  parties,  on  the lord  as much  as on  the 
vassal.  Whatever else may be said about it, one thing is clear, 
and that is that feudalism  represents the antithesis  to the 
conception of  an autocratic or absolute government. 
l  Cf. p. 61. 
Cf. pp. 62, 63. 
q.  pp. 63-66. 
CHAPTER  V. 
FEUDALISM  AND  THE  NATION. 
IT may  be  urged  that the tendency  of  feudalism  was  really 
and disintegrating, that it  tended to arrest or retard 
the developnlent of  the conception of  the national society or 
state, that the principle of  the loyalty which the vassal owed 
to his immediate lord was really inconsistent with the concep- 
tion  of  the authority of  the whole community and its head. 
There is a great amount of  truth in such a contention, and we 
must therefore consider the matter in some detail, but briefly. 
In  an  earlier  cha,pter attention  has  been  drawn  to the 
contrast, which  finds  expression  in some of  the epic poetry, 
between the personal  loyalty and devotion which  the vassal 
owes to his immediate lord and the indifference and even con- 
tempt for the overlord or king.l  There is no doubt that we 
ha,ve here a forcible expression of  an anti-national and disin- 
tegrating character in feudalism.  The truth is that the feudal 
System, whatever  may  have  been  its remoter  origins,  took 
shape during those years when the dissolution of  the Carolingian 
empire and the invasions of  the Northmen and  Magyars reduced 
Europe to an extreme confusion, and that  its characteristics are 
related to the absence of  such a well-organised government as 
might  give  the  private  man  adequate  protection.  In the 
absence of  strong central or national authorities, men had to 
turn for protection to the nearest power which  seemed to bo 
capable of  rendering this.  At the same time all those  juris- 
dictions, which had once represented the delegated authority of 
the Carolingian emperors and kings, tended to become heredi- 
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tary.  When Europe began to recover froin the anarchical con- 
fusions of  the late ninth century and the early tenth century, 
the  new  conditions  were  firmly  established,  and the  great 
national organisations which gradually formed themselves out of 
the ruins of  the Carolingian empire were at first rather groups 
of  semi-independent  territories or states than compact'ed ad- 
ministrative unities.  It would be outside of  our province to 
examine the varieties of  these conditions as they present them- 
selves to us in Germany or Italy, in France or England.  We 
must bear in mind that the conditions varied great,ly in detail ; 
it  is enough for our purpose to recognise that in spite of  these 
~ariat~ions  the conditions were substantially similar. 
It was the characteristic of feudal society that the local and 
personal  attachments were  st'rong, while the relations  to the 
central authorities were comparatively weak  and fluctuating. 
This is the fact which lies behind the weakness of  the overlord 
or king  and the  power  of  the immediate  lord.  The  great 
feudatories no doubt owed allegiance to the king or emperor, 
but the vassals of  the great fe~da~tories  had at  first probably no 
very clearly defined relations to the overlord.  We have now to 
recognise that while this was true, and while in Germany the 
process of  national consolidation was overpowered by the terri- 
torial principle,  in England and France, and ultimately in the 
other European states, the national unity triumphed over these 
disintegrating forces.  The truth is that while feudalism was 
based  primarily  upon  the relations  between  a  man  and his 
immediate lord, the principle of the national state was, though 
undeveloped, older, and soon began to reassert itself,  so that 
at least  as  early  as the eleventh  and twelfth centuries the 
principle  of  a  direct  relation  between  all free  men  and the 
king  began  to  be  firmly  established.  Students  of  EngIisll 
constitutional  history  will  remember  the significance  of  thc 
action of  William  the Conqueror  in requiring all landowners 
to take the oath of  fidelity to himself, whosesoever nien they 
were.l  We have now  to observe that this  principle  is em- 
*  The  important passages  are cited  Florence of  Worcester : "  Nec multo 
in Stubbs's  ' Constitutional  History of  post  mandav~t  ut  archiepiscopi,  opis- 
England,' section 96.  copi, abbates, comitee, barones, et vice- 
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bodied in the feudal law books of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. 
Jean  d'l'belin makes it clear that in the kingdom of  Jerusa- 
lem it was established as law after the war between Amauri I. 
and Girard  of  Seeste  (Sidon) that the sub-vassals as well as 
the tenants-in-chief had to take the oath of  allegiance (ligece) 
to the chief  lord, tlie king, and that he could require the in- 
habitants  of  cities and castles  held  by his  vassals  to swear 
fealty to himself.'  In  another passage he lays it down that 
when  any man does homa,ge in  the kingdom  of  Jerusalem to 
any one else than the chief lord he must not do "  iigece," for no 
one can do "  ligece "  to more than one man, and all the vassals 
of the vassals are bound to do "ligece"  to the chief lord of  the 
kingdom.2  In another place  again he describes the mode in 
which the sub-vassal makes allegiance to the chief lord of  the 
kingdom ; he is to  kneel and, placing his hands between those of 
the chief  lord, is to say, "  Sire, I make you allegiance  (ligece) 
according to the Assize for such and such a fief, which I hold 
of  such and such a person, and promise to guard and protect 
comites cum suis militibus, die Kalen- 
darum  Angustarum  sibi  occurrerent 
Saresbcrire ; quo cum venissent, milites 
eorum  sibi  fidelitatem  contra  omnes 
homincs iurarc coegit." 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle :  L' Thzer him 
comon  to  his  witan  and  ealle  tha 
landsittende  men  the  ahtes  wzeron 
ofer  eall  Engleland,  W-zeron  thaes 
mannos men  the hi  waoron,  and ealle 
hi bugon to him and wzeron his menn 
ancl  him  hold  athas  sworon  th~t  hi 
wolden  ongean  ealle  othre  men  him 
holden beon." 
'  Jean  d'Ibelin,  140 : "  Et fu celle 
assise  ensi  faite  et establie,  quo  les 
homes des homes dou chief seignor dou 
'eiaume  feisent ligecc au chief  seignor 
reiaume, par l'assise,  des fibs  quils 
tenoient  de  ces  homes,  ct  quo  toz 
ciaus qui avoient fait homage nu  chief 
Beignor, fust par l'assise  ou autrement, 
fucent  tenus  les  uns  as  autres,  et 
aussi  lea  homes  de  ces  homes  de 
ohascune  court  par  sei;  et que  si le 
rei  volcit  aveir la feaut6  des  gens  qui 
eatoient  manant  6s  citbs,  et 6s  chas- 
tiaux,  et  6s  bors,  que  ces  homes 
tenoient  de lui,  que il li juracent  toz 
feaut6,  et que  il  li  fucent  tenus  par 
cette feauti!  de  ce  que  les  homes  de 
oes  homes  li  sont  tenus  par  Is ligece 
faite par I'arsise  au chief seignor." 
Cf. id., 199. 
Id., 195:  "Et qui fait homage de 
chose qili seit ou roiaume B autre que au 
chicf seignor il lc deit faire on 1s maniere 
cleqsus devisieb, mais que tant que il ne 
li dcit pas faire ligece ; por ce que nu1 
home  no  pout  faire plus  d'une  ligece, 
et que  toz  10s  homes  des  homes  dou 
chicf  seignor  dou  reiaume  li  deivent 
faire ligece par I'assise ; et puisque I'on 
li deit la ligeco, l'on ne la pcut it autre 
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you against any who ma,y live or die, as I air1 bound  to do 
by the allegiance (ligece) made according to the Assize."  The 
chief  lord kisses lliin and replies, "  And I receive you in the 
faith of  God a,nd in my own, as I ought to do in accordallce 
with  the allegiance  (ligece) made  according  to the Assize." 
When  they  have  thus  made  allegiance  the  sub-vassals  are 
bound  to defend  and support  the chief  lord  against  every 
one,  and  even  against  their  inlmediate  lord  under  certain 
conditions.  If  the chief  lord has a  dispute or war  with  any 
one of  their lords, the sub-vassals are to remind their lord that 
they are the liegemen of  the chief  lord, and to request him to 
demand that the dispute should be submitted to the judgment 
of  the coilrt.  If  the chief  lord  refuses  to do  justice  in  his 
court, they will follow their lord, but if  he refuses to take these 
steps within forty days, or if  within that time he takes action 
against the chief  lord, they will forsake him and s~~pport  the 
chief 1ord.l  Again, Jean d'Ibelin says that if  any lord is doing 
wrong to the chief lord, without his knowledge, the sub-vassals 
1 Jean  d'Ibelin,  197 : "  Quant  les 
homes des homes dou chief seignor dou 
reiaume font au chief  seignor la ligece 
par l'assise, oelui qui la fnit deit estrc a 
genoills devant lui et metre ces mains 
jointes  entre les soea, et dire li : '  Sire, 
je  voz fais la  ligece par l'assise  de tel 
fi6  que je  tiens de tel,'  et nomer colui 
de qui il tient le fi6 et dire quels est le 
fi6;  'et voz  promet  8.  garder  et  8. 
sauver contre totes riens  qui vivre  et 
morir  puissent,  si come  je  faire le  dei 
de  ligece  faite  par  l'assise.'  Et le 
~oignor  li deit respondre :  'Et je  ensi 
voz  receis  en Dieu  fei  et en la  meie 
come je  faire le dei de ligece faitc par 
l'nssise.'  Et baisier  le  en la  bouche 
en  foi.  Et quant la  ligoce  est  ainsi 
faite, 10s  homes  qui  l'ont  f~ite  S0nt 
tenus  ou  seignor  de  garder  le  et de 
sauver contre totes riens  qui  vivre  et 
morir puissent,  main que encontre leiir 
seignor  de  cui  il  tienent  le  fib,  por 
quei  il ont faite la ligece par l'assise ; 
et en tele maniere que ce il avicnt que 
le cli~ef  seignor  ait contens  ou  guerre 
8.  aucun des seignors de ces homes qui 
li  ont fait la  dite ligece,  ciaus homes 
deivent  venir  8.  leur  seignor  et  dire 
li :  'Sire  voz  saves  que  nous  somes 
homes  liges  dou  chief  seignor  dou 
reiaume  devont voz ; por  quoi noz ne 
devonz  estre  contre  lui,  si  en  lui  ne 
remaint : si voz prions et  requerons que 
voz  adressi6s  vers  lui,  et  que  voz  li 
mand6s que il voz maint par l'esgart de 
sa court,.  Et  ce vos ce ne faitos dedenz 
quarante  jors,  nos  vos  guerpirons 
et  irons  B  lui  aidier  et  conseiliers 
contro voz,  se en lui ne  remaint.  Et 
se voz faites ce que noz voz requeronz. 
et il  voz  faut  dc  droit  faire  par  S* 
court, nos ne voz guerpironn pas. 
so  voz  dedenz  ceaus  quarante  jars 
feissiOes chose qui fust contre lui, no5 
ne  le soufririens pas se nos 1e  poriens 
amender ne  deatorber  son  mal;  et se 
noz  no  le  poriopnq  destorber,  nos  V02 
guerpirieens  lors  ot  iriemes  ti  lui  et 
feriens vers lui  rc que nos deveriens.' " 
Cf. id., 198. 
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,,ust  remonstrate with their lord, and if necessary must join 
the chief lord against him.l  Again, the close relation between 
the chief lord and the sub-vassal is illustrated by the principle 
that the chief lord is bound to protect him against his imniedi- 
ate lord, if he acts unjustly and without the authority of  his 
court, and to replace him in his fief if  he has been unjustly de- 
~rived  of it.2  Tliese principles  are stated in much the same 
terms also by Philip of N~vara.~ 
It  is clear therefore that even in a typical feudal ~onstit~ution 
such as that  of the kingdot11 of Jerusalem in the twelfth centjury,  .  . 
the principle of the supremacy of the central or national organ- 
isation over the relations between the vassal and his immediate 
lord  was  already  fully  recognised.  It  is  perhaps  scarcely 
necess:vy  to point out that this principle is clearly set out in 
Glanvill with regard to England in the twelfth century, but it 
is worth  while to notice that he niakes a distinction between 
the homage which a man may make to different lords for differ- 
ent fiefs, and the liege obligation (ligancia) which he can only 
make to that lord from whom he holds his " capitale tenemen- 
turn."  The distinction is not the same as that in the Assizes of 
Jerusalem, but it is parallel to it.  Glanvill makes it clear that 
in doing homage to  any lord, there must always be reserved tthe 
faith which he owes to the king, and that the sub-vassal must 
follow the king even against his lord.4 
If we  turn to France we find the principle of the reservation 
'  Id., 199. 
=  Id., 200. 
Philip of  Novara, 51. 
'  Glanvill,  ix.  1 :  "  Potest  autem 
quis  plura  homagia  diversis  Dominis 
facere  de  Feodis  diversis  diversorum 
Dominorum : sed unum eorum opertet 
eS8e  praecipuum, et cur11  ligancia  fac- 
turn :  illi  scilicot  Domino  faciendum, 
a qU0  tenet snum capitale tenementum 
is  qui  bomagium  faccre  dehet.  Fieri 
Butem debet homagium sub hac forma, 
scilicet  ut  is  qui  homagium  facere 
debt ita fiat l~omo  Domini  sui, quod 
fidcm illi portet de ill0 tenement0 unde 
hOmngium  suum  prccstat,  et  quod 
in  omnibus  terrenum  l~onoreln 
servet, salva fide  debita  domino  Regi 
et  haeredibus  suis.  Ex  hoc  liquet 
quod  vasallus  non  potest  Dominum 
suum infestare, salva fide homagii sui : 
nisi  forte  se  defendendo,  vel  nisi  ex 
przcepto principis cum eo iverit contra 
Dominum suum in exercitum." 
Cf.  'Summa  de  legibus,'  xiii.  1: 
"  Fidelitatem  autum  tenentur  omnes 
residentes  in  provincia  duci  facere  et 
servare . . . Omnes enim in Normannia 
tenentur  fidclitatcm  principi  ohser- 
vare.  Unde homagium vel fidelitatem 
alicuius  nullus  debet  recipere,  nisi 
salva principis fidelitate ; quod  eciam 
est  in  eorum  receptione  specialiter 
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of  fidehty  to the  king  is  clearly  stated  in  the  thirteenth 
century by the author of  the ' Jostice et Plet.'  The king, he 
says, must hold of  no one : dukes, counts, &C., may hold of 
each other, and become each other's men, but always, saving 
the dignity of  the king, against whom no homage is of  any 
authority.  "  Chastelain," "  vavasor,"  citizens and vlllains are 
under others, but all are under the king.l  Again, Beaumanoir 
sets out very distinctly the principle that the obligation of  the 
vass:tl  to follow his lord in battle does not extend to the case 
when the vassal is called upon to follow against the overlord 
or the king.2 
The only writer in whom we have found some suggestion of 
ambiguity about the matter is one of  the Lombard civilians of 
the thirteenth century, who also wrote on feudal law, James of 
Ardizone.  He seems indeed to agree himself with the jurists 
already  cited  that the sub-vassal is not bound  to follow his 
feudal superior against the overlord, and that he is rather to be 
rewarded if  he refuses to follow his lord against the "  prince " 
and the "  patria,"  for  every  man  is  bound  to defend  the 
"  patria,"  and the "  prince " is to be preferred to every other 
creature ; but he  mentions, apparently ss a view  which  was 
maintained by some, that a  vassal is bound to help his lord 
against another superior, and is not to be punished for this. 
The phrase is indeed ambiguous, but it leaves upon one's mind 
the impression that the "  alter superior "  is his lord's ~uperior.~ 
1 '  Jost~ce  et Plot,'  1.  16.  1 : "  L1 
lolr no dolt tenir do null.  Duc, contc, 
vlsconte,  baron  puent tenir  11  un  des 
autrcs et debenlr home,  sauf la dlgnlt6 
le  roi,  contre  qul  homage  ne  vaut 
nens  Cliastelain,  vavaqor,  cltacn, 
vllam,  sont  souzrnls  Q.  cols  que  nous 
a\ons  clovant  nomez.  Et tmt  sont 
soz la mam au rol " 
2  Beaumanoir,  11.  F5 : "  c11 qu~  sont 
semorit  pour  aldler  leur  sclgneurs 
contro  lcur  ancmls  ou  por  aid~er  lcur 
seigneurs  h  leiir  mown4  dcfend~e,  no 
do~rent  pas  contrernauder  ne  querre 
nu1  delal.  Et s'll  colltremandcnt  no 
no  qulere~lt  delal,  11  ne  gardent  par 
bion  lor  fo~  vers  leur  seigneurs.  Et 
quant 11  falllent  a leur selgneur  on  tel 
beeomg, 11  deservent Q.  perdre leur fief, 
ne 11  ne se pueent escuser par essolne, 
pus qu'il  solent  ou  pal3  et  que 
guerre  ne  eoit  contre cell  do  qul lour 
selgneur  t~enent  leur  hommage,  ou 
contio 1e  conte qui out leur souvelaln~~ 
on  contle  10  rol  qm  est  par  desseur 
tous." 
a  Jacobus  do  Ard~zone-'  Summa 
l  eudorum,'  G9. "  Item  ovcusatur  62 
dornlnur vult quod eurn ad~ubet  contra 
dominum lpslus dorninl  nam  91  mm 
offenderet,  nlsl  ei  sat~ifaceret,  feudo 
pnvarotu~, ut  In  tit.  de  feu. 
16  is  easy  to recognise  that the question  here raised  mas  a 
difficult one,  and that it would  arise specially  under Italian 
; but it  is important to observe that even in ltaly  the 
pinciple of  the reservation  of  fidelity to the overlord,  or  to 
the prince, was very definitely maintained.  We must, however, 
%llow  for the great influence wliich  the Roman jurisprudence 
would exercise upon the judgment of  James of  Ardi~one. 
There is indeed no doubt that in the judgment of  the feudal 
jurists of  the thirteenth century the king has a full jurisdiction 
over all persons within his kingdom. 
The author of the 'Sachsenspiegel'  lays down this doctrine 
with great clearness and emphasis.  The king, he says, is the 
common  (ordinary) judge  over all men.  Every man has his 
right (law) before the king, all authority is delegated by him. 
Whenever and wherever the king is himself present all other 
jurisdictions  are superseded, and all prisoners must be brought 
before him, any person refusing to do this will be put under 
the ban, and any man who is aggrieved by a  judgment  can 
appeal to the king.l  These phrases are very comprehensive in 
benefic.  1.  ~mper~alem,  5  ~llud,  et in 
alienando  feudum  conbonsns  maloris 
dornln~  debet  intervenlre,  ut In  pm- 
dicta const~.  prllno  respon  &  $  pilmo. 
Vel dlcatur quod Imne tenetur vasallus 
adluvare  dommum  contra  altcruni 
superiorem,  et non  punlatur,  qula  In 
serv~t~o  domlnl  su~  fac~t,  argumeu  ff. 
de  unur.  1.  sod  umus,  5  sl ~~istus-  in 
fie de qutz matsna ilotavl supra cadcm 
summa,  8  Item  sl  vasallus  vasalll,  et 
5  ubl vero plu~es. Item servus v.hsal11 
excuuatur,  SI  domlnus  feud1 petat  ut 
eum  adlnvet  contra  domlnum  8erv1, 
'n  Culus  est  potestate,  cum  servus 
8equendo dommum non punlatur, cum 
neceusltate potestat~s  dornlnl excusetur 
servus  parcndo  domlno  (ut  ff.  ad 
legem  Cornelien  de  fai,  l.  dlrus,  5 
Item  qenatus)  llcet  domlnus  debeat 
damnan. 
...... 
E+cusandus  eat  vasallus  et potlus 
VOL.  ID. 
plzcmlo  afficlendus,  SI  non  sorblerlt 
domlrio  coritra  princlpern  vel  patr~ain 
suam, ut In  t~tulo  do feudls et beneh. 
1.  lmper~alem  8  ultirno,  in  tltulo  de 
~acra.  et  forma  fide.  1.  ~llud.  . . . 
Qmlibet  onlm  debet  patr~am suam 
defendere,  (ut in  Lombar.  de  his  qu~ 
patrlam  defen.  1.  prima  et ultlma) et 
non potcut pater lure patria: potestatls 
reslstero,  quomlnus patrla obw.quatu~, 
(ut ff.  do  muneribus  ot  honorlbuz,  1. 
honor.  5  plcbel,  m  fine)  et prlnceps 
omnl  creaturzc  praofclrndus,  ut  In 
titulo,  de  lna~oritate  et  obod~ent. c. 
sollte.  Magnn  onlm  servit~a  ab  unl- 
vorsls  subdltls  debentur  lmperlo,  ut 
C.  do  opeilbus  publlcls  1.  qnicumque 
locus." 
l  '  Sachsenspiegel,'  m. 26. 1  "  Dle 
kolnng Ir geinene r~clitere  over a1 " 
Id., 111  33. l . "  Iewolh  man hcvet 
sln recht vol'mc konlnge." 
Id.,  111.  52.  2 . "  1)~n  komng kuset 
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their nature, and, while this is not the place to discuss their 
actual  ~onst~itutional  significance in the  administration  and 
judicial  organisation  of  the  empire,  they  are yet  of  great 
importance as  indicating how far at  least in theory the national 
conception had imposed itself upon the feudal. 
The same  principle  is  set out in the '  Summa de legibus,' 
one of  the Norman law books of  the thirteenth century.  The 
prince alone ha,s "  plena iurisdictio " over all disputes brought 
to him,l and again in another place,  the jurisdiction  of  the 
feudal lord is severely  limited to certain cases,  for all "  ius- 
ticiatio  personarum " belongs  in Normandy  to the Duke, in 
virtue of  the fealty which  all  men  owe  to hirn ; and again, 
jurisdiction over the bodies of  all men, small or great, belongs 
in Normandy  to the Duke, inasniuch  as they are bound  by 
fidelity and allegiance to him alone.2 
man  to riclltere  over  egen  nnde  len  Id., ii. 12. 4 : "  Schilt man en ordel, 
unde  over  iewelkes  man~les  lif.  Die  dos  sal  man  tien  an  den  llogcsten 
keiser  ne  rnach  aver  in  allcn  landen  riotitere, unde to lest vor den koning ; 
nicht  sin,  unde  a1  ungorichte  nicht  dar sal die richtcre sine boden to geven, 
richten  to aller tiet, dar umme liet he  dic  der horen  welk  ire  vulkome  vor 
den vorstcn grafscap, unde den greven  dome Ironinge." 
sculthcitdun~  ."  Id.,i. 58  1 : "  Svcnne die grove kumt 
Id., iii.  60.  2 : "In svelke stet des  to  des  gogrefen  dinge,  so  sal  des 
rikes  de  koning  kumt  binnon  dome  gogrcvcn  gerichte  noder  sin  geleget. 
rike,  dar  is  inle  ledich  monte  unde  Also  is des greven, svenne die koning 
toln, untie in svelke lant he lrumt, dar  in  sime  grafscap  lrumt,  dar  so  beido 
is ime ledich dat gerichte, dat he  wol  to  antwerde  sin.  Also  is  jewelkex 
richten  mut  alle  die  klage,  die  vor  richtcres,  dar die lroning  to antwerde 
gerichte  nicllt  begunt,  noch  nicht  is,  die  lilage  ne  ga  clenne  uppe  den 
gelent ne sin.  3. Svenne die lroning oc  koning." 
alrest in dat land lrumt,  so solen ime  1 ' Summa de legibus,'  ii. 4 : "  Solus 
ledich  sin  alle  vangrne  uppe  rectlt,  autcm  princeps  plenam  habet  iuris- 
unde man sal sie vor ime bringell undo  dictionem do quorrlis ad ipsum delatis 
mit rechte verwinnen  oder  mit rechto  omnibus laicalcm." 
laten, so man sie erst besonden  mach,  Id.,  vi.  8 :  "  Preter  hoc  tamen 
deder der tiet clat sie de koning eschet  sciendum  est  quod  pro  debito  Pin- 
to rechto oder sine boden, to dem nianne  cipis, elnpco termino solntioni deputator 
~olven  oder  to 'nlc  hove  oder  to 'me  soleL  in  debitores  iusticiatio  fieri  Car- 
l~use,  dar sie gevangen sin oder hebhrt  poris, licet pro nullo alio debito debeat 
gowesen.  Weigeret  man  sie  vore  to  corpus hominis iusticiari ; omnis enim 
bringenc, xint man sie to rochte geeschet  iusticiatio  in  Normannia  ad  duccm 
hevet,  imde  man  des  getiich  an  des  pertinet poreonarnm propter fidclitatoln 
koningrx boden hevet, man dut to hant  quam ei debent singuli observare.  Ex 
in de achte alle  die  sie  vengen,  unde  qao eciam  usitatum cst in Normannia 
lius  nnde  lude,  die  sie  weder  recht  cluocl nullus potest ab aliquo homagitlm 
halden."  recipere nisi ~alva  fidelitatc ducis No'- 
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The author of the '  Jostice  et Plet,'  and Beaumanoir, main- 
tain the same doctrine in France.  The author of  '  Jostice et 
plet' is indeed so much influenced by the Roman law that it 
may be held that he is to be considered rather as a civilian than 
,  feudalist,  but his  treatment of  the subject  corresponds in 
principle with that of the feudal jurists.  His phrases are note- 
worthy.  The king has jurisdiction everywhere and always, he 
has plenary authority in everything, while others have it only 
in  part.l  Again,  the  count  or  duke  has  "  jostice " in  his 
lands, but under the king who is over him, the king must not 
indeed deprive him of  this, so long as he does right, but the 
king can interfere to secure justice.  The king holds of  no one ; 
dukes, counts, viscounts,  and barons can hold of  each other, 
and become each other's men, but always, saving the dignity of 
the king, against whom homage is of  no avail, for all are under 
the hand of  the king.2 
mannie,  quod  eciam est in  reception0 
homagii exprimendum. 
Unde  nec  aliquis  in  Normannia 
hominis  sui  corpus  potest  vel  debet 
prisonie  mancipare,  nisi  coram  eo  de 
latrocinio  fuerit  insecutus  vel  in pre- 
senti  deprehensus,  vel  eius  serviens 
fuerit, ut propositus,  molendinarius vel 
quoquo modo rerum suarulrl receptor. 
quos arrcstare potest quousque compo- 
tum  debitum  et  plegios  suEcientes 
habuerit de eisdem. 
9.  Ad  bosci  forisfactum  garanne vel 
quarum defonsarum,  vel costume  de- 
tento, vel bladcrum,  seu pratorum vel 
alicrurn huiusmodi,  possunt homines a 
dominis feodorum  arrestari . . . dum 
tarnon  ad proscns  forisfactum  fuerint 
deprehensi, et  tantum detineri quousque 
"amna,  vel r-adia, vel plegios habuerinb 
damno illato restaurando et  emendn, 
Ubi  deheat extorqueri.  Si autem aliquo 
alio  pro  facto  crin~inoso  aliquis 
capiatur,  justiciario  debet  reddi  indi- 
late. 
Si  autem  dominus  homini  suo 
fecerit  iniurinm feodi rationo, ad ducem 
qertinet curia de eodem, nisi dominus, 
cluia  fuerit  interpositus,  eam  re- 
quisierit,  qui  iurisdictionem  habeat 
feodalem." 
Id., cxiii.  1 : "  Cum  in Normannia 
omnium iurisdictio corporum ad ducern 
tam piebis pertineat  quam magnatum, 
eo  quod  fidelitate  et  ligancia  soli 
principi  Ceneantur. " 
l '  Jostice  et Plet,' i.  7.  6 : "  L'en 
demande porquoi li rois use par tot et en 
toz tens de juridiction,  cum aucnn soit 
en  son rdgne juridiction  qui soie est ? 
et l'en respont quc en roi conferln6o est 
le poir de tote la r6gion, s'il ne le done ; 
et il a plenicr poer en tot, c'est  L,  en- 
tenclrc poor de prodome ; et li autre si 
n'ont  que  partie  de poer,  quar  il  ne 
sont ape16 qu'en partio de la  cure, non 
pas en plenier poer. 
Enten  que  rois  conferme  est  aussi 
comme  se  chascuns  motoit  sa  bone 
volrnt6  en  la  soie.  Enten  ci  rolson, 
par  que  rois  use  en  cbascuns  leu  do 
j uridicion." 
'Id.,  13.  1:  "Contes  a  en  ses 
terres en la cont6 sa jostice,  xau le roi 
qui est par dessur ; ne li rois no li doit 
pas sorbir sa jostice,  tant comme il fait 
droit.  Li rois peut ce amender." 
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Beaumanoir  asserts  very  emphatically  that  the  king  is 
supreme over  all jurisdictions  and over  all persons.  In one 
passage of  great importance which we have already discussed 
he explains the sense in wliich he uses the word "  souverain," 
and says that while every baron is "  souverain " in his own 
barony, the king is "  souverain " over all, and has the charge 
of  the whole  kingdom,  and therefore call  make "  establisse- 
ments " which  are binding  everywhere.  No  one is so  great 
that he cannot be called before the king's court, "  pour defatxte 
de droit ou pour faus jugement." 
The  whole  conception  is  summed up by  Bracton  in  an 
emphatic passage in which he lays down the principle that tlie 
king has the "ordinary "  jurisdiction and authority  over a11 men 
who are in the kingdom, for all laws which belong to the crown 
and the lay authority and the temporal sword a~re  in his hand ; 
it is he who holds justice  and judgment, that is jurisdiction, 
so  that it is  by his  juri~dict~ion,  as  being  the minister  and 
scignories et totes joutices,  sauf le roi, 
qui cst li par desus, 9.  amender 1e torfct 
qu'll a fet, et sauf ce que li rois a en la 
duchee, et autrcs par jutes  causes." 
Id., i.  16.  l : "  Li rois ne  doit tenir 
de nuil.  Duc,  conte, vicomte,  baron, 
puent tenir li un dos rtutres et devenir 
home,  sauf la dignit6 le roi,  contre qui 
homage  ne  vaut  riens.  . . . Et tuit 
sont soz la main au roi." 
1 Beaumanoir,  xxxiv.  1013 :  "Pour 
oe  que  nous  parlons  cn  cost  livre,  en 
plusours  lious,  du souvcrain,  et de ce 
qu'il  puet et doit ferc, li aucun pour- 
roient entendre, pour  ce  qno  nous  ne 
nommons  conte  no  due,  quo  ce  fust 
du roi : mais en toas les lious la ou li 
rois n'est pas nomm6s, noua cntendons 
de ceus  qui  tiencnt  en  baronnie,  car 
rhascuns  barons  est  souverain  en  sa 
baronie.  Voirs  est  que  le  rois  cut 
souverains  par  dessus  tous,  et a,  de 
son droit la  genoral garde de tout son 
roiaume,  par  quoi  il  puet  fere  teus 
etablissemcns oomme il li plest pour le 
commun  pourfit,  et ce  qu'il  estahlist 
doit  estre  tenu.  Et so  n'i  a  nu1  si 
grunt dessous li qui no  puist cstro tres 
on sa court pour  defaute do  droit  ou 
pour  faus jugement  et pour  tous  les 
cas qui touohuent le roi.  Et pour  ce 
qu'il  est  souverain  par  desseus  tous, 
nous le nommons,  quarlt  nous parlons 
d'aucune  souverainctd  qui  a  li  apar- 
tient." 
Cf.  xlviii.  1499 :  "  RZes  quant  li 
Rois  fat  aucun  establissomont  especi- 
aument en son  demaine,  si  baron  ne 
lessent  pas  pour  ce  a  user  en  lour 
terres,  selonc 10s anciennes cousiumos. 
Mes  quant li ~stablissemens  est goner- 
sus, il doit courre par tout lo roiaume, 
et nous  devons  croirc  quc  tel  estab- 
lisse~ncnt  sont fet par tros grant consoil 
et pour 10  commun pourfit." 
Cf.  also xi. 322 : "  Qar toute la laio 
juridicion  du roiaume est tenue du roi 
en fief  ou on  arriere  ficf.  Et pour  cc 
puet on venir en sa court, par voie 
clefaute  de droit ou  do  faus jugement 
quarit cil  qui de lui  tienent n'en  font 
cc qu'il doivent." 
vicar of  God, that he gives to every man that which is to be 
his.' 
when we now endeavour to sum up the conclusions which 
%rise  from tile study of  the political theory of  the feuda,l law 
books, it is evident that they represent very different principles 
from those wl~ioll  have been sometimes thought of  as related to 
feudalism.  The conception  of  personal devotion and loyalty, 
of an almost unquestioning obedience and fidelity of  the vassal 
towards his lord, was no doubt of great importance, and  the con- 
ception has left deeply marked traces in the structure and the 
sentiments of European political society.  But  it  is  also clear that 
the principle of loyalty did not, in the minds of  the feudal law- 
yers, or, as we shall see further in the second part of  the volume, 
in the judgment of  mediaeval society in general, override other 
considerations of  an  ideal and rational kind.  The feudal jurists 
recognised very clearly that all human relations, and not least 
the relations of  lord and vassal, must be controlled by the prin- 
cipIes of  equity and justice,  and that these principles found 
their embodiment in the law-the  law which is the superior of 
kings and princes,  wl~ich  is the expression  not of  their will 
merely, but of  justice,  and of  the custom and consent of  the 
community.  It is clear that the feudal Jurists conceived of  the 
relations of  vassal and lord as being limited and determined by 
the law, that lord and vassal were equally obliged to obey and 
to maintain the law, which prescribed the nature and extent of 
their mutual obligat'ions.  The relation of  lord and vassal was a 
contractual relation, the terms of the contract were prescribed 
Rracton, ii. 24 l (fol. 55b) : "  Nunc 
antem  dicenclum  erit  de  libertatihus, 
quis  concedere  possit  libertat,em,  et 
quibus,  et  qualiter  transferuntur,  ct 
qualiter possidentur vel quasi, et quali- 
per  usum  retinentur.  Quis ! Et 
sci~ndurn,  quod ipse  dominus rex, qni 
Ordi~lariam hahet  iurisdictionem  et 
dignitatem et potestatem super omnes 
qui  in  rogno  suo  sunt.  Hahet  onim 
omnia iura in manu sua, qua, ad coro- 
nam  et Licalem pertinent  potestatem 
et materialem gladium, qui pertinet ad 
regni  gubernaculum.  Habet  etiam 
i~istitiam  et iudicium,  quac  sunt iuris- 
dictionis, ut ex iurisdictione sun, sicut 
Ilei minister et vicarius, tribuat unicui- 
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by  law,  and the obligation  of  the contract  was  determined 
by law. 
Again, we have seen that  while feudalism, in its  great develop- 
ment in  the tenth century,  was  the result  of  the operation 
of  forces  which  were  anarchical,  or  which  at least  tended 
to disintegrate the larger  political  organisations  of  Western 
Europe, these tendencies were rapidly checked by the growth 
of  the principle  that the feudal jurisdictions  were  subject to 
the control of  the rising national  systems,  and that beyond 
the obligations of  the vassal to his immediate lord every in- 
dividual free man owed allegiance to the national sovereign. 
We  have  considered  the history  of  this movement  as it is 
reflected  in the feudal law books  themselves,  and have seen 
that at  least as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
it was  recognised  that the royal  or national  authority was 
paramount over all other authorities. 
It is no doubt true that feudalism left for many centuries 
deep traces in the structure of  Western society, and even on 
the theory of  political relations, but it is also true that, when 
we consider the subject in the broadest way, feudalism did not 
counteract  the normal  development  of  the political  ideas  of 
Western civilisation, but rather that in tlle end its main influ- 
ence  went  to further the growth  of  the principle  that the 
community is governed by law, and that the ruler as much ss 
the subject is bound to obey the law. 
PART 11. 
GENERAL  YOLITICAIi  THEORY  IN 
THE  llLEVENTH  AND  TWELFTH  CENTURIES. 
CHAPTER  I. 
NATURAL  LAW  AND  EQUALITY. 
WE now  turn to the history  of  the general development of 
political ideas from the beginning of  the tenth century to the 
end of  the twelfth, that is, we can resume the history of  these 
conceptions at  the point where we left them in our first volume. 
We  shall in doing this have occasion  fro~n  time to time to 
take account of tie  influence of  the three systems of  law which 
we  have considered, the feudal, the civil, and the canon law, 
but our main task is to trace this development in the general 
literature  of  those times, and in the principles  expressed or 
illlplicit in tlie constitutional development of Europe.  For tlie 
time being we shall not discuss directly the questions concerned 
with the relations of  the temporal and spiritual powers.  These 
became  during this period  so important that we  propose to 
devote a  separate volume to thern. 
h  considering the theories of  the civilians and canonists we 
have seen how important was the conception of natural law in 
the Middle Ages, but we must not look for any detailed discus- 
sion  of  this in the literature which we have now to examine, 
for these writers were for the most part enga,ged in considering 
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controversies and conflicts of  this time.  On the other hand, 
there is enough to show us that so far as they reflected upon 
the matter they all thought under the terms of the contrast 
between the natural and conventional condition. 
This is specially clear in regard to the conception of  human 
nature and its "natural " characteristics.  mTe  are apt to think 
of  medisowl society as governed by the idea of distinctions of 
blood and birth, and these conceptions were not wholly unim- 
portant.  It is, however,  clear  that, so far as men  reflected 
upon the matter, they accepted the tradition of  t,he later philo- 
sophical system of  the ancient world,  and of  Christianity as 
handed down by the Christian Fathers and  by the civil law, that 
there are no "natural "  distinctions in human nature, and that 
all  differences  of  rank  and  condition  are  conventional  or 
"  positive." 
We have dealt with the subject as it is illustrated in the 
writings of  the civilians and ~a~nonists  in the second voluine,l 
and we  only therefore add one citation from an ecclesiastical 
writer.  It is,  however,  specia,lly significant  to observe how 
emphatically the conception of the natural freedom of  men is 
stated by some of  the feudal lawyers. 
In  the tenth century, in a work of  that strange and eccentric 
prelate, Ratherins, Bishop of  Verona, we find a passa,ge  in which 
he urges upon Christian men that they should remember that 
God made all men equal in nature, and that it  is quite possible 
tha,t the subject  may be  a  better  man than his  lord.  The 
man who boastts of  his noble blood should remember that we are 
all  of  one  origin  and are made  of  the same  s~bst~ance.  In 
Christ we are all one, redeemed with the same price, reborn in 
the same baptism,  and those who rend asunder the unity of 
the brotherhood by setting themselves over others are really 
denying the conlmon fatherhood and redemption of  men.  In 
the sight of  God we ase only distinguished from each other SO 
far as our a,ctions are better;  the men who  humbly  serves 
is  better than the man who  arrogantly  despises  his  fellow- 
men,  he is nobler who  observes  the law of  nature and does 
not  repudiate  his  true  origin,  than  he  who  violates  that 
l  Cf.  vol. ~i.  Part I. chap. 4 ;  Part 11. chap. 5. 
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frielldship  between  men  which  is  so  great  and natural  a 
good.1 
The passage is no doubt based mainly upon recollections of  -- 
earlier writers,  of  the Fathers, and, probably through  them, 
of  Stoic writers  like Sene~a,~  but it is representative of  the 
normal judgment of mediaeval thinkers. 
we  may ta,ke as our first illustration from the feudal lawyers 
!  ,,  verv notable passage in the ' Sachsenspiegel.'  God, says the  -  " 
~,llthor,  made all men in His own likeness, and redeemed man  -- 
by His passion,  the poor  as well as the rich ; there were no 
slaves when the forefathers of  the Germans first settled in the 
land ; slavery, or serfdom, began by violence and captllre and 
unrighteous force ; the law of  Moses required all slaves to be 
set free in the seventh year; and the author holds that it is 
not in accordance with the truth or the will of  God that one 
man should belong to an~tlier.~ 
1 Ratherins  of  Verona-'  Prwloqui- 
orurn,'  i.  10 :  "  Attende  Deum  in 
principio  creutionis  hnmanw  dixisse : 
'Crescito  et mulliplicamini,'  . . . ut 
intelligas homines  non hominibus,  sec1 
volatilibus,  bcstiis  et  piscibus  esso 
prslatos,  omnesque  a  Deo  natura 
wquales  conditoq,  sed  inzqualitato 
morum  faciente,  aliis  alios  intantum 
suppositos, ut plerumque  aliqui domi- 
nentur  etiam  melioribns. . . . Nota 
vero  tu,  qnisquis  es,  qui  de  fastu 
alti  gloriaris  abusive  sanguinis ; onm 
omne  hominum  genus  in  terris  simili 
aurgat  ab  ortu,  et non  ex  alia,  sed 
ex  eadom  massa  cornpositus,  ex  uno 
patre,  ex  eademqne,  qua  servorurn 
quilibet,  sis  mutre  creatua.  Quia  si 
omnes in Christo quoqrte unum sumus, 
uno scilicet pretio redempti, eodemquo 
baptistno  renati :  quisquis  eamdom 
fraternik~tis  unitatem  cateris  so  pro- 
Ponendo scindere nititur, paternitatem 
sine  dubio  illius,  redemptionem  et 
regenorationem  quoque,  qua  eius  Glii 
elxcimu~,  quantum  in  se  est,  annul- 
Iare,  et, ut ita dicam,  ahncgaro  pro- 
batllr.  Verurn  si  solummodo  in  hac 
parte  dlsoernimus,  si  meliores 
aliis  in  operibus  bonis,  et  humiles 
inveniamur :  convincitur  melior  esse 
qui  tibi  servit  humiliter,  quam  tn, 
qui eum despicis arroganter ; nobilior, 
qui  tibi,  quod  promisit,  exhibit 
fideiiter,  quam  tu,  qui  eum  deoipis 
mendaciter ;  generosior,  qui  iura 
natur~ oustodions,  proprium  non 
deserit  ortum,  cluam  tu,  qui  vitiis 
vitia  nutriens  vim  amicitiw  mag- 
numque et natural0  viola^ bonum." 
2  Cf.  vol. i. pp.  20-22, and chap. 10. 
S~achsenspiegel,'  iii. 42.  1 : "  Cot 
hevet den man na ime selven gebeldet. 
uncle  hevet  ine  mit  sinen  martcro 
golcdegot.  den enen also  den anderen, 
ime  is  die  arme  also  besvas  als  dio 
rike.. . . 
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
3.  Do man ok recht ir~t  satte, do no 
was nen dienstman, undo waren a1 die 
ludo  vri,  do  unse  vorderen  her  to 
lande  quamen.  An  minen  sinuen 
ne  Iran  ik  is  nicht  upgonemen  na 
der  warheit,  dat jeman  des  anderen 
sole  sin; ok  ne  hebbe  wias  nen  or- 
kiinde.  . . . 
.  .  .  .  .  .  1 
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We may put beside these phrases a passage from Beaumanoir 
in  which  he  sets  out the  same  principles,  but in  different 
terms.  All men, he says, were at the beginning free, and of 
the same freedom, for all men are descended from one father 
and mother ; slavery (or serfdom) arose in many ways, such as 
that men were taken prisoners in war, or sold themselves into 
slavery on account of  their poverty, or because they could not 
defend themselves against the unjust violence of lords ;  however 
men may have become slaves it  is a great act of  charity that a 
lord should set his slaves (or serfs) free, for it is a great evil that 
Christian men should be in the servile c0ndition.l 
he  ok  to  haldene,  unde  dat  sevede 
jar.  dat het dat jar  der losunge,  so 
solde  man  ledich  laten  unde  vr1  alle 
dle gevnngen waren  unde In  egrnscap 
getogen,  mlt alsogedaneme  gerede  als 
inan  sic  rieng,  of  sle  ledlch  unde 
r7rl  woldcn  wescn.  Over  sevenwerf 
seven jar  quam dot vefteglstc jar,  dat 
het  dat  jar  der  vrouden,  so  muste 
allrr  manlllr  ledlch  unde  vrl  wesen, 
he wolde oder newolde. 
5.  Ok  gat  uns  got  orkunclos  mer 
an enem penmnge,  dar man Irne mode 
besochte,  do  he  sprak  latct  den 
lielsel  s~nes  beldes  geweldlch,  unde 
godes  belde  gevet  gode  Dal  bl  uns 
kundl~h  von  godos  worden,  dat  dle 
mensche,  godes  belde,  godos  wesen 
sal,  unde  sve  ino  andeis lsnlnnne  to 
segct  danne  gode,  dat he  ueder  got 
dut. 
6. Na  rechter  warhelt  so  hevet 
egenscap  begln  von  gedvnnge,  unde 
von  vengnlsse,  unde  von  unrcchter 
walt,  dic  man von  aldere  In  unrechte 
warhelt  getogon  hevet,  unde nu voro 
recht hebben xrel." 
Cf. '  Sehwebensplegel,'  57.  2 . "  Wir 
han da~  von  der  scl~r~ft,  daz  nieman 
sol  elgen  sln.  Doch  1st  ez  also  dar 
komen  nut gewalt  unde mlt tmancsal, 
daz es nu reht 15t daz eigen liute sln " 
Cf  id  206. 
1 Heaumanolr,  xlv.  1453 :  "  Com- 
ment que pluseur estat de gent sotent 
mamtenant,  volrs  est  qu'au  Lom- 
moncement  t~ut  furent franc et d'une 
mclslne  franchise ,  car  chascuns  set 
que noub  debcend~smes  tult d'un  pero 
et  d'une  mere.  . . . Et 11  serf  sl 
sont  venu  par  mout  de  manlcres 
d'aqu~s~c~ons.  Car 11  ~UCUII  sont venu 
par  estre  prls  de  guerre,  si donnolcnt 
servitude  seur  aus  et  seur  lcr  olrs, 
par  raenqon,  ou  por  lssir  de  prlqon , 
et 11  autre  sont  ~enu  palee  qu'il  so 
vendolent  par  povlet6,  ou  par  con- 
voltrse  d'avo~r . . . et 11  autre  sont 
venu parcc  qu'll  n'ont  eu pouoir d'aus 
defendre  dos  selgnours,  qu~  a  tort  et 
par  force  les  ont  atrtir  a  servltudo 
Et  par  quelconques  maniercs  q~i'll 
solent  venu,  nous  pouons  entendio 
que  grant  nulnosne  fet  11  slres  qul 
les  oste  de  selv~tudo  et les  met  en 
franch~sc,  car c'est  grans maus  qnant 
nues c~estiens  est de serve condition " 
Cf.  ~d.,  xlv.  1438  "Par touteq  tes 
choses  sont  serv~tudes  venues  avnnt. 
car  selonc  le  dro~t  nature1  chascun~ 
eat  frana,  mes  cc10  naturele  franclllio 
est  corrompue  par  les  acquisiclon~ 
clessus dites." 
Cf  also  Rracton,  I.  S.  1  (fol. 5b) : 
"  Libelorum autem homlnum quorum- 
cumque nulla est accoptlo apud Deum* 
nec etlam servorum, qula non est Per- 
sonarurn acceptor Deus, qua  quantum 
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~t is  clear  that even  the feudal lawyers were  profoundly 
affected  by the earlier traditions, and that to them just as much 
as to the Chrisblan  fathers the subjection  of  man to man as 
slave or villein was a thing conventional, not natural. 
ad  Deum,  qul  malor  est fit  tamquam  dlfferentla pereonarum,  qule homlnum 
mlnol, et qul przcessor  fiat  tanlqnam  quldam  sunt  pracellentes  et prclatl, 
mmlstrator.  Apud  hornlnes  vero  est  et alns p~lnc~pantur." cRAF. 11. J  DIVINE  NATURE OF POLITICAL  AUTHORITY.  93 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE  DIVINE  ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF 
POLITICAL  AUTHORITY. 
IN  the  first  volume  of  this  work  we  have  examined  the 
characteristic elements of  the theory of the origin and nature 
of  political authority as it is set out in the literature of  the 
ninth  century, and we  think that enough  has been  said  to 
make it clear that as soon as we  find any literary treatment 
of  political  conditions  and ideas,  we  find  that there  were 
very clearly fixed in the minds of  the men of  the new mediaval 
civilisation  some  highly  important  conceptions  of  political 
origins  and obligations.  We  have  in  the  last  volume  en- 
deavoured to examine the relation of  the revived Roman law, 
andof the new system of  Ecclesiastical law, to  these conceptions, 
and in the first part of  this volume we have considered  the 
bearing upon them of  Feudalism.  We must now inquire how 
far these conceptions can be  said to have been  continuoll~ly 
present to men's minds in the centuries from the tenth to the 
twelfth, and how far they were modified or developed. 
We are entering upon the study of  an age in which the struc- 
ture of society was very rapidly growing and changing, and we 
have to inquire how far and in what manner men's conceptions 
of the principles of  the political order changed with it.  If our 
interpretation of  the political theory of  the ninth century is 
at  all correct, the main features of  that theory are to be found 
in  three  principles-first,  that all  authority, whether  Tenl- 
poral  or  Syiritua,l, is ultimately  derived  from God ;  second, 
that the supreme authority in political society  is that of 
law, the law  which  represents  the principle  of  justice  and 
that the immediate  source  of  all political authority is 
the community, for law is primarily  the custom of  the com- 
m,wity,  and there can be no legitimate authority without the 
election or recognition of the community.  We have to inquire 
bow far these principles  continued to control the conception 
of political society, and in what manner they were modified or 
developed. 
During the tenth century and the earlier part of  the eleventh 
should infer, from the fragments  of  the literature which 
have survived, that there was not very much active political 
speculation ; we can indeed gather from occasional phrases the 
natnre of the conceptions which were current,,  but it  may 
be  doubted  whether  men  did generally  do  much  more than 
repeat the commonplaces of the ninth century tradition.  These 
commonplaces were not, however, unimportant,  and in some 
respects they seem to represent real and intimate convictions. 
It was  the great  constitutional  and ecclesiastica,l conflicts 
of  the latter part of  the eleventh  century, continued in the 
twelfth, which compelled men to consider these traditional pre- 
suppositions more closely, and from the middle of  the eleventh 
century we have an abundant and important body of  literature 
in which we can discern with great clearness the main features 
of an energetic and determined political speculation. 
We  must begin by considering the question how far in the 
period with wllich we are now dealing it  was doubted or denied 
that the secular authority was derived from God, and this will 
lead us on to the closely related  question  wl~ether  the State 
was  or was not conceived of  as having a moral function and 
purpose. 
As  we  have  seen,  the principles  of  the divine  source  of 
Political authority, and of  the moral function of  government, 
were most emphatically laid down by the Fathers,=  and main- 
ta'ined by  the  writers  of  the ninth  cent~ry.~  It  has  been 
t'hat these conceptions were  really  undermined by 
the influence of  Bt  Augustine,  especially  as expressed in the 
' be  Civitate Dei,' and that the effects  of  St Augustine's mode 
I  Cf. vol. i. chaps. 11,  13,  14.  P Cf. vol. i. chaps. 17, 18. 94  POLITICAL  THEORY : 11TII &  1.2~~  CI3NTURIES.  [PART  IL 
of  thought  are  clearly  traceable  in  the Middle  Ages.  we 
cannot  here  discuss  the  real  and  complete  meaning  of  st 
Augustine, the subject has been handled with great care and 
restraint  by Reuter.l  The question  with  which  we  have to 
deal  is  whether  there  was  among  the  political  theorists  of 
the eleventh or twelfth centuries any important tendency to 
think of  the secular power  as lacking  the divine authority, 
and as representing a principle of evil rather than of  good. 
The discussion centres round some phrases of Pope Gregory 
VII.  (Hildebrand), their meaning and their influence.  Some 
writers have attached a very great importance to these,  and 
have  considered  them  to  be  representative  of  a  clear  and 
dogmatic theory, which  as they have thought  was  of  great 
importance in the Middle Ages.  And no doubt Hildebrand's 
phrases are emphatic and startling.  The best known of  them 
is to be found in his famous letter to Hermann, the Bishop of 
Metz  (1081) : "  Q,uis nesciat : reges  et duces ab iis habuisse 
principium,  qui, Deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia, 
liomicidiis, postremo universis pene sceleribus, mundi principe 
diabolo videlicet agitante, super pares, scilicet homines, dominari 
caeca  cupidine  et intolerabili praesumptione  affectaverunt." 
Beside  these  words  me  may  put those  of  an earlier  letter 
written to the same Bishop  (1076) : "  Sed forte putant, quod 
regia  dignitas  episcopalem  praecellat.  Ex  earum  principiis 
colligere  possunt,  quantum  a  se  utraque  differunt.  Illaln 
quidem  superbia  humana  repperit,  hanc  divina  pietas  in- 
stituit.  Ills  vanam  gloriam  incessanter  captat,  hzec  ad 
caelestem vitam  semper aspirat."  These  are indeed strong 
phrases,  and might  well,  to the unwary,  seem  to imply  a 
definite doctrine of  the secular power, as representing not the 
authority of  God, but of  evil. 
In order, however, to arrive at the meaning of  ~ildebrand's 
phrases, we must begin  by observing that in other places he 
speaks  of  the  secular  power  in  very  different  terms.  In  a 
letter written to Rudolph, Duke of  Suabia, in 1073, he speibks 
of  his hope that the "  sacerdotium "  and the "imperium "  may 
1 H.Reuter, 'Augustinische Studien.'  a  Id. id., iv. 2. 
2 Gregory VII., Registrum, viii. 21. 
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be  in concord, thah, as the human body is ruled by its 
two eyes, so the body  of  the Church may be ruled  and en- 
lightened when the two authorities agree in the true religion.1 
rn a letter of 1074 to Henry IV., he bids him to know that he 
rightly  holds the royal power, if  he obeys Christ the King of 
Kings and defends and restores the Ch~rch.~  In a  letter to 
Sweyn, King of Denmark, in 1075, he prays him to administer 
+:be  iuthority entrusted to him, according to God, to adorn the  .- 
diguity of  the royal title with the appropriate virtues, and to 
it manifest that that justice, in virtue of  which he reigned 
over his subjects, also ruled in his heart.3  Again, in writing to 
Harold, King of Denmark, in 1077, he admonishes him to keep 
the honour of  the kingdom committed to him by God with all 
diligence, and to make his life worthy of  it, in wisdom, justice, 
and mercy, that God may be able to say of  him, "  By me this 
King  reigneth."  And  again,  in  writing  to Olaf,  King  of 
Norway, in 1078, he describes the true function,of his royal 
authority as being to help the oppressed, to defend the widow, 
and to love and defend justice with all his n~ight.~ 
Perhaps the most notable passage is contained in a letter 
1 Id.  id.,  i.  19 :  "  Quae  (litter=) 
nimirum  inter  cetera  dulcedinis  suae 
verba  illud  nobis  videbantur  cons~il- 
ero,  per  quod  et status inlperii  glori- 
osius regitur  et sanctae ecclesia? vigor 
solidatur : videlicet ut sacerdotium et 
imporium  in  unitate  concordire  con- 
jungantur.  Kam  sicut  duobus  oculis 
humanum corpus temporali  lumine re- 
gitur,  ita  his  duob~s  dignitatibus  in 
Pure  religione  concordantibus  corpus 
ecclosiae  spirituali  lumine  regi  et il- 
lurninari probatur." 
Id. id., ii.  30 : "Et tunc  demum 
"?$am  potestatem  recte  te  obtinere 
CORno~~a~,  si  regi  regum  Cllristo  ad 
rcat,aurationem defensionemque ecclosi- 
aruln  auarum  faciendam  dominationis 
altitudinen:  inclinas  et  verba 
:Psius  dicentis cum tremoro recogitas ; 
Ego cliligentes mc  diligo,  et honorifi- 
'""tey  me  honorifico ; qui ailtem  me 
COntemnunt,  erunt ignobiles.' " 
8  Id. id., ii. ,51 : "  Rogamus igitur et 
xinccra  to  caritate  monemus,  ut com- 
lnissa tibi regni gubernacula secunduln 
Doum  administrare studens, et :lomen 
regalia  oxcellentire  congruae  ao  con- 
sonanti  virtutum  proprictate  geras, 
quatenila  eam,  per  cuius  principn- 
tum  subiectis  imperas,  in  cordo  tuo 
scmper regnare iustitian~  ostendas." 
Id.  id., v.  10 : "  Dlonemu~  insuper, 
karissime,  ut  tibi  commissi  a  Deo 
regni  honorem  omni  industria,  sol- 
lertia,  peritiaq1:e  custodias.  Sit  vita 
tua  digna,  sapientis  reierta,  iuntitize 
et  nlisericordire  condimento  saleque 
condita,  ut de  te vera  sapientia  quze 
Deus  est  dicere  queat : '  Per  me  rex 
isto regnat.' " 
Id. id., vi.  13 : "  Sit vestre poten- 
tiae  usus et esercitatio : subvenire op- 
pressis,  defendere  viduas,  iudicare 
pupil!is,  iustitinm  non  solum  diligere 
sed etiam tota virtute defendere." oa~p.  D.]  DIVINE  NATURE  OF  POLITICAL  AUTHORITY.  97 
in  which  Hildebrand  urged  upon  William the Conqueror,  in 
1080, tile duty of  obedience to the papal authority, inasniuch 
as the Pope would have to give account $0 God for him in the  - 
day of jndgment ; he prefaced this exhortation to obedience by 
a very explicit statement that God had appointed two authori- 
ties greater than all others to rule the world, the apostolica,l 
and the roya1.l 
It is clear that if  we are to arrive at a  complete and just 
view of  the conception of  kingship and secular authority held 
by Hildebrand,  we  must not isdate the phra,ses of  the two 
letters to Hermann  of  Metz,  but must  consider them along 
with the sentiments he eqpresses at other times.  If,  then, we 
examine  the  circumstances  under  which  the two  letters  to 
Hermann were written, we find that the purpose of both was 
to rcfutc the arguments of  those who maintained tbat it was 
not lawful or proper for the Pope or any one else to exconl- 
nlunicatje the  king  or  emperor.  Hildebrand  was  primarily 
concerned to demonstrate the absurdity of  this view, and he 
justifies  his  action by three considerations-&&,  the general 
authority of  binding and loosing given by Christ to Peter, from 
which no one is exempt ; second, the precedents which he cites 
of  such exconlmunications of  kings in the past ; and third, by 
a  comparison  of  the dignity  and authority of  the temporal 
1 Gregory  VII.,  Kegistrum,  vii.  26 : 
"  Credimus,  prudentiam  vestram  non 
laterc :  omnibus  aliis  excollentiores 
apostolicam  et rcgiam  dignitatcs  hnic 
mundo,  ad eius regimina,  omnipotcn- 
tom  Deum  distribuisse.  Sicut  enin~, 
ad  mundi  pulchritudinem  oculis  car- 
neis  diversis  tempcribus  reprzscntan- 
dam,  solem  et  lunam  omnibus  diis 
eminentiora  disposuit  luminaria ;  sic, 
ne  creatura,  quam  sui  benignitas 
ad  imaginem  suam  in  hoc  mundo 
creavernt,  in  erronea  et  mortifera 
traheretur pericula,  providit, ut apos- 
tolica  et  regia  dignitate  per  divcrsa 
r~geretur  officia.  Qua  tamen  maiori- 
tatis  et  minoritatis  distantia  religio 
sic  se  movet  christiana,  ut  cura 
ot  di~~c~isatione  apostolica  dignitas 
post  Deum  gubernetmr  rcgia.  Quod 
licet,  fili  karissime,  tua  non  ignoret 
vigilnntia,  tamen,  ut  pro  salute  tun 
indissolubiliter  menti  tuz  sit  alli- 
gstum, clivina tostatur scriptura, apos- 
tolicam  et  pontificalem  dignitatcm 
reges  cllristianos  cmterosque  omnes 
ante  divinum  tribunal  roprzsentatu- 
ram  et pro  eorum  clelictis  rationem 
lleo reddituram.  Si ergo iusto iudici, 
et  qui  mentiri  nescit,  creaturarunl 
omnium  creatori,  in tremendo iudicio 
te  sum  reprzsentaturus,  iudicet  dili- 
gens  sapientia  tua;  an  dobeam  vel 
poesim  ~aluti  tum  non  diligentifisime 
cavcre,  et tu mihi  ad salutenl tuam* 
ut  viventium  possideas  terram,  do. 
heas  vel  possis  sine  mora  non  obe- 
dire." 
and spiritual powers.  It is in  this last  connection  that he 
discusses the origin  of  secular a,uthority, and urges tllat this 
its origin  in the sinful  ambition  and love  of  power  of 
men  who  desired  to make  themselves  the masters  of  their 
equals.  That is, Hildebrand in those phrases  liiaintains that 
the origin  of  secular  authority is  related  to the vicious  or 
character in human nature. 
We have then here one aspect of Hildebrand's conception of 
the nature of  secular authority,  stated sliarply  and without 
qualification, but in a  context which is highly  controversial. 
In the other passages which have been  cited me  have a very 
different view.  In these  he  describes  secular  authority  as 
being derived  from God, and as finding its true chara,cter in 
the defence and maintenance  of  justice,  and he  hopes  that 
there  may  be  a  true  concord  and  agreement  between  the 
" sacerilotium " ai~d  the  "imperium,"  the  two  authorities 
wliich God has appointed to rule over the world. 
These two conceptions may seem at  first sight, especially to 
tl~ose  who are unfamiliar with the Stoic and Pc~tristic  tra,dition, 
inconsistent and irreconcilable, but this is merely a confusion. 
For, in this tradition, government, like the other great institu- 
tions  of  society, such  as property  and slavery,  is the result 
of  sin, and represents sinful greed  and ambition, and yet is 
also the necessary, and, in the Christian conception, the divine, 
remedy for sin.  Men  in a  state of  innocence  would  neither 
need  coercive government, nor would they claim to rule over 
their fellow-men ; while in the state of  sin and ambition, inen 
desire lordship over cach other, but also, in this condition, men 
need control and restraint if  any measure of  justice  and peace 
is to be attained and preserved.  hnd thus the institution of 
government, which is the result of men's sinful passions, is also 
by God to reshin sin.l 
No  doubt the phrases  of  Hildebrand in the two letters to 
the Bisllop of Metz express one side of  the traditional theory 
in  very harsh and crude fasllion, and we have evidence that 
Cf.  Scnoca, Ep. xiv.  2 ; Irenzeus,  Doctrina Christiana,' i. 28 ; and vol. i- 
,Adv.  H:-er.,'  v.  24;  St  Augustine,  pp.  24,  126, 129. 
T)ei,'  v.  10,  xix.  15 ;  De 
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they were resented even among those who were not prepared 
to defend the investiture of  bishops with ring and staff by the 
secular authorities.  For instance, Hug11 of Fleury, in a treatise 
addressed to Henry I. of  England in the early years of  the 
twelfth century, protests indignantly against the phrases which 
llad been used by Hildebrand in these letters about the origin 
and character of the royal authority, and maintains that suck1 
opinions are absurd, and contrary to the apostolic doctrine that 
all authority is from God, and that there is a divine hierarchy 
of  authority  and obedience not  only  on  earth, but  also in 
heaven.l 
The phrases  of  Hildebrand  were resented, and, considering 
their highly  controversial context, this is not surprising.  Is 
there now any reason to think that the conception  which is 
expressed in these phrases was maintained by other writers of 
this period as representing a complete and exclusive theory of 
the origin and nature of  temporal authority ?  There are a very 
few passages in the contemporary literature which deserve our 
attention. 
In a  fragmentary  treatise  written  in  the  middle  of  the 
eleventh century by a French churchman attacking the action 
of  tlie  Emperor  Henry  111.  with  regard  to  the  Papacy, 
especially  no  doubt in view  of  the deposition  of  the Popes 
at the  Council  of  Sutri,  the author  severely  condemns  the 
emperor  as having  claimed  jurisdiction  over  the Pope,  and 
1 Rugo  of  Fleury,  'Tractatus  de 
regia  potcstate  et  sacerdotali  dig- 
nitate,'  i.  1 :  "  Scio  quosdam  nos- 
tris  tcmporibus  qui  reges  autumnant 
non  a  Deo,  sed  ab  his  habuisno 
principium  qui  Deum  ignorantes, 
snperbia,  rapina,  ~erfidia,  homicidiis 
et postremo  universi~  pene  scelaribus 
in  mundi  prinoipio  diabolo  agitantc 
supra  pares  homincs  dominari  cexca 
cupiclitnta et inenarmbili  affectaverunt 
prxsumptione vel ten~critate  .  Quorum 
sententia  quarn sit frivola liquet apos- 
tolic~  docun~ento,  qui  ait :  '  Non  eut 
potestas nisi a Deo.  Quz  enim sunt a 
Deo ordinata. sunt.'  Constat igitur hsc 
sententia, quia non ab hominibus, sad 
a  Deo  potestas  regia  in  tcrris  est 
ordinata  sive  disposita.  . . . Unde 
nobis liquid0  claret Ileum omnipot,en- 
tem  non  solum  humanum  corpus 
membrorum  distinxisse  lineamentis, 
sod et toturn mundum certis gradibus 
ac  potestatibus,  sicut  illa  c~lestis 
curia cognosoitur esse distincta, in 4Ua 
ipse  solus  Deus  pater  ornnipotens 
regiam  optinet  dignitntem,  ct in 'lua 
post  ipsum  angeli,  archnngeli,  tlwoni 
ot  dominationes  et  qumque  cxterte 
potestates  sibi  invicem  przrsse  mira- 
bili  et  modcstn  potestatum  varietats 
noscuntur." 
C'E.  St Grcgory the Great, Ep  V.  591 
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urges  that the emperor does not occupy the place of  Christ, 
but that it might  rather be  said  that he  holds  that of  the 
devil, when he uses the sword and sheds b1ood.I 
Again, in a treatise written by a certain Bernald, apparently 
in  the last  years  of  the eleventh  century,  he urges  that if 
the popes have authority to depose Patriarchs, they have the 
same authority over  secular princes  whose  dignity seems to 
have been created rather by men than by the divine institu- 
tion.% Cardinal Densdedit, in one  of  his  treatises,  speaks of 
the royal  authority as arising from human institution, with 
the   erm mission  indeed  of  God,  but not by His will,  and he 
refers to the demand  of  the Israelites for a  king,  as related 
in 1 Sam~el.~ 
The first of these passages is very drastic, and if  we had any 
reason to think that it represented a generally current view, 
would  have  considerable  significance ; but  a,s we  shall  see 
presently,  some  of  the  strongest  papalists  take  the  very 
opposite view of the use of  the temporal sword.VThe phrases 
of  Bernsld and of  Deusdedit do not represent anything more 
than the conception tha,t the temporal power  is not derived 
immediately from God, but is directly tlie creation of  hunlan 
will and authority. 
What was, then, the normal view of  these centuries as to the 
source and nature of  secular authority ?  There can really be 
'  '  De Ordinando Pontifice,'  '  Auctor  institutione videtur processisse." 
Gallieus ' : "  Ubi enim inveniuntur im-  Deusdedit,  '  Libellus  contra  in- 
Peratores locum  Christi  obtinere ?  Ri  vasores et symoniacos,'  iii.  12 : "  Nec 
verius liceat nobis dicere, potius offitio  mirum sacerdotalcm auctoritatem quam 
diabOfi  surguntur  (v.r.  unguntur)  in  Deus  ipse  per  se  ipsum  constituit,  in 
gladio et sanguine,  ut, dum per  peni-  lluiusmodi  causis  regiam  precellero 
tentiam  eruantur  vitia  spirituali rcse-  potestatem, quam sibi humana prefecit 
patione*  i~si  jnsaninnt  vel  in  code  vel  adinvcntio,  eo  quidem  permittente, 
In  Lnembrorum carnali  obtruncatione ;  non  tamon  volente.  Nam  de  prima 
quad  secundum  gratiam  apud  Deum  rege populi sui, quem sibi pctiit spreto 
Ornnino  est abhominabile."  prophets,  principatu, ait ad cumdem : 
Bernaldl~s,  Libellus  xii.,  '  De  ' Non  he,'  inquit,  '  spreverunt,  sod 
SolutiOne  Juramentorum ' :  "Sicut  me, ne regnem super aos ' (1  Sam. viii. 
Romani  pontifices  summos  7).  Et iterurn :  L Paenitet  me,  quod 
Patriarchas  deponere  possunt,  ita  et  constltuerim  Raul  regem '  "  (1 Sarn. 
'nferiores*  utpote  mundi  principes,  xv. ii.) 
utique  dignitas  potius  cs  4  see p.  103. 
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no doubt whatever about this to those who are at the pains 
to ma,ke themselves familiar with the literature of those tlillles. 
Tile  writers  of  these  centuries  are practically  unaninious in 
maintaining  that the  authority  of  the king  or  emperor  is 
derived from God.  The principle is clearly expressed by those 
wllo wrote before the development of the great conflict between 
tlle Papacy aqd the Empire in the latter part of the eleventh 
century, but we also find it maintained with equal clearness 
during the great conflict both by imperialists and papaJist,s. 
In a commentary by Bishop Atto of  Vercelli, wllic11 belongs 
to tlie second half  of  the tenth century, we find a very interest- 
ing and very emphatic statement of  the divine autllority of  the 
secular ruler, whether he was Christian or pagan.l  Again, in 
a  report of  the sermon  of  the Archbishop  of  Maintz st the 
coronation  of  Conrad  the  Salic,  which  Wippo  givea  in  his 
life of  Conrad,  the Archbishop is represented as referring  to 
the same phrases  of  St Paul, and as speaking of  God  as the 
source  of  all human dignity,  who  had appointed  Conrad  to 
be  king  over  his  people ; the king  is the vicar  of  ChrisL2 
The  sanle  conception  is maintained  by  Peter  Damian,  one 
of  the  most  illustrious  of  the reforming  Italian  churchmen 
of  the middle of  the eleventh century.  In a letter to Arch- 
bishop  Anno  of  Cologne,  he  speaks  of  the "  regnum " and 
"  ~acerdot~ium  " as  being  both  derived  from  God,  and  of 
1 Atto  of  Vercclli,  'Exp.  in  Ep.  tum  relinquitur.  Ostendit  ergo  Ilis 
Pauli  ad  Romanos,'  xiii.  i. :  "  Prac-  verhis  apostolus  manifeste,  quoniam 
terea, ne  dicerct  aliquis : Transivi  ad  ornnis  potestas,  tam  apud  papanOS 
gratinm  Evangclii ; libcr  sum :  nulli  quam apud Christianos, a Deo ordinata 
subditus essc  dcbeo ; proptorea  apos-  est, sive propitio sive irnto." 
tolus, ut nihil  suis auditorlbus deeaset,  Wippo, '  Vita Chunradi,' '  De Con. 
propter  bonum  pncis,  et  concordia:  secratiorle Rcgis,'  ' Scriptum est enim : 
subircit : '  Omnin  anima  potostatibus  Omnis potestns a Doo est ' : "  1s omni- 
sublimioribus  subdita  sit,.'  4b excel-  potens rex regum, totius llonoris auctor 
lentiori pnrte id cst anima, totu~  homo  et  principiun~, quando  in  princiPeS 
dcsignatur ; sublimiores autcm potes-  terrw  alicuius dignitatis grntiam trans- 
tates dicit  impcratores,  reges  et prin-  fundit,  quantum ad naturam princil~ji 
cipes huius saculi, quibus nos subdilos  pura et munda. . . . Dominus  Wi to 
esse aclmonet propter  honum  paris, et  c!egit  ut essos rex super populum suurn' 
concordia?, ne nomen Dei, aut doctrina  ipse  te prius  voluit  probare,  et Post 
Christi  blasphcmetur.  . .  .  ' Qnac  modum  regnare.  . . . Ad  mmmarn 
autem  sunt a  Deo  ordinatx  bunt,'  a  dignitatcm  pervenisti,  vicarius  OS 
bono  quippc ordinatore nihil  inordina-  Chriflti." 
the need  which  each  has  of  the  0ther.l  In another  place 
he  draws  out  in  some  detail  the  complementary  relation 
between  the  spiritllal  and  the  temporal  authorities.  The 
duties  of  the different members  of  the Church, for they are 
both within tile Church,  are not the same.  The duty of  the 
priest  is  to nourish  and cherish  all  in  mercy,  the duty  of 
the  judge  is  to punish  the  guilty,  to  deliver  the innocent 
from the power  of  the  wicked,  to  be  diligent  in  carrying 
the law,  and in  maintaining  equity ;  he  sllould  always 
*erneniber the words of  tlie apostle, "  Wouldest thou have no 
fear of  the power ?  do that which is good, and thou shalt have 
praise of him, for he is God's lviinister to thee for good.  But if 
thou doest  evil,  be  afraid ; for he beareth not the sword in 
vain " (Rom. xiii.  3,  4).2  Peter  Damian  is clem  that the 
authority  of  the secular power  in  administering  justice  and 
punishing crime is derived from God. 
The writers  whom we  have just  cited belong to the period 
1 peter  Damian,  Ep.,  Bk. iii.  6 : 
"  Sciebat  enim  (i.e.,  the  High  Priest 
Jehciada)  quoniam  utraque  dignitas 
alterns  invicem  utilitatis  est  indiga, 
dum  et  sacerdotium  regni  tuitione 
protegitur,  et  regnum  sacerdotalis 
ofEcli  sanct,itate fulcitur. . . .  ut dum 
regnum ac socerdotium optata per vos 
pace  perfruitur,  is,  qui  utriusque 
dignitatis  auctor  cst,  pacis  ieternm 
digna vobis prminia largiatur." 
Id.,  ' Opusculum,'  lvii.  1 :  L'  Non 
amnia  membra  Ecclesia  uno  fungun- 
tui-  officio.  Aliud  nempe  sacercloti, 
aliud  cornpetit  iudici.  Illo  siquidcm 
ri~ceribus debct  pietatis  affluere,  et 
'n  mnterna  misericordia,  gremio  sub 
e~uhcrantibu~  doctrina: semper  ubcri- 
filios  confovere.  Istius  autem 
~f'iciom rst,  ut  reos  puniat,  et  ex 
eorum manibus cripiat innocantos ;  ut 
VIG~rem  rectitudinis et iustitiz tcneat, 
et  a  zelo  sanctionum  legalium  non 
te~escat  ;  ut  ab ccquitatis  linea  non 
*eelinet ;  ut  legitimi  vigoris  geniun~ 
"On  onervet.  Momineat  ctiam scmper 
quad Por apostolum dicitur ; '  Vis non 
timere  potestatem ?  fac  bonum,  et 
habobis  laudetn  ex  illa.  Dei  enim 
minister  est tibi in  bonu~n. Si nutem 
malurn  feceris,  time,  non  enim  fiine 
causa  gladium  postat.'  In  quibus 
utiquo  verbis  (datur) intelligi,  aliud 
cssc  gladium  prinoipis,  aliud  infulam 
sacordotis.  Non  enim  ad 11oc pracin- 
geris  gladio,  ut  violentorum  mala 
debeas palpare  vcl  ungere : sod ut ea 
studeas  vibrati  mucronis  ictihus  oh- 
truncare.  Hinc  est  qaorl  sequitur : 
'  Dei enim minister est vindex in iram 
ci, qui malo agit.' " 
Cf.  id.,  '  Liber  Oratinsimus,'  10 : 
"  Regnum  narnque  et saccrdotium  a 
Deo  cognoscitur  institaturn,  et ideo, 
licet  amministratoris  persona  prorsus 
inveniatur  indigna,  officium  tarnen, 
quod  utique  bonum  est,  competcns 
aliqunrido gratia comitatur. . . . Reges 
cnim et sacerdotcs, licet nonnulli eorum 
reprobi  sint  per  notabilis  vitrc  mcri- 
turn,  dii  tamen  et  christi  diri  rep. 
prriuntnr  propter  nccepti  ministerii 
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before the great conflict had broken out, but the same principle 
is maintained  by writers of  all shades of  opinion  during the 
great struggle.  It is needless  to cite the declarations  of  the 
extreme imperialist  writers,  for  this  principle  is  one  of  the 
main foundations of  their argument against the papalists, and 
we  shall presently have to consider  some of  their phrases in 
detail,  when  we  discuss the conclusions which  some of  them 
wished to draw from this principle. 
It  is, however, very important to observe that this principle 
was held with equal firmness by writers who did not belong to 
the imperialist party,  and even  by the extremest  papalists. 
Gerhoh of  Reichersberg, one of the most important writers of 
the middle of the twelfth century, was certainly no partisan of 
the secular party, rather, vehemently maintained the liberty  and 
authority of  the Church, but he was also very clear in asserting 
the divine origin and authority of the secular power.  In one of 
his treatises he condemns in the strongest terms any attempt of 
the ecclesiastic to draw to himself the secular authority, on the 
ground that this would be to destroy the authority which had 
been set up by God Himse1f.l  Again, no writer of  the Middle 
Ages is clearer than John of  Salisbury as to the limits  and 
conditions of  the royal authority, and the right of  resistance to 
the tyrant, but he is equally  clear that the authority of  the 
prince comes from God, and has the divine sancti~n.~ 
l  Cerhoh  of  Reichersberg,  '  De 
Investigatione  Antichristi,'  i.  72 : 
"  Quin  etiam,  sicut  aliquando  cesares 
quaedam  pontificalia  et  ecclesiastics 
presumebant,  ita  iste  de  contra  cum 
sacerdotio  quoddam  in  se  cesayeum 
ac  suporccsareum  imaginantur.  . . . 
Hoc autem quid est  aliud,  quam po- 
testat,em n Deo constitutam destruerc ct 
ordinationi l)ei resistnrc  ? . . .  Audiant 
poritifices precipientem sibi Dominum : 
'Rcddite  qua:  snnt  cesaris  ce~ari,  et 
qua:  sunt  Dei  Dco,'  ut,  si  rcgali;~ 
zecclesie  a  regibus  tradita  tenere 
volunt,  regibus  inde  iustum  ac  de- 
centem  honorem  exhibeant.  Audiant 
item apostolum.  '  Deum timete, regem 
honorificate.' " 
John  of  Salisbury,  '  Policraticus,' 
iv.  1 :  "  Est  ergo,  ut  eum  plerique 
diffiniunt,  principis  potestas  publica, 
et in  terris  quzedam  divine maiesta- 
tis imago.  Procul dubio magnum quid 
divina: virtutis  declaratur incsse  prin- 
cipibus,  dum homines  nutibus  eorum 
colla  submittunt, ot  securi plerumque 
feriendas  prabent  cervices,  et  im- 
pulsu divino quisque timet quibus ipsc 
timori est.  Quod  ficri posse non  arbi- 
tror, nisi nutu facicnte divino.  Omnis 
etenim potestas a Domino Deo est, et 
cum ill0 fuit sempcr, et est ante evum. 
Quod  igitur princeps  potest ita a  Deo 
eat, ut potestas a Domino non recadat, 
sed ea utitur per  subpositam  manumt 
in  omnibus  doctrinam faciens  clemen- 
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we  shall presently have occasion to examine in detail the 
tlleory of  Mnnegold of  Lautenbach, the most incisive 
rniter of  the investiture controversy, and the most unsparing 
critic  in  the  Middle  Ages  of  what  he conceived  to be  the 
illegitill~ate  pretensions  of  the imperialists.  While,  however, 
he enlphaki~ally  repudiates what he held to be the false inter- 
pretation  of  the  apostolic  doctrine  of  the divine nature  of 
authority, he traces this error to a confusion between 
tile office  of  the king, which he evidently conceives to be sacred, 
and the position  of  an individual king who  may have justly 
forfeited  his authority, and cannot then claim obedience in the 
name of  the apostolic auth0rity.l  And again in another passage 
he quotes with approbation a sentence from a letter of  Pope 
Innocent I.,  which asserted that the exercise of criminal justice 
by the secular power was founded upon the authority of  God 
Himself  .2 
And  again  the same principle  is  maintained  by Honorins 
hugustodunensis.  In his  treatise  entitled ' Summa Gloria,' 
which  is in  the main  a  vindication of  the greater dignity of 
tie aut iustitie s11ac.  Qui ergo resistit 
potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit, penes 
quem  est  auctoritas  conferendi  eam, 
et,  cum  vult,  anferendi  vel  minuendi 
earn." 
Manegold,  '  Ad  Qebehardum,'  43 : 
"In eo namqus quod dicitur : '  Suhditi 
estote  regi  quasi  przcellenti,'  ct : 
'  Denm timete, regem honorificate,'  ot : 
'  Subditi  estote  dominis  non  tantum 
his  et modeatis,'  multum sibi aplau- 
dunt sibique  titulos victoria ascribunt 
non  iutellegentes  neque  que  locuntur 
de quibus affirmant.  Rcs enim 
non  nomen  est  natura,,  sed  offirii, 
Ricut episcopus,  presbyter,  diaconus. 
Et curn quilibet horum ccrtis ex causis 
de commisso ~ibi  officio dcpcnitur, non 
quad erat, nec honor officio debitus 
Postea est impendendus.  Quisqnis ergo 
amism  dignitatis postmod~lrn  eibi  re- 
verontiam impendit, potins prevaricator 
quam logurn sorvat~r  oxistit." 
'  Id.  id.,  39:  "  Unde  sanctissimss 
papa  Innocentius in  decretifi suis cap. 
xxii.  hos,  per  quorum  ministerium 
catholiri principes et pravos puniunt et 
pios defendunt, a reatu immunes osten- 
dit  dicens :  '  Quesitum  est  super  hie 
etiam  qui  post  baptismum  adminis- 
traverunt  aut  tormenta  sola  exerou- 
ernnt aut etiam  capitalem  protulnrunt 
sontentiam.  De  his  nichil  legimns  a 
maioribils difinitilm.  Memincrant enim 
a  Deo potestates has esse concessas et 
propter  vindictam  noxiorum  gladium 
fuisse  permissum  et Doi  ministrrium 
esso  in  huiusmodi  datum  vindicem. 
Qncmadmodum  igitur  reprehenderent 
facturn,  quod  auctore  Dco  vidcrent 
esse  concessum  ?  De  his  igitur  ita, 
ut  actenus  servatum  est,  sic  habe- 
mus,  ne  aut disciplinam evertere  aut 
contra  auctoritatem  Domini  venire 
videamur." 
The  passage  is  from  Innocent  I., 
Ep.  6,  and  is  also  citecl  by  various 
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the spiritual as coii~pared  with the telnporal authority, he held 
indeed that the authority of Inan over man was not primitive, 
but e~t~ablished  to restrain  men's  sinful passions,  but  he  is 
also clear that it was  established  by God.'  And in another 
chapter of  the same work he sets this out with great emphasis. 
The royal authority is indeed inferior in dignity to the priestly, 
but the royal authority must, in those matters which belong to 
it, be obeyed, not only by the laity, but by the clergy;  and 
he  quotes  St Peter and St Paul as teaching plainly  that it 
was instituted by God for the punishment  of  the wicked and 
the reward of  the good2 
l Honorius Augustodunonsis,  '  Sum- 
ma  Cloria,'  26 : "  Deus  namqne  non 
prefecit  primum  hominem  homii~ibus, 
sod  beptiis  et brutis  animalibus,  quia 
his  qui  irrationahiliter  et  bestialiter 
vivunt,  iudices  tantum  prelati  sunt, 
quatenus eos per timorem revocent  ad 
insitre  humanae masuotndinis  tenorom. 
Unde idem Deus per Noo Sein et Iafeth 
peccant,is filii posteritati prefecit,  quia 
nimirum  peccantes sacerdotio et regno 
subiecit.  Unde  et in  evangelio,  cuni 
discipuli  dicerent : '  Domine, ecce duo 
gladii hic,'  hrec  verba  sua auctoritate 
roboravit,  quia  ad  regimen  accelesia, 
in presenti vitu duos gladios necossarios 
premon~travit  ; unum spiritalom, scili- 
cet verbnm  Dei,  quo eacerdoti~lm  uti- 
tur ad vulneranclos peccantes, alterum 
materialem,  quo  regnum  utitur  ad 
puniendos in nialis perdurnntes. Necesse 
est enim, ut hos regalis potesta~  subigat 
glaclio  materiali,  qui  legi  Dei  rebelles 
non possunt corrjgi stola sacerdotali." 
Id. id., 24 : "  Quamvis igitur sacer- 
dotium  longo  transccndat  ragnum, 
tamen  ob  pacis  concordia,  vinculum 
monet  evangelica  ct  npostolica  auc- 
torit~s,  rcgibus honorem in secnlaribus 
negotiis  dumtaxat deferendum.  Cum 
enim  quidam  a  Doniino  inquirerent, 
utrum censum cesari  dari liceret,  a~t  : 
' Reddite,  quze  sunt  cesaris,  crsari, 
atquo  quae  sunt Dci,  Deo.'  Ergo  in 
his qua? ad rogni ius pertinent, oportet 
clerum  et populum  regibus  parere,  in 
his  autem,  quae  ad  ins  divinae  legis 
spectant,  Deo  placere.  . . . Jjeatus 
quoque  Petrus  apostolus  llortatur 
honorem deferro rcgibus : '  Deurn,'  in- 
quit,  '  timete,  reges  honorificate.' 
Et itorum : '  Subditi estote omni  hu- 
man=  creatnrre  propter  Deum,  sive 
regi quasi precellonti, sivo  dncibus  ab 
eo  missis  ad vindirtam malefactorum, 
laudem vero bonorum.' In  quibus verbis 
considerandnm  est,  quod  regcs  ct iu- 
dices  ob  solam  vindictam  mnlorum 
ronstitunntur,  qui laudem ferre  bonis 
dicuntur.  Justi eninl reges  et iudices 
solos impios et iniquos puniunt, iustos 
autom  ot  bonos  laudibus  extollunt. 
Boatus  etiam  Paulus  ad subiectionem 
principum  hortatur  dicons :  ' Omnis 
anima potestatibus  sublimioribus sub- 
dita sit.'  Et no  putcs potestates per 
homines  casu  constitui,  subiungit: 
'Non  est  enim  potestas  nisi  a  Dm.' 
Quia  vero  aliqoando  proptcr  peccnta 
populi mali iudiccs constituuntur, sicut 
in  Job  legitur :  '  Qui  regnare  facit 
ypocritam propter poccata  populi,' ali. 
quando  nutem  ob  merita  quorunclam 
iusti pr:cficiuntur, addit, : '  Quze  nutem 
sunt,  a  Deo  ordinatae  sunt.'  Et ne 
putares  bonis  quidem  nbecliendum* 
mtllis  ilutem  rosistondum,  adhuc  pro- 
scqultur : '  Itaquc qui resistit potestati, 
I)ei ord~nationi  rcaistit ; qui autem re- 
sistunt, ipsi sibi  dampnationem ac4ui- 
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There can really be 110  doubt whatever as to the normal con- 
ceptions of  the political theorists of  the eleventh and twelfth 
as to t'l~e  origin  and nature of the teniporal power. 
The phrases of Gregory VII. in his letter to Herniann of  Mete 
are no doubt at  first sight startling, and it  is not surprising that 
they have led to some misunderstanding, but it is clear that 
they only represent  one aspect of  his  own  conception of  the 
state, and that an examination of his correspondence makes it 
clear that he had no intention to deny that political authority 
was derived from God.  And we hope that it  is now evident that 
the political theorists of all schools of thought recognised that, 
if man in a state of innocence would have needed no coercive 
authority, man under the actual conditions of  human nature 
requires such an authority both for the suppression  of  wrong 
and injustice and for the maintenance of  righteousness. 
runt.'  Et  quocl  iudices  ad  malos  mali.  Vis  autcm non  tirnero  potcsta- 
tantum reprimendos,  immo  puniandos  tcm ?  Bonum  f~r,  et habebis laudem 
preficiantur, patenter suhditur : '  Prin-  ox ipcia.'  Eadorn ct l'etrus  dixil." 
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CHAPTER  111. 
THE  MORAL  FUNCTION  OF  POLITICAL  AUTHORITY. 
THE normal conception of the Middle Ages was then that the 
temporal as well as the spiritual power  derives its authority 
from God.  We must now observe that this principle found its 
rationale in the moral purpose or end of  temporal authority. 
Such occasional  and controversial  phrases as those of  Hilde- 
brand might leave the impression that secular authority had no 
other purpose than to minister to the ambitions and to satisfy 
the desires of  the ruler.  But this was very far from being the 
real principle of  the Middle Ages ; to these the authority of  the 
king or  emperor was  divine,  because it was  his  function to 
secure the establishment and maintenance of  jt~st~ice. 
It  is  true that St Augustine  had  entangled  himself  in  a 
position  which in some places  at least led him to deny that 
the state must find its essential and distinguishing  quality in 
justice.l  There is no trace of  this conception in the writers of 
tlie tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries ; the passages in 8t 
Augustine's  writings  which  support it are not, as far as we 
have seen, ever quoted.  On the contrary, the constant prin- 
ciple set, out by the medizval writers is that the maintenance 
of  justice is the essential function of  the ruler. 
We can find this represented first in some references to the 
beginnings of  organised society.  Such references are scanty and 
contain nothing new or important, but, such as they are, they all 
represent the beginning of the authority of  man over man as due 
to the need of  order and of  some method of  restraint upon meals 
evil tendencies.  Gerbert (Silvester II.),  for instance, says that 
1 St Augustine, '  De Civitatc Dci,'  xix. 21, 24.  Cf. vol. i. pp.  165-1'0 
it is certain that when our first parents abused their free will 
by their transgression, man was set over his fellow-man in order 
to restrain his unlawful desires, and that thus men are held in 
clle&  by  civil and ecclesiastical  laws.'  Again,  Othloh of  St 
Elnmeran  points  out that it is impossible  that men  should 
live together in peace unless  there is some system by which 
some  are  subjected  to othem2  Again,  the  history  of  the 
Bishops  of  Cambrai,  a  work  which  belongs  to the eleventh 
century, commences with a brief  account of  the beginnings of 
city life-men,  as it was said, at  first wandered about like the 
wild animals, without any government of  custom and reason, 
pursuing  blindly  the  satisfaction  of  their  desires ; it was 
only when they began to come together into cities that they 
learned to keep fait'h and to maintain justice,  and to live in 
obedience to each  other.3  These phrases obviously represent 
formal literary traditions, and are not in themselves of  much 
importance,  but  they  may  serve  as an introduction to our 
consideration of the theory of the function or purpose of  the 
state. 
We begin by observing that the principle of  the just end of  the 
state, which was, as we have seen, very firmly maintained by the 
' Silvester  11.  (Gerbert), Ep.  xi.: 
"  Cum  const,at  post  primorum  nos- 
trorum  parentum  praevaricationem  in 
libcri  arbitrii  abu~ionom  genus  homi- 
nnm ei sententie adclictum, ut et llomo 
capitibus  nliorum  sccundum  Psalmo- 
graphi  vocom  superponatur,  ad  com- 
Pescondos  sciliret  humane  voluptatis 
illirit~s appetitus,  et  legibus  non 
mod0 foronsibns, verum  ctiam ecclesi- 
astlcis  col~ibeamur  rogdis  ac  rationi- 
bus." 
Othloh  of  St  Emmeran,  '  Dia- 
logue  do  Tribus  q~lzutionibus,'  24: 
"0.  Ubl  rogo,  pluros,  vcl  saltim duo 
homines  simul  commoranteu,  pacifici 
Pobmnt esse umquam, nisi  alter alteri 
aubdatur 
H. Nusquam omnino. 
0.  Unde  erat  ncrcssc  ut  homines, 
etiam  ~rimi,  rcdd~rentur pacifici  et 
subiicorentur alter aIteri." 
'  Gesta,  Pontificum  Cameracen- 
sium,'  i.  1 : "  Urbibus quondam  zdi- 
ficandis ea primum cauqa ab auctorihus 
extitisse  dicitur,  ut  hominrs  passim 
ritu ferarum oberrantes,  quibus  noque 
mos,  neque  cultus  rationc  magistra 
regebatur,  nich~lquo  divinum  aut 
humanum  sapiebant,  sed  propter 
errorem  atque  inscientiam  caca  ac 
temeraria  dominatrix  animi  cupiclitas 
ad se explendam viribus corporis ahutc- 
batur  pernitiosis  satellitihns ; illi  in- 
quam  homincs  instructis  urbium 
moenibus in  unum  convenircnt,,  fidem 
colero  et iustitiam  rctincre  disrcrent, 
ct aliis parere  sua voluntate  consuas- 
ccrent ;  ac  non  n~odo  labores  exci- 
piendos communis commodi causa, sed 
etiam vitam amittendam estimarent,." 
Cf.  Alcuin,  'Dialogus  de  Rhctorica 
et Virtutibus ' ;  Cicero,  Tusc.,  v.  2 ; 
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political writers of  the ninth century, continued to be held in 
the tenth and eleventh.  In the ' Collectio Canonum ' of  -4bbo, 
t,he Abbot of  Fleury, which is inscribed to Hugh and Robert, 
Rings  of  the French  (i.e.,  before 997), he  quotes  as from 
Council of  Paris a passage from that treatise ' De Duodecim 
Abusivis Szeculi,' which was much used in the ninth century ; 
the justice of  the king is to oppress no man by force, to judge 
without favour of persons, to be the defender of strangers and 
children and widows, to put down vice and crime, to maintain 
the poor  with  alms,  to set just  men  over  the affairs of  the 
kingdom, to defend his countr;y against its enemies, and to hold 
the Catholic faith1 
Ratherius of  Verona gives a terse statement of the qualities 
which  make  a  true king,  and without  which  he  may  have 
the name but cannot have the reality of  kingship ; these are 
prudence,  justice,  courage,  and  temperance,  the  man  who 
possesses these qualities, though he be but, a peasant, may not 
improperly be said td be a king, while the man who lacks them 
though he held the universal monarchy of  the world could not 
l  Abbo,  Abbot  of  Fleury,  '  Col- 
lectio  Canonum,'  iii. :  "  Uncle  ex 
libris  qui  ex  conciliis  sui  temporis 
effecti  aunt  cum  subiectione  episco- 
porum,  quanta  f~cile est  reperiri, 
expressim libro 11. cap. I. post aliqua. 
'  Justitia  regis  est  neminem  irluste 
per  potostatem opprimore, sine accep- 
tione personarum  inter virum et prox- 
inum  suum  iudicare,  advenis  et 
pupillis  et  viduis  dcfensorem  esso, 
furta  cohibere,  adulteria  punire,  ini- 
quos  non  exaltare,  irnpudicos  et his- 
triones  non  nutrire,  impios  de  terra 
perdcre, parricidas et peierantes vivere 
non sinere, ecclesias defcnsare, pauperes 
ollemosynis  alere ;  justos  supor  regrli 
negotia constituore, senes et  sapientes et 
sohrios consiliarios habere, magorum et 
hariolorum  pytbonissarumque  super- 
stitionibus non  intondere,  iracundiam 
ditferre, patriam fortiter et iuste contra 
adversarios  defendere ;  per  omnia  in 
Deo vivrre, prosperitatibus non elevare 
animam, cuncta adversa patientor forre, 
fidem  catholicam in Deum habere, filios 
suos  non  sinere  impie  agero,  certis 
horis  orationibus  insistere,  ante horas 
congruas non gustare cibum.' " 
This  passago  comes  from  tho  9th 
section  of  the treatise  'Do Duodocim 
Abusivis Safculi,' to which  referonce is 
mado in vol. i. pp. 222-224.  I am glad 
to have the opportunity to draw  the 
attention  of  English  students to  the 
cxcellent  monograph  upon  this  little 
treatise which was published ot Munich 
in  1908  in  '  Texte  und  Untorsuch- 
ungen,'  3.1,  1, by Siegrnund Hellmann, 
to which  my friend  Professor  Soutta* 
of  Aberdeen  has  kindly  drawn  my 
attention.  Hellmann  has  not  only 
provided us with an excellent text, but 
has demonstrated the great 
that  it is  an Irish  work  dating  fro* 
between  630 and 700 A.D. 
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riglltly  be called a king, for t.hc nle~n  who governs wrongfully 
loses llis authority.* 
wippo, in that life of  Conrad tile  Salic to which  we  have 
referred, represoilts the Archbishop of  Maintz, in crown- 
ing  as urging hill1 to remember that he was the vicar of 
Christ, and that no one but he who imitated Christ was a true 
God required of  him above a11  that he should do justice 
and seek peace for his country, that he should be the defender 
,,f  cllurches and clergy, the guardian of  wiilows and orpl~ans.~ 
These examples will suffice to show that the principles of  tlle 
political theorists of  the ninth century continued to be held 
until the time of  the great conflict between the papacy and the 
empire.  They were not cllaaged by that conflict.  Neither the 
imperialists nor the papalists had any doubt whatever that the 
true fullction  of  the king  was  to maintain  and set forwa.rd 
justice.  The papalists might use the principle to justify oppo- 
sition and resistance to what they conceived to be an uiijust 
authority, and the imperialists to repel attacks upon what they 
conceived  to be the legitima$te claims  and autllority of  the 
temporal ruler, but they were at one in maintaining that this 
was the true pwpose of  all authority. 
There is an excellent  example of  the principles  of  the im- 
perialist writers in the mork called ' De unitate ecclesiae con- 
servenda,' which was written against the Bldebrandine tradi- 
Ratl~erius  of  Verona,  '  Pr;eloquio- 
rum,' iii. 1 : "  Rex os  ?  Dignitas, rogo, 
ipqa  to  dum  delectat, instruat.  Sunt 
ql~aoilam  rcgalis ordinis insignia, quibus 
sin% ct si  nomen  utcunquo,  re tamen 
vera corte non potest consistere dignitas 
tanta.  His ergo utero, his cxcrccrc, his 
exornaro.  Esto prudens, iustus, fortis 
et temperatus.  . . . 2.  Hae  quatuor, 
regulos proprie  noseuntur esse  vir- 
tutCs, ut  cur* his quilibet etiam rusticus, 
'OX  non  incongrue  dici ; sine his,  nec 
'PS0  universam  prne  mollarchiam  ob- 
tillene mundi, quamyuam abusive, rex 
vdeat  iuste  vocari ; male  enim  im- 
peralldo,  ut  ait  qui  supra,  6u11111i1lm 
imperiunl amittitur." 
Wippo, ' Vitn Chunradi,' '  Do Con- 
serratione Regis ' : "  Ad summum dig- 
nitatom pervenisti,  vicarius os Chribti. 
Nemo  nisi  illius  imitator  vorua  est 
dominator;  oportet  ut  in  hoc  solio 
regni  c-ogitcs de  honore  perenni.  . . . 
Cum  vcro  Deus  a  to  tnulta  requirat, 
hoc  l~otissimiim desitlesat  ut  fncias 
judiciurn  et iustitiam ao pacem patriar, 
qum semper respicit ad te ; ut sis de- 
fensor ecclesiarum  et clericorum,  tutor 
viduarum et orpl~axlorum  ; cum his et 
aliis bonis  firmabitur thronus tuus hic 
et in ~OI~~J~LUUIU." 110  POLITICAI,  THEORY : 11~~  & 12~11  CENTURIES.  [PART  11. 
tion, in  the last years  of  the eleventh  century,  possibly  by 
Waltram, Bishop of  Nauinb~wg. The author's treatment of the 
questions concerning the relations  of  Temporal and Spiritual 
power is important, and we  shall have occasion to deal with 
the treatise again in this connection, but for the moment it is 
enough to observe that in discussing  the nature of  the State 
he cites those passages  from the '  De Civitate Dei,' in which 
8t Augustine has prescrved Cicero's description of law as being 
the embodiment  of  justice,  and of  the state as that which 
exists to maintain law and justice.] 
'  De unltate eccles~ze  consorvanda,' 
i.  17 .  "  Res  publ~ca  emm  dlc~tur, 
quod slt ros popul~,  sleut scr~blt  snnctu.; 
Auguvtmus  In  ~pso  xvnn  libro  de 
clvltate Del , sod populum osse defin~t 
ccetum  multltudmls  lulls  consensu 
vel  utll~tatls  communlone  soc~atum. 
Qu~d  autem dlcat luris consensum, drs- 
putarido expl~cat,  pe~  hoe ostendonb gerl 
slne lust~tla  non  posse  rern  puhl~cam. 
'Ubl ergo,' ~nqu~t,  '  juvtltla vera non est, 
noo ms potest esse , quod enlm lure fit, 
profecto  luste  fit,  quod  autem  fit 
~nmste,  nec lure fier~  potest , non enzm 
iura  dlcenda  vel  putanda  quzl~bct 
lnlqua hornlnurn  const~tuta. Quoclrca 
ub~  non est vera ~ustltla,  lurls conserlsu 
soclatus  ccetus  homlnum  non  potest 
esse,  et ~deo  nec  populus;  et sl  non 
populus,  nec  res  popul~,  sed  quahs- 
cunque  mult~tudlnls,  quze  popul~ 
nomlne d~gna  non est.  Ac per hoc,  si 
10s publlca res est popnl~  et  populus non 
est,  qu~  consonsu  lurls  soclatus  non 
est, non est autem lus, ubl nulla lustlt~a 
eat, procnl dub10 colllgltur, uh~  lustit~a 
non est, non esse rem puhllcam.  Iust~t~a 
porro ost ea vlrtus, quae sun culque dls- 
tr~bu~t.'  Et  longo supra ~dem  Augustl- 
nus In hbro 11  do c~v~tate  Del lntrodu- 
eens sontentlam vel Sc~p~on~s  vel Tulli~ 
do  re  publlca .  '  Sicut  In  fid~bus,' 
lnqult,  'a t~bns  atque  cantu  lpso  ac 
voc~bus  concentus est qu~dam  tenendus 
ex  dlstlnct~s  son~s,  quem  lmrnutatum 
atque dibcrepantern  aures erudltze ferro 
non  possunt,  lsque  concentua  OX  d18 
snnllllmarum  vocum  moderat~o~~e  con 
cors tamen eficltur et congruus, sic ox 
summls  et  lnfim~s et  med~~v  ~nter. 
lectls  ordmibus,  ut  soms,  moderata 
latlone  civ~tatem  consensu  rl~ss~mlll~. 
molum  d~cunt oonclnere ,  et  qua 
liarmon~a  a  muslols  d~c~tur  In  cantu, 
cam  esse  In  clvltate  concordiam,  ar- 
tlss~rnum  atque opt~mum  omnl  In  re 
publlca vmculum ~ncolumltat~s,  eamque 
slne  lustltla  nu110  pacto  esse  posse. 
Populum  autem  non  omnem  ccetum 
mult~tudm~s,  sod ccetum lurls consonsu 
et utllltatls communlone soclaturn esso 
determ~nant,  et dicunt,  tune esse rern 
pul~l~cam,  ~d est rern popull, cum bone 
ac luste gentur, slvo ab uno rege, slvo 
a paucls opt~mat~bus,  s~ve  ab unlverso 
populo.  Cum  vero  ln~ustus  est  rex, 
quom tyrannum more Grzco appellant, 
aut  must^  opt~mates,  quorum  COnSen- 
sum dlcunt factlonern, aut lnlustuq lpgo 
populus,  cui  nomen  us~tatum  non  re- 
pellunt,  nlsl  etlam  lpsum  tyrannum 
vocent, non lam cllcunt vltlosanl, Slcut 
prlus fuorat dlrputatum, sed s~~ut  rat10 
ex 1111.; definltlon~bus  conneva docuisset 
omnlno  nullam  osse  rern  publleam, 
quonlam  non  esset  res  popull,  cum 
tgrannuv earn factlone  capessoret,  net 
lpse populus lam populus esset, SI esset 
Inlustus,  quonlam non esset multltudo 
luris  consensu  et  utllltat~s  communl* 
one souata, smut populu.:  fuerat d*filu- 
tus." 
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The same conception that the essential character of  kingship 
is to maintain justice is maintained in that treatise of  Hugh of 
~l~~~y  to which  we  have  already referred.l  He has a  very 
l,igh  conception of the nature of  the royal authority, he cites 
both the Paldine doctrine that all authority is from God, and  the 
Gelasjan principle that there are two powers by which the world 
is  tlle royal and the priestly, while Christ Himself  was 
both King and Prie~t,~  and he reproduces the phrases of  Am- 
brosiaster and Cathulfus, that the king has the image of  God 
the Father, while the bishop has that of  Christ, and maintains 
that the king has authority over all bishops in his kingdom.3 
~t  the same time he  maintains very  emphatically that the 
function of  the legitimate king is to govern his people in justice 
and equity, to protect the widows  and the poor;  his  chief 
virtues are sobriety, justice, prudence, and temperan~e.~ 
These illustrations will  be  sufficient  to make it  clear that 
those who  belonged  to the imperalist party were  quite clear 
that the function  or end of  the temporal authority was  to 
maintain  justice.  It is inore important to observe that the 
same  principle  was  firmly  maintained  by  the papalists  and 
anti-imperialists.  We  have  already  seen  that  Manegold  of 
Lautenbach  maintained  the  ultimate  divine  origin  of  the 
temporal power, while, as we shall see presently, he held that 
it was  derived  immediately  from  the  community.  He was 
perhaps the most vigorous assailant of Henry IV. and the most 
Soe p.  98. 
Hugh  of  Floury,  '  Tractatus  do 
regla potestate et  sacerclotali dlgnltate,' 
1.  1, 2.  Cf.  vol. I. pp. 149, 215. 
Id. id., I. 3 : "  Verunlptamen rex In 
regm  SUI  corpore  Patlls omnlpotentls 
Optinere  vldetur  Imaylnem,  et eplbco- 
Pus  CllrlsL~.  Undo  lite regl  sublacrrr 
vldentur  omnos  regnl  lpslus  eplscopi, 
B'~ut  Patr~  F111us  deprehend~tur  esse 
sublectua, non  natura,  sed  ordlne,  ut 
unlversltas  regnr  ad  unum  redlgatul 
Pr1nC1plum."  Cf.  vol. I. pp.  149, 215. 
'  Id  Id., 1. 6 : "  Porro leg~tlrn~  rcgls 
ORclum  est  populum  In  lustlcln  ~t 
d"Uuitate  gubernare et zcclcs~am  sanc- 
tam totls vlr~bus  defendere.  Oportet 
etlam eum esse puplllorum tutorem, et 
v~duarum  protectorem,  et  pauperum 
auxlhatorom, ut cum beato Iob Domlno 
dlce~e  poss~t  : ' Oculus fu~  ceco et pos 
claudo,  et rern  quam  nesc~ebam  d111- 
genter  lnvest~gabam.'  Debet  prolnde 
Deum ornn~pote~~tem,  qu~  rnultls homl- 
num mlllbus eum praposu~t,  toto mentls 
affectu dlllgere,  et populum slb~  a Deo 
commlssum  tamcluam  se  lpsum. . . . 
Debet  etlam  quattuor  prlnc~pal~bus 
maxlme  pollero  vlrtutlbus,  sobnetate 
v~delicet, lustlcla,  prudentla  ac tem- 
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radical theorist  of  the nature of  government in the elevelltll 
century,  he  had  as little  respect  for  the  arbitrary kmg  as 
any political writer of  the seventeenth century or of  tlie French 
Revolution.  But he founds his opinions, not on the theory that 
secular authority was a thing illegitilnate or improper, but on 
the principle  that as  the royal  authority excelled  all  other 
earthly power in dignity, so  it sllould also excel them all in 
justice and piety.  He who was to have the care of  all, to rule 
over all, should possess greater virtue tlian all, in order that he 
might  administer  his  power  with  the  highest  cquity.  The 
people  llad  not set him  over  them  that he  should  act as  a 
tyrant, but that he sllo~rld  defend tllcln from tyranny.l  Again 
in another passage Manegold urges  that the chief  distinction 
between  human nature and that of  other living  creatures is 
that it is possessed of  reason, and that therefore men consider 
not only ~vhat  they sliould do, but why they do it.  No man 
can make himself king or emperor ; mhen therefore tlie people 
set one  man over them, they do it in  order that he  should 
give to every man his due, that he should protect the good, 
destroy the wicked, and administer justice to a1L2 
Berthold  of  Constance  in  his  Annals  expresses  the  same 
principle, but in terms dcrived ultimately from St Isidore of 
Seville.  The true king is he who  does right, while the king 
who does wrong will lose his kingship ; or rather, he is no king, 
but only a tyrant.3  Lambert of  Hersfeld, in his account of  the 
l  Manogold, ' Ad  Gebehardum,'  30 : 
"  Regalls clgo d~gmtas  et potent18 slcut 
omncs  rnundanas  excell~t  poteqtnteq, 
SIC  ad eam m~n~straudam  non flaglt~o 
s1ssimu5  qulsquo  vel  turp~ssllnus est 
~onst~tuendus,  sed  qu~  s~rut  loco  et 
d~gnitntc, lta  n~ch~lom~nus  ~etero.: 
sap~entla,  ~ustlcla  superet  ot  p~etatc 
Necesse  est  ergo,  qu~  omnium  curam 
gercre, omnes dcbet gube~nare,  mmore 
gratia  vlltntum  super  cetcros  dohcat 
splendere,  tradltam  s~b~  potofitatem 
summo  equltat~s  l~bramiue btudcat 
admlnlstrare.  Noque  enlm  populus 
~deo  eum super  se oxnltat, ut llbcrum 
In sc excrcenda: tyrann~dls  facultatem 
concodnt, scrl ut a tyrannlcle cetororum 
et ~mprob~tate  defendat." 
2  Id.  ~d.,  47  "  In  hoe namque natura 
humnna  cotells  prestat  an~mimt~bus, 
quod capax ratlonls ad agenda queque 
non  fortu~t~s  cas~bus  prorult,  causas 
rerum  lud~t~o  rat~onis inqulr~t nec 
tantum,  qu~d  agatur,  sed  cur  ahqmd 
agatur,  ~ntend~t.  Cum  enlm  nullus 
se Imperatorem vel regem creare poss~t, 
ad hoe unum al~quem  buper se populus 
exaltat,  ut  lust1  ratlone  Inpelll  se 
gubernot  ct  rcgat,  culque  sua  dls- 
tr~buat,  p105  foveat,  lmplos  penmat, 
omntbus  vldellcet  ~nstlc~arn  Im- 
pendat." 
3  Bcrthold of  Constnnce,  '  Annales,' 
1077  4.~.  (1'  297)  "  Recte  lgltur 
demands put forward by the Saxons and Thuringians, in the 
rising of  1073 against Henry IV., represents them as acknow- 
ledging that they were indeed bound by their oath of  allegiance 
to Henry, but only if  he used his authority for the building up, 
and not the destruction of  tlie Churcli of  God, if  he governed 
justly  and lawfully according to ancestral custom, if  he main- 
tained for every man his rank and dlgnity and 1aw.l 
Again, in the twelfth century John of  Salisbury asserts with 
great emphasis that the Prince is  entrusted  with  his  great 
authority, is even said to be "  legis nexibus absolutus,"  not 
because he may do unjust things, but because it is his essential 
character to do justice and equity not out of  fear but from love 
of  justice.  Wlio would speak of  the mere will of  the prince in 
regard to publ~c  matters, when he may not will anything but 
that which law and equity and the public interest requires ? 
The prince is the minister of  the public utility and the servant 
of  equity,  and is  the representative  of  the commonwealth, 
because lie punishes all injuries and crimes with eq~ity.~ 
We  have been  compelled  to give  some  space to the con- 
sideration  of  the  questions  discussed  in  these  two  chapters 
raclendo  nomen  regm  tenetur,  al~o- 
qmn  am~tt~tu~,  unde  est  boo  vetus 
eloglum  '  Itex ens, SI recte  facls , a1 
non  facls,  non  erls ' . . . cur  non 
magls  ploprle  ty~ann~  In  hmnsmod~ 
fortlss~m~,  quam abus~ve  et absquc re1 
verltatls reges slnt nun cup and^." 
l  Lambert  of  He~sfeld, '  Annales,' 
1073 A.D.  (p. 197) : "  Sacramento se el 
fidem d~xlsse  ; sed SI ad aedlficat~onem, 
non ad dcstruct~onem  ecclesls Dn,  rex 
esse  vellet,  si  lust@, SI  leg~t~me,  81 
more  malorum  rebus  mode~aretur,  81 
EUUm  culque ordlnem, suam d~gnltatem, 
euas logos  tutas ~uv~olatasque  manere 
patcretur." 
John  of  Salisbury,  '  Pohcrat~cus,' 
W.  2 : "  Pnnceps tamen leg~s  nex~bus 
dlc~tur  absolutus,  non  qula  el  lnlqua 
hceant, sed qu~a  1s essc debet, qu~  non 
t~more pen=  sed  amcre  luqt~tlz 
sqmtato~n  colat,  re1  puhllcrr. procuret 
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utllltatem, et In omn~bus  al~orum  com- 
moda  pr~vats przforat  voluntat~. 
Sed  quls  In  negotlls  publ~cls lo- 
qu~tu~  de  p~lucipis  voluntate,  cum m 
els  n~l  e1b1  velle  l~ceat,  nlsl  quod  lex 
aut  aclmtas  persuadet  aut  ratio 
con~tnu~ns  induc~t  7  Ems  namque 
voluntus  In  h~s  vlm  debet  habe~e 
~udlcll, et ~ectlss~me  quod  el  placet 
In  tallbus  legls  habet  vigorem,  eo 
qnod ab aequ~tat~s  mente ems sentent~a 
non  d~srordet. De  vultu tuo,  lnqult. 
~udlclum meum  prodeat,  ocull  tu~ 
v~deant zqultatem ,  ~udex etenim 
lncorruptus  est  culus  sentent~a ex 
contemplat~one  assidua  Imago  est 
aeqwtatrq.  Publlca:  ergo  ut~l~tatls 
mln~ster et  sequ~tat~s  servus  est 
prmceps,  et In  eo personam  pubhcam 
gerit,  quad  omnlum  lnlurlas  et 
darnpna  sed  et  cllmlua  omnla  aeqm- 
tab  mcdla  puu~t." 
H only  because  there  has  been  some  uncertainty  as  to  the 
position  of  the  political  theorists  of  the  eleventh  and 
twelfth  centuries,  and this  uncertainty  has  arisen  owing  to 
the  supposed  influence  of  some  aspects  of  St Augustine's 
theories  of  Church  and  State.  We  shall  have  to  consider 
the nature of  this influence more  closely  when, in our next 
volume,  we  deal  with  the  theory  of  the  relations  of  the 
spiritual and temporal powers, and we hope that we shall then 
be able to see more precisely wl~at  influence St Augustine may 
have exercised.  In the nieanwllile it is, we hope, quite evident 
that the conception that the political tlieorists of  the eleventh 
a8nd twelfth  centuries  doubted  or  denied  either  the  divine 
origin of  the State, or the principle that its end and purpose 
was an ethical one, namely, the maintenance of  justice,  is a 
complete mistake.  No such doubt was seriously entertained, 
and the theorists were a11 conviuced that as temporal authority 
came from God, so also its purpose or function was to maintain 
the divine justice in the world. 
CHAPTER  IV. 
IT  is we hope now sufficiently clear that substantially there was 
no  doubt in the great formative period  of  the Middle  Ages 
which  we  are now  considering-that  is, in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries-that  the State was a divine institution, that 
political as well  as ecclesiastica1 authority was  derived  from 
God, and had an ethical or moral, as well as a material function. 
We hope to consider the systematic theories of  the thirteenth 
century in  a  later  volume,  and cannot  here  anticipate  our 
discussion  of  them. 
This conception, which, as we have shown, was fully admitted 
even by the most determined papalists, found its most emphatic 
expression  when  the king was called  the Vicar of  God.  The 
title was not so far as we have seen used by any of  the more 
strictly papalist writers during this period, though it had been 
frequently used by the Churchlnen of  the ninth century,l but 
if the phrase was not actually used  by them, the conception 
which it expressed, that the authority of  the king is derived 
from God, was unreservedly admitted. 
We have now to consider  how far this principle may have 
been interpreted, in the period which we are now considering, 
as implying that the authority of the king or ruler was in such 
a  sense divine that resistance to him  was under any and all 
circumstances unlawful.  We have endeavoured to set out the 
origin of  this conception in our first volume ;  as far as we can 
judge, it  seems to  us clear that the conception was substantially 
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an oriental one, which came into the West in the main through 
certain of  the Fathers, and that it was derived by them, imme- 
diately,  from  a  one-sided  study  of  certain  passages  in  t'he 
historical books of  the Old Testament.  It was St Gregory the 
Great who formulated it, and as we shall presently see, it is to 
his influence that we can generally trace the appearance of the 
conception in the Middle  Ages.  We have also  showed  that 
while  St Gregory  the  Great  drew  out the conception  with 
great  clearness,  and while  certain  other  Fathers  may  have 
inclined towards it, yet others, and especially St Ambrose and 
St  Isidore, set out a fundamentally different principle, and that 
St  Isidore especially drew a very sharp distinction between the 
king and the tyrant.l 
The writers of  the ninth century inherited both traditions, 
and they cited the phrases which belong to both, but it is clear 
that while they might use the phrases of St  Gregory, they were 
governed rather by the tradition of  St  An~brose  and St  Isidore, 
and that while they looked  upon the secular authorit>y  as a 
divine institjution,  it was  to them  divine  only  so  far as it 
represented  the  principles  of  justice  and  the  authority  of 
law.2 
These two principles were inherited by the men of  the Middle 
Age.s.  What did they make of  them "low  did t,hey relate 
them to each other ?  We have seen that both parties, in the 
great conflict of  the ternporal and spiritual powers, maintained 
that all authority, whether ecclesiastical or secular, came froin 
God, and  that they were at  one in maintaining that the function 
of authority was to  uphold justice and righteousness.  But there 
were some who maintJned that while this was true, yet the 
king was answerable only to God, that there was no a.uthority 
which  could  judge  him, and that the subject must therefore 
submit even to injustice and oppression, looking only to the 
just judgment of God to  punish the oppressor and to defend the 
innocent.  As  we shall presently  see, there are traces of  this 
view even before the outbreak of  the great conflict between the 
Papacy  and the Empire,  but, not unnaturally, in the great 
conflict, some imperialists, in their anxiety to lay hold of  every 
l  Cf. vol. i. chap.  14.  Cf. vol. i. chaps. 18 aud 19. 
instrument of  defence against the Popes, tended to assert this 
view with much greater emphasis. 
In the tenth century Atto of  Vercelli, in one of  his letters, 
maintains  very  dogniatically  that it is an impious  thing to 
resist the king, even though he is unjust and wicked.  As St 
Gregory the Great had done, he cites the example of  David, his 
veneration for the Lord's anointed, and his refusal to lift his 
hand against him, and he alleges the example of  the submis- 
sive tone of  St Gregory in writing to the Emperor Maurice.  He 
also quotes a passage, which he thinks comes from the writings 
of  St Chrysostom, in which it is said that while it is true that 
the people elect the king, when he is once elected they cannot 
depose  him,  and sollie canons  of  a  Council  of  Toledo  which 
condemn revolt against the kin g, under penalty of  excommuni- 
cati0n.l  And, in a passage from another treatise of  which we 
have already cited some words, he explains away a passage of 
Hosea which seems to  imply tha,t there might be kings who had 
not derived their authority from God, and maintains that even 
in matters of  religion a good man must not resist the king, but 
must submit patiently to persecution however unj~zst.~ 
Atto of  Vercelli, Epistle I. : "  Non 
leve  est  regalem  irnpugnare  maies- 
tatom, etsi  iniusta in aliquo  videatur. 
Dei  enim  0rdinati0 est ; Dei  est  dis- 
pensatio.  Profanum  est  enim  violaro 
quod  Dens  ordinat.  .  . .  Sane 
sciondum,  quia cum Deus  omnipotens 
utilem  populo  principem  donare 
dignatur,  iustum  eat  ut  eius  hoe 
pietati  ascribant,  et  grates  exinde 
dignas  persolvant.  si  autem  adversus 
fuerit,  suis  hoc  imputent  peccatis, 
ipsumquo  flagitare  non  desinant,  ut 
hoc secundem multitudinem misericor- 
diao  suae  propitius  disponat.  Nam 
deiiciendua  vel  impugnandus  nullo 
mod0  eat a populo,  qui iam ordinatus 
est  a  Deo.  . . . Venerabilis  etiam 
Ioannes  Chrysostomus  in  quadam 
hornilia sua ait .  '  Sirut onim videmus 
in lstis mundialibus regnia quomodo in 
primis  quidem  nemo  potest  facero 
se  ipsum  regem,  aed  populus  digit 
sibi  regem,  quem  vult :  sed cum rex 
ille  fuerit  factus  et  confirmatus  in 
regno, iarn  habet potestatem  in homi. 
nibus, et non potest populus iugum de 
cervice  sua  repcllere.  Nam  primum 
quidem  in  potestate  populi  est facere 
sibi  ragem  quem  vult ; factum autenl 
de  regno  repellera,  iam  non  est  in 
potestate  eius,  et sic  voluntas  populi 
postca in necessitatem convertitur.' " 
The  passage  attributed  to  St 
Chrysostom  does  not  come  from  his 
writings, but from a "  Prlvilegium " of 
Pope Leo VIII.  Cf.  M. G. H.,  ' Libelli 
de Lite,' vol. ii. p. 422, note 2. 
Id.,  ' Exp.  in  Ep.  Pauli  ad  RO- 
manos,'  xiii.  I : "  Cur  autem  suhditi 
esse  debeamus  ostondit,  ~ubiungens  ; 
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In a  commentary  on  the Psalms by  St Bruno,  who  was 
Bishop of  Wiirzburg froin 1034 to 10-18, the words, "  Against 
Thee only have I sinned " (PS.  li. 4), a,re interpreted as mean- 
ing  that  while  a  private  person  wk-lo  commits  an  offence 
transgresses  against  God and the king,  tile king transgresses  - 
only  against  God,  for  there is no  man  who  can  judge  his 
acti0ns.l 
The  excommunica,tion and  deposition  of  Henry  IV.  by 
Gregory VII. raised in its most, acute form the question which 
had already arisen  with the great Saxon revolt of  1073, the 
question how far revolt aga.inst the royal autl~ority  was a thing 
legitimate, and more  especially t'he question  how  far such a 
revolt  was  consistent  with  the Christian  conception  of  the 
Sed  eum  in  libro  cuiusdam  sapientis 
scriptum sit : '  Reges regnaverunt, sod 
non per me ; principes exstiterunt,  et 
non cognovi ' (Hosea viii.  4) quomodo 
non est potestas, nisi a Deo ?  Sciendum 
out ergo, quia sunt qua Deus propitius 
ordinat, et disponit ; sunt que iratus 
ficripermittit.  .  .  .  .  . 
' Quae  autem  sunt  a  Deo  ordinatre 
aunt ;  ' a bono qnippe ordinatore nihil 
inordinatum  relinquitur.  Ostendit 
ergo  his  verbis  Apostolus  manifesto, 
quoniam  omnis  potestas,  tam  apud 
paganos quam apud Christianos, a Deo 
ordinata  est,  sive  propitio  sive  irato. 
Deerat  enim  timor  Dei  hominibns ; 
ideoque  ne  more  piseium  ab invieem 
consumerentur,  datw  sunt  potestates 
etiam malis, ut boni  patientie  virtute 
probarentur, et mali lcgibus mundanis 
ccercerentur,  et  pnnirentur.  . .  . 
Verum,  quia  erant  nonnulli  dicentes : 
'  In secularibus  negotiis  nos  subditos 
esse oportet ; in fide antem, et in his, 
qua ad Deum pertinent, nu110  mod0 ;  ' 
ideirco  volens  apostolus  ostendere, 
quia in omnibus  subditos esse oportet 
propter  Deum,  adjecit :  '  Qui  autem 
resistunt,  ipsi  sibi  damnationem  ae- 
quirant.'  Ac  si aperte dicerit : Dum 
ipsi  persequendi  occasionem  tribuunt, 
suos  perseeutores  excusabiles,  et  se 
improbnbiles  reddunt ; ideoquc  dig- 
nam  causam  mortis  habeant,  sed 
dignum  mortis  premium  accipiunt. 
Cur  autem  principes  dati  sint  mani- 
festat,  subiungens ;  ' Nam  principes 
non  sunt  timori  boni  operis,  sed 
mali ; '  non  enim  ideo  principes  dati 
sunt, ut eos terreant qui bona operan- 
tur, sed qui mala. 
Igitur,  ut ostenderit vim potestatis, 
et quare  potestas  data  sit,  adjunxit: 
'  Vis  ergo  non  timere  potestatem ? 
bonum fae, et habebis laudem ex illa.' 
Sod  forte  aliquis  dieet :  '  Nunquid 
saneti  apostoli  potestatibus  subditi 
fuerunt,  qui  prineipibus  usqne  ad 
mortem  restiterunt,  ne  Christi  fidem 
amitterent ? '  Vere  subditi  fuerunt, 
qnoniam  non propter  mala  opera,  sad 
propter  bona  persequendi  occasionem 
dedernnt ." 
l  Bruno  of  Wiirzburg,  '  Expositio 
Psalmorurn,'  1.  5  (li.  4) : " '  Tibi  soli 
peccavi.'  . . . Si quis enim cle  populo 
erraverit,  et  Deo  peccat  et  regi. 
Nam  quando  rex  delinquit,  soli  Deo 
reus  est.  Iste  igitur  rex  soli  Deo 
peccare  se  dicit,  quia  hominem  non 
habet qui eius faeta diiuidicet." 
This  passage,  which  is  also  cited 
by  Atto  of  Vereelli  in  the letter  we 
have  just  considered,  is  taken  from 
Cas~iodorus's  Commentary  on  the 
I'salms. 
divine nature of  secular  authorjt'y.  We  do not yet  discuss 
the question of  the relat,ion of  the spiritual authority to the 
temporal, though it must be remembered that this was always 
present to men's minds. 
The imperialist  party  did not necessarily  or always  take 
up the position that t'he temporal power was in such a sense 
sacred, that it could never under any circumstances be justifi- 
able to revolt against it, but it was natural enough that some 
of  them should have recourse to that tradition of  the Church. 
In Henry IV.'s  reply  to the bull  of  deposition  of  1076,  he 
denounces Gregory VII.  'S  arrogance and audacity in venturing 
to raise his hand against him who had been  anointed to the 
kingdom, while the tradition of the holy Fathers taught that 
he could be judged  by  God alone,  and could be deposed for 
no  crime,  except for that of  departing from the faith ;  the 
Fathers indeed had not judged  or deposed even the apostate 
Julian, but had left him to the judgment  of  G0d.l  Berthold 
of  Constance, in  his  Annals for the year  1077, relates  how 
some of the clergy  were continually proclaiming that neither 
the Pope nor any other authority could judge kings, whatever 
might be the crimes of  which they were guilty, even if  they 
were  heretic^.^  Berthold himself  holds this conception to be 
absurd, but his evidence is only the more important. 
The  source  of  t'his opinion  is  obviously  in the main  the 
tradition of  some of  the Christian Fathers, and especially  of 
St Gregory the Great.  There is a very good example of  this 
in  a  treatise  written  sbout 1080 by  Wenrich,  the  head  of 
the educational school at Trier, afterwards Bishop of  Vercelli, 
in the name of  Theodoric, the Bishop of Verdun, who was at 
l  M. G. H., Legum, Sect. IV. Const., 
vol.  i.  62  (1076) :  "Me  quoque,  qui 
licet indipus inter christos ad regnuin 
sum unclus, tetigisti, quem sanetorum 
patrnm  traditio  soli  Deo  iudicandum 
docuit,  nee  pro  aliquo  crimine,  nisi  a 
fide qnod absit exorbitaverim, deponen- 
dum  asseruit ;  cum  etian  Iulianum 
apostatam prudentia sanctorum patrum 
non  sibi  sed soli Dco iudicanclum  de- 
ponendumque  commiserit." 
a  Berthold of  Constance,  '  Annales,' 
1077 A.D.  (p. 296) :  "  Tunc vero  quae 
hmresis et sominarium erat clericorum, 
pertinaces  nonnulli  passim  concionati 
sunt, in reges  quamquam  hereticos et 
cunctis flagitiorum facinorumque reati- 
bus  exoletos,  sanguinarios  nefnndissi- 
mos,  nee  non  omnifariam  profanos et 
sacrilegos, nec ipsius papa, nee allculu~ 
magistrntnum  iudicium  et sententiam 
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that time one of  the supporters of  Henry IV.  It is a protest 
against  Gregory  VII.'s  action  in  deposing  Henry  IV.  and 
encouraging the German  princes  to revolt  against him.  He 
maintains that such conduct wats contrary to the law of  Godll 
and urges the example of  the humility and courtesy of  Gregory 
the Great, who even when he reproved the authorities of  the 
State was  careful  to address them in terms befitting  their 
dignity, and protested that he recognised that he owed obedi- 
ence  to  kings,  and  acted  in  this  spirit  even  in  regard  to 
actions of which he disapproved.  When the emperor required 
him to promulgate a law forbidding the reception  of  soldiers 
into monasteries,  he protested  against it  as contrary to the 
law  of  God,  but he carried  out the imperial order  for its 
prom~lgation.~ 
Another example will be found in the treatise ' De unitate 
ecclesize conservanda.'  The author was a determined partisan 
of  the cause of  Henry IV. against the Hildebrandine party, and 
contrasts Hildebrand's conduct with that of  Gregory the Great. 
Hildebrand claimed to have authority over kings and  kingdoms, 
1 Wenricus,  Scolasticus  Treverensia, 
Epistola, 1.3. 
2  Id.  id., 4 : "Hoc plane lacte nutri- 
tus beatus papa Cregorius in verbis, in 
moribus,  in  ipsis  denique  snis  in- 
crepationibus  hnmilitatem  et mansue- 
tudinem  ubique  redolet.  Hinc  est 
quod in sublimi loco positas personas, 
quarunque inutiles vel etiam  infames, 
dignitatum  tamen vocabulis,  appellat, 
reverendis  allocutionibus  honorat,  po- 
testatem eorum qnalibus potest verbis 
attollere  et exaltnre  non  dissimulat. 
Summus pontifex obcedientiam so regi- 
bus  debere  protestatur  et asserit,  ea 
debiti  necessitate  ad ea,  quz mentis 
iudicio ipse reprobat, pro tempore tole- 
randa aliquando dcscendit, quio tamen 
ipsa  quantum sibi  displiccant,  adopta 
 ortu tun it ate,  salva in omnibus  princi- 
pis reverentia, sperte innotescit.  Unde 
cum  legcm  do  militibus  ad  conver- 
sione~n  minime  recipiondis  imperator 
promulgari  iussisset,  legem  quidem 
latam,  quam  Deo  adversari  videbat, 
statim exhorruit,  sed  tamen illam  ex 
iussione  principis ad omnium notitiam 
ipse,  qui  earn  inprobabat,  insinuaro 
non  distulit.  Expleta  humilitsr, 
obmdientie,  ad  eundem  impera- 
torem :  '  Ego,'  inqult,  '  iussioni  sub- 
ditus  eamdem  legem  per  diversas 
terrarum  partes  feci  transmitti ;  et 
quia lex ipsi omnipotenti Deo minime 
concordet,  ecce  per  suggestionis  mcm 
paginam serenissimis dominis nuntiavi. 
Utrobique ergo quae  debui exsolvi,  qui 
et imperatori  obcedientiam  praebui  et 
pro Deo quod sensi non tacui.' " 
We  have  drawn  attention  to  the 
importance of  these  words of  Gregory 
the  Great  in  vol.  i.  p.  155.  The 
influence  of  these  wo~ds  of  Gregory 
are again  illustrated  by the use  made 
of  them by  the author  of  the '  Trac- 
tatus  Eboracenses,'  iv.  (M.  G. H., 
'  Libelli de Lite,' vol. iii. p.  671). 
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while Gregory the Great, with true humility, called himself the 
servant of  servants, and in his book on "  P-Care  "  he set 
out the conduct of David as an example to all good subjects 
who have bad rulers.  D-  would not take advantage of  the 
opportunity to slay  his persecutor, but repented that he had even 
cut off  the skirt of his cloak ; and the author cites the words of 
Gregory the Great, in which he condemns even criticism of  the 
conduct of  the ruler, lest men  should transgress against God 
who gave tthem  their auth0rity.l  He looks upon the successive 
deaths of  Rudolpll of  Suabia and of  Herrnann of  Luxemburg, 
who had been  set up against Henry IV., as examples of  the 
judgment  of  God upon those who revolted against their lawful 
king, who had received his authority from God, for neither the 
princesnor the  people of  that  party could destroy tha,t  a~thority.~ 
The same principles were majntained by others of  the im- 
perialist  party.  In the work known as tlie ' Liber Canonum 
contra Henricum quartum,' which, as it is thought, was com- 
piled in the year 1088, the supporters of  Henry IV. are repre- 
sented ass  bringing forwa$rd  the authority of  St Augustine and 
1 'De  Unitate  Ecclesiae  Conser-  tioni,  qui  eos  nobis  praetulit,  obvi- 
vanda,' ii. l : "  Unde et  Gregoriu~  papa  amus.' " 
cum  esset  summus  pontifex  ct virtu-  Cf.  id.,  ii.  l6 ;  cf.  vol.  i.  p  162, 
turn artifex, in tantum so infra omnes  153. 
humiliavit,  ut primus ipse  in epistolis  Id., i.  13 : "Duo enim reges, unus 
suis  servum  scrvorum  Dei  se  appel-  post  unum,  substituti  sunt  nostris 
averit  et  hoc  humilitatis  nomen  ad  temporibus  a partc principum,  et par- 
posteros  quoquo  transmiserit.  Qui  in  tern  regni  tenuerunt,  et non  totum : 
libro  pastoralis  curm  proposuit  do  quod  scilicet '  totum ' habet magnum 
bonis  subditis et malis  rectoribus ex-  pietatis mysterium in unitate fidelium. 
emplum  Saulis  et  Davicl,  qui  certc,  Sed  quia  hoo  consilium  et  hoc  opus 
dun1 eum posset  eundemque  persecu-  ex  hominibus  erat,  dissolutum  est, 
torem  Ruum  occidere,  noluit  occidere,  quod ex Deo non  erat, quoniam  post 
eo  quod  esset  christus  Domini,  in-  breve  temporis spatium ipsam quoque 
super  ct  viros  suos,  ne  consurgerent  partem  regni  utrique  amiserunt,  et 
in eum  legitur  sermonibus  confregisse  unus  in  praelio,  alter  in  expugnatione 
et, quia vel  oram  chlamydis  suae  ipso  unius  castelli  miserabilitcr  perierunt, 
prrccidisset,  ~oonituisse. '  Si  quando,'  superstite  eo  cui  potcstas  data  est  a 
inquit, '  contza rectores vel in minimis  Deo,  quam  scilicet  potestatem  nec 
lingua  labatur, per  afflictionem ~ooni-  principes  nec  populus  partis  illius 
tentiz  cor  prematur,  et  cum  prz-  d~ssolvere  potuerunt ullo modo, qurtlldo 
positae  potestati  aliquis  detraxorit,  quidem  ipsi  quoque  regi  possint  iam 
eius iudicium,  a  quo sibi  pralata  est.  donante Ueo filii succederc in rcgnum. 
pcrliormscat;  quia,  cum  in  prpposi-  sicut  ipye  patribua  suis  successit  In 
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St John Chrysostoin to prove the impropriety of  the action of 
Hildebrand in excommunicating Henry IV.  The passage cited 
from St Augustine  affirms the divine origin  of  the temporal 
authority, and the duty of  obedience by Christia,n men  even 
to an unbelieving emperor such as Julian.  The passage attri- 
buted to St John Chrysostom is the same as that quoted by 
Atto of  Vercelli, and sets out the principle that, while no man 
can make himself  king but only the people, when the king has 
once  been  elected  and confirmed  the people  cannot  depose 
him.l  These words are again substantially reproduced in the 
collection of  Epistles, &C., of  the Cardinals who were in opposi- 
tion to Hildebrand and Urban IL2 
Again, Sigebert of  Gembloux, in a letter written in the name 
of  the  clergy  of  Liege  about  the  year  1103 against  Pope 
Paschal II., urges that even if the emperor were such  as the 
papal party represented him to be, his subjects must submit, 
for it is their sins which merited such a ruler.3 
The most  complete  statement, perhaps,  of  the doctrine of 
non-resistance, and of  the conception that the king is respon- 
sible only to God for his conduct, which is to be found in the 
literature of  this period, is contained in the treatise written by 
Gregory of  Catino in the name of  the monks of  Farfa, prob- 
ably in the year 1111.  He maintains very emphatically that 
the royal  or imperial  authority could  not be  condemned  or 
overthrown by any man.  The authority of  the saints both of 
the  Old  and New  Testanlents  showed  that rulers  must  be 
endured  rather than  condemned ; no one  of  the saints and 
prophets and other orthodox Chri~tia~ns  had ever ventured to 
condemn or depose a  king  or  emperor,  even though  he had 
been  unjust or impious or heretical.  That wisdom  which  is 
Christ satid, "  By Me kings reign," and by  Him therefore alone 
can they be condemned.  San1 and David sinned, but neither 
M. G. H., '  Libelli  de Lite,'  vol. i.  tamen eum principari nobis pate&mur ;  . 
p.  491, 2 ; cf. p.  117.  quia,  ut talis  nobis  principetur,  pec- 
Id.  id., vol. ii. p. 422.  cando  meremur.  Esto,  concedimus 
3  '  Leodicerlsiurn  Epistola  Adveraus  vobis  inviti  eum  talem  esse,  qualern 
Paschalem  Papam,'  9 : "  Nihil  mod0  dicitis.  Nec  tnlis  a  nobis repellendus 
pro  imperatore  nostro  dicimus.  Sed  esset  armis  contra  eum  sumptis,  sed 
hoc dicimus, quod, etiamsi  talis esset,  precibus ad Deum fusis." 
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Samuel nor Nathan ventured to condemn them.  Many kings  - 
and emperors both before and after the coming of  Christ were 
- 
wicked and heretical, but none of  the prophets, or apostles, or 
saints condemned them or attempted to take from them the 
obedience  and dignity  which  was  their due, but left  this to 
God, and endured their persecutions for Christ's  sake ; even 
Christ Himself, while He lived in the flesh, condemned no man. 
Gregory  then relates  a  number  of  examples  of  the conduct 
of the Christian Fathers, as illustrating this principle, and it 
is noteworthy that he points  out quite correctly  that Pope 
Oregory 11. restrained the Italians when they wished to revolt 
against  Leo  the Iconoclast  and to set  up another  emperor. 
Finally, summing up the whole mat'ter, he urges that it is God 
only, the Almighty creator of  kingdoms and empires, who can 
grant them or take them away, and that he who resists the 
powers that have been ordained by  God resists the ordinance 
of G0d.l 
1 Gregorii  Catinensis,  '  Orthodoxa 
dofensio  imperialis.'  7.  "  Suhlimiores 
vero  potestates,  id  est  regia  vel  im- 
perialis magnitudo, a Deo aut permissn 
aut constituta, aut a  nu110  contemna- 
tur  aut condcmnetur  sive  destruatur. 
Sanctorum habcrnus auctoritates pluri- 
morum  et in  testamcnto  veteri  et in 
nova gratia evangelii, qui magi8 huius- 
modi  sufferentes portarunt  quam con- 
denmare  prosumpserunt.  . . . Quotl 
si  ita  habctur,  ccrtissime  in  omnium 
auctoritatibus sanctorum, prophetarum, 
apostolorum ac reliquorum  orthodoxo- 
rum, quorum nullos potestatem regiam 
vel  imperialem,  licet  iniquam,  licet 
impiam, licet hereticam condemnare vol 
deponere  ausus  est  nec  aliquo  mod0 
presump~it  ; . . . 
8.  Veteris enim et novi actus hiptori- 
as relegcntes et bonos principes inveni- 
mus et malos, sod nunquam repperimus 
conscripto iudirio ab alicluo sanctorum 
fuisse  condempnatos.  Do  ipsis  enim 
~apientia, quae  Christos  est,  clicit: 
'Per  mc  reges  regnant.'  Per  ipsum 
ergo  solum  condemnandi  sunt,  per 
quem solum regnare noncuntur.  Ri  quis 
vero id, quod soli Deo reservanduln est, 
voluerit  condemnare,  nunquam  evadit 
punitionem.  Denique Saul peccavit et 
a Deo recessit et Deus ab eo, et tamen 
propheta Samuel non illum condemnare 
a  se ansus est.  David quoque regem 
tribus  possimis  criminibus  delinquen- 
tem propheta Natan non condemnavit, 
sed  magis  penitentem  recepit.  . . . 
Itaque si  omnes  discuriantur  historiz 
vel Icgen, contra hoc notissirnum dictum 
non  invenies  proposicionem.  Nam 
rnulti  regum  vel  imperatorum  et ante 
et post  adventurn  Christi  pcssimi  vel 
horetici  fuerunt,  qnos  prophetw  vel 
apostoli  sanctique  patres  et  reliqui 
cloctores ecclesi~  ad mortem non  con- 
dernnarunt nec clebitum ohsequium vcl 
decus  ipsis proprium  abstulerunt,  sed 
soli  hoc  Deo  reliquerunt  et  eorum 
nephandas  malicias  ~el  pcrseouciones 
ad  tempus  Christi  amore  substinu- 
erunt,  quia  eius  omnimodis  membra 
extitorunt.  De  quo  dic~t  apostoluu 
Johannee :  '  Qui  dicit  so  in  Christo 
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ambulare.'  Christum enim, qui legem 
non venit solvere, sed adimplere, nemi- 
nem  legimus  condemnasso  adhuc  in 
carne  vivens.  . . . Gregorius  eciam 
papa  secundus  Romanos  omnesque 
Italicos  Constnntinopoli  pergere 
atque  Leonem  augustum  volentes  in- 
torfirere et aliam  imperatorem  eligere 
compescuit .  Iusserat  enlm  idcm  im- 
perator sacras imagines deponi et impie 
concremari et prefatum pontificom sibi 
in  hoe  non  obedientem  crudeliter 
occidi. . . . 
10. Ha?c idcirco  omnia  prenotavim- 
us, ut Deum solummodo omnipotentem 
regnorum et imperii omniumque potes- 
tatum ordinatorem, concessorem trans- 
latoremque  evidentissimis  sanctorum 
catholicorum documontis ostenderemus. 
Ordinatas  autem a Deo potestates qui 
condemnare vel secundnm apostolum eis 
resi~tere  presumit,  Deo  eiusque  ordi- 
nationi  resistit,  quia  non  est potestas 
nisi  a  Deo,  et licet mala  sit potestas, 
eicut Saul vel sicut Nabuctlodonosor et 
multl  alii  ante  adventum  Domini  m 
diebus prophetarum, et post adventum 
Domini temporibus apostolorum eorum- 
quc successorum orthodoxomm fueront, 
nullus  tamen  eam  condemnare  vel  ei 
vectigal vel censum sive debitum hon- 
orem  contomnere debet, maxime  cum 
dominus Christus et  magister noster pro 
se  tributum reddere  est dipnatus.  Si 
enim ipse reddidit, qui pro nobis pauper 
extitit nlhilque  in hoc seculo possedit, 
quis clemens,  quis  vccors,  quis  stultus 
Christo religiosior aut sublimior vel esse 
temptet sanctior ?  Et quis praepotens 
sine gravi offensione in Deum condem. 
nare potest  eum, quem Deus omnipo- 
tens, qui celestia simu et terrena mode- 
ratur, inextimabill providentia suffert ? 
Denique  ipse  solus  ordinator  et sibi 
tempore placito cuiuscunquc potestat~s 
interernptor  est et translator,  quia in 
manu  eius  sunt  omnes  fines  terrae 
et  ipso  omnium  flatum  viventium 
continet." 
CHAPTER  V. 
JUSTICE  AND  LAW. 
WE have so far endeavoured to make it clear that the political 
theory of  the eleventh and twelfth centuries held firmly to the 
principle of  the divine origin and authority of government, and 
the conviction that its function was to mainta.in righteousness 
and justice.  In the last chapter we have seen that with some 
writers, and especially among those who were engaged in de- 
fending  the imperial position  in  the great  conflict  with  the 
papacy, the principle of  the divine nature of government some- 
times passes into the conception that the authority of the ruler 
was  in  such  a  sense  divine that it could  never  be  resisted, 
whether  it was  used  justly  and wisely,  or foolishly  and un- 
righteously, and that the king was responsible for his actions 
to God only. 
This  conception was not unimportant,  and indeed in later 
times,  and especially in the seventeenth  century,  assumed  a 
considerable significance.  But it was not the normal theory of 
the Middle  Ages,  and we  must now  consider  aspects of  the 
political ideas and principles of those times which were both 
more  completely  developed  in  theory,  and also  much  more 
closely  related  to  the  actual  political  and  constitutional 
movements of  these centuries. 
As we ha,ve  already seen, there were two traditions which had 
come down from the Fathers-the  one, with which we have just 
dealt, that the authority of  the king was always sacred, whether 
it was used justly or unjustly, the other, that as the function of 
kingship lay in maintaining justice  and righteousness, he was 
no true king who did not behave justly,  who did not govern 
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equity.  In the first voluine of  this work it has been pointed 
out how fully this conception  was developed, and how firmly 
it was  held in the ninth centuryY1  and as we  shall presently 
see  it was  equally  firmly  maintained  in  the  eleventll  and 
twelfth  centuries. 
There  was  a  related  principle  which  had  governed  men's 
minds and controlled their actions in the ea,rlier Middle Ages, 
which  has also been fully dealt with in the first volume,  and 
that is the principle that the just order of  the State is embodied 
in its law, that to govern justly  is to govern according to the 
law.2  We have in the first part of  this volume considered the 
high development of  this conception in the feudal organisation 
of  society, and in the principles of  tlie feudal lawyers ; we have 
now to consider its place in the polit,ical circumstances and in 
the general political theory of  this period. 
And finally, we have in the first voluine considered the early 
stages of  the conception of the authority of  the ruler as repre- 
sentring  the authority of the community, and  as being dependent 
upon  the faithful discharge  of  the obligations  which  he  had 
~ndertaken,~  we must now consider the rapid development and 
the great importance of  this principle in the Middle Ages. 
mre have already pointed out that the writers of  the period 
with which we are dealing are united in maintaining that the 
purpose and function of  all authority is to maintain righteous- 
ness and justice, that the ambiguities of  St Augustine had no 
effect upon them.  We must now observe that this principle 
was  constantly drawn out to the very important conclusion 
that where there was no justice there was no King, but only a 
Tyrant.  This distinction between the King and the Tyrant was 
indeed one of  the most important of  the political conceptions of 
the Middle Ages.  The distinction is the same in principle as 
that of  Aristotle, but it was not from him that it was drawn, at 
least directly.  Directly it came to them from  St Isidore of 
Seville  and the writers of  the ninth century, and it is probable 
that it is Cicero from whom St Isidore derived it. 
The most complete statement of  the conception is to be found 
1 Cf  vol. i. chap. 18. 
a  Cf. vol. i. chap. 19. 
Cf. vol. i. chap. 20. 
a  Cf. vol. i. pp.  172-73 ;  221-28. 
in the ' Policraticus ' of  John of  Salisbury.  We shall have to 
discuss  his  political  theory in detail presently,  but we  may 
begin  by  noticing  some  words  in  which  he  expresses  this 
principle.  This, he says, is the only or the supreme difference 
between the tyrant and the prince, t'hat the prince governs the 
people according to law and obeys the law l~irnself,~  the tyrant 
is  one  who  oppresses  the people  by  violence,  and is never 
satisfied unless he makes the law void and reduces the people 
to ~lavery.~  The essence of  kingship is respect  for law and 
the just rights and liberties of  the people, without them a man 
may have the name,  but not the reality  of  authority.  We 
can trace the significance of  this conception through the whole 
political literature of  tlie Middle Ages. 
We have seen its great importance in the ninth century, and 
even in the scanty literature of  political theory in the tenth 
and early  eleventh  centuries  we  find  tlie  essential  principle 
firmly maintained.  We have already referred to a passage in 
the '  Przeloquiorum ' of  Ratherius  of  Verona  which  has this 
meaning, but it is worth while to look at it again.  There are 
certain qualities without which  a  illan may indeed have the 
name  but  not the  reality  of  kingship ; the king  must  be 
prudent, just,  brave, and self-restrained ; the man who pos- 
sesses these qualities, though he were a peasant, may not ini- 
properly be called a king-without  then], even if  a man held 
the dominion of  the whole world, he could not justly be called 
a king, for when a man governs ill he loses his a~thority.~  We 
'  John  of  Salisbury,  ' Policraticus,' 
iv.  1 : " Est ergo  tiranni  ct prilicipis 
ha?c difforentia  sola vcl maxima, quod 
hic  legi  ohtemperat,  et cius  arl~itrio 
populum  regit,  cuius  se  clodit  minis- 
trum." 
a  Id  id., viii.  17 : "  Est crgo tiran- 
nus,  ut cum  philosophi  dcpinxerunt, 
qui violenta dominationc populum pre- 
mit,  sicut  qui  logibus  rcgit  princcps 
est. . . .  Princops  pugnat pro  legihus 
et populi libertate ; tirannus nil nctum 
Putat  nisi  legex  cvacuet  et popularn 
dev0cet in servitutcm." 
'  Ratherius  of  Verona,  L l'rzloqui- 
orurn,'  iii.  1. : " '  ROX  et3 '  ?  Dignitas, 
rogo,  ipsa  te  dum  deloctat,  instruat. 
Sunt quivdam  regalis  ordinis  insignia, 
quibus sine,  etsi  nomen  utcumque,  re 
talncn vera certe non potest consistero 
dignitas tanta.  His ergo utero, his exer- 
ccrc, his cxornare.  Esto prudens, justus 
fortis et temperatus. . . . Ha:  quatuor 
regales proprie noscuntur esse virtutes, 
ut cum his quilibet etiam rusticus, rex 
non incongrue dici;  sine  his,  ncc  ipse 
unlversam  pene  monarchiam  obtinens 
~nundi,  quamquam  abusive, rex valcat 
iuvte vocari : male enim imperundo, ut 
nit  qui  supra,  summum  imperium 
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may put beside this a phrase from the "  Proverbs " attributed 
to that Wippo, from whose Life  of  Conrad the Salic we  have 
already quoted.  The king, he says, must learn and hearken 
to the law, for to keep the law is to reign.l 
We have begun by citing these phrases, not because they are 
in themselves specially important, but only in order that we 
may be clear that these principles were not merely thrown out 
in the great conflicts of  the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but 
that they represent the normal convictions of medizeval society, 
which were continuous with those of  the ninth century.  It is 
true that these great conflicts forced men to consider over again 
their principles,  and to determine what practical action they 
were prepared to take in order to enforce them ; the political 
development  of  European civilisation from the middle of  the 
tenth century to the end of the thirteenth was indeed almost 
incredibly rapid, and it would be absurd to imagine that the 
ideas or principles embodied in these constitutional develop- 
ments were not themselves greatly modified, or enlarged, in the 
process ; but at least, as we understand it, the movement of 
ideas was continuous and organic. 
4 
he principle that unless tlie king is just and rules according 
to  aw he is no true king is the first principle of  the medizeval 
theory  of  government,  and was  firmly held  even  before  the 
great political agitations of the eleventh and twelfth centuries 
compelled men to think out the real nature of  their political 
convictions.  While,  however, this is true, it is also true that 
these great k  isturbmces had in a very high  degree the effect 
of stimulating political reflection, and it is no doubt to this that 
we  owe  it that, after  the compasative  silence  of  the tenth 
century, we suddenly find ourselves, in the latter part of  the 
eleventh century, and in the twelfth, in face of  a great pro- 
duction of  political pamphlets and treatises. 
It is not our part here to trace the political and conStitutiona1 
movements  of the several European countries, but the history 
1 Wippo, '  Proverbia '- 
"  Uecet rcgem discere legem, 
Audlnt rex, quod przc~pit  leu, 
Legem servnre, hoc est ie~nare." 
of political ideas would be unintelligible if we were not to bear 
in mind something of the general nature of  these movements. 
We must not make the mistake of imagining that the interests 
and energies of  the European people were concentrated upon 
the struggle between the Papacy and  the Empire, or the related 
conflicts of Church and State  in the various European countries. 
No doubt these were not only of  high importance in themselves, 
but they had a great influence in stimulating political thought. 
And yet it may be doubted whether they had, taken by them- 
selves, any serious effect on the constit'utional development of 
European  civilisation.  We hope in the next  volume to ex- 
amine the questions related to these conflicts in detail, and to 
consider the nature of the oppositions or difficulties which lay 
behind them.  But the political or constitutional development 
of Europe was not caused by them, or dependent upon them. 
All this is familiar to the students of  the constitutional history 
of  the European countries,  but it is sometimes forgotten by 
those who are not well acquainted with this. 
Tbe history of  the political theory of  the Middle Ages was 
organically and continually related to the development of  the 
political civilisation of Europe ; no doubt, as we have constantly 
endeavoured to show, it derives its terms, and much of  its sub- 
stantial tradition from the past, but it  was shaped and  moulded 
in the actual movement of  these times. 
It was with the political agitations and revolts of  Germany 
in the latter part of  the eleventh century that active political 
speculation and controversy began.  We cannot here deal with 
the real  nature of  the circumstances  which  lay  behind  the 
great revolt of  the Saxons and Thuringians against Henry IV. 
It is enough for our purpose to observe that it raised at once 
the fundamental questions as to the nature and conditions of 
political authority.  We have cited the words of  Ratherius and 
Wippo as illustrating the commonplaces of  literature before 
the great movements of  the eleventh century ; with the out- 
break  of  the Saxon revolt  against  Henry IV. in  1073 these 
commonplaces assumed another aspect, and became the founds- 
tions of a rapidly developing political theory. 
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We have already  referred  to the terms  of  the demands 
which Lambert of  Hersfeld attributes to the Saxons and Thur- 
ingians in t,he revolt of  1073, but we must now consider these a 
little inore closely.  They demand that he should do justice to 
the Saxon princes wliose properties he had confiscated witliout 
legal process, and that lie sl~ould  do this in accordance with the 
judgment of  the princes, that lie sl~ould  put away from his court 
the lowborn persons by wl~ose  counsels he had administered the 
state, and should entrust the care of  tlie great affairs  of  the 
kingdom to the princes to whom this belonged, that he slrould 
disiniss  his  coilcubiries and restore tlie  queen  to her proper 
position, and that he sliould do justice  to tllose who asked for 
it.  If  lie would do these tliings they would witli ready lninds 
obey 11i111,  under those terms wllich became free men born in a 
free empire, but if  he  would  ilot  amend his  ways,  they  as 
Cllristian men would not associate with one who was guilty of 
the worst crimes.  They had indeed sworn obedience to him, 
but only as to a king who would uphold the Church  of  God, 
and would  rule  justly  and lawfully  according  to  ancestral 
custom,  and would  maintain the rank and dignity, and hold 
inviolate the laws proper to every man.  If  he violated these 
things they would not hold theinselves bound by tlieir oath, but 
would wage a just war against him as a barbarian enemy, and 
an oppressor of  the Christian name, and would fight till their 
last breath for the Church of  God, for the Christian faith, and 
for their own libert~.~ 
l  Cf. pp. 112, 113. 
2  I.amhert of  Iiersfeld, 'Annales,'  A.D. 
1073 (p. 196): "  Ut prineipibus Saxonire 
qaibus  sine  legitima  discussione  bona 
sun  ademerat,,  secundum  principum 
suorum iurisdictione~n  satisfacoret . . . 
ut vilissi~nos  homines, quorum  corlsilio 
seque remquo puhlicam ljraeeipiter de- 
disset,  de  palatio  eiceret,  et  regni 
negocia  regni  principibuc,  quibus  ea 
competerent,  curanda  atquo  adminis- 
trade permitteret:  ut. abdicato  grege 
concubinurum,  quibus  contra  scita 
eanonum  attrito  frontis  rubore  in- 
cubabat, rcglnam, quam sibi secundurn 
eoclesiasticas  traditiones  thori  soriarn 
rognique  consortenl  delegissct,  coniug- 
ali loco haburet et dilige~et  ; ut cetera 
flagitiorum  probra,  quibus  dignitatem 
regiam  adoloseens  infamaverat,  nunc 
saltem  maturato  sensu  et ietate  ab- 
diraret.  Postrcmo per  Deum  rogant, 
ut iu~ta  postulantibus sponte annugrot, 
nec sibi  magni  cuiusquam  et innsitati 
facinoris  necessitatem  impeneret .  Si 
ita faceret, se  pro~nptissimo  animo  ei 
sicut  actenus  servituros,  eo  tamen 
modo,  quo ingenuos homines atque in 
libero imperio natos regi  serviro  opor- 
teret ; sin  autem, christianos  so  esse. 
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As  we have just  said, we  are not here concerned with the 
real nature of the revolt of  the Saxons and its ultimate causes 
and character,  it  is not  difficult  to recognise  even  in this 
passage something of t'he complexity of  the situation, and we 
cannot feel any confidence that these particular principles were 
urged by the leaders of the revolt against Henry IV. in these 
terms.  We must indeed take them rather as representing the 
ideas and theories and, probably, the literary reminiscences of 
Lambert.  But they are not the less significant on that account. 
The  passage  contains  soine  constitutional  conceptions  with 
wliich we shall deal later, but in the meanwhile we can fix  our 
attention on the sharp and definite character of  the distincti~n 
between the king to whom men swear allegiance, and the unjust 
ruler who sets at  naught the la,w and rights of his subjects, and 
to whom  therefore men  are under no obligations.  It is the 
history of this conception which we must trace farther. 
We  may put alongside of  this passage  from Lambert the 
terms of  a  speech which Bruno, the author of  the '  De Bello 
Saxonico,' puts into the mouth of  Otto, who had been Duke of 
Bavaria.  It is  represented  as addressed  to the  Saxons at 
"Normeslovo ''in 1073.  He  exhorts them to  rise against Henry, 
and urges upon them that the castles which Henry was building 
were intended to destroy their liberty, and  in fiery terms he asks 
whether, when  even slaves would not endure the injustice of 
their masters, they who were born in liberty were prepared to 
endure slavery.  Perhaps, he says, as Christian men they feared 
to violate their oath of  allegiance to the king ; yes ! but they 
were made to one who was indeed a king.  While Henry was a 
king, and did those things which were proper to a king, he had 
kept the faith which he had sworn to him wliole and undefiled, 
but when he ceased to be a king he was no longer such that he 
net  velle  hominis,  qui  fidem  christi-  patorotur.  Sin  ista prior  ipse  temer- 
anam  capitalibus  flagitiis  prodidisset,  asset, se iam sacramenti lluius religione 
Communione maculari. . . .  Sacrament0  non  teneri,  sod  quasi  cum  barbaro 
ei  fidem dixisse,  sed  si  ad zdifiea-  hoste  et christiani  nominis  oppressore 
tionem,  non ad destructionem ecolesice  iustum  deinceps  bellem  gestures,  et 
Dei, rex esse vellet, si iuste, si legitime,  quoad  ultima  ritalis  caloris  scintilla 
si more maiorum rebus moderaretur, si  supcresset,  pro  ecclesia  Dei,  pro  fide 
suum cuique ordinem, suam dignitatem,  christiana,  pro  libertate  etiam  sua 
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should keep faith to him.  He had taken up arms, and adjured 
them to take up arms, not against the king, but against the 
unjust assailant of  his liberty, not against his country, but for 
his country, and for that liberty which  no good  man would 
consent to lose except with his 1ife.l 
Lambert of  Hersfeld sets out the same principle, bllt in more 
technical terms.  He represents  Otto  as  urging  at another 
time that herein lay the difference between the king and the 
tyrant, that the tyrant  compels  the obedience  of  unwilling 
subjects by violence  and cruelty, while the king governs his 
subjects by laws and ancestral c~stom.~ 
Berthold of  Constance in his  Annals for the year 1077 re- 
lates, as we have already menti~ned,~  how on Henry's return to 
Germany after his absolution by Hildebrand at Canossa, many 
of  the clergy maintained that no one could judge or condemn a 
king however  wicked  and criminal.  Berthold  himself  holds 
that this opinion is absurd, and cites, though without mention- 
ing his  source,  St Isidore of  Seville's  phrases,  that the king 
holds his title while he does right, if  he acts wrongfully he loses 
it ; and maintains that those who do wickedly and unjustly are 
really  tyrants,  and are only improperly  called kings.'  The 
1 Bruno,  '  De  Bello  Saxonico,'  25 . 
"  Serv~  rere  paratl  in~usta lmpolla 
domlnorum  non  perferunt,  et vos  In 
hbertate nat~,  aequo  anlmo serv~tutem 
tolerabltls ?  Fortasse  qula  Chrlst~anl 
est~s,  sacraments  regl  facta  vlolare 
tlrnetl~.  Optlme,  sed  regl.  Dum 
mlhl  rou  erat,  et ea  qum  sunt  regls 
faclebat,  Bdel~tatem quam  el  luravl, 
lntegram et lmpollutam servavl, post- 
quam vero rex  esse des~vlt,  cul fidem 
sorvare  deberem,  non  fu~t. Itaque 
non contra regcm,  sed contra lniusturn 
meae  libertatis ereptorem , non contra 
patr~am,  sed pro patrla et pro l~bertate 
mea, quam nemo bonus, nlsl cum anlma 
slmul am~ttlt,  arma CBPIO,  et ut v08 ea 
mecum cap~atis  expostulo." 
2  Lambert  of  Hersleld,  ' Annales,' 
A.D  1076  (p.  249)  "  Hanc regis  ac 
tlrannl  osse  distantlam,  quod  hlc  VI 
atque  crudcl~tate  obedientlam  extor 
queat  ab mv~tls,  llle  leglbus  ac  more 
maiorum  moderetur  subleotls praclpl- 
atque faclenda." 
See p  119. 
Berthold of  Constanco,  '  Annales,' 
1077  A  D.  (p.  297)  "  Recte  ~gitur 
faclendo nomen reg~s  tenetur,  alloquin 
am~ttltur,  undo est hoc vetus eloglum : 
'  Rex ens, si recte facls , 81  non fa018 
non  ens ' . . . S1  autem  nec  lust0 
mdicent,  nec ple condescendant, neque 
regulam  officl~  sul  vel  sola  saltem 
nominationls  lmagine  mlnlmum  quld 
att~ngant,  set potlus  ultra modum  et 
lnsanlas  ethnlcorum superlatlvas,  v@ 
faclnorosae  et  luxuriosae  llbcrtatem 
nefanthss~m~  omnlfarlam  ct po~tentu- 
os~  exerceant,  crudellss~ma  dominandl 
malestate  populum  suppr~mant, et 
rnlserrlme  supprossum  devorent, et ad 
lnternec~em  usque consumant, cur non 
magls  proprlc  tyrannl  In  hulusmodl 
fortleslml,  quam abuslve et absque re1 
verltate rrges sint nuncupandl." 
same phrases are again quoted by Hugh, Abbot of  Flavigny, 
in  defending the deposition of  Henry 1V.l 
Herrand, Bishop of Halberstadt, writing in the  name of  Louis 
the Count of Thuringia about 1094 or 1095, expresses the same 
conceptions, but in a more developed form, in his answer to a 
letter of  Waltram  the Bishop  of  Naumburg.  Waltram had 
urged the authority of the words of St Paul : "  Let every soul 
be  subject r;o  the higher powers, for there is no power but of 
God."  Herrand replies that Waltram was misinterpreting St 
Paul, for if every authority was from God how could the prophet 
(Hosea viii. 4) have spoke11 of  princes who reigned, but not as 
of  God.  They were willing to obey an ordered power, but how 
could  such a  government as that of  Henry IV. be called  an 
order at all;  it is not order to confound right  and wrong. 
Again, in a later passage, answering Waltram's contention that 
concord  was  useful to the kingdom,  Herrand replies  that it 
was absurd to speak thus of a society which could not be called 
a kingdom, for a kingdom is something rightful ; could  that 
be  called  a  kingdom where innocence  was  oppressed,  where 
there was no place for reason, for judgment,  or for counsel, 
where every desire was reckoned to be lawful ?  Such a king- 
dom should rather be called a  congregation  of  the wicked,  a 
council of  vanity, the dregs of iniquity ; in such a  kingdom 
concord  is unprofitable.  Among  good  men  indeed  concord 
is praiseworthy, but among evil men it is blameworthy ; what 
man in his right mind would speak with approval of  a concord 
of robbers, of  thieves, of  unclean persons ?  L! 
l Hugo,  Abbas  Flavmlacensls, 
Chronlcon, 11.  fol. 111. 
Herrandus, '  Eplstola ' . "  Ad sub- 
lectionem  domlnl  Henrici , quem  lm- 
peratorem  dlcunt,  nos  lnv~tas,  et  In 
quantum lntcll~gere  datur, ut per omnla 
subdltl  slmns,  quasl  apostollco  argu- 
mento  necessltstem  Impoms,  dlcens . 
'  Omms anlma potestatlbus superloribus 
subdlta slt , non est enlm potoatas nisi 
a Deo  QUI ergo potestatl reslstlt,  Del 
Ordlnat~onl reslstlt '  Quam  apostoll 
scntcnt~am  te  male  ~ntclllgere, pelus 
Interpretail  diclmus.  S1  enlm  omms 
Pobstas  a  Deo  eat,  ut  tu  ~ntelllgls, 
quld  est,  quod  de  qulbusdam  diclt 
Domlnus  per  prophetam :  '  Ips~  reg 
naverunt, et non ex me, prlnclpev extl- 
terut, et non  cognovl ' . . . Praevldens 
per Splritnm sanctum spostolus te tui- 
que slmlles  heretlcos In  eccles~a  emer- 
euros,  qul  '  bonum  malum,  malum 
bonum ' dlcerent,  qu~  ' tenebras lucem 
et lucem  tonebras'  ponerent,  qul  de 
sententus  verltatls  occas~onem mdu- 
cendl errorls captarent,  cum praemlels- 
set  ' Non est potestas nlsi a Deo ' ut 
coniecturam  reprobi  lntellectus  ampu- 
taret : '  Qu;e autem sunt,' ~nquit,  a Deo 
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The  distinction  between  the  true  king  and the  tyrant, 
between just  and legal authority, which was the characteristic 
of  the  true  commonwealth,  and mere  violence  and  unjust 
power,  was indeed firmly fixed in the minds of  all mediaeval 
thinkers, and we find it clearly set out even in the writings of 
those who were the strongest upliolders of  the imperial or royal 
authority.  We  have  already  had  occasion  to  discuss  the 
opinions of  Hugh of  Fleury as represented in his treatise on the 
royal and sacerdotal powers, addressed to Henry I. of  England. 
We have seen how stoutly he maintains, against the apparent 
meaning of  certain pl~rases  of  Hildebrand, that the authority ol 
the king is from God, and that he even repeats those phrases, 
which had been used by Ambrosiaster and Cathulfus, in which 
the king is described as bearing the image of  God, while the 
bishop bears that of  Christ.l  And while, as we have seen, he 
holds very clearly that the function of  the king is to maintain 
justice and equity, he also urges that the honour due to those 
in authority must not be measured by their personal qualities, 
but by the place  which  they hold,  and that therefore even 
heathen rulers must receive the honour due to their p~sition.~ 
ordinatam  et  non  resistimus,  immo 
dabimus ilico manus.  Miror autem, si 
in to vel gutta sanguinis est, quod non 
erubescis  dominum  Henricum  regem 
dicere  vel  ordinem  habero.  An  ordo 
tibi  videtur  ius  dare  sceleri,  fas  ne- 
fasquo, divina et humana confundere. 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Quomodo  autem  concordiam  utilem 
assoris regno, quod nullum est ?  Keg- 
num  quippe  quasi  rectum  dicitur. 
An  regnum  recte  dicitur,  ubi  omnis 
innocentia  laborat,  ubi  neque  rationi, 
neque iudicio, neque consilio locus est : 
sod quidquid libitum id licitum putatur? 
Tale regnum  ecclesiam  malignantium, 
concilium vanitatis, donique totius ini- 
quitatis sentinam  rectius  appollaveris. 
Tali  regno  nos  concordiam  inutilem 
dicimue.  Sicut  enim  inter  bonos 
laudabilis,  ita  inter  malos  reprc- 
hensibilis  concordia  est.  Guis  enim 
concordiam latronum, quis furum, quis 
immundorum,  nisi  mente  captus,  ap- 
probat 7 " 
l See pp. 98, 111. 
Hngh of  Fleury, 'Trnctatus do regia 
potestate et, sacerdotali dignitnte,'  i.  P : 
"  Honorandi etiam sunt omnes,  qiii in 
potestate  sunt  positi,  ab  his  quibus 
przsunt, etsi non  propter se, vel prop- 
ter  ordinem  et gradum,  quem  a  Deo 
acceperunt.  Sic  enim  iubet  apostolus 
dicens.  ' Omnibus,'  inquit,,  ' potes- 
tatibus  sublimioribns  subditi  estote. 
Non  ost  enim  potestas  nisi  a  Ueo. 
Quae oninl sunt, a Deo ordinatre sunt.' 
Jpse  nempe,  sicut ia~n  superius  osten- 
sum est, per pravas malorum hodnum  . 
voluntates  explere  nonnumquam  con- 
suovit  suam  aequam  ac  iustissinlam 
voluntatem, sicut per Judeos malivolos. 
bona  voluntate  Patris,  Christus  pro 
nol~is  occisus est.  Quod scientes atque 
credentes, et przceptum apostoli pariter 
observantes, otiam gentiles in poteptato 
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hd  yet he also warns kings and princes and tyrants that those 
who refuse to keep the commandments of God are wont to lose 
their power and authority, and that it  frequently happens that 
the people revolt against such a king.l 
The author of the controversial pamphlets which have been 
published  as the ' Tractatus Eboracenses ' sets the temporal 
power higher perhaps than any other writer of  the Middle Ages, 
and in a strange phrase which has some resemblance to that of 
Ilugh of  Fleury  he  speaks of  the priest  as representing the 
human nature of  Christ, while the king represents the divine 
nature.2  But even he recognises that there have been  kings 
who were no true kings but only tyrantse3 He does not indeed 
say that they are to be resisted, but he is aware of  the distinc- 
tion between the true and false king.  In another passage he 
makes tlle distinction very clear between the authority which 
is always good, and the person of  the ruler who may be evil. 
Our  Lord  had  bidden  men  give  to Cssar that wliicli  was 
C~sar's. He did not say, render  to Tiberius  that which  is 
positos honoramus, et mala quam nobis 
ingerunt  acquanimiter  toleramus,  ne 
Ueo  iniuriam  facere  videamur,  qui 
illos  ordinis  titulo  super  homines  ex- 
tulit atque sublimavit, licet  illi indigni 
sint ordino quo fruuntur. 
l  Id. id., i.  9 : "  Porro ipsi peges et 
principes  atquo  tyranni,  dum  Deo 
subesa,  et  eius  prreccpta  custodire 
ronuunt.  dominationis  sure  vim  et 
potestatom  plerumque  solent amittere, 
sicut  primus  homo  dominationis  sua, 
vigorem et dignitatis przrogativsm post 
mam tranegressionem  cognoscitur ami- 
slsse.  l'ostquam  nornpe  divino  noluit 
esse  subiectus  imperio,  ipsa  etiam 
corporis  sui  membra  sibi  rebellaro  et 
ignitos  aculeos  carnalis concupiscentia: 
Htatim contra suam voluntatem in sua 
carno  sevire persensit.  l'isccs  quoque 
maris  et volucres  cleli  et bestiae  agri, 
illi  ante comissum  facinus  quasi 
privata  animalia  subiacebant,  iugum 
dominationis eius a se ceperunt abigere, 
et  iam ei amplius solito service nolebant. 
Qua: tarneu ornrlia vi rationis SUZ  capit 
domum  paulatim  sibi  su1,igere  ct  ad 
suos usus oxquisitis artibus retorquere. 
Itaque  pari  mod0  regi  Deo  contrario 
popuIus sibi subiectus mullocies  incipit 
adversus  cum  insurgere  et  vasiis  ac 
multiplicibus insidiis illum appetere ct 
multis adversitatibus fatigare." 
P Tractatus Eb~ra(~en~es,'  iv. (M. G. 
H., '  LiBclli  de  Lite,'  vol.  iii.  p.  606) : 
"  Sacerdos  quippe  aliam  prsfigurabnb 
in Christo naturam, id est hominis, rcx 
aliam, id est Dei.  llle superiorem qua 
equalis est  Deo  patri,  i~to  inforiorem 
qua minor est patre." 
a  Id. id. id. : "  Similiter et do ceteris 
regibus  sentiendum cst,  qui in spiritu 
Dei  vc~iorunt  ct  virtute,  non  do  illis 
qui regnaverunt et  non ex  lleo, quoniam 
non  rogcs,  sod  tiraniii  fuerunt  et in 
spiritu  malign0  et  contraris  virtute 
venerunt.  Quorum  unus  fuit  Olias, 
qui,  quoninm  per  superbiam  usurpa- 
vit  sacerdotium,  lepra  percussus  est, 
quoniam  non  crat  Christus  Domini, 
nec  cum  Domino  unus  eiat  spiritus. 
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Tiberius' ; render to the authority, not to  the person, the person 
may be evil, the authority is just, Tiberius may be wicked, but 
Caesar is good.  Render, therefore, not to the evil person, to the 
wicked Tiberius, but to the just authority, to the good Czsar, 
that which is his.l 
If  these are the judgments,  even of  those who defended the 
temporal authority against what they conceived to be the un- 
rea,sonable claims of  the spiritual power,  we need not be sur- 
prised that the supporters of  the political or ecclesiastical oppo- 
sition pressed  them still more emphatically.  We  shall have 
occasion  presently to deal with  the position  of  Manegold in 
detail, but in the meanwhile we may observe how sharply he 
draws the distinction between kingship and tyranny, and how 
emphatically he states the conclusion that  the ruler who governs 
tyrannically has no claim whatever upon the obedience of  his 
people.  The  people,  he  says,  did not  exalt  the ruler  over 
themselves in order that he should have freedom to tyrannise 
over them, but in order that he should defend them from the 
tyranny of others.  It  is therefore clear that when he who was 
elected to re~t~rain  the wicked and to defend the good, actually 
becomes evil, oppresses the good, and is guilty of  that tyranny 
which it was his duty to repel, he justly falls from the dignity 
which was granted to him, and that the people are free from 
their  subjection  to him,  inasmuch  as he  has  violated  that 
agreement in virtue of  which he was app~inted.~ 
As we have already said, the conception of  the fundamental 
difference between the king and the tyrant is developed more 
l '  Trnctatus Eboracenses,' iv. (M. G. 
l+.,  '  Libelli  de l,iLe,'  vo:.  iii, p.  671)  : 
" Reddite,  inquit,  qua?  sunt  cesaris 
cesari,  non  qua? sunt Tyberii  Tyherio. 
Reddite  potestati,  non  persone.  Per- 
sona enim nequam, sed iusta potestas. 
Iniquus  Tyberius,  sed  bonus  cesar. 
Iteddire  ergo  non  personae  nequnm, 
non iniquo l'yberio,  sod iuste potestati 
et bono cesari quc sus sunt." 
Manegold, 'Ad (:ebehardum,'  xxx. : 
"  hecesse est ergo,  qui omnium curam 
gelere, omnes debet gubernare,  maiore 
gratia  virtutum  super  ceteros  debeat 
splcndere,  traditam  sibi  potestatem 
summo  equitatis  libramine  studcat 
administrare.  Neque  enim  populus 
ideo eum super se exaltat.  ut libcram 
in se exercendae tyrannidis  facultatem 
concedat, sed ut a tyrannide cet&orum 
et improbitate  defendat.  Ar,que, cum 
ille,  qui  pro  coercendis  pravin,  probis 
dofendendis  eligitur,  pravitatem in  se 
fovere,  bonos  conterere,  tyrannidem, 
quam  debuit  propulsare,  in  suh~sctos 
ceperit ipse crudelis~iirie  excrcere, nonne 
clarum  est.  merito  illum  a  concessa 
dignitate  cadere,  populum  ab  eius 
clearly and completely by John of Salisbury than by any other 
writer  of  these centuries.  We have from time to time cited 
various passages from his ' Policraticus,' but his position in the 
history of political theory is so important and so representative 
that we must consider it briefly as a whole. 
We have already cited  some of  the phrases  in which  he 
draws out the distinction between  the king and the tyrant; 
we must look at  these more closely.  This, he says, is the only 
or the greatest difference between the prince and the tyrant, 
that the prince obeys the law, and governs the people, whose 
servant he reckons himself  to be,  according to the law ; he 
claims, in the name of  the law, the first place in carrying oui 
the public  offices, and in submitting to the burdens  of  the 
commonwealth ; he is superior to other men in this, that while 
others have their particular obligations, he is bound to bear all 
the  burdens  of  the State.  The prince  is  endued  with  the 
authority of  all, in order that he may the better minister to 
the needs  of  all.  The will  of  the prince  is never  contrary 
to justice.  The prince is the public authority, and an  image on 
earth of  the divine majesty, and his authority is derived from 
God.  The passage concludes with those famous phrases of  the 
Code  in  which  it is  said  that the authority  of  the prince 
depends upon  the law,  and that it is a  thing  greater  than 
empire to submit the princely authority to the laws.] 
dominio et  subiectione liberum existere, 
cum pactum,  pro  quo constitutus est, 
constet illum prius irrupisse 7 . . . 
Ut enim imperatoribus et regibus ad 
tuenda  regni  gubernacula  fides  et 
reverentia est adhibenda, sic certe, sic 
firma  ratione,  si  tyrannidem  exercere 
erupcrint, absque omni fidei lesione vel 
pietatis  iactura  nulla  fidelitas  est  vel 
reverentia impendenda." 
l  John  of  Salisbury,  '  Policraticus,' 
iv.  1 : "  Est ergo  tiranni et principis 
hrcc  differentia sola  vel maxima, quod 
hic  legi  obtcmperat,  et  eius  arbitrio 
populum  regit  cuius  se  credit  minis- 
trum,  et  in  rei  public2  munoribus 
excrccnd~s  et oneribus  subeundis legis 
heneficio  sibi primum  vendicat locunl, 
in  eoque praefertur  ceteris,  quod,  cum 
singuli  teneantur  ad  singula,  principi 
onera imminent universa.  Unde merito 
in eum  omnium  subditorum  potestas 
confertur,  ut in utilitate singulorum ct 
omnium exquirenda et facienda sibi ipso 
sufficiat, et human= rei publice status 
optime  clisponatur,  dum  sunt  alter 
alterius membra.  In quo quidem opti- 
mum vivendi ducem naturam sequimur, 
quae  macrocosmi  sui,  id  est,  mundi 
minoris, hominis scilicet, sensus univer- 
so.: in capite collocavit, et ei sic universa 
membra subiecit, ut omnia recte move- 
antur, dum sani capitis sequuutur arbi- 
trium.  Tot  ergo  et tantis  privilegiis 
apex principalis extollitur et splendes- 
cit, quot et quanta sibi ipse necessaria 
credidit.  Recte  quidam,  quia  populo 
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For the definition of  the tyrant we must turn to a later pas- 
sage, where we find it said that the philosophers have described 
him as one who  oppresses the people by violent  domination, 
wliile  the prince is one  who  rules  by the laws.  The prince 
strives for the maintenance of  the law and the liberty of  the 
people ; the tyrant is never satisfied until he has made void 
the laws and has reduced the people to slavery.  The prince is 
the image of  God, and is to be loved and cherished ; wlille the 
tyrant is the image of  wickedness, and often it is meet that he 
should be slain.  The origin  of  tyranny is iniquity, and it is 
this poison of  unrighteousness and injustlee which is the source 
of  all the troubles and conflicts of the wor1d.l 
It is specially important to observe that to John of  Salisbury 
the essence of  the d~stinction  between the tyrant and the prince 
lies in his relation  to law.  In other places he enforces the 
principle in very interesting phrases.  There are some, he says, 
who whisper or even publicly proclaim that the prince is not 
subject to the law, and that whatever pleases hiin has the force 
of  law; that is, not merely that which  he,  as legislator, has 
establifihed as law in accordance with equity, but whatever he 
may chance to will.  The truth is, that when they thus with- 
necessitas  expleatur , quippe cum nec 
voluntas  eiua  iustitiae  invenintur 
adversa.  Eat  ergo,  ut eum  plerique 
diffiniunt, princeps potestas publica et 
m  terns  quzdam  dlvinae  maiestatis 
Imago. . . . Omnis eton~m  potestas  a 
Domrno Deoest, et  cum 1110 fu~t  semper, 
et est ante evum. . .  D~gna  siquidem 
vox  est,  ut  ait Imperator,  maiestatc 
regnantis  se  leg~bus  alhgatum  prln 
cipem  profit er^.  Qu~a  de  lulls  auc 
torltate prlncipla pendet auctorita.; , et 
revera  mama  lmperlo  est,  summ~ttcre 
legibus princ~patum  (Cod  1  14  4), ut 
nichll  sib~  princcps  licere  oplnetur, 
quod a iurt~tiae  aqu~tate  discordet " 
John  of  Sallsburv,  '  Policraticus,' 
viii.  17.  "  Est  ergo  t~rannus, ut 
eum  ph~losoph~  depinxerunt,  qui  v10 
lenta  domlnatione  populum  premit, 
slcut  qui  legibus  reg~t  pr~nceps  est. 
, . . Prlnceps  pugnat  pro  leg~bus  et 
populi  libertate ; tirannus  n11  actum 
putat  nisi  lcges  evacuee  et populum 
devocet In se~vitutem. Imago quaedam 
di>lnitatls est princeps, et tirannus ash 
adversariae  fortitudinis  et Luc~feriana, 
prav~tatis  imago,  slquidom  illum  imi- 
tatur  qul affectavit sedem  ponere  ad 
aquilonem  et  similis  esso  alt~ssimo, 
bon~tate  tamen  deducta.  . . . Imago 
de~tat~s,  pr~nceps  amandus, venerandus 
est  et coleodus ,  tlrannus,  pravltatls 
imago,  plerumquo  eCam  occidendus. 
Orlgo tiranni lniqu~tas  est et de rad~ce 
toxlcnta mala et pcst~fera  germmat et 
pullulat  arbor  securi  qual~bet  succl 
denda.  NISI enlm  ln~quitas  et inius 
tit~a  carltatis exterminatr~x  tlrannldcn~ 
procurasset,  pax  secura  et quies  por- 
petua  in  e\um  populos  possed~sret, 
nemoquo  cogitaret  de  finlbus  Ire- 
dueendls." 
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draw the king from the bonds of the law they make him an 
outlaw.  John does not indeed desire to destroy the dispensing 
power  of  the ruler, but he refuses  to submit the permanent 
or prohibitions of  the law to his caprice.l  We may 
compare with these words those of  another passage in which he 
urges that all men are bound by the law ; the prince is said to 
be free from the law, not because he may do unjust things, but 
because his character should be such that he follows equity and 
serves the commonwealth, not from fear of  punishment, but for 
love of  jnstlce,  and that he always prefers the convenience of 
others to his own personal desires.  It is indeed meaningless to 
speak of  the prince's  desires in respect to public matters, for 
he may not desile anything but what law and equity and the 
common good require ; his will has indeed in these matters the 
force of  law, but only because it  in no way departs from equity. 
The prince is the servant of  the public good and the slave of 
equity, and bears  the public  person,  because he punishes all 
injuries and crimes with eq~ity.~ 
l  Id.  id.,  IV.  7 . "  Procedant  nunc  integra conservetur " 
dealbatores  potentum,  susurrent  aut,  a  Id lcl ,iv 2  "  Omnes itaquo neces- 
01  hoc parum cst, publi~e  praeconentur  sitate legis servanda? tenentur adstricti, 
prlncipem  non  esse leg1 subiectum,  et  nisi  forte  aliquis  sit  cui  lnlqultatis 
quod  el  placet,  non  mod0  In  lure  licent~a videatur  indulta.  Princeps 
secundum formam aqu~tatis  condendo,  tamen  leg~s  nexibus dicitur absolutus, 
sed  qualitercumque,  leg~s  habere  vig-  non  quia ei iniqua Ilceant, sod qula is 
orem  Regem quem  leg^.; nexlbus sub-  esse  dcbet,  qul  non  tzmore  pena  sed 
trahunt,  SI  volunt  et audent, exlegem  amore  lustitia  aquitatem  colat,  re1 
faclant, ego, non mod0 his renitcntibus  publicw  procutet  utllitatem,  ot  In 
sed mundo  reclamante,  ipsos hac leg0  omnibus  aliorum  c3mmoda  pnvatm 
tener1 confirmo.  In quo emm, inqult,  pracferat voluntat~ Sed quis in negoti~s 
qul  net  fallit  nec  fallitur,  iudic~o  publlcis loquetur de princlpis voluntate, 
iudlcaverltl~,  iudicab~m~rli Et certe  cum  in  eis  nil  s~b~  velle  liceat,  nlsi 
ludlclum  gravisslmum  In  h~s  qui  quod  lex  aut  aqultas  persudot  aut 
Praesunt  606,  eo  quod  mensura  bona  ratio communis ut~l~tat~sinducit?  E~us 
cOnferta roagltata  ct supereffluens  re  namque  voluntas  In  h~s  vim  debot 
fundeh  in  sinus eorum  NCO  tamen  habore  iud~c~i,  et rect~ssime  quod  el 
dls~enbatlonem  legis subtraho man~bus  placet  in talibus logis  liabet  vlgorem, 
Pctestatum,  sod  perpetuam  praecep  oo  quod  ab  aquitat~s  mente  elus 
tlOnem  aut  prohih~t~onem  habentia  sonteut~a  non  dlscordet  De  vultu 
'lblto  eorum nequaqJam arbitror  sub-  tuo,  inqu~t,  ~udic~um  meum  prodeat, 
pcnencla  In hls itaque dumtaxat quae  ocul~  tu~  v~deant  aqu~tatem  , iudcx 
mObllia  sun*, dlspensatio verborum ad-  eten~m  incorruptus  est cmus sententla 
mlttitur~  lta tamen ut cornpensatlone  ex  contemplatione  assldua  ~mapo  est 
'lonebtatls  aut  utllltet~s mens  legls  aeqmtatls.  rubl,ca:  ergo  utllltaL16 140  POLITICAL  THEORY : llT~  &  12~~  CENT-;.  [PART  11. 
It is important to observe, in considering these passages, how 
much John of  Salisbury is affected by the revived study of  the 
Roman law ; his reference to Vacarius, and the progress of  the 
influence of  the Roman jurisprudence in England, in spite of  the 
attempts to restrain it, is well known ;  and the effects of  his 
own study are very clearly illustrated in the passages we have 
just discussed.  He is evidently gravely concerned to find a just 
meaning for such phrases, as that the prince is "  legibus solu- 
tus,"  or " quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem," for evi- 
dently they had, by somc, been used to defend the conception 
that the prince was not subject to the law, and that even his 
capricious desires might  override the law.  Such conceptions 
seem to him monstrous and impossible.  The will of  the prince 
which is to have the force of  law can only be that which is in 
accordance with  equity and law.  He is only free in relation 
to law in the sense that his true character is that of  a man 
who freely obeys the law of  equity.  It is specially interesting 
to notice his phrase about the result of  withdrawing the prince 
from the authority of  the law, that the true result of  this is 
to make him an outlaw-that  is, a person to whom all legal 
obligations cease. 
To appreciate the significance of  these principles of  John of 
Salisbury  completely,  we  must  bear  in  mind  not  only  the 
traditions which we have considered in this chapter, but also the 
whole tradition of  the feudal lawyers, culininating in the dog- 
matic affirmation of  Bracton that the king is under the law.2 
It is  evident  that John  approaches  the discussion  of  these 
questions formally through the medium of  the Roman law and 
other literary traditions, but that his actual judgment  corre- 
sponds with and expresses the effects of  the political traditions 
and the practical circumstances and necessities of  his own time. 
The legitimate prince or ruler is thus distinguished, in John. 
of  Salisbury's mind, by this, that he governs according to law. 
minister  et  zquitatis servus  est  prin-  punit." 
ceps, et in eo personam publicam gerit,  1 John  of  Salisbury,  '  Policraticus.' 
quod  omnium iniurias  et dampna sed  viii. 22. 
et  crimina  omnia  requitate  media  Wf. p.  67. 
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What is then the law to which he is subject, and which it is hie 
function to administer ?  It does not represent the arbitrary 
will of  the ruler, nor even of  the community.  John finds ex- 
pression for his principles in terms derived partly from the con- 
temporary Civilians and partly from the Digest.  The prince, he 
says,  must remember that his justice is subordinate to that of 
God,  whose  justice  is eternal and whose  law is equity.  He 
defines equity in terms used by a number of  the Civilians, as 
"  rerum  convenientia  . . . quae  cuncta  coaequiparat ratione 
et imparibus  (in paribus) rebus paria iura desiderat,"  and as 
that which gives to every man his own.  Law is the interpreter 
of  this equity, and he cites the words of Chrysippus as quoted 
in the Digest, that it is law which orders all things divine and 
human, and those of  Papinian and Demosthenes, that law is 
formed and given by God, is taught by wise men, and estab- 
lished by the commonwealth.  All, therefore, he concludes, are 
bound to obey the law, unless perchance some one claims to 
have licence to commit iniquity.l 
In another place  John  of  Salisbury  takes  from  the work 
which  he knew as the '  Institutio Traiani,' and attributed to 
Plutarch, a definition of  the commonwealth which represents 
the  conception  that  all  political  authority  embodies  the 
principles  of  equity  and  reason.  The  commonwealth,  he 
represents the work  as saying, is a body  which is animated 
by  the  benefit  of  the  divine  gift,  and is  conducted  at the 
l  Id.  id.,  iv.  2 :  "  Nec  in  eo  sibi 
principes  detrahi  arbitrentur,  nisi 
iustitire  sure  statuta  prreferenda 
crediderint iustitire  Dei,  cuius iustitia 
iustitia in evum est, et lex eius requitas. 
Porro requitas, ut iuris poriti asserunt, 
rerum  convenientia  est,  quz  cuncta 
coaequiparat  rationo  et imparibus  (in 
paribus P)  rebus  paria  iura  desiderat, 
in omnes requabilis, tribuens unicuique 
quod  suum  est.  Lex  vero  eius  in- 
terpres  est,  utpote  cui  requitatis  et 
i~titire  voluntas  innotuit.  Unde  et 
earn  omnium  rerum  divinarum  et 
humanarum  compotem  esse  Crisippus 
asaeruit,  ideoque  prrestare  omnibus 
bonis  et  malis  et  tam  rerum  quam 
hominum  principem  et  ducem  esse. 
Cui  Papinianus,  vir  quidem  iuris 
experientissimus,  et  Demostenes, 
orator  prrepotens,  videntur  suffragari 
et omnium hominum subicere obedien- 
tiam,  eo  quod  lex  omnis  inventio 
quidem  est  et  donum  Dei,  dogma 
sapientum,  correctio  voluntariorurn 
excessuum,  civitatis  compositio,  et 
totius criminis fuga ; secundum quam 
decet  vivere omnes qui in politicre rei 
universitate versantur.  Omnes itaque 
necessitate  legis  servandre  tenentur 
adstricti,  nisi  forte  aliquis  sit  cui 
iniquitatis licentia videatur indulta." 
Cf. vol. ii. pp.  7,  8, and vol.  i. p.  66 
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bidding of  the highest  equity,  and controlled  by the rule of 
reas0n.l 
The autliority of  the law and the State is the authority of 
justice  and reason, and it is impossible therefore for John to 
conceive of  any ruler ss being legitimate, or as having any real 
claim to authority, unless he is obedient to the law, which is 
the embodiment of  justice and reason. 
What  are then  the  conclusions  which  John of  Salisbury 
draws from these principles, in regard to the practical questions 
of  tlie relations of  subjects and rulers ?  It is true that he is a 
little  hampered  by  the recollection  of  the Augustinian  and 
Gregorian tradition ; that he remembers that in the patristic 
tradition  the  evil  ruler  may  be  the  instrument  of  God's 
punishment  upon  an evil  pe~ple.~  And in  one  passage  he 
1 John  of  Sahsbury, '  Pol~cratlcus,' 
v.  2 : " Est  autom  res  publlca,  slcut 
Plutarco placet, corpus quoddam quod 
~IVIUI  munens  benefic~o anlmatur,  et 
summa, iequ~tatls  agltur nutu et regl 
tur quodam moderamme ratlonls " 
For a dlscuss~on  of  thls work see C. 
C.  Webb's edltlon of  the '  Pol~crat~cus,' 
v01  I  p. 280, note 15. 
2  Id. ~d ,  v  4 : '' Nos autem, qu~bus 
de  celo  ver~tas  llluxlt,  non  deorum, 
qul  nu111  suut, sed  verl  Del  mln~str~s 
et amlcls magnam reverentlam cred~mus 
exlnbendam , sed et lmlmlcls elus In- 
terdum,  quonlam  hoc  lpse  prrecep~t 
qu~  saepe  maxlmam  ad  erud~t~onem 
suorum  pesslmls  homlnlbus  contullt 
potestatem.  Unde  lllud  '  Sublect~ 
estote  omnl  humsna,  creaturae  prop- 
ter  Deum, slve  regl  quasl  przecellent~ 
slve  duc~bus  tamquam  ab  eo  mlssls 
ad  vlndlctam  malefactorum  laudem 
vero bonori~m.' Et  lllud  '  Serv~,  sub- 
dltl cstote clornln~s  vestrls, non tantu~n 
bon~s  et modestls sed etlam dlscolls ' " 
Id.  ~d,  vln.  18 :  "  Mlnlstros  DLI 
tamen tlrannos esse non abnego, qu~  In 
utroque  pnmatu,  scihcet  anlmarurn 
et  corporum,  lust0  suo  ludlclo  esse 
volult  per  quos  pun~rentur mall  et 
corrlgerentur  et  exercerentur  bonl 
Nam et peccata popul~  faclunt regnare 
ypoor~tam et,  slcut  Regum  testatur 
li~stor~a,  defectus sacerdotum In populo 
Del  tlrannos  ~nduxlt.  Slqu~dem 
pr~ml  patres  et  patr~archae vlvend~ 
ducem  opt~mam  naturam  eecut~ 
sunt.  Successerunt  duces  a  Moyse 
sequentes  legem,  et  ~udlces  qu~  leg~s 
auctor~tate regebant  populum ;  et 
cosdem  fume  leg~mus  sacerdotes. 
Tandem  In  furore  Domln~  dat~  sunt 
reges,  a111 qu~dem  bon~,  a111 vero mall. 
Senuerat  enlm  Samuel  et,  cum  fill1 
elus  non  ambulaverunt  In  vns  suls 
sed  avarltlam  et  ~mmuncht~as  sec 
tarentur, populus,  qu~  fortasse  et ~pso 
meruerat  ut 01  tales  prreessent  sacer- 
dotes, a Deo, quem contempserat, s~bi 
regem extors~t Ele,ctus est ergo Saul, 
regls  tamen  lure  prced~cto,  ~d est  qul 
fil~os  eorum tolleret ut faceret aurlgas, 
et fillas ut pan~fica,  fierent et focarlz, 
et  agros  et  praedla  ut  ea  pro  l~b~to 
dlstr~bueret servls  sum,  populumque 
totum serv~tutls  premeret lug0  Idem 
tamen  chrlstus  Domln~ dlctus  est, 
et  tlrannldem  exercens  reglum  non 
amls~t  bonorem.  Incusslt  enlm  Deus 
t~morem  omn~bus,  ut eum quasl mlnls- 
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seems at least doubtful whether it is lawful for a man to seek 
the death  of  him to whom he is bound by fidelity and oath, 
and ho mentions with  approbation the conduct of  David v~ho 
would  not  use  violeilce  against  Saul,  and of  those  who  in 
oppiession pray to God for de1iverance.l 
When, however, we have allowed for certsin qualifications, it 
remains true that Jolln of Salisbury maintains veiy emphatic- 
ally that the tyrant lias no rights against the people, and may 
justly  and rightfully be slain.  He deals with the matter first 
at  the end of  the third book, and says that it is not only lawful 
to kill the tyrant, but equitable and just, for it is riglit that he 
who talres  the sword  should perish by the sword. That is, he 
who usurps the sword, not he who receives it from the Lord. 
He who receives liis authority from God, serves the law, and 
is the miniater  of justice  and the law,  while  he  who  usurps 
trum  Domlm,  culus  quodammodo 
gestabst  Imaglnem,  venerarentur. 
Ampllus  qu~dem  adlclam ,  etlam 
tyrann~  gentlum  reprobat1  ab  etell10 
ad mortem mlnlstrl Del sunt et chr~st~ 
Domln~  appellantur.  Unde  propheta ; 
'  Ingrcdlentur  portas Babllonls duces,' 
v~del~cet  Clrus et Darxns,  ' ego  enlm 
mandavl  sanct~ficatls  mels  et  vocavl 
fortes meos In lra moa et exultantes In 
glorla  mea '  Ecce  qula  sanct~ficatos 
vocat  Medos  et  Persas,  non  quod 
sanct~  essent,  sed  Domm1  adve~sus 
Babllonem  lmpleba~it  voluntatem. 
Allas  quoque .  '  Ecce  ego  aclducam,' 
lnqult, ' Nabugodonosor servum meum, 
et, qula bene mlcli~  serv~v~t  apud Tlrum, 
dabo  el  Eglptum '  Omms  autem 
potestas bona, quomam ab oo  est a quo 
8010  omnla et sola sunt bona.  Utent~ 
tamen  lnterdum  bona  non  cst  aut 
Patlcntl  sod  mala,  hcet  qnod  ad unl- 
\.ers~tatem  s~t  bona,  1110  faclente  qu~ 
bene  ut~tur malls  nostrls  Slcut 
enlm In  plctura fuscus aut nlger  col01 
aut  ahqu~s  alms  per  se  cons~doratus 
lndecens est, et tamen In  tota plctura 
decet ,  SIC  per  so  quedam  lnspecta 
lndecora  et  rnala,  rclata  ad  un~versl- 
tatern  bona  apparent  et  pulch~a,  eo 
omma s~b~  adaptante cums omnla opera 
valde  sunt  bona.  Ergo  et  tlrannl 
potestas  bona  qu~dem  est,  tlrannide 
tamen n~chll  pelus.  Est omm  tlrannl~ 
a  Deo  concessa,  homlnl  potestatls 
nbusus.  In hoc  tamen  malo  xnultus 
et magnua  est  bonorum  usus.  Patet 
ergo  non  In  solls  prlnc~plbus esse 
tlranmdem,  sed  omnes  esse  tlrannos 
qu~  concessa  desupor  potestate  m 
subd~tls  abutuntur." 
'  Id.  ~d , vln.  20.  "  Hoc  tamen 
cavendum docent hlstorla,, ne quls 1111~8 
mol~atur  lnterltum  cu~  fide~  aut sacra- 
ment~  rehglone tenetur  ast~lctus  . . 
Nam  et Sodech~as  ob  neglectam  fide~ 
rel~g~onem  leg~tur  captlvatus , et quod 
In  a110 regum Iudre no11  memlnl, erut~ 
sunt ocul~  elus, qula Deum, cul ~uratur, 
etlam  cum  ex  lust& causa  cavetur 
tlranno,  lapsus  In  pcrfid~am  non  plo- 
posu~t  ante  conspectum  suum  .  . 
(The example of  Dav~d  and haul  . 
Et hlc quldem modus delendl tlrarlllos 
utlhss~mus et  tutlsu~mus est.  sl  qui 
premuntur  ad  patrocln~um  clementls 
Del  humll~at~  confug~ant et  puras 
manus  levantes  ad  Domlnum  devot~s 
prec~bus  flagollum  quo  afA~guntur 
nvertant." the principle of  justice, and that this justice is embodied in the 
law.  The ruler who is unjust, and who violates the laws and 
customs of  his country, has ceased to have any claim to tlla 
obedience of  his subjects, and may justly  be resisted,  and if 
necessary  deposed and killed.  It is probable that the some- 
what harsh terms of  his doctrine of tyrannicide are due to tile 
influence of his study of classical literature and history, and it 
is interesting to observe the first effects of  the direct study of 
the ancient world.  But though the form of  his principle of  the 
right of resistance to unjust and illegal authority is probably 
literary in its origin,  and might not have met  with  general 
approbation, yet the essential principle which he maintains is 
the normal view of the Middle Ages. 
CHAPTER  VI. 
CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY  AND  CONTRACT. 
WE have so far endeavoured to trace the development of  the 
conception that political authority is controlled and limited by 
the principle of  justice,  and by the law as the embodiment of 
this.  There is no doubt that in this conception we have one 
of the most important apprehensions of  political theory in the 
Middle Ages.  In modern times it may seem that the principle 
does not take us very far, for we  always tend to ask what is 
justice,  and whether the law is just,  and this is the natural 
tendency of  a time when nien are conscious of  movement and 
change.  In  the Middle  Ages  the  conditions  of  civilisation 
were actually changing probably  as rapidly  as they are to- 
day,  but  men  were  hardly  conscious  of  change,  and  the 
appeal to precedent, to tradition, was probably almost wholly 
sincere. 
While,  however,  the belief  in the supremacy  of  law and 
justice is of  the first importance, yet it  is also true that a society 
which is civilised and moving towards greater civilisation must 
not only be possessed of  some ideal or ethical principles,  but 
must also develop some method or form for securing the effec- 
tive authority of  its principles.  In the Middle Ages this was 
represented  by the development of  the conception  that the 
ruler  received  his  authority,  sometimes  by  the principle  of 
hereditary succession in some one family, but never without 
the election or recognition of  the great men, or the community 
as a whole-and  these two cannot be separated in the mediaeval 
apprehension.  And the authority which  the medizeval ruler 
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could only exercise normally with the counsel of the great men 
of  the community. 
We have considered the earller stages in the development of 
these principles in our first volume, and they were too firmly 
rooted in the structure of  medi~val  society to die out even in 
the chaos of  the tenth century ; but it is no doubt true that in 
this respect, as with regard to the other principles of  political 
authority, it was the great civil and religious  conflicts of  the 
eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries  which  made  men  clearly 
conscious  of  ideas  and convictions  which  had always  been 
implicit, but had only occasionally been expressed.  It is, how- 
ever, important to observe that, even before these violent con- 
flicts compelled men to make real to themselves their political 
principles, we can find occasional but very clear expressions of 
what we may call the constitutional conception of  authority. 
Here is, for instance, a very characteristic expression of  the 
principle that the king governs only with  the counsel of  his 
faithful men.  This is contained in a letter written by Gerbert 
(afterwards Pope Sylvester 11.)  in the name of  Hugh, King of 
France, to the Archbishop of  Sens.  The king was  evidently 
somewhat doubtful of the loyalty of  the archbishop, who had 
probably not been  present  at his  consecration in  Rheims in 
July 987, and admonishes him with some asperity to make his 
allegiance before November, and, evidently in order to reassure 
him,  declares that he has no intention  of  abusing the royal 
power, but intends to administer the affairs of  the state with 
the advice and judgment of  his faithful men, among whom he 
reckons the archbishop as one of  the most honourab1c.l 
We  find  the same  principle  expressed in a  contemporary 
Gerbert, 'Eplstola,'  107  "  Regal1  dni  Ne  sl  forte,  quod  non  optamus, 
potentla In nullo mod0  abut1 volentcs,  persuaslone q~~orumdam  pravorum dill- 
omme negotla  relpubl~ce  In  consulta  genter vobls exequcnda rnlnus audlatls, 
tlone  et sententla  fidellum  nostro~um  sententlam domm  pape,  comprovlncl- 
dlsponlmus,  vosque  eorum  partlclpcs  allumque  eplscopolum  durlorem  per- 
fore  dlgnisslmos  ludlcanrus.  Itaque  feratls,  nostraque  ommbus nota  man- 
honeste  ac  benlgno  affectu  vos  mone-  suetudo  lustlsslmum  correctlonls  assu- 
mus utl ante K1.  novemb  eam fidem  mat zelum regall potcntia " 
quam  ceterl  noh~s  firmavorunt  con-  Cf  tho  notes  to the  letter  In  the 
firmetls ob pacem et concordlam sancte  edltton of  J. Havct. 
Del  ecclesle,  toclusque  popul~  chr~stl- 
work of  Abbo,  the Abbot of  Fleury.  How can the king, he 
deal with the affairs  of  the kingdom  and drive out in- 
justice  except with the advice of  the bishops and chief  men 
of the kingdom 1  how can he discharge his functions if  they do 
not  by  their  help  and counsel  show  him  that honour  and 
reverence  which is due ?-the  king alone is not equal to all 
that the needs  of  the kingdom  require.  And he appeals to 
the  obligations  which  they  had  taken  upon  themselves  in 
electing him  to the kingdom,  for it were better not to have 
assented to his election than to contemn him whom they had 
elected.  There are three important elections, lie says-that  of 
the king or emperor, which is made by the agreement of  the 
whole  kingdom ;  that  of  the bishop,  which  represents  the 
unanimous agreement of  the clergy and people ; and that of 
the abbot, which is made by the wiser judgment of  the com- 
munity.l 
This conception corresponds precisely with the contemporary 
forms of  legislative or  quasi-legislative action.  The Capitula 
issued by the Emperor Otto I. at  Verona in 967 are said to be 
established by the emperor and his son Otto the king, with the 
chief  princes-that  is, the bishop,  abbots, and judges,  along 
with  the wliole pe~ple.~  And again, the Emperor Henry 11. 
l Abbo,  Abbas  Florlacensls,  ' Col-  ~ta  mellus  est  election1 prlnclpls  non 
lectlo  Canonum,'  IV. :  "  Cum  regls  subscrlbere quem post  subscrlptionem 
m~mstenum  slt  totlus  regnl  penltus  electum  contemnere  vel  proscnbore, 
negotla discutere,  no  quld in 01s  lateat  quandoquidem In altero libertatls amor 
Inlustltlz,  quomodo  ad  tanta  potent  laudatur, In  altero servllls  contumac~a 
subslstele,  nlsi  annuent~bus  eplscopls  probo  datur  Tres namque  electlones 
et prlrnorlbus  regnl  ?  Et cum  apos-  generales  novlmus,  quarum  una  est 
tolns  dlcat  '  Doum  tlmetc,  regem  legis vel  ~mperatons,  altera pont~ficls, 
hononficate,'  qua  ratlone  sul  mm18  tertla  abbatls  Et prlmam  quldem 
ten1  vlces  exerceblt  In  contumaclum  faclt concorclla totlus regnl , secundam 
pcrfidla,  sl  el  prlmores  regnl  auxillo  vero unan~mitas  clvlum et clen,  ter- 
et cons1110 non exlnheant debltum hou-  tlam sanlus  conslllum  ccenob~alls  con- 
orem cum omnl reverentla  Ipse enlm  gregatlonls  Et unaqueque  non  pro 
solus non sufficlt ad omnla regm utilla  seculanr  amlcltle  gratia  vel  pretlo. 
Idcirco  partlto  in  alus  onere,  quos  sed ad suam prcfesslonem pro sap~entla 
dlgnos  cred~t  honore,  honorandus  est  vel  v~tz  merlto  Porro ordlnatus rex 
et lpse  slncera  devot~one,  ne  quls  01  ab omnlhus subdltls fidem slbl sacra 
'ontradlcat  quomodocunque,  qula ' qul  mento exiglt, ne In allqmbus regnl sul 
Potcstatl  reslstlt,  Del  ordlnatlonl  re-  fin~bus  d~scordla  geuorarl posslt " 
@~stlt  '  Slquldem  ut mellus  est  non  M  G  H,  Legum, Sect IV., Constl- 
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issued  in  1022  the  Constitution  confirming  and  approving 
certain  synodical  legislation  of  Pope  Benedict  VIII.,  along 
with the senators, the officers of  the palace, and the friends of 
the commonwea1th.l 
It is not within  the scope  of  our  work  to deal with  the 
development cf  the c~nst~itutions  of  the European state% but 
it is impossible to separate the history of political theory from 
the history of  the growth of  institut'ions.  This id  alwa,ys true, 
but especially in the earlier Middle Ages, when there was very 
little merely abstract political speculation.  In the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries this was somewhat different, but we 
hope  to deal  with  this later.  In the elevent'h and twelfth 
centuries it is obvious that political theory arises very largely 
out of  the conflicts of  the time, and reflects in the main the 
constitutional  principles  of  the  European  societies,  as men 
conceived them.  While therefore  we  must keep clear of  any 
attempt to give an account of the constitutional organisation 
of  Western  Europe,  we  must endeavour by means of  a  few 
illustrations to indicate what seem to us to be some of  its most 
important principles. 
There is no doubt that in the Middle Ages the authority of 
the ruler  was  conceived  of  as normally  depending upon  the 
election, or at least the recognition, of  the community.  The 
conception of  a strictly hereditary right to monarchy is not a 
medisval conception.  In France and England no doubt the 
principle  of  succession  within  one  family  established  itself 
early.  But students of  English history do not need to be re- 
minded that some form of  election or recognition was always 
quae  instituit domnus  Otto gloriosissi- 
mus imperator et item Otto filius eius 
gloriosus  rex,  una  cum  summiu  prin- 
cipibus,  id  sunt episcopis,  abbatibus, 
iudicibus, seu curn omni populo." 
1 M. G.  H., Legum, Sect. IV., Consti- 
tutiones,  vol.  i.  34 :  " Omnia quidem 
quae pro ecclesiae necessaria reparation0 
aynodaliter  invtituit et reformavit  pa- 
ternitas tua, ut Hius laudo, confirm0 et 
approbo ;  et  ut  omnes sint  paratiorea, ea 
me iilviolabiliter servaturum adjuvante 
Deo  promitto.  Et in  aternum  man- 
sura  et  inter  publica  iura  semper 
recipienda  et humanis  legibus  solem- 
niter  insorlbenda  hac  nostra  auctori- 
tate,  vivente ecclesia  per  Dei  gratiam 
victura,  cum  senatoribus  terrae,  cum 
domesticis palatii,  et amicis reipublica 
coram  Deo  et  ecclesia  ita  corrobor- 
amus." 
a regular part of the constitutional process of succession to the 
throne.  And in France it was not really otherwise, though the 
strictly  hereditary  principle  may  be  thought  of  as  having 
established itself there more rapidly.  In the Empire the suc- 
cession  was elective, and if  at any time during the eleventh 
century  it  might  have  tended  to  become  hereditary,  this 
tendency  was  abruptly  checked  in  the  great  civil  wars 
Henry IV.'s  reign,  and in  the troubles of  the thirteenth 
century. 
It  is worth while to notice some of tlie phrases in which this 
is expressed.  Hermann of Reichenau relates how the Emperor 
Henry 111.  procured  the election of  his infant son as king at 
Tribur in 1053, but mentions that the election was made subject 
to the condition  that he  should prove a just  r1zler.l  Bruno 
relates  how  at the  council  of  Forchheim,  in  1077,  it was 
determined  by the common  consent,  and approved  by the 
authority of  the Roman pontiff, that no one should receive 
the royal authorit,y by hereditary succession as had been the 
custom, but that the son  of  the king,  even  though  he were 
wholly worthy, should succeed to the kingdom by free election 
rather than by hereditary right ; while if  he were not worthy, 
or if  the people did not desire him, they should have it  in their 
power to make him king whom they would.2 
This principle is again expressed, and something more of  its 
significance indicated, in the circular letter issued by the Arch- 
bishops of  Cologne and Mainz and other bishops and princes on 
the occasion of  tlie death of  Henry V. in 1125.  They annouilcc 
the Emperor's  death, and say that they have celebrated  liis 
funeral, and that they now  propose to hold  an assembly to 
consider  the condition  of  the kingdom and to arrange for a 
Nerimannus Augiensis, '  Chronicon,' 
A.D. 1053 : "  Imperator Heinricus mag- 
no  aput  Triburiam  conventu  habito, 
filium  mquivocum  regem  a  cunctis 
eligi, eique  post  obitum suum, si rec- 
tor  iustus  futurus esset,  subicctionem 
Promitti fecit." 
Bruno,  ' De  Bollo  Saxonico,'  91 : 
"  Hoc etiam ibi consensu communi com- 
probaturn,  Romani  pontificis  auctori. 
tate cst corroboratum, ut rcgia potostas 
nulli  per  haereditatem,  sicut  ante fuit 
consuetudo,  cederet,  sed  filius  regis, 
ctiam si valde clignus esset,  potius per 
electionem spontaneam quam per  suc- 
cessionis  lineam  rex  provcnirct ;  si 
vero  non  essct  dignus  regis  filius,  vel 
si  nollet  eum  populus,  quem  regem 
facore  vellet  haberet  in  potestate 
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successor.  They disclaim  all intention of  prejudicing the de- 
cision of  those to whom they write, but they express the hope 
that they will be mindful of  the oppression of  the Church and 
king don^, and will invoke the help of  God that He would  so 
guide the election of  a successor t'hat the Church and kingdom 
might be free from the slavery in which they had been held, 
and might live under their own laws, and that the princes and 
the people might have peace.l  The writers of  the letter not 
only  claim the right  of  determining the succession, but also 
clearly  consider  that this  right  should  be  used  to provide 
security for good government and the due observance of  the 
laws. 
We  can find another illustration  of  the recognition  of  the 
elective principle, and of the conception that it  involved definite 
obligations on the part of the chosen ruler, in the letter sent to 
Pope Eugenius 111. in the name of Frederick I. (Barbarossa)  on 
his election to the kingdom in 1152.  He speaks of  himself as 
having  been  clothed  with  the royal  dignity,  partly  by  the 
homage  of  the lay princes,  partly by  the benediction  of  the 
bishops, and as having put on the royal mind, and that there- 
fore he purposes, according to the terms of that promise which 
he made when he was enthroned and consecrated, t'o give all 
honour and love to the Pope and the Roman Church, to all 
ccclesiastical persons the ready justice  and defence which was 
their due, and to widows and orphans and the whole people 
entrusted to him law and peace.2 
'  &l.  G. H., Legum, Sect. IV., Consti- 
tutiones,  vol.  i.  112 : "  Nullum  tamen 
praiudicium  deliberationi  et voluntati 
vestrae  facientes, nichil  nobis singulare 
ac  privatum  in  hac  re  usurpamus. 
Quin  pooius  discretioni  vestrae  hoc 
adprime  intimatum  esse  cupimus, 
quatinus  memor  oppressionis,  qua 
ecclesia  cum  universo  regno  usque 
mod0  laboravit,  dispositionis  divinae 
providentiam  invocetis,  ut  in  sub- 
stitutione alterius personre sic ecclesire 
sure  et regno  providcat,  quod  tanto 
servitutis  iugo  amodo  careat  et suis 
legibus  uti  liccat,  nosque  omnes  cum 
subiecta  plebe  temporali  perfruamur 
tranquillitatc." 
M. G. H., Legum, Sect. IV., Consti- 
tutiones,  vol.  i.  137 : "  Nos  vero  in 
multiplicibus  regiae  dignitatis  orna- 
mentis,  quibus  partirn  per  laicorurn 
principum  obsequio,  partim  per  re- 
verendas pontificum benedictiones ves- 
titi sumus,  regium  animum induimus, 
tota  mentis  virtute  intendentes,  ut 
iuxta  professionls  nostra  formulam, 
quam  ab  orthodoxis  prreesulibus  in 
ipso  regni  throno  et  unctione  sacre 
accepimus,  lionorem  vobis  et  dilec- 
tionem,  et sacrosanctae  matri  nostre 
We have already dealt with the treatment of this question in 
the feudal law books, but it is worth while to notice again the 
terms in which the principle of  election is set out in 
tile ' Sachsenspiegel.'  The Germans, according to the law, are 
to elect the king, when the king is elected he is to swear t8hat 
will maintain the law, and put down all that is against it.1 
And in another place the author lays down the principle  of 
election in the broadest terns when he says that all authority 
is founded upon ele~tion.~  What the exact significance of  the 
latter phrase may be is difficult to say, but at  least it seems to 
illustrate the breadth and importance of  the elective principle. 
The fact that in medizeval theory the authority of  the king 
is founded upon the election or at  least the recognition cf  the 
community does not in truth require any serious demon~tra~tion. 
It is very important, however, to notice tlmt it is not only in 
the election  or  succession of  the ruler  that the authority of 
the  community  was  recognised,  but  that in  some  sense  or 
another  the legislative  action  of  the ruler  was  limited  and 
conditioned by the counsel and assent of  the great men of  the 
community.  This is clear in the first place from the formula 
which  are used  in  a11  legislative  or  quasi-legislative actions. 
We may take a few examples from the twelfth century. 
The great settlement of  Worms in 1122 was embodied in the 
' Privilegium Imperatoris,' in which Henry V. agreed to resign 
the imperial claim to the right of  investiture of  bishops  with 
the ring and staff.  This is expressly said to be done with the 
counsel and consent of the princes whose names are s~bscribed.~ 
Romanre  reoclesire  et omnibus  eeclesi- 
asticis personis  promptam  et debitam 
iusticinm  ac defensionem exhibeamus, 
viduis  ac  pupillis  et universo  populo 
nobis  commisso  legem  et pacem  faci- 
amus et conservemus." 
1 '  Sachsenspiegel,'  iii.  52.  l :  "  Die 
dudeschcn  solen  durch  recht  den 
koning  .  .  .  kiesen." 
nl.  54.  2 :  "  Als  man  den  koning 
kuset,  so sal he dem  rike  hulde  dun, 
undo  sveren dat he recht  sterke unde 
unrecht  krenke  unde  it  rike  vorosta 
an  sime  rechte,  nls  ho  lriinne  und 
moge." 
Id., i.  55.  l : "  AI  werlik  gerichte 
hevet  begin  von  kore ; dar umnle  ne 
mach  nen  sat  man  richtere  sin  noch 
neman,  he  ne  si  gekoren  oder  belent 
richtere." 
Cf.  i.  56  and  58.  Cf.  '  Schwaben- 
spiegel,' 71.  1. 
M. G. H., Legum, Sect. TV.,  Couati- 
tutiones, vol. i. 107 : "  Hzc  omnia acta 
aunt  consensu  et  consilio  principum 
quorum nomine subscripts sunk." 154  POLITICAL  THEORY : 11~~  &  12~~  CENTURIES.  [PART  11. 
Lothar  111,'s Constitution,  ' De  Feudorum  Distractione,'  of 
1136,  was  made  on  the  exhortation  and  counsel  of  the 
archbishops,  bishops,  dukes,  and other  nobles  and judges.1 
Frederick I. issued t'he feudal constitutions of  Roncaglia after 
taking counsel  with  the bishops,  dukes,  marquesses,  counts, 
judges of  the palace, and other chief  person^.^ 
It  is not, however, only in the formal preambles of legislation 
that we  find  this principle recognised.  It  was  expressly  as- 
serted as a principle of  government by so great and masterful 
an emperor as Frederick Barbarossa.  In replying to certain 
demands of  Pope Hadrian IV.  in relation  to the papal and 
imperial position in the city of Rome, and to certain claims of 
the  imperial  authority  on  ecclesiastical  persons  in  Italy, 
Frederick, while giving a provisional answer, says that he can- 
not  give  a  complete  answer  until  he  has  consulted  the 
 prince^.^ 
There  is  really  no  doubt  whatever  that  in  the  normal 
tradition  of  the Middle  Ages  the position  of  the ruler  was 
conceived  of  as that of  one who  ruled  with  the advice and 
consent of the chief persons of the community.4  The relation 
of  this to the feudal conceptions, as we have endeavoured to set 
them out, is obvious,  but the tradition  was  older  than the 
feudal sy~tern.~  The authority of  the mediaeval ruler rested 
upon the election or consent of the community, and was exer- 
cised normally and constitutionally with the advice of  persons 
M. G. H., Legum, Sect. IV., Consti-  domini  ad  quem  feudum  spectare 
tutiones, vol.  i.  120 : "  Hortatu itaque  dinoscitur." 
et  consilio  archiepiscoporum,  episco-  M.  G.  H.,  Legum, Sect. IV., Con- 
pornm, ducum . . . ceterumque nobil-  stitution~~,  vol. i. 179 : " Quamvis non 
ium, simul etiam judicum, hac edictali  ignorem, ad tanta negotia non ex animi 
lege  in  omne  ovum  Deo  propitio  mei sententia, sed ex consilio principum 
valitura decernimus."  me  respondcre  debere,  sine  prejudicio 
M. G. H., Legum, Sect. IV., Consti-  tameu  sapicntium  hoc  absque  con. 
tutiones,  vol.  i.  148 : "  Habito  igitur  sultatione respoudeo." 
consilio episcoporum, ducum, marchio-  The  examples  we  have  givczl  are 
num,  comitum  simul  et  palatinorum  taken from the Empire, but they could 
judicum  et  aliorum  procerum,  hac  as  easily  be  taken  from  France.  Cf. 
edictali  leg0  Deo  propitio  perpetuo  '  Recueil  GBu6ral  des  Anciennes  Lois 
valitura  sancimus :  ut  nulli  liceat  Francaisos,' ed. Jourdan, Decrusz, and 
feudum  totum  vel  partom  aliquem  Isambert ;  '  Etablissemens  des  Cap& 
vendere,  vel  impignorare,  vel  quoquo  tiens,' Nos. 47,  49,  75,  104, 108. 
mod0  alienare,  sine  permissione illins  Cf. vol. i. chaps. 19 and 20. 
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who were not merely his dependents or creatures, but were in 
gome  sense, however  vague  and undetermined,  the represen- 
tatives of  the community. 
It  was the great civil conflicts of the eleventh century which 
compelled men in the Empire to consider how far the conditions 
and assumptions of  constitutional order gave the community 
or its chief  men the right to take such action as might secuye 
the purposes for which the ruler had been elected or recognised. 
It is from this  standpoint that me  must  again  consider  the 
principles of government which are presented by the historians 
of the great revolt against Henry IV.  We have already dealt 
with some passages from their writings in considering the theory 
of the relation of  authority to justice, but we must look again 
at some of  these, and consider them from the standpoint of 
their constitutional theory. 
According  to the account of  Lambert of  Hersfeld, the de- 
mands of  the Saxons and Thwringians in 1073 were, first, that 
Henry  IV.  should  do  justice  to  the  Saxon  princes,  whose 
possessions, as they said, he had seized without judicial process, 
in accordance with the judgment of  the princes of  the kingdom ; 
secondly, that he should dismiss from his court the low-born 
persons  by whose  advice he had been governing, and should 
entrust the administration of  the affairs of  the kingdom to the 
princes of  the  kingdom, to  whom the charge properly belonged ; 
and thirdly,  that  he  should  put  awa~y  his  concubines  and 
abandon  the vicious  habits  which  had  disgraced  the royal 
dignity.  If  he would  do these things they were prepared to 
serve him, but only as became free men in a free 0mpire.l 
l  Lambert  of  Hersfold,  '  Annales,'  reginam, quam sibi secundum ecclesias- 
1073 (p. 196): "Ut principibus Saxonire,  ticas traditiones thori  sociam regnique 
quibus  sine  legitima  discussion0  bona  consortem  delegisset,  coniugnli  loco 
sua  ademerat,  secundum  principum  liaberet  et diligeret ;  ut  cetera  flagi- 
suorum  iurisdictionem  satisfaceret.  tiorum  probra,  quibus  dignitatem 
. . . Ut  vilissimos  homines,  quorum  regiam  adolescens  infamaverat,  nunc 
consilio  seque  remque  publicam  prre-  saltem maturato sensu et aetato abdi- 
cipitem dcdisset, de palatio eicerct, et  caret.  Postrcmo  per  Deum  rogant  U* 
regni negocia regni principibus, quibus  iusta  postulantibus  sponte  annueret, 
competerent, curanda atque adminis-  ncc  sibi magni  cuiusdam  atque  inusi- 
tranda permitteret : ut abdicato grege  tati  facinoris  nccessitatem  imponerot. 
concubinarum, quibus contra scita cano-  Si itn faceret, se  promptissirno animo 
rum  attrito  frontis rubore  incubabat,  ei  sicut  actenus  servituros,  eo  tamon 156  POLITICAL  THEORY : 11TH  &  12~~  CENTURIES.  [PART  11. 
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AS we have already said, we are not discussing the question 
of  the real nature of  the causes which lay behind the revolt of 
the Saxons, and we think that the sentiments or motives attrib- 
uted by Lambert and the other historians to the revolters must 
often be taken rather as those of  the writers than of  those into 
whose mouths they are put.  We are concerned with the theory 
which  the great  conflicts  brought  out rather than with  the 
conflicts themselves, and the passage just cited represents two 
constitutional principles of  great importance.  First, that the 
king has no arbitrary power, but that there is a legal authority 
in the State to which  he  and all  others must  submit ; and 
secondly,  that the great  affairs  of  the State are not to be 
administered  by  him  at his  capricious  pleasure,  but  only 
through those who have a constitutional right to be consulted. 
The principles which  are thus expressed in relation to the 
beginning of  the great revolt are constantly repeated  during 
the conflicts which followed.  Lambert represents even those 
who  belonged  in a  measure  to the royal party as admitting 
their validity.  In the speech which he attributes to Berthold, 
formerly Duke  of  Carinthia,  Berthold  admits  the justice  of 
the complaints of  the revolters, but begs them to consider the 
reverence which is due to the royal majesty,  and urges that 
they should lay aside their arms and agree upon a meeting to 
which  the  king  should  summon  the  princes  of  the  whole 
kingdom, at  which he might clear himself, before the common 
judgment,  of  the charges  made  against  him,  and might  set 
right whatever should need c0rrection.l 
modo,  quo lngenuos honlines atque m 
libero imperio natos regi  servire oper- 
teret , s~n  autem, christianos  se  esse, 
nec  velle  hominis,  qui  fidem  chrlsti- 
anam  capltal~bus  flagitiis  prodidlsset, 
commumone  macularl.  . . .  Sacra- 
mento  se  el  fidem  d~xissc,  sod  si  ad 
aedificatlonem,  non  ad  destructioncm 
ecclesiae  Del,  rex  esqe  vellet,  81  luite, 
81  legitime,  si  more  malorum  rebus 
moderaretur, sl suum cuique  ordlnem, 
sunm  dignitatem,  suas leges  tutas in 
violatasque manere pateretur  Sin lsta 
prlor  lpse  temeraesset  se  lam  sacra- 
menti  hulus  religione  non  tenen,  sed 
quasi cum barbaro  hoste  et christlani 
nominis  oppressore  iustum  deinceps 
bellum  gesturos,  et  quoad  ultlma 
v~talis  caloris  scintilla  supereaset,  pro 
ecclesla  Del,  pro  fide  christ~ana,  pro 
hbertate etiam sua dimicaturos " 
1 Lambert  of  Hersfeld,  '  Annales,' 
1073 (p.  197)  "Iustam  eorum  esse 
causam, quos summls szpe ~niuriis  reps 
inrlementla ad hiec extrema experlendu 
ccegisset,  honori  tamen  suo  magls 
consulendum  quam  iracundiae,  et de- 
ferendum  regiae  malestati,  qure  apud 
It was indeed this constitutional conception, that the king 
was  in  the end responsible  to the judgment  of  the princes 
of  the kingdom,  which  was  maintamed throughout the long 
struggle between  Henry IV. and those who  revolted  against 
his  authority.  They maintained  steadily that it was for the 
council of  tlle princes of  the kingdom to  decide upon the justice 
or injustice of  the charges brought against Henry, and that it 
was in their power, for sufficient reasons, to declare the throne 
vacant.  Lambert represents  Rudolf  of  Suabia as refusing in 
1073, at the meeting between the Saxon princes and those of 
the royal  party  at Gerstengen,  to be  made  king,  until the 
matter had been  considered  by  a  council of  all the princes, 
and it  had  been  decided  that this  could  be  done  without 
involving them in the guilt of  perjury.l 
It is true that when once the great dispute between Henry IV. 
and Gregory VII. had developed, and when in 1076 Gregory 
had formally excommunicated Henry, the revolters, as reported 
by Lambert, eagerly seized upon this new  circumstance, and 
proposed to refer the charges against Henry to the Pope, who 
was  to be invited to attend a  council of  all the princes  at 
Augsburg, and, when all parties had been heard, to pronounce 
judgment  upon them.  They also decided that if  Henry was 
not released  from his  escommunication  within  a  year,  they 
would no longer recognise him as king.2 
barbaros  etiam  nationes  tuta  mvlo-  nisi 1110  pertinaclter resistendo iuraret, 
lataque  fuisset ,  prolnde  remisso  numquam  se in hoc  consensurum, n~sl 
armorum  strep~tu, pacatis  ammis,  a  cunctls prlncip~bus  conventu habito, 
sopitis simultatibus, tempus locumque  slne nota penurii, lntegra existimatione 
constituerent,  quo  rex  toclus  regni  sua, id facere posse decerneretur." 
prlnclpes evocarct, et  iuxta communem  Lambert  of  Hersfeld,  '  Annales,' 
sontentlam  et  oblocta  purga~et et  1076 (p. 254) . "  se tamen rem Intogram 
quao  correctionis egcre  v~derentur  col-  Romnl pont~ficis  cogn~t~one  reservaro , 
ngeret."  acturos se  cum eo,  ut in punficatione 
'  Lambert  of  Hersfeld,  'Annales,'  sancta?  Mai~ae  Augustam  occurrat, 
1073 (p 203) .  "  Cumque  toto triduo  ~biqne celoberrimo  conventu  babito 
consilia contulissent, et quid facto opus  principum  toclus  regni,  discussis 
esset  communi  soll~citudine perqulre-  utrarumque  pait~uln allegat~on~bus, 
rent,  1182~ postremo  cunctls  sententla  ipse suo iudiclo vel addlcnt vel absolvat 
convelllt, ut, reprobato rege, alium qu~  accusatum , quod  si ante diem  anni- 
bqbernando idoneus esset ellgerent  .  versarlum excommu~ncationis  8U=,  8110 
Et profecto Ruodolfum  ducom   bidc cm  pra: crtirn vi~~o,  ex~ommunicatione  non 
absque dllatatlone regem constituisaent,  ~b6olvatur, absque  r~lrsrtatione In 158  POLITICAL  THEORY  : 11~~  &  12T~  CENTURIES.  [PART  11. 
In our next volume  we  shall have  to examine the whole 
question of  the pririciples  of  the papal intervention, here we 
need  only observe that it greatly  strengthened the hands of 
those who were already in revolt against Henry.  The revolters 
would evidently have been glad to put the whole responsibility 
of  Henry's deposition upon the Pope, and indeed at  the council 
of  Forchheim in 1077, as Berthold of  Constance reports it, they 
at first assumed that the Pope had finally deposed him, but the 
Pope's legates seem to  have made it  clear that this was not so- 
presumably on account of Henry's absolution at  Canossa early 
in the same year-and  intimated that it was for the council tb 
judge  and to determine upon their action.  It  was the princes 
therefore  who declared him to be deposed, and elected Rudolf of 
8uabia.l  It soon, however, became clear that there was still a 
strong party which supported Henry, and Berthold represents 
the chief men of  both parties as agreeing later in the same year 
that the principal men of the kingdom should meet, and along 
with the legates of  tlie Pope should consider  what should be 
done, and as determining that they would by common consent 
repudiate whichever of  the kings should refuse to accept their 
judgment, and would acknowledge and obey the other.2 
perpetuum causa  cecldent, nec leg~bus 
dt~nceps  regnum  topetere  poss~t,  quod 
leglbus  ultra  admin~stmre, annuam 
passus  excommun~cationem,  non 
posslt " 
Berthold  of  Constance,  '  Annales,' 
1077  (p.  291)  " 1)enlquo  in  Id~bus 
prad~ctls,  ut dellberaturn est, ex magna 
parte  opt~mates regnl  convenerunt 
Ihique hab~to  colloqu~o,  perquam mult~s 
~nlust~t~arum  et lnlurlarum  calam~to- 
slss~mls proclamat~or~~bus  et  querl 
monns,  quas  s~bl  et totlus regnl  prl- 
rnat~bus  et  a.ccleslls  inlatas  haberet, 
regem accusabant , et qnla papa, ne ut 
re61 obced~rent  aut servirent,  ipsis tam 
~nte~d~xer~t,  regnl dlgn~tate  pnvabant, 
ncque regls  saltern nomlne  dlgnum  ob 
lnaud~ta  lps~us  mlllefar~a  flagitla adlua~ 
cabant,  set alium s~bl  pro 1110  el~ge~e 
et const~tuerc  unanlm~ter  destlnabant 
Legati  autem  sed~s  apostollcie  audlto 
1111c tarn sacrllego  homlne,  non parum 
qu~dem mnatl  sunt,  quod  tamdlu 
lllum  super  se  sustlnuerunt  Verum 
tamen ld quod lnlunctum erat CIS,  non 
ret~cebant, quln  potlus  In  aud~entlrt 
cunctorum  propalabant  sua legatlolns 
communltonum,  ut  si  quollbet  SUE 
caut~onls artlhclo  possct  fier~, lsto 
adhuc  allquamdlu  qualltercumquo 
sustentato,  allum  s~bl  regem  nequa 
quam  const~toeront  ,  alloquln  117  I, 
qula  multo  mellus  sua?  nccess~tatls 
expertiim  non  ignorarent  per~culum, 
quodcumque s~b~  opt~mum  prie catc~~s 
ludlcarent, apostollco non contrad~cente 
peragerent." 
Bcrthold of  Constance, '  ilmnales,' 
1077  (p.  300) .  "  Quatinus  malorcs 
totlus  regnl  omnes  post  paululum 
przter  ambos  regcs  ad  colloqu~um 
iuxta  Renum  conven~rent,  et ~b~dem 
cum  legatis  s~mul  apoatollcls  mstls- 
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We hlld another very significant assertion of  this principle, 
that there was in the corninunity an authority which could sit in 
judgment even upon the supreme ruler and upon his actions, in 
the last stages of  Henry IV.'s tragic reign.  In  his despair, when 
he had been  overwhelmed by the union of  his son Henry V. 
with his opponents, he wrote, as is reported by Ekkehard, to 
the bishops and princes of  Germany appealing to them against 
his son's conduct towards him.  They replied inviting liim to 
lay his case before the princes and the people, that he might 
receive and render justice,  and that by tlie due consideration 
and just settlement of  all the causes of  discord, the Church and 
the kingdom might be restored to security.l 
The claim was indeed far-reaching, and if  it  stood alone might 
hardly deserve serious consideration, but as a matter of  fact it 
is only a clear statement of  the theory which was represented 
throughout the reign of  Henry IV.  And it did not disappear 
with his death.  We find a close parallel to it some years later 
in  a  document  which  belongs  to the last  stages  of  the in- 
vestiture  controversy,  to the year  before  the  settlement  of 
Worms.  This is a statement of  the conclusions arrived at  in 
a  council  of  the  princes  held  at Wuraburg  in  1121.  The 
emperor is to render  obedience  to the apostolic  see,  and to 
make  peace with  the Pope  by  the  advice  and help  of  the 
princes, under such condit~ons  that the emperor shall have that 
which belongs to him, and the churches also shall possess their 
own in peace and quiet.  The princes propose to devise a settle- 
ment of  the dispute concerning investitures.  If  the emperor 
slmo  lat~on~s  ludlcla~lie  examlne, 
qu~d  optimum,  qu~clve ~ust~sslmum 
super  tarn  gran& causa  foret,  d~mdl- 
candum  dehberarent ,  et  alterutrl 
regum  qu~  d~ffin~tionlbus  illorum  non 
oonsentlret  despecto,  communl  voto 
contralrent , alter1 tandem consentaneo 
tota  fidolitatc  et sub~octlone,  ut  regl 
Oportet obrndlentlss~rne  serv~rent  " 
Ekkehard Uraug~ensls,  ' Chronlcon 
Unlversale,'  A D.  llOG : " Quapropter 
placet  tam  rogl  quam unlversls  regnl 
Pnnclp~hus, lmmo  ~uncto  exercltul 
orthodoxo,  quo  sonlor  Idem,  ne  ulla 
s~b~  patoat advcrsus nos lusta querela, 
quacunque rlcyrrlt secuntate, quacun 
que maluer~t  stat~one,  coram  przsenti 
senatu s~mul  et populo,  causam  suam 
agat, lustlciam  susclp~at,  lust~ciani  et 
reddat,  quat~nus  ab  ortu  sclsmatls 
omnibus sedit~oms  causls, acsl nll tnde 
fuerlt dlffin~tum,  undique d~scussls,  tam 
6110 quam pat11 sun lustlc~a  rospondeat, 
secclcs~a  vero regnlquo status, non  ut 
lpse moro suo propon~t  post longas In- 
duuas, sod ~nprcsont~arum,  111s  contro- 
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under  any advice  or influence should  take hostile  measures 
against any one on account of  this, the princes,  acting under 
his own authority and consent, determine that they will  act 
together and admonish him not to do this, and, if he should 
neglect their advice, the princes will abide by the faith which 
they have pledged to each 0ther.l 
It is no doi~bt  difficult to measure precisely the reality and 
value of  principles which are put forward in periods of  violent 
controversy and civil war.  But in this case we  can recognise 
with confidence that the principle that the ruler is not an arbi- 
trary or irresponsible master of  the State, but must govern in 
accordance  with  the counsel  and judgment  of  others  whose 
duty it is to see that justice is done to the whole community, 
was firmly held apart from the mere passion of  revolt, and that 
the stress and pressure of  civil conflict only brought out into 
clearer view conceptions which had always been  present and 
powerful. 
It  is  then  from  this  standpoint  that we  can  profitably 
examine the political theory of  Manegold of  Lautenbach, by 
whom the conception of  the limitations and conditions of the 
royal  authority was  most  clearly  and sharply  set  out.  In 
order to deal adequately with his position  we must not con- 
sider  only  a  few  isolated  phrases,  but  must  endeavour  to 
make clear to ourselves the logical structure of  his theory. 
1 M.  G. H,  Leg, Sect. IV., Const., 
vol. I.  106 : "  Hoc est cons~l~um  In quod 
convenerunt  prlnclpos  de cont~oversla 
Inter domnum mperatorem  et regnum. 
Domnus  lnporator  apostollcre  sedl 
obedlat.  Et de calumpnla quam adver- 
sus eum  habet ecclesla, ex  concll~o  et 
auxlllo pr~nc~pum  Inter lpsum et dom- 
num papam componatur, et s~t  firma et 
stabllls pax, ita quod clomnus Inperator 
que  sua  et  que  regnl  sunt  habeat, 
ecclesle et unusqusque  sua  qmeto  et 
pac~lice  possldeant  . . . Hoc  etlam, 
quod ecclesla adversus lnpeiatorem  et 
regnum de investlturls causatur,  prln- 
olpes  sme  do10  et  slne  slmulatione 
elaborare mtendunt, ut In lloc regnum 
honorem suum retmeat.  . . . Et sl In 
posterum  domnus  Imperator  co1151110 
vel suggestlone alicu~us  ullam In quem- 
quam  vlnd~ctam pro  hac  ~n~mlcltlh 
exsuscltaver~t, consensu  et  llcentla 
lpslus lioc Inter se prlnclpes confirment 
ut  ips~  lnslmul  permaneant  et  cum 
omnl cantate et reverentla,  ne allqmd 
horum facere vellt,  eum commoneant. 
S1  autem  domnus  imperator  h00 
consll~um preter~er~t,  prl~lclpos slcut 
ad  lnvieem  fidem  clederunt,  ~ta  earn 
observent " 
Cf. p.  66. 
~t would be to fall into a complete and deplorable confusion 
if we were to think that Manegold denied or doubted the sanc- 
tity and the divine authority of  secular government.  On the 
contrary,  as we  have already  pointed  out,l if  he  attacks its 
abuse, it  is in the name of the greatness and the august nature 
of  the office of  the king.  The royal office, he says, excels all 
other  earthly  authorities, and therefore the man who  is  to 
administer it should excel all other men in wisdom, justice, and 
piety, for he who is to have the care of all, to govern all, should 
be adorned with greater virtue than others, that he may be able 
to  exercise  the  powers  entrusted  to  him  with  the  highest 
eq~ity.~  Again,  in defending  the right  of  the opponents  of 
Henry IV. to use violence in resisting him, he urges with great 
force that the authority of  the State in punishing transgressors 
is a part of the divine order.3  He does not doubt the truth of 
the words of St  Peter, "Be subject to  the king as supreme," and 
"  Fear God, and honour the king," but only argues that they 
have been misapplied, for the title of  king is a description not 
of a personal quality, but of  an office, and obedience is due to 
the office, not to  a man who has been deposed from it.4 Wenrich 
l See p.  103, 111. 
Manegold, ' Ad Gebehardum,' xxx.. 
"  Regahs ergo dlgnltas et potent~a  slcut 
omnes mundanas excell~t  potestates, SIC 
ad earn minlstrandam non  flag~tloslss~. 
mus  qulsque vel  turplsslmus  est con- 
atltuendus, sed qul slcut loco et dlgnl- 
tate, lta n~chllon~mus  ceteros sapientla, 
lustleln superet et p~etate. Necesse est 
ergo, qu~  ommum curam gerere, omnes 
debet gubernare, malore grat~avlrtutum 
supor ceteros debeat splendere, tradltam 
81b1 potestatem  summo equltatis hbra- 
mlne studeat admlnlstrare." 
a  Id., xxxvm. : "  Unde martyr sanc- 
tlsslmus et egreglus pontlfex Cypmanus 
ln nono  abus~onum  gradu Inter  multa 
dlstr~ct~onls  et  dlsc~pllnre mlnlsteria 
lustlclam  regls  assent  esse  lmplos  do 
term eradere, parricidas et perlurantes 
non slnere vlvere. . . . 
Id.,  xxxrx :  "  Unde  sanctlsslmus 
Papa  Innocentlus  In  decretls suls cap 
VOL.  111. 
xxi~ hos,  per  quorum  mlnlsterlum 
cathollc~  prlnclpes  et praves  punlunt 
et  p~os  defendunt,  a  reatu  lmmunes 
0stendlt dleens :  '  Qucs~tum  est supor 
hls etlam qul post baptlsmum admlnla- 
traverunt  aut  tormenta  sola  exercu. 
erunt  aut  etlam capitalem  protulerlnt 
sententlnm.  De  h~s  mch~l  leg~mus  a 
ma~orlbus  dlfin~tum. Memmerant enlm 
a Deo potestates has csse concessas et 
propter  vlndlctam  noxiorum  gladlum 
fulsse permlssum  et  Del  rnlnlsterlum 
esse  In  hulusmodl  datum  vmd~cem. 
Quemaclmodum  lg~tur reprenderent 
factum,  quod  auctore  Deo  vldorent 
esse concessum 7 ' " 
'  Id, ~1111.  .  "  In eo  namque  quod 
cllc~tur  '  Subdlt~ estote  regl  quasl 
przcellent~  ' et : '  Deum tlmeta, regern 
hononficate ' et . '  Subd~ti  estote  clo- 
mlnls  non  tantum  boms  et  modes- 
t~,'  multum  sib~  aplaudunt  slblque 
tltulos vlctonrt! ascnbunt,  non  lntelle- 
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of  Trier had urged against Hildebrand  that Ebbo the Arch- 
bishop of  Rheims had been deprived of  his see for taking part 
in the deposition of  Louis the Plous, in the ninth century, and 
Manegold  admits  that this  was  lust, because  it  was  done 
without  due process  and for unjust reas0ns.l 
Manegold, that is, recognises fully and explicitly the august 
and sacred nature of  political  authority and its function in 
maintaining justice  and equity.  But, on the other hand, he 
refuses to admit that this means that the authority of  the ruler 
is absolute, or that he is irresponsible and irremovable,  and 
with  characteristic  boldness  he  attacks the tradition  of  the 
absolute divine right of  the ruler in its most  august  source. 
Wenrich  of  Trier had,  as we  have already  seen,2 urged  the 
words and the example of  Gregory the Great as showing that 
even the popes, and even in matters which concerned religion, 
had felt themselves bound to obey the commands of  the em- 
peror even when they thought them wrong.  Manegold meets 
this first by suggesting that the words of  Gregory are susceptible 
of  another interpretation ; but he does not hesitate to maintain 
that if  indeed Gregory meant what was thought, and acted as 
he was understood to have done, his words and actions were 
wrong  and must be rep~diated.~  Manegold  was  clearly  pre- 
gentes  neque  que  locuntur  neque  de 
quibus affirmant  Rex enlm non nomen 
est nature, sed officii, sicut episcopus, 
presbyter,  dlaconus  Et cum  qullibet 
horum  certis  ex  causls  de  coinmlsso 
sibi oficio deponltur, non est quod ernt, 
nec  honor  offic~o dobitus  postea  est 
mpendendus  Q~11squi9  ergo  arnlssae 
dignltatis postmodum sibi reverentlam 
inpendit,  pot~us preval~cator quam 
legum servator exist~t  , quamquam  et 
sl  in  lpso  lnper~o  quod  s~t  contra 
Dommum  inperant,  nullatenus  s~t 
obedlendum,  sed omnl  llbertate resls 
tendum  Ergo  neqtiaquom  contra 
apostol~  prc~cptum  faclunt  qui  vestro 
Heinrico  a  regal1  d~gnltate  depos~to 
nunc reslstunt " 
1 Id, xl~v  "Non  enlm  negamus 
Ebonem  iuvte  depositum,  qui  contra 
imperatorem  catholicum  conspiravit 
eumque  nu110  ludiclario  conventu 
discussum, nulla vocatlorle expectatum, 
non confessum, non convictum p~emns 
corruptus  deiecit  et Lothanum  filium 
o1u5  rcguo s~iblimare  contend~t  " 
Cf  Wenrici,  Scolastlcl  Treverensls 
Epistola,  4  I 
See pp  119, 120 
a  Id,  xlv  "  Proferunt  namqae 
boat1 Gregorii exemplum,  si tamen est 
vezum, quo vidcl~cet  ast~ueic  conantu~, 
non  mod0  quoslibet  epircopos,  sod 
lpsum  summum  pontificem  reg~bus 
obedlcnti~  deblto  ac  necess~tate  esse 
obstrlctum, et ex hulus  deb~tl  necessi- 
tate ad ea constr~ngi  agonda  quae  lpse 
non amb~geret  Deo contrana et ideo ex 
mentls ludltio reprobanda  Qud  ig~tur 
huic  assertion1  nefandius,  quld  potest 
*%red to refuse to accept any authority however august which 
would impose the yoke  of  an unlimited  obedience upon the 
subject. 
It  is with the same courage that lie deals with the question of 
the binding nature of  the oath of  allegiance.  Wenrich had made 
a vigorous attack upon the action of  Hildebrand in absolving 
the subjects of Henry IT. from their oath of  a1legiance.l  Mane- 
gold answers him not so much by urging the papal authority in 
this matter as by examining the nature of  such an oath and the 
conditions of  its obligation.  This, he says, is the superiority of 
human nature to that of  the animal, that in virtue of  the power 
of  reason it examines the causes of  things, and considers not 
merely what should be done, but why it should be done.  No 
man can make himself king or emperor, and the people elect a 
man to this position in order that he may protect the good and 
destroy the wicked, and administer justice to every man.  If  he 
esse scelestlus, contra voluntatem vide- 
licet  domnlicam  cuiquam  hominum 
obedientlam  ex  debit1 necess~tate  In 
pendendam  7  Hinc ipse princeps apos 
tolorum nos instrnit dicens  ' Obedire 
oportet  Deo  magis  quam  llom~nibus  ' 
Et  supra . 'S1 ~ustum  est In conspectu 
Del  vos  potius  audire  quam  Deum, 
iudicate '  Proponunt  enim  ' Ego,' 
~nquxd Gregorius,  '  lussioni  subdltus 
eandem  legem  per  diversas  terrarum 
partes  feci  transmit61 ,  usque  utro 
blque  ergo  quod  debu~  exsolvl,  qui 
et lmperatori  obedientlam  prebui  et 
pro  Deo  quod  sensi  minime  tacui ' 
Multi  sunt  enlm  locutionum   mod^, 
multa  et genera,  qu~bus  pro  divcrsi 
tat9  causarum  et  personarum  non 
solum  sanctorum  sermones,  sed  et 
communes  et  vulgares  dispensantur 
locutiones.  Sanctl enim, qula homines 
ease  se  meminerant,  mod0  humano 
suas  locutiones  formabant.  Solent 
mm  hommcs ita loqui vel cognatis v01 
amlcis  vel  certe  extranels  '  Implev~ 
quad  imperastl '  et.  '  Quodcumque 
lusseils  ut servus  tuus  ~mplebo  '  et 
'  Nullus  tuus propiius libentius obedit 
voluntati  tuae'  . . . Secundum  hunc 
tgltur  locutionis  modum  beatus  Gre 
gonus  obedlentiam  se  dic~t  debero et 
non ex allcuius dcbit~  necessitate  . . . 
Cum ~gtur  hatc ita esse certa compre- 
hendantur  ratione,  certe  tamen,  81 
Gregorlus  al~qua  temporis  vel  cau- 
sarum  d~sponsatoria  ratlone  funestam 
legem ad omnium noticiam non distulit 
insinuare  fecitque  transmittere,  certe, 
Inquam,  hoc  facto sedem  beato  Petr~ 
divinitus concesso nequaquam privavit 
prir llegio.  At  si  sanctissimus  1110, 
corpore  quod  corrumpltur  animam 
aggravante,  aliquid  ut  homo,  quod 
cum  gratia  ipsius  dicam,  excessit, 
nullatenus  in  hoc  al~quem suorum 
successorum  ad su~  lmitationem  con- 
stringit,  quia  nec  Petrus  pnnccps 
utique apostolorum In hoc se imitandum 
docult,  quod  gentes  iudaizare  coegit, 
nec  Cypr~anus, quia  Donat~stas re- 
baptizandos censuit, rebaptizandi noble 
necesritatem  imposuit  Neque  sanc- 
torum  excessus  ad  imitandum  sunt 
conscr~pti, sed  potius,  ut  caveantur, 
denotnti sunt " 
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violates the agreement under which he was  elected, and dig. 
turbs and confounds that which  he was  to set in order, the 
people is justly  and reasonably  absolved from its obedience, 
since he has broken  that faith which  bound him  and them 
together.  The people never binds itself by an oath to obey a 
ruler who is possessed by fury and madness.l 
There are, Manegold points out, two cases which have to be 
considered, that of  the man who takes a just  and reasonable 
oath to the king, and that of  him who  takes an unjust and 
unreasonable oath, and he examines the two cases separately. 
He who takes a just  and reasonable oath to the king swears 
that he will be his  companion and helper in maintaining the 
government of  the kingdom, in preserving justice  and estab- 
lishing  peace,  and this  oath is binding  so  long  as the king 
demands his help in doing those things which he has sworn to 
do.  But if  the king ceases to govern the kingdom, and begins 
to act as a tyrant, to destroy justice, to overthrow peace, and 
to break his faith, the man who has taken the oath is free from 
it, and the people is entitled to depose the king and to set up 
another, inasmuch as he has broken the principle upon which 
their mutual obligation depended.  This, Manegold maintains, 
is what the German princes had done ; they had perhaps sworn 
allegiance rashly when Henry IV. was too young to understand 
the nature of  an oath, but they had striven to keep their oath, 
until he threw aside his  obedience  to the apostolic  see, and 
forced them to apostatise from the Christian religion.  When 
for this  crime  the  Synod  of  Rome  had  deposed  him,  and 
1 Manegold,  '  Ad  Gebehardum,' 
xlvn. :  "In hoc namque natura humana 
ceterls  prestat  an~mantlbus, quod 
capax rationis  ad agenda  queque  non 
fortultis cas~bus  proru~t,  causas rerum 
iud~tio  rat~orns  mquirit  ncc  tantum, 
qu~d  agatur,  eed  cur  aliquld  agatur 
mtendlt.  Cum  enim nullus sc inpera- 
torem  vel regem  creare poss~t,  ad hoc 
unum aliqucm super se populus exaltat, 
,  ut iust~  ratlone  Inpcrn se  gubernet  et 
regat,  cuique  sua  d~str~buat,  p~os 
foveat, lnpios penmat,  omnibus  v~de- 
hcet  lustlciam  inpendat.  At  vero  si 
quando pactum, quo cllgltur, lnfringlt, 
ad ea d~starbauda  et confundenda, que 
corrigcre const~tutus  est, eruperit, ~uste 
rat~on~s  conslderat~one populum  sub- 
lect~onls  deb~to  absolv~t,  qulppe  cum 
fidem  prior  ipse  deserucrit,  que  alter- 
utrum altero fidclitate colligavlt  HUC 
accedit,  quod  populus  nequaquam  IU- 
ramento  ad  hoc  se  culqunm  obligat, 
ut  ad quoficumque  furont~s  anlmi  In- 
potus  obediat,  aut, quo lllum furor et 
lnsanla  prec~pitat, dlum  necess~tudo 
sublect~on~s  sequi compellat." 
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deprived  him  of  the royal  dignity,  the Christian  people  no 
longer owed him  any reverence.  It was the proper function 
of  the apostolic  see to reassure  the people,  which  was  con- 
cerned  and anxious about the obligation  of  the oath it had 
taken, and it is therefore clear that it justly  loosed the oath 
which was certainly and manifestly null and void, and publicly 
annulled that which was inherently inva1id.l 
The discussion of  the second case, that of  the man who has 
sworn  to do  something  in  itself  evil  and unjust,  does  not 
demand any detailed consideration.  Manegold urges, and sup- 
ports  his  contention with  a  number  of  patristic  quotations, 
that such oaths are obviously from the outset null and void.2 
It should be observed that Manegold's treatment of  the real 
nature of the authority which was exercised, when a man was 
absolved from the obligation of  an oath, was not in any way 
peculiar  or eccentric,  but represents what was  probably the 
1 Id, x1v11 :  "  Aut  enim  qulsque 
juste et qua fierl debet ratlone reg~bus 
et princlplbus iurat, aut lnluste et qua 
fier~ non  debet  ratlone  Scquamur 
utraque et, qua sorvanda sunt ratlone, 
vldeamus. 
xlvill . Ut enlm  ab adversarns in- 
ducto  utamur  exemplo, SI, ut Augus 
tlnus d~ffin~t,  per Deum est iurare Deo 
ms reddere, 1110,  qu~  iuste et qua fierl 
debet  ratlone  reg~bus  vel  prlnclp~bus 
lulat, hoc sacrament0 confirmat, ut ad 
regni  gubernacula  tuenda,  lustic~am 
servandam,  pacem  stablllendam  indl- 
v~duus  et inremotus comes et adlutor 
existat  Hoc  uamque  sacramentum 
luranteln tam diu deblt~  necess~tate  ob- 
str~ng~t,  quam  dlu is  CUI  luratum  est 
ad lurata facienda  iurantom popos~~t. 
At  vero, SI 1110  non regnum gubernare, 
sed  regni  occaslone  tyrannidem  exer- 
cere,  iustir~am  destruere,  pacem  con- 
fundere,  iidem  deserere  exarsent,  ad- 
luratus luramentl necessitate absolutus 
ex~st~t,  liberumque  est  populo  illum 
deponere, alterum  elevarc,  quem  con 
stat  alterutre  obllgationis  rationem 
Pnus  deserulsse  SIC,  mquam,  sic 
Pnncipes nostri,  quamvls vestro Hem- 
rloo  minus  caute,  parum  considerate 
~urassent, adhuc  utpote  parvulo  ac 
necdum  fide~ sacramentls  ~niciato, 
tamer1 sacrament] consideratlone omni 
reverent~a studebant  obedlre,  donec 
lllos,  apostol~cam  ablurando  obedlen- 
tiam, idolatr~am  cogebat exercere et a 
crist~ana  religione apostatare.  '  Quasi,' 
~nqu~d  Samuel, '  peccatum arioland~  eat 
repugnare et quasl scelus idolatr~e  nolle 
acquiescere.'  Super  quo ~g~tur  scelere 
postquam huuc Romana 5inodus iusta, 
ut  supra  prolat~un est,  ratione  de- 
posu~t,  regla  dlgn~tate  prlvavit,  nulla 
regle potestntis reverentia  a chnstiano 
populo  fu~t  oxh~benda  Pertinult 
igitur  ad  apostol~ci  officlum  populum 
de  his  securum reddere,  quem  de ex- 
h~bltis sacrament18  vidlt  solhcitum 
estuare.  Constat  ergo  illum  iuste 
sacramenta solvlsse, que omn~bus  fide11- 
bus  et  rationall  lntellectu  nltent~bus 
certum  et manifestum  est  nulla  cxis- 
tere.  Implcv~t  igitur  officlum  suum, 
fecit  quod  erat  apostol~cum,  dum  ea 
quae  lntus  soluta  cognov~t  form  dls- 
c~ndere  non dlstullt." 
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normal conception of  the can0nists.l  We are not here dealing 
with the claim of  the ecclesiastical or papal authority to have 
tile power  of  deposing kings ; with that we propose to deal 
in the next volume,  and we  shall then have CO  consider the 
treatment of  this subject by Manegold.  In the meanwhile we 
must observe that his  contention that the oath of  allegiance 
is not binding to the king who abuses his authority is really 
independent of this.  In his opinion the Pope merely declares 
that obligation annulled which is already null and void. 
We can now approach the consideration of that well-known 
passage in which Manegold sets out his theory of the nature of 
political authority and obligation in the sharpest and clearest 
terms.  We have already indeed cited the first words of  the 
passage, the words in which he expresses his judgment of  the 
greatness and dignity of  the royal office, and of  its high moral 
function in maintaining ju~tice.~  The royal dignity excels all 
earthly authority, and he who is to hold it, who is to have the 
care and government of  all, should be superior to all in virtue, 
that he may exercise this power with the highest equity.  So 
far we have already followed Manegold's  argument, but sud- 
denly he turns to the other side of the principle.  The people 
does not exalt  him in order that he should act as a tyrant 
towards them, but in order that he should defend them from 
the wickedness  and tyranny of  others.  If  he, who has been 
elected to put down the wicked and to defend the good, turns 
to wickedness,  oppresses  the good,  and plays  the part of  s 
tyrant over his subjects, it is clear that he justly falls from the 
office which was conferred upon him, and that the people are 
free from his dominion and from their subjection, inasmuch as 
he has violated that agreement (pactum) in virtue of  which he 
was appointed.  The people cannot in such a case be accused 
of  a breach of  faith, for it 1s he who has first broken faith. 
And then Manegold, with characteristic audacity, reinforces 
this principle by a comparison from humble life.  If a man has 
given his swine for a suitable wage into the charge of  a swine- 
herd, who, in place of keeping them safe, steals, slays, or loses 
1 Cf.  vol. 11. pp.  202, 203.  Cf. p.  I12 and p.  161. 
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them, he will refuse to pay the wage, and will disniiss him from 
his service.  If this is just in such humble matters, how much 
more is it clear and just that the man to whom the rule of  men 
has been committed, and who uses his power not for the true 
government of  men,  but to lead them into error,  should be 
deprived  of  all power  and dignity.  This principle  is surely 
right in Christian times, for even the Romans drove out Tarquin 
for the outrage which his son had committed against Lucretia. 
It  is one thing to reign, it is another to act like a tyrant, and, 
while  men  should  render  faith and reverence  to kings  and 
emperors in order  to maintain  the true government  of  the 
kingdom, yet, if they play the tyrant, then they deserve neither 
faith nor rever(3nce.l 
1 Manegold,  '  Ad  Gebehardum,' 
xxx.  "  Regnlis  ergo  digmtas  et 
potentia slcut omnes mundanns excellit 
potestates,  sic  ad  eam  ministrandam 
non  flagit~osissimus qu~sque  vel  tur 
pissimus  est  constituendus,  sed  qui 
sicut loco et dignitate, ita nichilommus 
ceteros  sapientia,  iust~cia  superet  et 
pietate  Necesse est ergo, qni omnium 
curam gerere, omnes debct gubernare, 
maiore  gratla  vlrtutum  super  ceteros 
deheat  splendere, traditam  sibi pot~s- 
tatem  summo  equitatis  libramine 
studeat  admlnlstrare.  Neque  enlm 
populus ldeo eum super  se exaltat, ut 
liberam  in  se  exercendac  tyranmdis 
facultatem concedat, sed ut a tyrannido 
ceterorum et improbltate defondat  At 
qul cum 1110,  qui pro coercendis pravis, 
probis defendendis cligltur, pravitatem 
In  se fovere, bonos contorere, tyranni- 
dem, quam debuit propnlsnre, In  sub- 
iectos ceperit lpse crudelissime excrcere, 
nonne clarum cst, morito illum a con- 
cessa dignitate cadere, ~opulum  ab eius 
dominio et suhiectione liberum ox~stere, 
cum  pactum, pro  quo constitutus est, 
constet illum prius ilrupisse ?  Nec 1110s 
qulsquarn poter~t  lush3 ac rationablliter 
perfid~a: arguere,  cum  nichllommnus 
constet  lllum  fidem  prlus  dcserulese. 
Ut enim de rebus vilioribus oxemplum 
trahamus, si quis alicui digna mercede 
porcos  suos  pascendos  committeret, 
ipsumque  postmodo  eos  non  pascere, 
sed furan, mactaro et perdero cognos- 
ceret,  nonne, promlssa  mercede etiain 
slbi  retenta,  a  porcls  pascendls  cum 
contumella  illum  amoveret  ?  S1  In. 
quam, hoc In  vlllbus robus custoditur, 
ut nee porcarius quidem habeatur, qui 
porcos non pasceie, sed studot disper- 
dere,  tanto d~gnius  iusta  ct probablll 
ratlone omnis, qui non hominee rogere, 
sed  in  errorein mittere  conatur,  omni 
potentla et dignitate, quam in hominee 
acceplt, privatur, quanto conchtio homl- 
num  a natura dlstat porcorum  Quid 
~gitur  mirum, si hrec disc~pllna  sub Chrla- 
tiana rehgione custoditur, dum antlqu~ 
Romani,  etate  v~dellcet illustrium 
virorum  Collatini  et  Bruti,  Tarquni~ 
regls  superblam  non  ferentes,  pro 
stupro, non  quod ipse, sed quod fillus 
eius  in  Lucretia  nobili matrona  com- 
miserat,  cum filio  pariter  illum patria 
et regno depellerent, ac, ne  quisquam 
lmperli dluturmtate insolescoret, annua 
bib1  imperia per  b11108  exlnde consules 
crearent  ?  Allud eat regnare, aliud in 
regno  tyrran~dem  exercore  Ut enlm 
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We  have  in  this  passage  not  only  the  summary  of  the 
political conceptions of  Manegold himself, but the crystallisa- 
tion oi a lnovement of  political t,hought and principle into a 
great  phrase.  For  when  Manegold  represents  the  relation 
between the king and the people as embodied in an agreement 
or "pacturn," a contract binding equally upon each party, he is 
not only giving the first definite expression to the conception 
which  came in later times to be known as the theory of  the 
"social contract," but he is summing up in one phrase the main 
principle of  mediaeval political society.  This conception is the 
same as that which finds its classical expression in the phrase 
of  the "Declaration of  Rights" that James 11. had broken the 
original contract between the king and the people,  and it is 
also the expression of  the mediaeval principle of  the relation of 
the king to the law and the administration  of  justice.  It is, 
indeed, of  the first importance to observe that Manegold's con- 
ception is not constructed upon some quasi-historical  concep- 
tion of  the beginnings of  political society, but rather represents 
in concrete form the constitutional principle of  the mediaeval 
state as embodied in the traditional methods of  election or re- 
cognition, and of  the reciprocal oaths of  the coronation cere- 
monies.  The people  have indeed sworn obedience,  but their 
oath is related to and conditioned by the oath which the king 
has at the same time taken to administer justice  and to main- 
tain the law.  It is in virtue of  this that he has been elected or 
recognised, and it is these reciprocal oaths which constitute the 
contract.  The oath of  the people is indeed "ipso  facto" null 
and void if  the king does not on his part faithfully observe the 
obligations  which  he has taken.  Men  do not undertake  SQ 
great an obedience except for reasonable causes, and it is not 
reason to think that they are bound to obey one who refuses 
to recognise the principles and conditions in virtue of  which 
they promised obedience. 
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~t is no doubt true that the phrases of Manegold are related 
to a period of  great confusion and civil war, and if  they stood 
alone  they  would  represent  at the best  an interesting  and 
important  anticipation  of  later  developments  of  political 
principle  or theory.  Eut they do not stand alone, there is 
indeed no other writer  of  the eleventh  or  twelfth  centuries 
who expresses the principle in exactly the same phrases, but 
the principle expressed by his phrases is the normal principle 
of the political theory of  these centuries. 
regni  gubernecula  fides  et reverentia  vel  reverentia  impendenda.  ' In 
est  adhibenda,  sic  certo,  SIC  firrna  maxirno  enirn imperlo' a~t  hystoricus. 
ratione,  si  tyrannidern  exercore  '  rnlnima est licentia.' " 
eruperint,  absque  omni  fidei  lesione  Cf. id. xlvii., p. 164, note. 
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CHAPTER  VII. 
THE  CONCEPTION  OF  A  UNIVERSAL  EMPIRE. 
WE  have  endeavoured  to  set  out the main  aspects  of  the 
theory  of  political  authority  in  the  eleventh  and  twelfth 
centuries, and we have so far made no distinction between the 
theory as it may have been related to the empire and the other 
Western states.  We do not indeed find any reason to think 
there was any substantial distinction ; on the contrary, the 
principles of  political organisation  appear to us to have been 
substantially the same in all the European communities. 
There is, however, one conception which has been thought to 
have been important in the theory of the structure of  medizeval 
society with which we have not deaIt, and this is the concep- 
tion of  the political unity of the world.  It  has been sometimes 
thought  that as the Middle  Ages  present  us  with  a  unified 
ecclesiastical  system under the headship of  the Pope,  so,  at 
least  in  principle,  they  represent  a  unified  political  system 
under  the  headship  of  the emperor.  There  is,  indeed,  no 
doubt that at least in the fourteenth century, when abstract 
political theory was very highly developed, ma~ny  writers,  of, 
whom  Dante was  the most  illustrious,  were  much  occupied 
with  this conception, and it might well be supposed that this 
represents the natural survival of  the impression of  the great 
attempt of Charlemagne to gather together into one the divided 
members of the ancient Roman empire. 
It is indeed  clear  that the conception  of  the one empire 
embracing and including all lesser  states, and claiming some 
indeterminate superiority over them, was from the first  fre- 
quently held among the people of  the empire which the Ottos 
built up in the tenth century, and that they conceived of the 
position  of  the Roman emperor as being  something different 
from that of a German king.  The expeditions to Italy repre- 
sented the claini not merely to political authority in Italy, but 
to  the  succession  of  Charles  the  Great  and of  the ancient 
empire. 
This is the conception  which is represented in the Annals 
of Quedlinburg.  They speak of the consecration and coronation 
of  Otto 111.  in 996  as being  done with  the acclamation not 
only of  the Roman  people,  but of  the people  of  almoet  all 
Eur0pe.l  And  they enlarge  these phrases,  and make  them 
even more emphatic in describing the position of  Conrad 11. 
(the Salic).  They  speak of  the chief  men  of  all Europe and 
the envoys of many peoples as hastening to his court,2 and of 
the emperor  as one to whom  all parts of  the world  bow the 
neck.3 
The  author  of  the life  of  St Adalbert,  writing  probably 
about the end of  the tenth century, uses a phrase which serves 
well to illustrate the conception  of  the emperor as supreme 
lord  of  the world.  He speaks of  Rome  as the head  of  the 
world,  and says that Rome  alone  can  transform kings  into 
emperors.  It  is Rome that keeps the body of  the Prince of 
saints,  and it is right  therefore  that the lord  of  the world 
should be appointed by Rome.4 Berno, the  Abbot of  Reichenau, 
in a letter to the Emperor Henry II., addresses him as hia lord, 
the  propagator of  the Christian religion, Emperor and Augustus, 
'  Annales  Quedlinburgenses,  Con- 
tinuatio,'  996 : "  Hic ergo  sede intro- 
nizatus apostolica, dominum Ottonem, 
huc usque  vocatum regem, non solum 
Romano,  sed  et pene  totius  Europ;~ 
populo  acclamante . . . imperatorem 
consecravit Augustum." 
Id.  id.,  1024 :  "  Emensa  itaque 
imperator  quam coeperat  via,  cunctis, 
ut ita  dicam,  Europze  primis  ibidem 
confluentibus, diversarumque  gentium 
missaticls  ad imperiale eius obsequium 
undique  properantibus,  sacrosancturn 
dominicre resurrsctionis  gaudium, toto 
iam  corridente  mundo,  prout  decuit 
talem, eximia celebrant gloria." 
a  Id.  id. : "  Et  quid do victoriosissimi 
imperatoris referam gratulatione ?  Cui 
cuncta  mundi climata  colla  subdendo 
inserviunt,  quique  eo  magis  super 
accurnulata  gloria  merito gaudet,  quo 
se,  Deo  donante,  altiorem  ceteris, 
praminentem Iaetatur univcrsis." 
Vita  S.  Adalberti,  21 :  "  Roma 
autem  cum  caput  mundi  et urbium 
domina  sit  et  vocetur,  sola  reges 
imperare  facit ;  cumque  principis 
sanctorum  corpus  suo  binu  refoveat, 
merito  principem  terrarum  ipsa  con- 
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the lord both of  bnds and see, and gives thanks to God, who 
has made his niagnificence excel that of  all kingd0ms.l  And 
Wippo, in his panegyric on Henry III., says : "Thou art the 
head  of  the world, while  thy head  is the ruler of  Olympus, 
whose members thou dost rule with the just order of  the law."  2 
Such are some of  the phrases used by the earlier writers as 
expressive of  the conception that in some sense the emperor 
was lord not merely of the German and Italian kingdoms,  but 
of  Europe and of the world.  And the tradition was not'lost, 
but  continued throughout  the Middle  Ages.  Thus St Peter 
Damian,  in  the second half  of  the  eleventh  century, in  his 
treatise  on  the  disputed  election  of  Alexander  11.  and 
Cadalous  of  Parma,  adjures  the royal  counsellors  and  the 
ministers  of  the Apostolic  See  to labour  together  that the 
"  summum sacerdotium "  and the Roman empire may be united 
in alliance with each other, and that the race of  men which is 
ruled  by  these  two  may  not be  divided.s  And  in  a  letter 
addressed by him to Henry 111. he speaks of  all the kingdoms 
l Berno,  Abbas  Augls  Dlvltls,  Ep. 
111. :  "  Domlno  suo,  Chrlst~ans  rell- 
glonls propagator1 orthodoxo, Helnr~co 
~mperatorl  Augusto  nec non terrarum 
marlsque  domlno.  . Iure  lmmenso 
cordls  lubllo  grates  rerum  omnlum 
persolv~mus  Dommo,  qu~,  In  modum 
excelsac  pyramidls,  vestrre  d~gnltatls 
magn~ficent~am unlversls  superex- 
cellere fec~t  regnls " 
Wlppo,  '  Panegyncus  Helnrlcl 
Regls ' .- 
"Tu  caput  es  mundl,  caput  est  t~b~ 
rector  Olymp~, 
Cmus  membra  regls  lust0  modera 
mlne legls " 
'  St  Peter  Dam~an, '  Dlsceptat~o 
Synodalls,'  ' Clausula  dlct~on~s  ' : 
"  Amodo  lgltur,  dlloctlss~m~,  ~llmc 
regalls aulre cons111ar11, hlnc sedls apos- 
tohcae commmlstn, utraque pars In hoc 
uno  stud10  consplremus  elaborantes, 
ut summum  sacerdotlum  et  Roman- 
um  s~mul confadcratur  lmperlum, 
quatlnus  humanum  genus,  quod  per 
hos  duos aplces In  utraque  subatant18 
reg~tur,  null~s-quod  abs~t  l-part~bus, 
quod pro Kadaloum nuper factum est. 
rescmdatur , slcque mund~  vertlces m 
perpetus  kar~tat~s  unlonem  concur- 
rant,  ut ~nfer~ora  membra  per  eorum 
dlscord~am non  res~llant  ;  quatlnus 
smut In uno med~atore  Del et homlnum 
hrec  duo,  regnum  sclllcet  et  sacer- 
dotlum,  dlvlno sunt conflata mystono, 
~ta  subllmes  lstae  dure  persons  tanta 
s~b~met  lnvlcem unan~m~tate  lungantur, 
ut quodam  rnutua  car~tat~s  glutlno et 
rex  In  Romano  pont~fice  et Romanus 
pont~fex lnven~atur In  rege,  salvq 
sclllcet suo prlvlleg~o  papae, quod nemo 
prretel  eum  usurpare  perm~tt~tur. 
Ceterum  et  lpse  delmquentes,  cum 
causa  dlctavent,  forens1  lege  coher- 
ceat,  et rex  cum  sms  eplscopls  super 
anlmarum  statu,  prolata  sacrorum 
canonum  auctontate,  decernat  Ille 
tanquam  parens  paterno  semper  lure 
prernlneat,  lste  velut  un~cus  ac  sm- 
gular~s  fillus  In  amorls 1111~s  amplexl- 
bus requlescat." 
of  the world as being subject to his empire.'  Again, we  Inay 
notice how, in a treatise ascribed to Cardinal Beno, in the last 
years of  the eleventh century, Hildebrand is vehemently cen- 
sured for applying certain words of  St Gregory the Great to 
the emperor, as though there were no difference between him 
and any "  provincial " king.2 
It is thus that when  the empire reached its highest point 
under Frederick I. (Barbarossa),  we find a frequent recurrence 
of  phrases indicating the notion that the Empire was superior to 
all other States, and even in some sense supreme over them. 
Thus Frederick uses of  himself  a phrase which might seem to 
be  a claim to universal  authority.  In the introduction to a 
document of  1157 he styles himself "  Frederick, by the grace of 
God emperor and always Augustus," and says that he holds by 
the Divine providence "  Urbis et Orbis gubernacula."  Again, 
in  a  document  relating  to the enfeoffment  of  the Count of 
Provence, he speaks of  the dignity of  the Roman  empire as 
having  a  more  excellent glory and greatness  than  all  other 
kingdoms,  authorities, or  dignities, as it  is  adorned  by  the 
greater number and merit of  its illustrious princes and wise 
men.4 
It is, however, in one of  the documents relating to the Council 
of  Pavia (1159-1160) that the imperial claims are most forcibly 
expressed. On the death of  Hadrian IV. there had been a double 
election to the papacy, and both  Alexander 111.  and Victor 
1 St Peter Dam~an,  Eplst ,  Bk  v11  1 : 
"  Et cum omnla regna  terrarum, quae 
vestro sub~~c~tur  lmpeno, testo mundo, 
larglss~ma vestrse  pletatls  abundant~a 
repleat." 
M.  G.  H , '  Llbell~  de  L~te,'  vol. 
11 , '  Benoms  al~orumque card~nal~um 
Scr~pta,'  111  9 . "  Vel  SI  lubentls sunt 
non  recte  div~slstl, dum  prcceptum 
adversus  provlnclarum  regem  com- 
posltum  Caesar1  oposu~st~,  quasl  nulla 
s~t  d~fferent~a  csesarls  et  culusl~bet 
prov~nc~al~s  regls " 
M.  G  H,  Legum, Sect. IV , Con- 
etltut~ones,  vol. I  161. 
'  Id.   d.  ld.,  vol.  I.  216  (1162): 
"  Fr~dencus  dlvlna  favcnte  clement~a 
Romauorum Imperator augustus.  Cum 
Roman1  lmpern  d~gn~tas,  slcut  nu111 
mortal~um  In  dublum  vemt,  per  se 
pr~nc~pal~ter  ac  s~ngular~ter  nullo  nlsl 
d~vmo  lnnlxa  pod~o,  tot~us  honestatls 
omn~umque  vlrtutum s~t  adornata ful- 
gonbus, tanto comparaclone solls, quam 
habet  ad  al~a  sydera,  excellentlorl 
glor~a et  magn~tud~ne  omma  regna 
et  rel~quas potestates  vel  d~gn~tates 
v~detur  prsecellere,  quanto  ~llustr~um 
prlnclpum  ac  saplenturn  vlrorum, 
qu~  portant  orbem,  ampllorl  numero 
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claimed to have been duly elected.  Frederick maintained that 
in such a circumstance the emperor had the responsibility of 
taking the proper steps to prevent a schism, and he therefore 
called together a council at  Pavia to inquire into the matter and 
to decide which of the two claimants had a just title.  It is in 
the letter of invitation to the German bishops that he uses the 
strongest phrases about the position and dignity of  the empire. 
When Christ, he says, was content with the two swords, this 
pointed to the Roman Church and the Roman Empire, for it is 
by these two that the whole world  is ordered in sacred and 
human  things.  For  as  there  is  one  God,  one  pope,  one 
emperor,  there  must  be  one  Church.  And  thus  it is  the 
Roman emperor who must take measures to provide a remedy 
for this great mischief.  He has therefore called together  an 
assembly of  the bishops of the empire, and of  the other king- 
doms, France, England, Spain, and Hungary, in order that they 
should in his presence  decide which  of  the claimants should 
lawfully rule over the universal  C7hurch.l 
We are not here concerned with the question of  the relation 
between  the secular  and the ecclesiastical  authorities which 
was raised by this attempt to deal with the disputed succession 
to the papacy,  we  deal with  Frederick's  letter here only  as 
illustrating his assertion of a special and unique position of  the 
l  M.  G.  H.,  Legum, Soot.  IV.,  Con- 
stitut~ones,  vol.  I.  182,  ' Enrycl~ra  In- 
vltatoria  ad  Ep~scopos  Teutolllcos ' : 
"  Quod m passlone sua Chr~stus  duobus 
gladus contentus  fuit, hoc in Romana 
acolesia et In  imperio  Romano  credi- 
mus  mlrabih  prov~dent~a  declarasse, 
cum  per  hac  duo  rerum  cap~ta  et 
prlncipia totus mundus  tam in dlvinis 
quam In  human~s  ordmetur.  Cumque 
unus Deus, unus papa, unus imperator 
sufficlat,  et  una  recclesia  Del  esse 
debeat,  quod slll0  dolore cordis diccre 
non possumus, duos apostollcos In  Ro- 
mana acclesia habere vldemur. 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Ne  itaque  In  tanta  discr~mine  dls- 
cordla  universalis  eccles~a  pericl~tar~ 
poss~t,  Romanum  imperlum  quod  ad 
remedlum  tam  pernlciosl mall  divlna 
clementia prov~dit,  unlversorum  salut~ 
debet  solllc~te  prov~dere  et,  ne  tanta 
mala in acclesla Del premlneant futurls 
casibus sollerter obviare. . . . 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
curlam  sollempnem et generalem con- 
ventum  omnlum  acclesiast~corum 
virorum  In  octava  ep~phan~z  Papia 
celebrandam ~ndix~mus,  ad quam  am- 
bos  qu~  se  dlcunt  Rolnanos pont~fices 
vocavlmus omnesque eplscopos Imperil 
nostr~  et  al~orum  regnorum,  Francla 
vldel~cet,  Anglis,  Hispania  atque 
Ungarire, ut eorum in presentla nostra 
lust0 declaretur  examine, quls lllorum 
reglmen  universalis  reccleo~m de  lure 
debeat  obtlnere." 
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empire.  If  we were to take the encyclical letter to the German 
bishops  alone,  we might well think that Frederick  definitely 
claimed  that  the  empire  stood  above  all  other  political 
authorities.  When,  however,  we  take account  of  the other 
documents relating to the Council of  Pavia, we observe that his 
tone is somewhat different.  His letter to Henry 11. of England 
has been preserved, and it is noticeable that in this the more 
pretentious  phrases  about  the  position  of  the  empire  are 
omitted, and that he confines himself  to the invitation to send 
as many of  his bishops and abbots as possible to the meeting at 
Pavia,  that they may assist in restoring the peace of  the Church.l 
And in another of  these documents, a letter addressed to the 
Archbishop of  Salzburg asking him to postpone his recognition 
of  either of  the claimants to the papacy, he tells him that he 
has entered into communication with the Kings of  France and 
England, and asked  them  also  not to accept  either of  the 
claimants unless he had been  recognised  by them 
There is,  however,  a  passage in a  letter of  Henry 11.  to 
Frederick I. cited by Rahewin, which  seems to recognise the 
superior authority of  the emperor in a  very large sense ; he 
speaks of  the emperor as having the right to command, and 
assures him  that he will not fail in ~bedience.~  And Roger 
of  Hoveden relates that Richard I. of  England being a prisoner 
in Germany, and in order to procure his release from captivity, 
handed over his kingdom of  England to the Emperor Henry VI., 
'  M.  C  H., Legum, Sect. IV.,  Con-  noqtrls tempor~bus  incolum~s  In summa 
stitut~ones,  vol. I.  183 : " Set quia hoc  tranqulllltate posslt permanere." 
lam  dm  desiderabile  votum  nostrum  Id  d. ~d.,  vol. I.  181 : "  De cetero 
necessarle cure prepedlunt, dllect~onem  noster  predlctus  legatus  hoc  verbum 
tuam  modls  qulbus  possumus  exora-  elect~onls  de Romano pontifice in cordl- 
tum esse cuplmus, quatlnus de vener-  bus  eorum  ~ta  firmablt,  ut  ips~  una 
abh collego eplscoporum rognl  tui et  nobiscum unum lnde velint et sapiant, 
abbatum  aliorumque  orthodoxorum,  nec in al~quam  personam favorem suum 
quorum sap~entia  et relig~one  Anglorum  tarn subrto ponant, nlsl quam nostrum 
prefulget ecclesla, quotquot potes, nobis  trlum unlcus laudaver~t  assensus " 
transm~ttas  et prred~cto  sacro convcntui  Rahewin,  '  Gesta  Fridoi~m, Im- 
lnteresse faclas, ut eorum ceterorumque  peratorls,'  111.  7 :  "  Regnurn nostrum 
eocles~avt~corum  vlrorum  salubr~ dlc-  vob~s  exponlmus. . . .  Vobis Imperand1 
tante consil~o  unitas Romana? zcclesl~,  cedat auctontas, nobis non  deerlt  vol- 
eo  medlante  qul facit utraque  unum,  untas obsequend~."  Cf  Bvce.  'Holy 
reformetur et status eccleslarum nulla  Roman Ernplre,' p.  186, not0 k. 
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"  as to  the Lord of  all," and t,hat the emperor then invested him 
with it  on the terms of  the payment of  an annual tribute.l  He 
adds that the emperor released him from this on his deathbed, 
but he also mentions that Richard was summoned in virtue of 
his oath and faith to be present at Cologne in 1197, as being a 
chief  member of  the empire, to take part in the election  of 
Henry VI.'s  silccessor, and that he  sent envoys to represent 
him.2 
It is difficult  to say what credit is to be attached to this 
story ; if  it is true, it has to be observed that Richard was 
acting under compulsion.  But it is possible that there may be 
some  confusion  about it, as  Richard was  at the same time 
invested, according to Hoveden, with the nominal kingdom of 
Arles by Henry VI.3  There may be some confusion, and it is 
possible that it was in this connection that he was summoned 
to the election. 
Such  are some of  the most  important illustrations  of  the 
survival in the eleventh and twelfth centuries of  the conception 
of  the emperor not only as holding a position and authority 
different from that of  all other rulers, but as in some sense the 
supreme lord of  a united world, as representing the conception 
of  a political unity of  the civilised world.  It must be observed 
that with the exception of  the last passages, all of  these phrases 
represent the opinion or feelings of  those who were emperors, 
or members of  the empire.  When we turn to the consideration 
of  the question how far the sentiments of  men in other western 
countries corresponded with them, we find ourselves in a some- 
what different atmosphere. 
l  Roger of  Hoveden, '  Chronicle,' ed. 
Bp. Stubbs, Rolls Series, vol. iii. p. 202, 
A.D.  1193 : "  Ricardus  rex  Anglia  in 
captione  Henrici  Romanorurn impera- 
toris  detentus,  ut  captionem  illam 
evatleret,  consilio Alienor  matris  SUE, 
deposuit se de regno Anglia et tradidit 
illud  imperatori  sicut  universorum 
domino,  et  investivit  eurn  inde  per 
pilleum suum : sed imperator sicut pra- 
locutum fuit, statim roddidit ei, in con- 
spectu magnatum Alemanniie et Angliz, 
I 
regnum  Anglia  pradictum,  tenendum 
de ipso pro  quinque millibus librarum 
sterlingorum  singulis annis  de  tributo 
solvendis,  et investivit  eum  inde  im- 
perator  per  duplicem cruoem  de auro. 
Sed  idem  imperator in  morte  sua  de 
omnibus  his  et  aliis  conventionibus 
quietum  clamavit  ipsum  Ricardum 
regem Anglia et haredes suos." 
Id. id., vol. iv. p. 37. 
S Id. id., vol. iii. p. 226. 
There has survived a very significant letter written in 988 by 
Gerbert (afterwards Pope Sylvester II.),  in the name of  Hugh, 
King of  France, to the Emperor of  Byzantium, which indicates 
very clearly the attitude of  the newly established kingdom of 
the Western Franks.  It is possible, indeed, as M.  Havet has 
suggested,  that the letter was  never  actually sent, but it is 
hardly the less  significant.  It  expresses the desire for close 
and friendly relations, and, in order that these may be secured, 
proposes  a  marriage between  Robert, the son of  the French 
king, and the daughter of  one of the emperors, and assures them 
that the French king will resist any attempt on the part either 
of the "Gauls"  or the "Germans"  to attack the Roman Em- 
pire.l  It is no doubt very probable that the project of  a matri- 
rnonial alliance with Byzantium was suggested by the marriage 
of  Otto 11. with Theophano, and that the letter may represent 
nothing more than a project of  Gerbert's for the glory of  the 
French  kingdom.  But  the recognition  of  the  Easterns  as 
rulers of  the Roman Empire, and the undertaking to defend 
it against a possible atta.ck on the part of  the "Germans,"  are 
very significant of  the attitude of  t,he French kingdom. 
In a curious poem by Adalbero, Bishop of  Laon, there are 
some lines  which  seem  to assert the dignity of  the French 
kingdom  and its indep~ndence.~  In a letter of  William, the 
Abbot of  St  Benignus, at  Dijon, addressed as has been thought 
1 Gerbert,  Epistol~,  111 : "  Basilio 
et C.  imperatoribus  orthodoxis,  Hug0 
gratis Dei rex Francorum. 
Cum  nobilitas  vestri  generis,  tum 
etiam  gloria  magnorum  actuum  ad 
amorem vestrum nos hortatur et cogit. 
Ii  quippe esse videmimi, quorum ami- 
citia  nihil  dignius  in  humanis  rebus 
possit  existimari.  Hanc  sanctissimam 
amicitiam  iustissimamque  societatem 
sic expetimus,  ut nec  regna,  nec  opes 
vestras  in  ea  requiramus :  sed  haec 
conditio, quae  nostri  iuris  sunt,  vestra 
efficit.  Magnoque usui,  si placet,  hac 
nostra  coniunctio  erit,  magnosque 
fructus afferet.  Etenim  nobis obstan- 
thus nec  Gallus,  nec  Germanus  fines 
lacesset Romani imperii.  Ergo ut ha0 
VOL. 111. 
bona fiant perpetua, quoniam est nobis 
unicus filius, et ipse rex,  nec ei  parem 
in matrimonio aptare possumus propter 
affinitatem  vicinorum  regum,  filiam 
sancti  imperii  pracipuo  affectu 
quarimus." 
'  Adalbero,  Bishop  of  Laon,  '  Car- 
men,'  389 :- 
"  Regnum  Francorum  rages  sub  tem- 
pore patrum 
Subjugat,  et  semper  sublimi  pollet 
honore, 
Regum  sceptra patrum  nullius sceptra 
coercent 
Quisque  regit,  gaudens  virtutibus, 
imperat aque 
Novimua  imperium  iam  regibus  ease 
fugatum." 
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to Pope John XIX. (1024-1033), he asserts that the Roman 
Empire, which once ruled over the whole world, is now broken 
up, and is ruled by many kings, and that the power of binding 
and loosing in heaven and earth belongs to the jurisdiction of 
St Peter.1  We are not now concerned with the ecclesiastical 
question, but the emphatic assertion of the contrast between 
the unity of  the ecclesiastical authority and the fragmentary 
and divided nature of  political authority is very noteworthy. 
And again, while as we have seen St Peter Damian in some 
places  speak  as though the world was united under the rule 
of  the one  emperor  and the one  Pope, in another work  he 
expresses himself  very differently, and contrasts the one Pope 
who rules over the world with the many kings whose authority 
is limited to their particular territories, and explains that this 
is the reason why the death of  the Pope is notified throughout 
the world, while there is no reason  why the death of  a king 
should be thus anno~nced.~ 
There is then some evidence that the idea of  the unity of  the 
world continued to influence men's thoughts and expressions, 
that  the  tradition of  the universal empire of  Rome, and the  great 
unity of  the Carolingian empire was never wholly lost, and that 
from time to time it was asserted by emperors, or those who 
were under the imperial rule.  On the other hand, we find occa- 
sional statements which seem to repudiate the conception of  a 
unity of  political control, and we can find no examples of  any 
attempt seriously and practically to assert this.  This does not 
mean that there was no conception of  a unity of  the Christian 
1 W~ll~am  of  D~jon, Eplstle  (In 
Rodolphus  Glabe~, H~st., iv.  1): 
"  Quon~am  llcet  potestas  Roman1  Im- 
Peru,  que  ohm  In  orbe  terrarum 
monarchcs  v~gult, nunc  per  cllversa 
terrarum loca lnnumerls  regatur  scep 
trls,  11gand1 solvend~que  In  coelo  et 
In  terrn  potostas  lncumblt  maglster~o 
Petrl." 
2  St  Peter  Dam~an, '  Opusculum,' 
xxln.  1 : "  Ad quocl facl10 respcndetur, 
qula cum unus omnl mundo papa pm- 
s~deat,  reges  autem  plur~mos  m  orbe 
terrarum sua culusque regm meta con- 
cludat,  qula  qu~l~bet  Imperator  ad 
papa  vestlgla  corru~t,  tanquam  reX 
regum, et prlnceps ~mperatorum,  cunc- 
tos In carne v~ventes  honore ac cllgn~tate 
przcell~t.  . . . Porro qula terrenl prln- 
clpes  regm  SUI  qu~squc  ut d~cturn  est, 
l~m~t~bus  lncluduntur, causa non est cur 
per  allonas  munch  prov~nclas eornm 
obltus  d~ffundatur  ,  papa  vcro,  qula 
sclus  est  omnlum  eccles~arum  unlver- 
sal19 eplscopus, cum lnce privatur, mars 
oius pcr  ampla terrarum regna d~ffun- 
d~tur." 
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and civilised world.  We shall have to consider this more care- 
fully when in our next volume we endeavour to deal with the 
question  of  the relation of  the spiritual and temporal powers. 
It is important to observe that, although  there has been 
preserved a great mass of  political writing of  the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, it is only in a few incidental phrases that we 
find any trace of  the conception  of  a  political  unity of  the 
world.  It  is not till the latter part of  the thirteenth century, 
or rather till the fourteenth century, that the conception of  a 
universal empire takes an important and conspicuous place in 
political theory-that  is, not until it had ceased to have any 
relation to the actual political circumstances of  Europe.  What 
may have been the conditions under which the idea of  political 
unity became important, just when the actual development of 
the modern nationalities was rendering it  practically impossible, 
we cannot at  present consider, though we hope that we may be 
able to deal with this later. 
The truth is that, if  we  are to be in a position to consider 
this whole question seriously, we must begin by taking account 
of  the actual trend  and movement  of  European civilisation 
during the Middle Ages.  As soon as we make the attempt to 
do this we shall recognise that the most important aspect of  the 
living growth of  the centuries, from the tenth to the sixteenth, 
was the development of  the great nationalities of  Europe out of 
the chaotic welter of  incoherent tribes.  For a moment these 
had  been  united  by  Charles  the Great  under  the Frankish 
lordship,  but the unity  was  merely  artificial  and apparent. 
Once his great mind and strong hand was removed Europe fell 
back into confusion, and it was only slowly out of  the con~plex 
of  oppositions  and sympathies that there arose the various 
European nationalities.  The movement was thus both towards 
unity and towards division, unity within certain areas, and the 
political separation of  these great areas from each other. 
No  doubt the position of  the emperors and their relation to 
Rome gave them a place which was formally different from that 
of other European rulers, and it is probably true to say that 
few men  would  have doubted that this gave them a  certain 
priority or precedence.  But the position of  the new monarchies 180  POLITICAL  TEtEORY :  ~ITH  &  12~~  CENTURIES.  [PART 11. 
was  in  the main that of  independent  states, recognising no 
authority over them but that of God.  We are therefore driven 
to the conclusion that while the tradition of  a universal empire 
was not dead in these centuries, and while in those parts of 
Europe  which  were  closely  connected  with  the Empire  the 
conception was always more or less present to men's minds, it 
is yet impossible to recognise that during the eleventh  and 
twelfth centuries the conception had any living part in deter- 
mining either men's ideals, or the principles and theory of  the 
structure of  s0ciety.l 
1 For a further dlscuss~on  of  thls question, see vol. v. Part I. chap. 10. 
CHAPTER  VIII. 
SUMMARY. 
{THERE  are three great conceptions expressed in the political 
literature of  the Middle Ages, so far as we  have yet examined 
it.  The first is the principle that the purpose or function of 
the political organisation of  society is ethical or moral, that 
is, the maintenance of  justice  and righteousness  We  have 
seen in an earlier volume that this was  continuahy and em- 
phatically maintained in the political literature of  the ninth 
century, and our examination of  the general literature of  the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, and of the feudal law books to 
the thirteenth, has been  sufficient to show that no one ever 
seriously questioned it.  If there has been  any doubt among 
modern scholars it has arisen from a misunderstanding  as to 
the influence of  St Augustine on the medizeval theory of  the 
state, and from  a  hasty  interpretation  of  some  phrases  of 
Hildebrand. 
No  doubt there lay behind St Augustine's treatment of  the 
state a real difficulty which had its origin in the fact that, as we 
can see in the later philosophical systems of the ancient world 
and  in  the Christian  theory  of  life,  men  had  become  more 
clearly  aware  of  the  existence  of  characteristics  of  human 
nature and personality which cannot be adequately expressed 
in  the terms  of  the political  organisation  of  society.  It is 
this new  apprehension of  the nature of  human  life which  is 
struggling for expression in St Augustine's  'De Civitate Dei.' 
His apprehension is often profound, but the expression of  it 
is  sometimes  crude and ill-considered.  As  we  have  seen in 
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State as such the character of  justice, though at  other times he 
speaks in  different  terms.l  But  the difficulty is not  to be 
measured by these hasty phrases of  St Augustine.  The diffi- 
culty lay in the fact that men had begun to apprehend that 
there  are aspects  of  the moral  and  spiritual life which  the 
coercive machinery of the state cannot adequately represent. 
This is no donbt the principle which lay behind the develop- 
ment  of  the conception of  the independence of  the spiritual 
power.  It was conceived of  as the embodiment of moral and 
spiritual ideals which could not be adequately represented by 
the temporal power.  When the distinction was cxudely con- 
ceived,  the former  was  spoken  of  as being  concerned with 
"  divine " things and the latter with "  secular."  We  cannot 
here  discuss  these  questions  adequately,  we  shall  have  to 
return to them when in our next volume we deal with the rela- 
tions of  the ecclesiastical and political powers in the Middle 
Ages.  We can, however, recognise  at once that behind the 
formal aspects of this question there lay great and profound 
difficulties, difficulties for which  we  have not yet found any 
complete solution. 
It is necessary to recognise the existence of  real perplexities 
for the medieval political thinkers.  But, having done this, we 
must also recognise that the broad common-sense of these men 
refused to allow itself  to be entangled in these perplexities to 
such an extent as to admit any doubt whether the State had 
a moral character and purpose.  It is clear that no medieval 
thinker seriously doubted the moral function of  the State, and 
that this moral function was the securing and maintaining of 
justice.  Even when Hildebrand  urged that the Ptate had its 
origin in sin, he did not mean that the State was  sinful.  It 
may have been  sin which  made it necessary, but also it was 
the remedy  for  sin,  the divinely  appointed  remedy  for  the 
confusion which  sin  produced,  the  means  of  curbing  and 
restraining  the sinful passions and actions of  men. 
This is the real meaning of  the doctrine of  the New  Testa- 
ment, and the Fathers, and of  the Middle Ages, that the author- 
ity of  the king is a divine authority.  He is God's minister for 
l  Cf. vol. i. pp. 164-170. 
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the punishment of the wicked and the reward of  the good.  ~t  is 
true that here again a certain confusion had crept in, owing 
mainly  to some rash phrases of  St Gregory the Great,  and, 
as we  have  seen, there were  some  even in the Middle Ages 
who  were carried away by this tradition into the impossible 
theory that the authority of  the king was in such a sense divine, 
that he was responsible only to God, and that it was always 
unlawful to resist him even when his conduct was unjust and 
illegal.  But  again  the robust  good  sense  of  the mediaval 
political thinkers and the force of  circumstances counteracted 
this influence.  They believed firmly in the divine nature of  the 
state, they looked upon the ruler as God's representative and 
servant, but only so far as he really and in fact carried out the 
divine purpose of  righteousness and justice. 
This, then,  was  the first principle  of  the political theory 
which  we  have been  considering.  And the second is closely 
related to the first, for it is the principle of  the supremacy of 
law as the concrete embodiment of  justice.  Mediaeval thinkers 
upon  politics  were  not  disturbed  by  some  of  our  modern 
perplexities,  they  were  satisfied  to  regard  the  law  of  any 
society as the expression of  the principle of  justice  for that 
society.  It is very difficult for us to put ourselves back into 
the mood and temper of  these times ; we look upon all legal 
regulations  as being  at the best  reasonable  applications  of 
general principles which make for the wellbeing of  human life, 
we  look upon laws as the expression of  the j~tdgment  of  the 
legislative authority, representing more or less adequately the 
judgment  of  the community, and normally we  recognise the 
laws as reasonable, though not necessarily the best possible ; 
we  take them  to  be  rules laid  down  by  men  yesterday  or 
to-day, and perhaps to be changed to-morrow.  Our difficulty 
is to make it clear that there ought to be, and to feel certain 
that there is,  a  real moral  sanction  behind  them, and that 
they justly interpret the actual needs of  society.  To the men 
of the Middle Ages the law was a part of  the local or national 
life ; it had not been made, but had grown with the life of the 
community, and when men began to reflect or theorise on the 184  POLITICAL  THEORY : I~TH  &  12~~  CENTURIES.  [PART U, 
nature of  law, they assumed that these customary regulations 
represented the principles of  justice. 
To  the mediaeval  political theorist then the supremacy of 
justice meant the supremacy of law, and though the expression 
of  this conception by John of  Salisbury is stronger and more 
systematic  than  that  of  most  writers  of  the  period  which 
we  have been  considering, yet it does not really go  beyond 
their  principles.  To  them  the  conception  of  an  arbitrary 
authority was simply unthinkable, the distinction between the 
king who governs according to law and the tyrant who violates 
it, was not  a rhetorical  phrase,  but the natural and normal 
expression of  their whole  mode of  thought. 
And if we now compare the conceptions which are embodied 
in  the  general  political  literature with  those  of  the feudal 
lawyers, we find that they are substantially identical.  Indeed 
Bracton  and  the  authors  of  the  Assizes  of  the  Court  of 
Burgesses of Jerusalem speak as sharply and definitely as John 
of  Salisbury.  "There is no king where will rules and not law," 
"The king is under God  and the law,"  "La dame ne le sire 
n'en  est  seignor se  non  dou dreit,"  these phrases are as un- 
equivocal as those of  John of  Salisbury, and their doctrine is 
the doctrine of all feudal lawyers. 
 h he third great principle of  medieval political theory is again 
related to the others, and it is the principle that the relation 
between the king and the people is founded and depends upon 
the mutual obligation and agreement to maintain justice  and 
law.  We have considered the clear and somewhat harsh terms 
in which this is expressed by Manegold of  Lautenbech.  It may 
be urged that he represents an extreme position which was not 
generally approved,l but we  must not allow ourselves to be 
misled into the judgment that the principles which he expressed 
were strange or unfamiliar.  On the contrary, it is clear that 
he was only putting into definite if  hard form a principle which 
was generally assumed as that which determined the relations 
between subject and ruler.  This is, we  think, the conclusion 
which must be drawn from the literature which we have just 
been examining, and our judgment is only confirmed when we 
turn to the strictly feudal literature.  The feudal obligation may 
have once been conceived of  as one of unconditional personal 
loyalty, but, as we find it in the feudal law books of  the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, it is clear that this loyalty was limited 
and conditioned by the principle of  the necessary fidelity of  lord 
as well as of  vassal to the mutual and legal obligations which 
each had undertaken. 
Manegold  may  express the principle in one way, John of 
Salisbury in another, and the authors of  the Assizes of  Jeru- 
salem in a third, but their meaning is the same.  Manegold 
speaks of  deposing the ruler who has broken his contract, John 
of Salisbury of  the lawfulness of  slaying the tyrant, the authors 
nf  the Assizes  of  refusing  to  discharge any  of  their  feudal  --  - 
obligations to the lord who refuses to do justice to his vassal 
according to the law and the judgment of  the court ; the forms 
of  expression are different but the principle is the same.  The 
mediaeval  conception  of  contract  is  not  a  speculation  of  a 
pseudo-historical kind, related to some original agreement upon 
which political society was founded, but rather a natural and 
legitimate  conclusion  from  the  principle  of  the  election  or 
recognition  of  the ruler  by  the community,  and the mutual 
oaths of  the ceremony of  coronation ; it is an agreement to 
observe the law and to administer  and maintain  justice. 
l Cf.  Gerhoh of Reichersberg, '  Epis-  '  Libelli de  Lite,' vol. iii. pp. 232, 233. 
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~lectcd  thev  cannot denoro  hlm.  at 
tr~buted  to  Lim  but thli  really comes 
from  Prlv~legium  '  of  Pope  Leo 
VIII, 117, ILL 
Church  Seo Spi~itual  Power 
HIS repudlatlon  of  inequality  In 
human nature, 4 
Orlgln  of  cit~es  and  states,  107 
(note 3) 
HIS treatment  of  law  as  embod~ 
ment of  justice,  and of  function 
of  the  state  to  ma~nta~  I  law, 
quoted Erom  '  De  C~vitate  Del 
In  treatire  De unltate occle~rac 
bonservanda,  110 
St Is~dore  s  conceptlon  of  dlffer 
ence  between  king  and  tvrant 
probzblv derived lIom him,  126 
Clvihans- 
Restate Star- and Pauline tlleorles 
of human nature and hlal ery  5 
Treatment of rolation  ot  qplrl&al 
and temporal author~tles,  7 
Law requlres consent of  those con 
cerned, 48 
Their definit~on  of  eqmty c~ted  by 
Joh~i  of  Salisbury, 141 
Comitatus  Its  place In development of 
feudalism, 23, 24 
Commendatio  Its place  In  develop. 
mont of  feudalism  23  24 
Consuetudines Feudo~um- 
Feudal law book of  Lombardy, 69 
If  vassal falls to discharge his obli 
gatlon  to his  lord  he  loses  his 
fief, 59, 60 
Vassal can only be deprived of  h~s 
fief  for  definite  and  proved 
offence,  60 
Decis~on  In  such cases  belongs  to 
court of 111s  peers or to court of 
emperor, 60 
Court  can  compel  lord  to  make 
restitution to his vassal, 60 
Lord can only proceed  agoinst h18 
X assal In ~oui  t, 60 
Relation  of  these  pr~nciples to 
"  Cdictum  de  beneficiis  regnt 
 italic^ " of  Conrad 11, 60 (note 
9) 
U1 
Conrad 11, Emperor- 
HIS "  Cd~ctum  de  beneficiis regni 
Itahcl,"  60 (note 3) 
Annals  of  Quedllnburg  speak  of 
chlef  men  of  hurope  hastening 
to 11~~  court and of  enboys of  all 
nations hastenlng "  ad ~mper~ale 
elus obsequlum,  171 
Constitutional theory- 
And soclal contract, 147 169 
Poht~cal  author~ty  dependent upon 
elect~on  or  recognihon  of  great 
men or commumty, 147 
Is exercised normally w~th  consent 
and pounsel  of  great men of  the 
community, 147, 148, 154, 1bO 
Illustrat~oris  of  thls  principle  in 
early  M~ddle  Ages  in  Gerbert 
(Sylvester  I1 l,  148,  Abbo  of 
Fleury,  148,  149,  In  formulas 
of  loglslat~on of  Empire,  149, 
150, In the eloventh and twelfth 
centuries, in Hermann of  Re~che 
nau,  151, Bruno,  151, circular 
letter of  arcl~b~shops  and pllnces 
on death of Henry V,  151, 152, 
Freder~ck  I  (Barbarossa), 152, 
Sacllsenspicgel,  153  formulas 
of  legislation  in  Empire,  153, 
154 , In B  rance, 154 (note 4) 
Claim  by  princes  of  autho~~ty  to 
JII lge and depose emperor,  166- 
159. 
Clalm  by  princes  of  authority  to 
control  government  of  Empire, 
159, 160 
political  theory of Manegold  w~th 
regard  to  the  conditions  and 
limitations  of  roval  authority,  .. -- 
160 169 
The  ' Pacturn,"  m v~rtue  of  which 
the kine 1s a~~omted.  163 167 
~elatlon  "of  ;oncept~on  to 
"  Social Contract  of  the seven 
teenth and e~ahteenth  centuries, 
168, 169 
Theory  of  mutual  agreement  to 
maintam  law  and  lustice  by 
peoplc  and ruler a fundamental 
part  of  p  trcal  theoly  In  the 
Middle Ages, 184, 185 
Coronat~on  oath  King sweals to maln 
taln justrce and law, 33, 34 37, 39,40 
Coulanges, Fustel de, 11. 
Court, Dccis~ons  of- 
Test of  vahd custom, according to 
Beaumanon, 42 
Accepted  as  law  In  kmgdom  of 
Jerusalem, failing Asslzes, 44 
Court, Feudal- 
Is judge  in  all  cases  of  dlspute 
about mutual obligations of  lord 
and vassal, 62 74 
Composlt~on  of  it, 64 66, 60 65, 72 
Means of  enforcing the dccis~ons  of 
court upon lord, 66 66,  71 74 
Cannot judge,  accordmg  to Boau 
manoir,  in cases of  dispute  be 
tween whole bodv of  vassals and 
a necessary  quality of  the state 
never  clted  In  eleventh  and 
twelfth ccnturies,  106 
Passages in it from C~cero  describ 
Ing  f~motion of  the  state  as 
maintenance of  law and justlce, 
quoted  m  treatise  '  De  r~n~tate 
ecclesiie conservanda,'  110 
Declarat~on  of  Rights  Original  con 
tract between king and people,  168 
'  De Duodecim Abus~vls  Sseculi - 
Functlon of  king to ma~ntaln  jus- 
lord, 64 
Relations of  the court to the k~ng, 
In Biacton, 71 74 
"  Couronnement de Louis "  runct~on 
of  author~ty  1s to maintam lust~ce,  32. 
Custom- 
Prlmary source of  law, 41 45, 47 
English laws are customs according 
to Glanvill and Bracton, 41, 48 
All pleas, aocordlng to Beaumano~r, 
are  determ~ncd accord~ng to 
custom, 42 
Customs must be maintained, ac 
cordmg to  Beaumanoir, by feuda 
tories and kings of  France, 42 
Tests of  legal custom  42 
Assizes of  Jerusalem bascd on cus 
toms of  various countries, 43 
Cases in k~ngdom  of  Jerusalem to 
be  dec~ded  by  custom,  falling 
Asslzes, 44 
Court for Spans  admimstcnng  Jus 
tice based on their customs, 45 
Dante  His  conceptlon  of  political 
un~ty  of  the world, 170 
'  De Civitate Del - 
Quest~on  of  the influence of  ~ts  con 
ception of  political authorltj, 93, 
94 
Pas~ages  which deny that jud~ce  is  I 
tlce,  108 
C~ted  by Abbo of  Fleury, 108 
Probablv  of  Irish  origln,  108 
(note  i) 
- 
Demosthenes  HIS definlt~on  of  law 
c~ted  bv John of  Salisbury,  141 
~eusdedz,  Cardmal- 
Royal author~ty  founded on human 
~nstitutlon,  with  permlsslon  of 
God, but not by His w~ll,  99 
Refers to creation of  monarchy in 
1 Samuel, 99 
D~vine  origln  and  nature  of  political 
authority, 92 ?05,  115 124 
"  Divlne lt~ght,  10, 115 124 
Concept~on  that res~stance  to king 
1s always unlawful, derived from 
some E athers, and especially St 
Gregory the Great, 116 124 
Conception set out by Atto of  Ver 
cell], 117 ,  by St  Bruno of  Wurz- 
~uestyon  ra~sed  In  acute form  by 
Saxon revolt of  1073, 118 
Henry IV s reply to bull of  dcposl- 
tion by Gregory V11 ,  119 
Maintalnedby  some German clergy, 
119 , by Wenrich of  Trrer,  119 , 
hv author of  '  De unitate eccles~a 
-d 
conservanda,'  120,  by  sup 
porters of  Henry IV , 121 , by 
Sigebert  of  Gembloux,  122,  by 
Gregory of  Catlno, 122 
Domitlan, Emperor  HIS  murder,  146 
Eglon, King of  Moab  HIS  murder, l45 
Ekkehard Umuglensls  Reports Honry 
IV 'S  appeal to German blshops  and 
princes aga~nst  111s  son, 159 
Election of  King or Emporor- 
Abbo of  Fleury, 149 
Authonty  of  ruler  normally  de 
ncnds upon eloction  or recognl 
tlon, 156 
This  1s  true even  m  England  or 
France, 150, 151 
Elective principle finally establrshed 
in Empire  dur~ng  Henry  IV 6 
reign, and at death of  Henry V, 
151 
Election  of  Henry IV  subject to 
condition that he should prove a 
just ruler, 151 
Principle  lad down  by  COU~CI~  of 
Forchheim,  1077, 161 192  INDEX. 
him  whch  seems  to  recos?nise  I  Greaory VII .  Po~e-  Circular  letter  of  German  arch 
bishops  and princes on death of 
Henry V ,  15  1 
Letter  of  krederlck  I  to  Pops 
Eugemus 111 ,  152 
Elective  pr~nciple laid  down  ~n 
Sachsensplegel for all authority, 
153 
Emperor  See under King 
Empire- 
Conflict with Papacy, 7 
Conception  of  a universal  emplre, 
170 180 
England- 
English law is custom, 41, 42, 48 
William  the  Conqueror  requires 
oath  of  fidelity  from  all  land 
owners in England, 76 
F~delity  to klng always reserved m 
doing homage, 79 
Election  or  recogmtion  necessary 
for  succession  to  throne,  150, 
151 
Equality in humail nature- 
In Stoics and Fathers, 3,  4 
Treatment of  the subject by Beau- 
manoir, 49, 90 
Rather~us  of  Verona,  88 
Sachsenspiegel,  89 
Schwabenspiegel,  89 (note 3) 
Bracton, 90 (note 1) 
Eugenius I11 ,  Pope,  152 
Ezekiel  Concept~on  of  lndlvidual re- 
spons~bility,  8 
Fathers, Christian- 
Their Influence on inedireval pol~ti 
cal theory  3 10 
Political  institutions convent~onal 
not natural, 4 
Freedom  and  equality  of  human 
nature always real, 4 
Slavery a pun~shment  for vice, 4 
Private property conventional not 
natural, 5 
Property the result of  greed, and a 
remedy for it, 5 
Propertythe creation of  the State 5 
Almsg~ving  an act of  just~ce  not of 
chanty, 5 
Div~ne  nature of  polit~cal  authority, 
9, 93 
Pol~tical  institut~ons,  results of  and 
remodies for sin, 97 
Theory of  Divlne R~ght derlved 
from some of  them  10,  116 
Others  draw sharp dishnction be 
tween king and tyrant, 116 
Feudalism- 
Its influonce on pol~tical  theory of 
Middle Ages,  1,  19 86 
Takes  shape  in  ninth  and  tenth 
centuries, 15,  16 
Two  principles,  loyalty  and  con 
tract,  21 
Contrast between literary and legal 
conceptions of  it, 21 23 
Comitatus, Commendatio, Benefici. 
um, elements in ~t,  23, 24 
Personal loyalty of  vassal to lord, 
24 29 
Illustrated in '  Raoul of  Cambrai,' 
24, 25, 28  29 
In Fulbert of  Chartres  25, 26 , ~n 
Jean d Ibelin, 26, 27  in Glan 
vill, 27, in Bracton, 27 
Conception  of  law  and  justice  in 
feudal law books, 30 40 
Conception  of  source  of  law,  41 
51 
Conception of  method of  mainta~n 
ing law, 52 74 
Feudal system in its essence  con 
tractual, 74 
The ant~thes~s  of  absolutism,  74 
Its anarchical  and  disintegrating 
tendency, 75,  76, 86 
Its orlgln  in per~od  when  central 
government  had  broken  down, 
75, 76 
Gradual  v~ctory  of  national  prin- 
c~ple over  the  disintegrating 
forces, 76 86 
Fidelity to king reserved m  hom 
age, 77 81 
Klng recognised by all feudal ~unsts 
as having  full jurisdiction  over 
all persons,  81 86 
Fidel~ty  See Loyalty 
Flach  Le Compagnonnage dans lea 
Chansons de Geste,'  25 (note 2) 
Flanders, Count of  Case between him 
and city of  Ghent, 65 
Forchhe~m,  Council of- 
Determines that German kingdom 
shall be elective, 151 
Doposition  of  Henry IV ,  158 
Elect~on  of  Rudolph of  Suabia, 158 
France- 
Kings  of  France  and  feudatorles 
must maintain the customs of  the 
kingdom, 42 
Quest~on  whether legislat~ve  prac 
tice  of  France  was  d~fierent 
from others, 49 
Reservation  of  fidehty to king  in 
homage, 79,  80 
Election  or  recognition  necessary 
for succession to throne, 151 
Foimule of  legislation, with advice 
and consent  of  great  men,  154 
(note 4) 
Frederick I  (Barbarossa), Emperor- 
Recogn~ses  his election  and prom 
ises justlce,  152 
Feudal  constitution  of  Roncagha 
made with counsel of  great men, 
154 
Admits  that in  grave matters  he 
cannot  act  without  consulting 
princes,  154 
Phrases  which  claim  universal 
authority, 173 175 
Letter of  Henry I1  of  England to 
Gelasius I ,  Pope-- 
Statement of  relation  of  spmtual 
and temporal  authorities, 6 
Cited by Hugh of  Fleury, 111 
Gerbert  See Sylvester I1 
Gerhoh of  Reichorsberg- 
Divine  origin  and  authority  of 
secular power,  102 
Condemns Manegold s phrases, 184 
Cerstengen  Meeting  there  between 
Saxon  princes  and those  of  the im 
per~al  party,  157 
Ghent  Case between the city and the 
Count of  Flanders, 65 
G~rard  of  Seeste  War  between  him 
and Kine Amauri I.  77 
this,  175 
Frederick  I1 , Emperor  Case  of  his 
representative and the lord  of  Bey- 
rout, 57 
Fulbert, Bishop of  Chartres  HIS defi 
nition of  feudal obligations, 26, 26 
" 
Glanvill- 
Reverence of  vassal for lord, 27 
English law 1s  custom, 41, 42 
Laws of  England though unwritten 
may properly be called laws, 46 
C~tes  "  Quod prlncipi placet, legis 
habet vigorem, ' 46 
-H'S  phrases about sinful origin and 
character of  secular authority,  94 
Other phrases seem to  recognise its 
div~ne  orlgln and purpose, 94 96 
Discussion  of  this  apparent  con 
tradiction, 96 98 
Laws  are promulgated  by  prince 
with counsel of  great men, 46 
Vassal  perhaps  entitled to defend 
himself  against his lord, 61 (note 
l), 79 (note 4) 
Fidelity to king always reserved in 
England, In doing homage,  79 
"  Ligancia  only made to lord of 
whom a man holds his "  capitale 
tenementum,"  79 
Government 
A  conventional institution accord 
ing to Fathers, 3, and Stoics, 5 
A result of  sin, 5 
Conception  of  ~t as natural by St 
Thomas Aquinas, 5 
This had little Influence tlll end of 
thirteenth century, 5,  6 
Gratian  HIS dictum that no law is 
valid  unless it  is  accepted  by  the 
custom of  those concerned, 47, 48 
Gregory, St, the Great 
Probable reference to his statement 
of a heavenly hierarchy, by Hugh 
of  Fleurv. 98 (note 1) 
Source of  &e  theory of  the  Divine 
Right,  10 
To his influence ~t can generally be 
traced in Middle Ages, 116  a c , 
Atto of  Vercelli,  1?7, Wenr~~h 
of  Trler,  119,  De  uintate 
ecclesia! conservanda,  120 
Gregory 11, Pope  HIS act~on  in rc 
strain~ng  Italians from revolt against 
Leo the Iconoclast, cited by Gregory 
of  Catino, 123 
VOL. 111 
Excommumcat~on  of  Henry IV In 
1076, 157 
~evolters  w~sh  to  refer  charges 
aga~nst  Henry IV to him, 157 
Gregory of  Catino- 
' Orthodoxa  defensio  imperialis,' 
wntten  in  name  of  monks  of 
Farfa, 122 
Condemns all revolt against royal 
authority, 122 
No saint of  Old or New Testament 
had ventured to condemn or de 
pose  k~ng  or  emperor,  even 
though a heretic,  122, 123 
Pope Gregory I1 restrained Ital~ans 
from  revolt  agalnst  Leo  the 
Iconoclast.  123 
God only gives or takes away king- 
doms and empires, 123 
Hadnan IV , Pope  Disputed  succes 
sron on h~s  death, 173 
Harold,  Gregory  King  V11 of  ,  95  Denmark  Letter  of 
Henr  I1 ,  Emperor- 
Jonstitutlon of  1022 issued by him 
along with great men, 150 
Berno of  Reichenau addresses him 
as  lord of  lands and sea, 171, 172 
Henry 11,  of  England- 
Frederick  I  invites  him  to send 
bishops and abbots to Council of 
Pavia. 175 
His  letter recognising Frederick I.'s 
su lemacy, 175 
Henrv 18.  Emoeror- 
HIS cohduci about Papacy attacked 
by a French Churchman. 98  ------,  ~  ~ 
Procures election of  his infant son 
as  king, subject to  condition that 
he should prove a just  rule^. 181 
Wippo speaks of  him as head of  the 
world, 172 
Peter Damian  speaks of  all k~ng 
doms of  the world as subject to 
him. 172.  173  --.  , 
Henry IV ,  Emperor- 
Demands of  Saxon and Thunngan 
revolters.  113. 130.  l  _  I"" 
Maintains in his reply  to Gregory 
V11 'S  bull  of  deposition  that 
kin  s could  only  be Judged  by   of,  and only deposed for heresy, 
l19 
Civil  wars  of  hir  reign  check  do 
velopment  of  hereditary suLces 
slon to throne in Gormany,  151 
Developmcnt of  constitutional con 
ceptlons  in  course  of  ravolts 
aga~nst  him, 155 159 
N 194  INDEX.  INDEX. 
Excommunicated by Gregory VII., 
157.  -.  . . 
Depos~t~on  by  pr~nces  at Forch- 
helm, 158. 
HIS appeal to b~shops  and prmces 
agalnst his son,  159. 
Henry V ,  Emperor- 
Hereditary  succession  to German 
kmgdom finally destroyed on h~s 
death, 151. 
C~rcular  letter  of  Archb~shops  of 
Cologne  and  Mamz  and  other 
princes, arranging for elect~on  of 
successoi to h~m,  152. 
Henry V1 ,  Emperor  Roger of  Hovo- 
den's account of  subm~ss~on  of  R~chard 
I  of  England to h~m  as vassal,  175. 
Hermann, B~shop  of  Metz : Letters of 
Gregory VII, to h~m,  94-98. 
Herrand, Blshop of  Halberstadt 
HIS answer to Waltram of  Naum- 
burn, wr~tten  m name of  LOUIS, 
count of  Thur~ng~a,  133. 
Corrects  mismterpretat~ons  of  St 
Paul's words about obed~ence  to 
ruler, 133. 
Quotes Hosea as  speak~ng  of  prlnces 
who re~gned,  but not as of  Cod, 
133 
0b8cl1ence due to an ordered power, 
but  government  of  Henry  IV. 
could  not  be  called  ordered. 
133 
No order where there is not ~ust~co  ..- 
and law, 133. 
H~ldebrand  See Gregory VII. 
Holofernes. tvrant, 145. 
~onorlus  ~u~ustodunenals- 
His treatise '  Summa Glor~a,'  103 
Tempor"1 author~ty  not pr~mlt~ve, 
but estabhshed by God,  104. 
Temporal authority must be obeyed 
by clergy as well as  la~ty,  104. 
Hoveden, Roger of- 
HIS  story of  H~chard  I.  makmg h~m- 
self vassal of  the Emperor Henry 
VI, 175, 176 
R~chard  I  summoned as  Elector of 
German Kmgdom, 176. 
Hugh, Kmg of  France- 
Letter wr~tten  In h~s  name by Ger- 
bert, assurlng Archbishop of  Sens 
that he proposed to govern w~th 
~dv~ce  and  Judgment  of  h~s 
fideles,"  148. 
Letter wr~tten  In his name by Ger- 
bert  to hmperor  of  13yzant1um 
recoenlslng  him  as Roman  em- 
peror,  177: 
Hugh, Abbot of  Flav~gny Urges differ- 
ence between lrmg and tyrant, prob- 
ably from St Is~dore,  133 
Hugh, Monlz  of  Fleury- 
Repud~ates  ~nd~gnantly  tlie  asser- 
tion  (probably  Gregory  VII.'s) 
that roval  author~ty  1s  not  of 
Statement of  heavenly  hierarchy, 
probably  der~ved  from  Gregory 
the Great, 98 (note 1) 
C~tes  both  St Paul  and  Gelasms, 
111 
Reproduces saylng of  Ambros~aster 
and  Cathulfus,  that  kmg  has 
Image of  God, b~shops  have that 
of  Chr~st,  111, 134 
Funct~on  of  kmg  IS  to mainta~n 
justice,  &C., 111. 
K~ng  has author~ty  over all b~shops 
In h~s  kmgdom, as Chrlst IS sub- 
ject,  not m nature but order, to 
the Father, 11  1. 
Even heathen rulers  must receive 
due honour,  134. 
Warns rulers that those who do not 
keep commandments of  God are 
wont to lose then power,  135. 
People  often  revolt  agamst  such 
kings,  135. 
d'Ibelm, Jean- 
Spec~al obl~gat~ons  of  vassal  to 
lord, 26,  27. 
Corol.at~on oath  of  Klng of  Jeru- 
salcm ; k~ng  swears  to  mam- 
tam law and justice, and men of 
kmgdom swear to ma~ntain  good 
usages and customs of  kmgdom, 
39. 
~ccbunt  of  orlgln  of  Ass~zes of 
Jerusalem,  43,  44. 
Falling  Ass~zes, Court  determines 
accorchng to custom and the pre- 
v~ous  dec~s~ons  of  Court,  44 
Ment~ons  Court for Syr~ans,  45. 
Mutual  obhgat~ons  of  lord  and 
vassal, 53 59 
These  are enforced  by  Court,  53- 
59. 
Breach of  these mvolves loss of  fief 
or servlce, 53. 
D~scusses compos~t~on  of  feudal 
court,  and  espec~ally  the place 
of  tlie lord In ~t,  54-56 
Method  of  enforcmg  dec~s~ons  of 
)Court upon the lord, 56-59. 
Sub-vassals  and  ~nhab~tants  of 
c~t~es  and  castles take  oath to 
ch~ef  lord, 77. 
"  L~gece  "  In  klngdom  of  Jeru- 
salem  only  due  to ch~ef  lord, 
77.  .  .. 
Form of  "  L~gece,"  77,  78. 
Sub-vassals  must support ch~ef  lord 
aga~nst  their ~mmed~ate  lord, un- 
less he refuses to do justice In h16 
Court, 78,  79 
Sub vassals must prevent then  lord 
domg  wrong  to the ch~ef  lord, 
78. 79 
~hlef  lord must protect sub-vassals 
agamst unlawful act~on  of  lm 
med~ate  lord, 79. 
Icelandic Sagas, 23. 
Innocent I,  Pope  Exercise of  just~ce 
upon  crlmmals founded upon  auth- 
or~ty  of God,  103. 
Inst~tut~o  Tra~anl- 
Reference to~t  by John of  Salisbury, 
141, 142 
Its ongln, 142 (note 1). 
Isadore, St, of  Sev~lle- 
D~st~nctlon  between  k~ng  and 
tyrant, 116, 126, 132. 
Probably  der~ved from  C~cero, 
126. 
James 11, of  England  Satd  by  De- 
clarat~on  of  R~ghts  to have vlolated 
the or~ginal  contract  between  kmg 
and people,  168 
John of  Sal~sbury- 
Author~ty  of  pnnce  comes  from 
God, 102. 
Funct~on  of  the prlnce 1s to maln- 
tam justtce  and law, 113. 
Prmce  sa~d  ,f.o  be  "  leg~s  nexibus 
absolutus  only  because  ~t  IS 
his  character  to  do  just~ce, 
113. 
D~stmct~on  between  prince  and 
tyrant,  127,  137,  138. 
Influence  on  h~m  of  Roman  law, 
140. 
Interpretat~on  of  ~ts  phrases about 
relation of  prlnce to law,  140. 
Nature and or~gln  of  law, ~ts  rela- 
t~on  to equ~ty,  141. 
Defin~t~on  of  th:  commonwealth de; 
rived from  Inst~tut~o  Tra~an~, 
141, 142 
Relat~ons  of  people  to ruler,  his 
theory  m  part  affected  by  St 
Augustme  and  St Gregory  the 
Great,  142, 143 
Mamta~ns  that  tyrants  have  no 
nghts agamst  people  and  may 
justly  be slam,  143-145 
Examples  of  the fate  of  tyrants 
fro~ri  Roman and Jew~sh  h~story, 
145. 
Influence of  class~cal  literature and 
h~story  on h~m,  146. 
Agreement  of  h18  pr~nolples  w~th 
those of  Ass~zes  of  Jerusalem and 
Manegold, 185. 
Jost~ce  et Plet '- 
Pr~nce  IS under the law, from wh~ch 
he  der~ves h~s  pr~v~leges,  38 
(note 1). 
Vassal  must  be  judged  In  Kmg's 
Court by hls peers,  63 
F~del~ty  to Kmg always reserved In 
hornago, 80,  83 
King  has plenary jur~sd~ct~onevery- 
whe~e  and always, 83. 
Kmg holds of  no one, 83 
Jul~an,  Emperor- 
Henry IV urges that Fathers had 
not  judged  or  deposed  him, 
though an apostate,  119. 
VOL. m. 
St Augustine cited by Imperlallats 
as affirmmg duty  of  obedience 
even to an unbel~eving  einperor 
l~ke  h~m,  122 
Just~ce- 
Its treatment in feudal law books, 
30 40. 
The pnnc~ple  which lies beh~nd  all 
authority, 32 37. 
Its relation  to law ~n feudal  law 
books,  37  40 
Is end of  polit~cal  author~ty,  106- 
114 
Justlce  and  law  necessa~y to 
pol~t~cal  anthonty, 125 146. 
To  govern  ju5tly  IS  to  govern 
accord~ng  to law, 126, 126 
W~thout  just~ce  there  18  no  lr~ng 
but only a tyrant, 126. 
Ma~ntonance of  just~ce the  first 
prmc~ple  of  medmval  political 
theory,  181, 182. 
Suprcma~y  of  law asembodlment of 
~ustlce,  183,  184 
Kmg- 
Theory of  D~v~ne  R~ght  of, 10. 
Contrast between Roman and Teu. 
ton~o  concept~ons,  11. 
Contempt  of  kmg  or  overlord  in 
feudal poet:y,  28,  29 
Kmg 1s only  selgneur dou dreit," 
32. 
Swears to mamtam law and just~ce, 
33 40 
He IS  V~car  of  God,  Bracton,  34, 
35,  68,  69,  85,  the  V~car  of 
Chnst,  W~ppo,  100,  109 ,  t~tle 
used In nmth centul  y,  115. 
He 18 the se~vant  of  Cod when  he 
does nght, of  tllo dev~l  when he 
does wrong,  35,  68,  73 
He is bound by the law,  35. 
He 1s under God and the law,  38, 
67. 
There  IS  no k~ng  where  w~ll  rulrs 
and not law, 38, 67 
Account  of  creat~on  of  monarchy 
by Beaumanoir, 49. 
People  to  restra111  the  k~ng  ~f 
refuses to do ~ust~ce,  52 
Vassals  to  rertlnm  the  K~ng  of 
Jerusalem ~f be does wrong,  62- 
69. 
Emperor  l~able  to be  judged  by 
Count Palatme, 61. 
Vassal  has r~ght  to mako war  on 
Kmg of  France ~f he ~cfuses  to 
do  h~m  justlco  In  h~s  Court, 
03,  72 
Bracton  co~rects m~sreprcsenta- 
t~ons  of  phrase  '' Quod prlncipl 
placet, &c ," 69 
Kmg has no equal or  superior  In 
Ills k~ngdom,  70. 
Kmg is like the least when he seeks 
just~ce,  71. 
N2 INDEX. 
Some mamtain, according to Brac 
ton, that ' Univeis~tas  regni et 
baronag~um  may  and  should 
correct 111s wrong act~ons,  71, 72 
Court 1s  kmg s superior, probably 
a  ~assaee  mteroolated In  Brac 
to;,  72 74 
Ev~l  king a tyrant, Bracton, 73 
Relat~on  between  kmg,  as repre 
sentmg the nat~on,  and feudal 
Ism.  78 86 
~illiam  the Conqueror requlres all 
landowners  to swear fidel~ty  to 
him.  76 
Sub vassals  of  kipgdom ,;f  Jeru 
salem must do  l~eece to k~ne  "  ., 
only, 77,  78 
F~del~ty  to king always reserved in 
England. France. and Lombardv 
In 8oing'homage;  79 81 
He has  full  jur~sd~ction  over  all 
persons  and in all causes in the 
judgment  of  all  feudal  jurists, 
81 85 
Qualit~es  of  a true king, according 
to Ratherins,  108, 127,  W~ppo, 
109,  128 , Hugh of  Fleury,  11  1 
King has image of  God, b~shop  that 
of  Chr~st.  Hueh  of  Fleurv.  111.  ,  W,  - 
134 
Greatness and dignity of  h~s  office, 
Manegold,  111, 112 
D~vine  r~ght  of  king,  115 124 
Dlstlnct~on  between  k~ng  and 
tyrant,  Manegold,  112,  136 , 
Berthold  of  Constance,  112, 
132.  John  of  Sal~sburv. 127. 
137 146  Tract  Ebor , f35 
Th~s  d~stinct~on  probably  der~ved 
through  St Is~dore  from Cicero,  . 1 
126 
The king governs accordmg to law, 
John of  Salisbury,  127, 128 
Revolters  against Henry IV  w~ll 
lng to obey h~m  if  he  governed 
accord~ng  to law  and  custom, 
130 133 
No  kingdom  where  there  1s  not 
r~ghtful  ordei,  133 
King represcnts the d~v~ne  naturc, 
priest  the  human  nature  of 
Christ, Tract  Ebor , 135 
Lambert of  Hc~sfeld- 
Oath of  alleg~ance  only b~nd~ng  to 
kmg who mamtains just~ce  ancl 
law,  113,  130, 131 
Demands of the Saxons and rliur 
lngians, 130 132, 155 157 
Distlnct~on  between  k~ng  and 
tyrant,  132 
Counc~l  of  prlnces have r~ght  to de 
termme luhtlce of  charge aga~nst 
Henry IV ,  157 
Lat~n  l~terature  Influence  of  ~ts  le  I 
v~ved  study  In  eleventh  and 
twelfth centuries,  146 
Law- 
Contrast between Roman and Teu- 
tonic concept~on  of its ongln, 11 
In  M~ddle  Ages, usually the Custom 
of  the country, 12 
Conception  of  ~t  m  feudal  law 
books, 30 86 
Rclat~on  of  law to justice,  30 40 
Reverence  for it in  M~ddle  Ages, 
31. 32 
1~111g is  bound  by  the  law  and 
under  it,  Bracton,  35,  38, 
'  Jost~ce  et Plet,  38 (note 1) 
No  king  where w~ll  rules and not 
law, Bracton, 38, 67 
Source of  law, accordmg to feudal 
law boolrq, 41 51 
Law pr~mar~ly  custom, Bracton, 41, 
42, 48, Beaumanoir,  42, Jean 
d Ibelin,  43 45,  Phihp  of  No 
vara, 45 , Glanvill, 42, 46 
Summa de legibus, 46 
Begmnmg of  conception of  legisla 
tion, 41 45 
Leg~slation  the  action  of  pnnce, 
great men, and people, 46 51 
Illustrated in Glanv~ll,  46 , Summa 
de leg~bus,  46, 47, Bracton, 48 
Position  of  Beaumanoir  w~th  re 
gard to thm, 48 51 
Dec~sion  of  courts to be  taken as 
law  In  kingdom  of  Jerusalem 
fa~lmg  the Ass~ze~,  44 
Importance  of  conception  of  laws 
as ' a populo conservati,"  47 
And  of  the customs of  those  con 
cerned.  47,  48 
Method  of  ma~ntenance  of  law  in 
feudal law books,  33,  52 71 
Place of  feudal court In this, 52 74. 
Ilamtenance of  law and justice the 
end of the state, 110, 113 
Pr~nce  sa~d  to be ' legis nex~bus  ab 
solutus  only  because  ~t 1s  h~s 
essential character to do just~ce, 
John of Sahsbury, 113 
Dist~nction  between  king  and 
tyrant  hes  In  relat~on  to  law, 
John  of  Salisbury,  127,  137 
140 
Laws  made  by  kmg,  great  mcn, 
and people In Empire,  149,  150, 
153,  154,  m  France,  154 
(note 4) 
fiupremacv  of  law as ombodlment 
of  lust~cc, the  second  great 
prlnc~ple of  med~reval political 
thco~~,  183,  184 
Leo V111 ,  Pope  I eople elect kmg but 
cannot depose h~m,  117 
Leo the Iconoclast, Emperor  Grcgory 
of  Catmo c~tes  the act~on  of  Oregory 
I1  In restra~n~ng  Ital~ans  from revolt 
uga~nst  him,  123 
'  Llber  Canonum  contra  Henr~cum 
qulrtum,  represents  supporters  of 
Henry  TV  as  bring~ng forward 
autlionty  of  St  August~ne  and  St 
Chrysostom  to  prove  wrongfulness 
of  h~s  excommunication,  121, 122 
L~berty- 
Natural condition of  human nature, 
3 
All  men  In  the  beginning  tree, 
Sachsensp~egel,  89  Beaumano~r, 
49, 90 
Contrary to God's  will and Scrip 
ture that one man should belong 
to another,  Sachsensp~egel  and 
Schwabensp~egel.  89 
LiBge- 
Letter in name of  clergy  of  Liege, 
by S~gebert  of  Gembloux,  122 
Wlckedncss  of  resistme  the  em 
peror,  122 
Llgece  See under Allegiance 
Lo:hair  I11 , Emperor  Constitut~on 
de  Feudorum  d~stract~one  made 
w~th  consent of  ereat men.  154 
Louis the PIOUS,  ~k~eror   HI^ dcpos~ 
tion  162 
Louis, St, Etablissements de- 
Mutual  obligations  of  lord  and 
vassal,  62. 
V~olat~on  of  vassal s  obhgat~ons 
enta~ls  loss of  fief, 62 
Refusal of  lord to subm~t  case be 
tween b~m  and his vassal  to the 
court involves  forfe~ture  of  ser 
v~ce,  62. 
Certain  offences agamst vassal  do 
the same, 62 
D~spute  between  kmg  and  vassal 
about  questions  concerning  hls 
ficf  must  be  dec~ded  by  court, 
including the vassal s pcers,  63 
If  king  refuses  to  do  ~ustice  to 
his  vassal  In  court,  vassal  can 
make war agamst kmg, and 2-11s 
sub vassals  must  follow  lum, 
63 
Lord- 
Concept~on  of  personal  loyalty to 
h~m,  !,9  29." 
"  Lady  or  Lol;d " only ' selg- 
neur dou clre~t, 32,  37 
Mutual  obl~gations of  lord  and 
vassal, 26, 53, 59 66. 
Quest~on  how far he was a member 
of  the feudal court, 54 56,  65 
Means  of  enforcing  dec15lon  of 
court aeainst him, 66 66,  71 74 
Loyalty, personal- 
An olement of  fcudal~sm,  and a new 
conce~tion  in  political  theory, 
21, 2f, 30 
Treatment in med~aeval  hterature, 
9A  04 
Magyars- 
Them invasions,  15, 75 
Their defeat by Otto the Great,  15 
Manegold of  Lautenbach- 
Office of  kmg is sacred  103, 161 
Exercise of  cnminal ju5tlce founded 
upon author~ty  of  God,  103 
Temporal power,  of  d~v~ne  origin, 
111, 161 
Der~ved ~mmediately from  the 
commumty,  111,  112,  163,  164, 
l fifi  --- 
Function  of  royal  author~ty  is  to 
mamtaln Jnstl~e,  112, 162. 
D~st~nct~on  between  k~ng and 
tyrant,  136,  164 
Pcople  under  no  obligat~on of 
obed~ence  to tyrant, 136, 164 
Exammat~on  of  h~s  political theoly, 
160 169 
Question  of  obligation  of  oath of 
alleg~ance,  163 166 
Nature  of  papal  autbor~ty  m  do 
claring ~t vo~d,  163 166 
The  contract  (  pactum ")  on 
which royal author~ty  1s founded, 
136, 166 169 
Ag~eement  of  his  princ~ples  w~th 
those  of  Assl~es  of  Jciusalem 
and John of  Sal~sbury,  185 
Marcus  Aurcl~us  HI~  just~ce and 
felicity,  145 
Nat~on  Relation  between  national 
eovernment and feudal system, 75 86  - 
Nature- 
Inst~tut~oils  of  society convent~onal 
not natural, according to Fathers 
and Stoics, 3, 4 
Bv  nature  all  man  are  free 
"and  equal,  Stoics and  Fathers, 
3 ,  Rathenus  Sachsensp~cgcl, 
Schwabensoiegel,  and  Beau 
manolr,  88- 91- 
Nero,  Emperor  The most  monstrous 
and wicked of  men, 145 
Nerva, Emperor  His just and happy 
rule, 146 
Normandy-  Supreme ]ur~sdiction  of  Duke over 
all causes and persons,  82 
All men bound by  hdellty  and al- 
leglance to prlnce alone m  Nor- 
mandy, 82 
Norsemen  llie~r  ~nvas~ons,  15, 75 
Novara, Ph111p of- 
Origin of  Assizes of  Jerusalem, 43 
Method  of  enforcing  decis~on  of 
court against lord  56 50 
D~scusses  relations  of  ch~ef lord 
and  sub vassals  m  same  terms  -,  -" 
Relat~on  to tribal loyalty, 28  I 
as Jean d Ibelm, 79 
D~fficult  to reconc~le  w~th  nat~ona 
Rome on account of  the outrae 
her,  167  I  of  Henry 1- 198  INDEX.  INDEX. 
Roman Law (Civil Law)- 
Its influence on political theory of 
M~ddle  Ages,  1 
Contrast between ~ts  conception of 
political authority and Teutomc, 
11 
Manegold d~scusses  the question of 
blndlng nature of  an oath, 163- 
166 
Olaf, King of  Norway  Letter to h~m 
by Gregory V11 ,  95 
'De Ordinando I'ont~fice '- 
Its  author a French Churchman, 98 
Crit~cises severely  Henry  111  s 
act~on  about Papacy,  98 
Den~es that  emperors  hold  the 
place of  Chr~st,  98, 99 
Maintains that they hold the place 
of  the  dev~l  when  they  shed 
blood,  99 
Othloh of  St Emmeran  Peace lmpos 
sible unless men are subject to each 
other,  107 
Otto 'I, Emperor- 
Victory over Magyars at  the Lech 
feld, 15 
HIS  Capitula  issued  at  Verona, 
along w~th  princes  and  people, 
149 
Otto 111 ,  Emperor  Annals of  Qued 
llnburg  speaks of  his coronation  as 
acclaimed by all Europe, 171 
Overlord- 
Contempt  for  h~m  expressed  In 
some feudal literature,  28, 29 
Relation  between  h~m  and  sub 
vassals, 75 86 
Papacy- 
Confl~ct  wlth Empire,  7,  16,  129 
Falls  under  tyranny  of  Roman 
nobles in tonth century, 16 
Rescued from them by  the Ottos 
and Henry 111, 16 
Pap~nian- 
Posslble influence  of  his defimtion 
of law  on feudal jurists,  47,  69 
(note 3) 
His definition of  law clted by John 
of Salisbury, 141 
Paul, St- 
Slavery an external cond~tion,  4 
His doctrine that all authority 1s 
from God,  100,  101,  104,  111, 
117,  123 (note l), 135 
Pav~a,  Council of, 1159 and l160  A  D - 
Documents  relating  to  disputed 
election to Papacy,  173 175 
Some of  them seem to set out the 
supremacy of  the Ernpro over 
the world, 173,  174 
Others make no such claim, 175 
Peter,  St  His command to obey  the 
hing,  102, 103, 104, 161 
l'eter,  Dam~an- 
Temporal  as  well  as  sp~rltual 
authority  (  Regnum  ac  qacer 
dotium ")  18  denved from  God, 
100, 101 
Funct~on  of  temporal authority is 
to maintain justice,  101 
Race of  men ruled by Papacy and 
Emplre,  172 
-- 
Spemal  Influence  on  Assizes  of 
Court of  Burgesses,  44, 45 
Influence on concept~on  of  legisla 
t~on,  45 
Poss~ble  Influence of  revlved study 
of  it on Beaumanon, 49,  51 
"  Consell  of  Pierre of  Vermando~s 
cons~sts  largely of  citations from 
it, 61 
Its  lduence on Glanvill, 46 
Its influence  on  Bracton,  35 37, 
67 69 
Speaks of  all kingdoms of  the world 
as subject  to Henry 111,  172, 
173 
In  another  place  he  speaks  of 
secular  author~ty  afi l~mited  to 
particular territories,  178 
Plerre de Fontalnes, Consell- 
Professes  to record the customs of 
the Vermandois, 6 1 
Cons~sts  largely  of  citations from 
Code and Digest, 61 
Court is  judge  between  lord  and 
vitssal  tln  cases  concerning  the 
fief, but not in other questions, 
61, 62 
Plato  Conception  of  social  contract, 
12 
Plutarch  Author of  '  Instltut~o  Trai 
ani,'  according to John of  Sallsbury, 
141,  142 
Property, pnvate- 
Conventional and not natural, ac 
oordlng to Stolcs and Fathers, 5 
Result of  greed, 5 
Created by the State, 5 
Almsgiving,  an act of  justice,  not 
chanty, 6 
Quedllnburg, Annals of  Phrases about 
relatlon of  Empire to Europe, 171 
"  Quod  prlnc~pl placet  legis  habet 
vigorem  '- 
Cited bx Glanx ill, 46 
Bracton  warns  agalnst  wrong  In 
terpretations of  thls,  68,  69 
'  Raoul de Cambra]'- 
Illustrates  conception  of  feudal 
loyalty, 24, 25 
Illustrates  contempt  for  overlord 
or klng, 28, 29 
Ratherius, Blshop of  Verona- 
HIS  concept~on  of  human equality, 
88,  89 
No  kmgsh~p  without  just~oe,  108, 
109, 127 
A  peasant  who  is  prudent,  juet,  -  brave,  &c,  may well  be  callod 
a king,  127 
Rau de Tabarle  Dlspute between him 
and Klng Amaun, 57 (note 1) 
Recogn~t~on  of  klng  See under  Elec 
tion 
R~chard  I,  Klng of  England- 
Story of  his subm~ss~on  as vassal to 
the  Emperor  Henry  VI,  175, 
176 
Said  to have  been  invested  wit11 
kingdom of  Arles by Henry V1 , 
176 
Roger of  HOT  eden- 
Relates that Ric~ard  I of  England 
accepted  posit~on  of  vassal  of 
Emperor Henry V1 , 175, 176 
Relates  that Henry  V1  inlestcd 
Rlrhard  I  with  lungdom  of 
Arles,  176 
Its  influence on John of  Salisbury, 
140, 141 
Romances, Arthurlan, 23 
Rome, ~ts  relation to medieval Empire, 
171 
Rousseau  Overthrow  theory  of  con 
x entional nature of  government, 3,  6 
Rudolph of  Suab~a- 
Letter to h~m  of  Gregory V11 ,  94 
Refuses in 1073 to be elected King 
of  Germany untll quest~on  of  de 
position of  Henry IV  had boon 
considered  by  all  the  prlnoes, 
1 K7 
..W, 
Election  as King  at Forehhe~m, 
1077,  158 
'  Sachsensplege1'- 
Klng when elected  must swear to 
maintain law, 40 
Vassal may wound or slay his lord 
in self  defence.  61 
Emperor  liable  to  judgment  of 
Count Ealatms, 61 
Klng  1s  gemene  rlchtere  ' over 
all men, 81 
When  king  18  present  all  other 
jurlsdictlons are superseded, 81 
Or~glnal  freedom of  all men, 89 
No  slaves when Germans first set 
tled in thou country, 89 
It 1s  not  In  accordance  with  the 
truth that one  man should  be 
long to another, 89 
Kmg  to  be  elected  by  the  Ger 
mona  1x7 
'  Schwabensptege1'- 
According  to  sorlpture  no  man 
should be e  slave (eigen sln), 89 
(note 3) 
slavery  Arose  from  force,  and  18 
now  according to law,  89 (note 
9\ 
"I 
Emperor  liable  to  judgment  of 
Count Palatine, 61 
All jud~c~al  authority founded upon 
election  153 
Seebohm  Roman  influence  on  Teu 
tonic ~nstitutlons,  11 
Seneca- 
Repudiates  inequality  of  human 
nature, 4, 89 
Men s bod~es  may be enslaved, the 
mind is free  4 
Government the result of  vlce, 5 
HI? concept~on  of  personahty, 7 
S~gebcrt  of  Gembloux- 
Letter wrltten In name of  clergy of 
Liege against Pope Paschal 11, 
122  --- 
Even ~f emperor ~as  wicked,  sub- 
jects must obey, 122 
Slax ery- 
A convent~onal  institution accord 
ing to Fathers, 3 
A  punishment  and  remedy  for 
human vice, aocordlng to  Fathers, 
4 
Ar~stotellan  concept~on  of  ~t,  4 
Its relation to natural law,  87 91 
Treatment  of  subject  In  Fathers 
and  Stoics,  89,  m  Sachsen 
sp~egel,  89, m Schwabenspiegel, 
89 (note 3), in Beaumanoir, 90, 
In Brarton, 90 (note 1) 
Social contract-- 
A medizval concept~on,  12,  13 
Anticipated in Plato s Laws,  12 
Feudalism In essence a system of 
contractual relat~ons,  74 
Constitutional  theory  and  social 
contra~t,  147  169 
Treatment of  sub~eot  by Manegold, 
160 169 
The agreement or ' pactum,"  164, 
166 169 
Relatio? of  this to,  Orig~nal  Con 
t~act of  the  Declaration  of 
Rights,  168 
Helatlon  to  soolal  contract '  ..." 
All judicial author~ty  founded upon  theorles  of  se~  onteenth  and 
elect~on.  153  /  eighteenth centuric  108.  185 
Saxons-  Sovereignty- 
Their  demands  in  revolt  against  Common  conception  of  this  hxs 
Henrv  IV.  113,  129 132,  155,  no  place  in  M~ddle  Ages  41,  ".. 
156 
Ihelr revolt  raised  quest~on  how 
far rcs~stance  to royal authority 
was ~onslstcnt  w~th  divine nature 
of  grant,  118,  119 
Actl\ e  pol~t~~al  speculaLion  and 
controversy  begins  with  their 
revolt,  129 
46 
Beginning of  conception in relet1011 
to legislation,  45 
L~m~ted  in  medlavnl  thcory  by 
justice  natural law,  and law of 
God,  46 
Beaumanoir s  use  oi  the  wo~d 
souverain,  50,  84 200  INDEX.  INDEX.  201 
dolng homage to a lord in Nor 
mandy, 79 (note 4) 
In last  resort  vassal  who  thlnks 
hlmself  wronged  can  renounce 
hls  fief  and  challenge his  lord, 
66 (note 1) 
Lord  In  same case  can  renounce 
homage and challenge hls vassal, 
66 (note 1) 
Sutr~,  Councll of  Deposition of  Popes, 
98. 99 
Spencer, Herbert  The pollae theory of 
the State, 6 
Spnitual llfe  Source of  conceptlon of 
~ts  ~ndependenoe,  6 9 
Splntual Power- 
Authority of, source of  the concep 
tlon,  6 9 
Expres51on of  thls  by  Pope  Gel 
WIUS I., 6. 
Treatment  of  the  prlnclple  by 
Clvlllans and Canomsts, 7 
Confllct with  Temporal power,  9, 
16 
Btate  See Authority, Pollt~cal 
Statuta et Consuetud~ues  Normama ' 
Duke of  Normandy  swears to main 
tam lustice and law, 40 
Stoics- 
Thelr ~ufluence  on medlaval polltl 
cal theory, 4, 89,  97 
Them conception of  personality,  7 
Stubbs, Blshop- 
Relatlon  of  anclent  to  Teutonic 
~nstltutlons,  10,  11 
Cltes account ot  Wllllarn the Con 
queror's  actlon  In  maklng  all 
landowners In England take the 
oath to hlm,  76 (note 1) 
'  Summa de Leglbus '- 
Law created to malntain order and 
~ustlce,  37 
"  Consuetudlnes " are customs ob 
served  from  anclent  tlme  by 
prlnce and people,  47. 
"  Leges  et a  populo  In  provincla 
conservate " made by pnnce, 47 
Fidellty to Duke always reserved In 
~~iin,-Klng  of  Denmark  Letter  of 
Gregory V11  to him, 95 
Swords, Two  Interpreted as polntlng 
to Papacy and Emplre by Fredenck 
I,  174 
Sylvester I1 ,  Pope- 
Authority of  man over man  arose 
from  transgression,  to  reatram 
hls unlawful deslres,  106 
Royal  authority  In  France  exer- 
cls?? wlth advice and judgment 
of  ficleles,  148 
HIS letter  recognlslng Emperor of 
Byzantium  as Roman empcror,  ."" 
Tarquin  HIS  expul-ton from Rome for 
the outrage on Lucretla,  167 
Temporal Power- 
Its ielatlon to Splrltual,  6 9 
Dlvlne nature and orlgln, 9, 10, 92 
105 
Its  function to maintaln ]ust~ce  and 
law, 106 114' 
Theory of  the  Divine Rlght,"  10, 
115 124 
Tentomc  prlnc~ples of  government 
Relatlon  to Roman,  10 12 
Theodonc,  Blshop  of  Verdun  Letter 
wrltten ~n hls name  by  Wenrlch of 
Trier,  119, 120 
?'hunngians  See under Saxons 
Tractatus Eboracenses '- 
Cltes Gregory the Great's letter to 
Emperor Maurlce, promlslng obe- 
dlence to his command, though 
he thought it wrong, 120 (note 2) 
Sets Temporal  power  hlgher  per- 
haps  than  any  other  wr~ter  ~n 
the Middle Ages, 135 
Prlests represent the human nature 
of  Chrlst, klngs the dlvlne nature, 
135 
Dlst&ngulshes  kmg and tyrant, 135 
Distlnctlon between the authority, 
whlch  1s  good,  and  the  roler, 
who may be evll, 135,  136 
Tr~bnr,  Councll  of  Electlon  In  1053 
of  Infant son of  Henry I11  on ~ondl- 
tlon  that  he  should  prove  a  good 
ruler,  151. 
Tyrant  See under Kmg 
Ill 
Seems to repudiate  clulm  of  Ger- 
mans to Roman emplre, 177. 
Syrlans  Court for them, In Jerusalem, 
adrmnistenng thelr own customs, 45. 
'  De unltate ecclesiae conservandu '- 
Author  posslbly Waltram, Blshop 
of  Naumburg,  109, 110 
Wrltten aeainst Hlldebrandlne tra 
dltion, 109 
Quotes  from  '  De  Civltate  Del,' 
Clcero's  doscrlptlon  of  law  and 
state  as  exls<ing to  malntaln 
justice,  110 
Contrasts conduct of  Oregory V11  -  wlth that of  Gregory the Great, 
120 
Cltes Glegory the Great's  phrases 
about  duty  of  submlsslon  to 
klngs,  121. 
Looks upon deaths of  Rudolph  of 
Suabia and Henry of  Luxemburg 
as examples of  God's judgment 
upon rebels, 121 
~ty  of  the world- 
Question of  importance of  the Idea 
In  Mlddle Ages, 2 
Conception of  a universal emplre, 
170 l80  .-- 
Concentlon  of  umtv  under  POD~. 
Vacarlus  John of  Salisbury's reference 
to h~m,  140 
Vassal- 
Personal loyalty to lord, 19 29 
Mutual  obhgations  of  lord  and 
vassal, 26, 27, 53, 62,  64, 66 
Fallure to dlscharge his obl~gatlons 
to h18 lord 1s treason,  53 
Involves forfeltwe of  fief, 53 
Fallure of  lord to dlscharge obllga 
tions  to vassal involves  loss  of 
servlce, 53 
Judge of  d~sputes  between lord and 
vassal 1s the court, 53 74 
Court is composed of  the vassals, 
54, 60,  63,  65, 71,  72 
Obligation  of  vassals  to  support 
each  other  m  malntainlng  their 
legal rights, and the deo~slons  of 
the courts,  56 59 
Vicar of  Chyt- 
Klng  gent  vlces " of  Chrlst  on 
earth, Bracton, 68 (nohe 2) 
Klng 1s vlcar of  Chnst, Wlppo, 100, 
i  na  -v" 
Vlcar of God- 
Kmg 1s  God's  vlcar,  Bracton,  34, 
35,  67, 68,  69, 73,  85 
The tltlc frequently used In  nmth 
century, 115 
Vlctor  Disputed  elect~on  to Papacy, 
173 
Vltellms, Emperor  HIE  murder,  145 
Waltz,  10 
Waltram, Bishop of  Naumburg- 
Po:sibly  the author of  the treatise 
De  umtate  eccleslae  conser 
vanda,'  110 
HIS  letter  to  Count  Louis  of 
Thunngla,  133 
Wenr~ch- 
Head of  the school at Trler,  119 
Afterwards Blshop of  Vercelll, 119 
Protests  agamst  deposltlon  of 
Henry IV. by aregory V11 ,  and 
hls  encouragement  of  German 
prlnces to revolt,  as being  con 
trary to law of  Clod,  120 
Cltes  Gregory  the  Great's  letter 
to  the  Emperor  Maunce,  120, 
162 
Urges  that  Ebbo,  Archbishop  of 
Rhelms, was depnved for taklng 
uart m  devosltlon  of  Louls the 
PIOUS,  161- 
Attacks Gregory V11  for absolving 
the subjects  of  Henry IV  from 
then oath of  allegiance, 163 
WAlham.  Abbot of  St Bemenus  Asserts 
that koman Emplre  I;  now  broken 
up,  177, 178 
Wllllam the Conqueror- 
Requlres all landowners in England 
to take  the oath  of  fidellty  to 
hlm, 76 
Letter of  Gregory V11  to hlm, 96 
Wlppo- 
Llfe of  Conrad the Salic, 100 
God  is  the  source  of  all  human 
dlgmty, 100 
King  1s  the vlcar  of  Chnst,  100, 
109 
Funct~on  of  the klng is to do ]us 
tlce,  109 
Kmg  must  hearken  to  the  law, 
for to keep the law  1s  to relgn, 
128 
Speaks of  Emperor  Henry I11  as 
"  caput mundl,"  172 
Worms  '  Pnvlleglum Imperatorls,'  in 
whlch  Henry  V  agreed  to  reslgn 
nght  of  lnvestlture  of  blshops wlth 
rmg and staff, 153 
Wurzburg- 
Council  of  prlnces  held  there  In 
1121, 159 
Declarat~on  that prlnces intend to 
settle  the  lnvestlture  question, 
&C., 169. 
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